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Military intervention in theory and practice: 
French policy in sub-Saharan Africa since 1960 
Abstract 
French military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa since 1960 has operated 
according to a bilateral dynamic independent of - although often influenced by 
and justified in terms of - global ideological or bloc alignments. It has been 
characterised by mechanical responses to perceived intervention stimuli. It has 
frequently disregarded international law and contradicted France's self-image as 
homeland and promoter of human rights. It reached its nadir as a result of 
French support for the genocidal regime in Rwanda. 
Accordingly, this study advances two principal arguments: French military 
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa has been driven by a unique French or 
Franco-African dynamic which has operated largely independently of global bloc 
politics and geostrategy; and the first failure of French intervention - in Rwanda 
from 1990 up to and including 1994 - marked a watershed in the practice, and the 
beginning of a military retreat from the continent more forced than voluntary. 
International Relations intervention theory has typically disregarded the Franco­
African interventionary system, although France acts in defence of its allies and 
interests as Realism tells us it will, in an interventionary sphere of influence 
comparable to that of the US in Latin America. This study considers France's 
legitimisation for its interventions through claimed derogations from the non­
intervention norm, and identifies France's unique interventionary dynamic 
which arose from its regular activation of mechanical responses to perceived 
intervention stimuli. 
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The context for these responses may be found in France's unique role in Africa 
since decolonisation. Throughout the Cold War, France was given carte blanche 
by the West to intervene in its exclusive African sphere, often in breach of those 
states' sovereignty. This derogation from international norms was made possible 
by the French-controlled creation of the new states to emerge from 
decolonisation, the sovereignty of which was deliberately circumscribed by 
military accords so that intervention frequently became an automatic feature of 
interstate relations along the Franco-African axis. 
This study's empirical focus - the uniqueness of this axis in the international 
system - was demonstrated by the continuity of French interventionary 
behaviour in the early 1990s, with no immediate change correspondent to the 
global shift in the balance of power and in the use and justification of military 
intervention. A perceived need to rework the legitimisation of French 
intervention only came about in 1994, during preparation for Operation 
Turquoise in Rwanda, following the first failure of intervention (and the collapse 
of a French-backed army and regime) in France's African sphere. Although the 
justificatory discourse of French military intervention was changed at this time to 
embrace a humanitarian agenda under a UN mandate, its practice changed - to a 
reluctant observance of the nonintervention norm - against France's will, and 
only as a result of the transformation since 1994 of the political and military 
environment in central Africa. 
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Preface 
The focus of this project, military intervention as the most explicit manifestation 
of France's enduring post-colonial involvement in Africa, was the result of 
numerous meetings and informal conversations with friends and colleagues at 
the University of Portsmouth, where I arrived with only the most general 
appreciation of Franco-African relations, and next to no knowledge of those 
states which, as the theatre of French interventions in Africa, were to be key 
aspects of this study. Research for this project, initially proposed in March 1994, 
was swiftly overtaken by Rwanda's 'dark Spring' of that year and the 
controversy which surrounded France's re-intervention there in June. Fieldwork 
in Rwanda in 1996 led me to question the relevance and value of doctoral 
research on military intervention in light of the scale of that country's suffering 
and the urgency of its post-conflict crises. It was only the resultant Za'irean war 
and overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko which seemed to demonstate that criticism 
of earlier interventions, from members of the academic community among 
others1 could help forestall further inappropriate interventionary responses. 
Many people have helped, in a variety of ways. Special thanks are due to (in 
Rwanda) M. Jean Carbonare, James-Bernard Bizimungu and family Froduald, 
Germaine, Mama Germaine and Frank (born 1995); Mr Denis Polisi, Secretary 
General and M. Vianney Ruyunbyana, Librarian, RPF secretariat Kigali; Mr 
Claude Dusaidi, Major-General Paul Kagame and his secretary Yvonne Karera at 
the Defence Ministry1 Mr Tito Rutaramera and M. Jacques Bihozagara; staff and 
students of the Universite Nationale du Rwanda and Faculte de Theologie Protestante 
de Butare, notably Philibert Kagabo and Elisee Munyamukweli; in Uganda, Hon. 
Grace Akello MP, Mr Dixon Kamukama and all colleagues in the Faculties of 
Arts and Law at Makerere University. 
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I would also like to express my gratitude to (in Nottingham), colleagues Dr 
Martin O'Shaughnessy and Professor Stephen Chan, and the libraries of the 
Universities of Nottingham and Nottingham Trent; Professor Richard Little of 
Bristol University and Professor Christopher Clapham at Lancaster; friends and 
colleagues at King's College London, notably Dr 'Funmi Olonisakin; Professor 
John Peel of SOAS and the African Studies Association of the UK; in Portsmouth, 
Professor Brian Jenkins, Dr Moussa Dieng, friends and colleagues; and above all 
Dr Tony Chafer, without whose guidance, support and saintly patience, this 
project would never have seen completion. 
On a more personal note, I would like to express my love and thanks to my 
family and especially my wife Alexandra, who was most frequently exposed to 
the variable pressures on time and personality the prolonged completion of a 
thesis entails. 
And for what it may be worth, I would like to dedicate this project to the 
Bizimungu and Munyakayanzi families of Nyamirambo, Kigali, and to those 
family-members, victims of their country's recent crises, whom I could not meet. 
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MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: 
FRENCH POLICY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SINCE 1960 
Introduction 
An abundant literature, including recent volumes of memoirs and interviews by 
former eminences grises of France's African policy-making Guy Penne1 and the 
late Jacques Foccart2, allied with a shift in official discourse most apparent in the 
public pronouncements of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin3 and Foreign Minister 
Hubert V edrine, offer together an impression that France, in light of priorities 
transformed not least by the pace of European integration, is reworking its 
relationship with Africa. The passing of the generation represented by Foccart, 
former president Mitterrand, and key clients Houphouet-Boigny and Mobutu on 
the one hand, and the accession to power in France of a new, post-decolonisation 
generation of liberal technocrats - embodied by Jospin inter alia - on the other, 
have provided observers with apparent proof of an evolution in Franco-African 
relations. This most special north-south axis will henceforth, it is suggested, be 
characterised more by partnership than patronage, more by democracy than 
dictatorship. 
A key element in this hypothesis, which links most recent retrospectives and 
reassessments, is that France's apparent new objectivity in Africa, its attempted 
restructuring of relationships both military (reduction in strength of permanent 
garrisons, reluctance to intervene militarily) and economic (devaluation of the 
CFA franc) in its once jealously-guarded sphere of influence, is entirely 
voluntary. By this reckoning, the process results from new priorities in Paris, 
' Guy Penne, Memoires d'Afrique (198 1 - 1998): Entretiens avec Claude Wauthier, Paris: Fayard 1999 
2 Jacques Foccart, Foccart Parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995 
(Tome I), 1997 (Tome II) 
3 See especially Lionel Jospin, 'Evolution generale de la politique de defense de la France' , Defense 
nationale, November 1998, pp5-20 
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where Europe is seen as the natural amphitheatre for French rayonnement 
(exemplified, for example, by former Health- and Humanitarian Action minister 
Bernard Kouchner's appointment in 1999 as UN administrator for Kosovo) . 
Africa at one extreme is considered a burden to be shared with fellow­
Europeans; at the other, it is boasted of as if by parents proud that the French­
fostered states of the pre earn� (now again taken to refer exclusively to France's 
former colonies) have achieved a level of political and economic maturity and/ or 
democracy sufficient to allow them to find their own way in the world. Some 
forty years since the beginning of formal decolonisation, France may now retire, 
satisfied at a job well done. 
In contrast, it is intended here to offer a countervailing analysis, to the effect that 
France's apparent disengagement from Africa, in its current limited form, is not a 
voluntary policy-shift, but is instead retreat, involuntary retreat, dictated by 
African circumstances - particularly the emergence of new regional powers -
over which France has lost control. This loss of control and dimunition of 
influence may be attributed to a number of factors. Within tropical Africa, the 
end of the Cold War part-inspired the rise of civil society and liberal parties 
opposed to 'Big Men' dictatorships and the institutionalised clientelism (what 
Jean-Fran<;ois Bayart has called la politique du ventre/ of sclerotic regimes kept in 
power partly by external powers responding to perceived Cold War imperatives. 
The same decade since 1989 has seen the coming-of-age in tropical Africa of a 
new generation, better educated and travelled than their parents, who most 
importantly did not know colonial rule and did not serve in French uniform in 
defence of an unknown mere-patrie. 
This loss of influence has been partly explained by the 'Anglo-Saxon conspiracy' 
theory of Franco-American rivalry in contemporary Africa, which has become 
4 Jean-Fran�ois Bayart, L'Etat en Afrique: La politique du ventre, Paris: Fayard 1989 
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common currency in much French thinking5• However, the breakdown of 
traditional (and always inaccurate) labelling of African states as 'francophone' 
and 'anglophone' is hastened by the media and internet-fuelled dominance of 
English as a global vehicle of communication faute de mieux. And African 
attitudes to France have been profoundly affected by the growth of explicit 
racism and intolerance in France itself, demonstrated by the State during the 
forcible eviction in 1996 of hunger-striking Malian sans papiers from the Parisian 
church of St-Ambroise where they had sought sanctuary, and their subsequent 
expulsion on military planes. 
It will be argued here that French interventionary practice from 1960 to 1990, 
including its first intervention in Rwanda, was driven primarily by a mechanical 
interventionary response, typically in tune with but operating independently of 
Cold War imperatives. As we shall see in Chapter 4, France was assisted and 
applauded by the US in its Chadian and Zairean interventions, which were 
perceived as key elements in Western containment of Soviet penetration and/ or 
Libyan expansionism; but these interventions were driven in the first instance by 
French geo-strategic priorities and determined by the unique bilateral dynamic 
of Franco-African relations - here support for client regimes. Although they 
chimed with US interests at the time, they were not conducted at the Americans' 
behest; the very idea would have been anathema in Paris. France, as its African 
policy-makers repeatedly insisted, understood Africa; and while it suited, this 
was accepted by the US and others as the Monroe Doctrine a la franr;aise.6 Indeed, 
5 The 'Anglo-Saxon conspiracy' has been analysed recently by Asteris C. Huliaris, 'The "anglosaxon 
conspiracy": French perceptions of the Great Lakes crisis ' ,  Journal of Modern African Studies 36:4 ( 1 998) 
pp593-609 
6 Max Hilaire makes the observation in respect of the US' assertion of its right to intervene in its hemisphere 
- the 'Monroe doctrine' - that: ' [T]he relationship is a hegemonic one, operating under a different set of rules 
independent of international law, that the United States will assert a right to intervene in the affairs of its 
neighbours if their policies are not consistent with US regional or global strategy;  and that the US will 
disregard international law and invoke regional doctrines to justify its actions ( . . .  ) The . . .  cases . . .  demonstrate 
the conflict between international law on the one hand, and regional norms, power politics and political 
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former US Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen told the Quiles 
Commission that he was: ' [T]res etonne de la theorie d'un complot anglo-saxon 
contre les inten�ts de la France qui ne correspondait a aucune realite . . .  Les Etats­
Unis ont toujours reconnu le "pre carre fran<;ais" en Afrique comme un element 
positif, que n'etait pas contraire aux inten�ts americains.'7 
However by 1990, although global geopolitics had changed, French policy in 
Africa had not. France under Mitterrand pursued an African policy 
indistinguishable from that of the previous three decades - to the extent that 
despite the efforts of some reformers, notably Mitterrand's first cooperation 
minister Jean-Pierre Cot/ Foccartian-style networks, particularly those developed 
by Mitterrand's son and African policy advisor Jean-Christophe, again became 
key factors in the Franco-African equation. A key to understanding the failures of 
French African policy during the 1990s may be found in France's own criteria ­
announced by the late President Mitterrand in his address to the 1990 Franco­
African summit at La Baule - making aid conditional on progress towards 
democratisation. These conditions were never applied in practice, and by 1993, 
the notion of linking aid to political reform or human rights observance had been 
superseded by a more pragmatic discourse favouring 'democratisation a vitesse 
variable'. With Cold War security imperatives gone, French interventions no 
longer chimed with Western global geo-strategy, and many non-French 
observers failed to understand why France felt it necessary to intervene. By the 
mid-1990s, the US and others - Canada, Japan and Scandinavian countries - were 
no longer content to leave French economic influence unchallenged. At the same 
doctrines on the other. They further illustrate how international law can be manipulated to advance the 
foreign policy goals of a major power. ' 
Hilaire, Max, International Law and the United States Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere, The 
Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International 1997, p. viii 
7 Assemblee nationale, Mission d'information commune Rapport no. 1 27 1 ,  Enquete sur la tragedie rwandaise 
(1990- 1994), Paris 1998, Tome I: Rapport, p3 1 
8 Cot described his brief experience as Cooperation Minister, and offered some insights into the workings of 
what Fran<;:ois-Xavier Verschave would later call la Fram:;afrique, in Jean-Pierre Cot, A l'epreuve du 
pouvoir. Le tiers-mondisme pour guoi faire?, Paris: Seuil 1984 
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time, African commentators began writing of a second decolonisation, freed from 
the dead hand of Cold War-backed dictators, and inspired by successful 
insurgencies in Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea9, as well as by the example of 
largely peaceful regime transition in eastern Europe. 
All of these factors have contributed to an involuntary diminution of France's 
standing in Africa. But the key turning point, central to this study, was France's 
failure in the mid-90s to recognise and respond to dramatically changed 
circumstances in those parts of the expanded pre carre it knew least well: the 
former Belgian territories of Zaire (a Belgian colony), Burundi and Rwanda 
(Belgian protectorates under League of Nations and latterly UN mandate) . It was 
Rwanda which would become, by some assessments, France's African Vietnam. 
France's militarisation of and complicity with an extremist, sectarian regime even 
while that regime planned and implemented genocide, failed to prevent the 
overthrow of that regime - the first-ever defeat for a French-backed army and 
administration in Africa - and discredited French African policy domestically, in 
the region and internationally to the extent that its interventionary hands were 
tied in 1996 when, as it feared, the dominoes of the pre-carre began to fall to 
insurgents hostile to France. The effects of this have been multifold; most 
recently, following a military coup in the Comoros islands on 30 April 1999 
which overthrew the administration of President Tadjidine Ben Said Massonde 
(installed following a French military intervention in 1995), a spokesperson at the 
Quai d'Orsay 'ruled out' intervention on that occasion.10 
To summarise, it will be argued that French military intervention in sub-Saharan 
Africa since 1960 has operated according to a bilateral dynamic independent of -
9 For succinct accounts of the insurgencies in Ethiopia and Eritrea, see Christopher Clapham ed. ,  African 
Guerrillas, London: James Currey 1998. For accounts of the Ugandan NRA insurgency, see: Clapham 1998; 
Y.K. Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, London: Macmillan 1997; and Godfrey Ondoga ori Amaza, 
Museveni's Long March, Kampala: Fountain 1998 
10 Paul Webster, 'Army coup on Comoros islands' ,  The Guardian 1 May 1999 
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although often influenced by and justified in terms of - global ideological o r  bloc 
alignments. It has been characterised by mechanical responses to perceived 
intervention stimuli. It has frequently disregarded international law and 
contradicted France's self-image as homeland and promoter of human rights. It 
reached its - logical and in many ways forseeable - nadir as a result of its support 
for the genocidal regime in Rwanda. 
Theoretical framework 
It may be argued that IR intervention theory typically fails to account for the 
Franco-African interventionary system, although France acts in defence of its 
allies and interests as Realism tells us it will, in an interventionary sphere of 
influence comparable to that of the US in Latin America.11 It may be useful at this 
point to explain the tension suggested in this study's title between theory and 
practice of military intervention. One of the earliest volumes on the topic this 
century, Ellery Stowell's Intervention in International Law (1921), concluded in an 
Idealist age that: 'For generations it has been the custom of governments to 
justify their recourse to force before their nationals, and it will be no small 
guarantee of the observance of the law when governments understand that their 
explanations and excuses must stand the test of reason - by which is meant 
unprejudiced examination of the alleged grounds of action in all the states of the 
world' .12 This study will consider France's legitimisation and claimed 
derogations from the non-intervention norm, and identify the unique French 
11 Richard Little notes (in reference to JLS Girling, America and the Third World: Revolution and 
Intervention, London 1980) that: 'The United States has established a world-wide network of interlocking 
interests which are designed to promote American security and prosperity. As a consequence, the [US] has 
developed entangling patron-client relationships with a large number of governments around the world. The 
problem is that there is no "threshold" between involvement and intervention. Confronted by domestic 
instability in a client state, the [US] has found itself enmeshed in the task of securing a client's survival.' 
Richard Little, 'Recent Literature on Intervention and Non-Intervention' in Ian Forbes & Mark Hoffman 
eds . ,  Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention, Basingstoke: Macmillan 1993, 
pl7 
12 Ellery C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, Washington DC: John Byrne & Co. 192 1 ,  p458 
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interventionary dynamic which arose from France's regular activation of 
mechanical responses to perceived intervention stimuli in Africa. 
Thereafter, it is intended to consider the perceived contemporary shift in 
intervention theory which has seen 'humanitarian intervention' move centre· 
stage as a major dynamic of post-Cold War IR legitimisation. The purpose here 
will be to extract from the contemporary debate its essential argument regarding 
intervention. This argument comprises a growing acceptance of, and indeed 
demand for, intervention, facilitated by a decline of state sovereignty (and hence 
of the inviolability of frontiers) as an absolute concept, and by a corresponding 
erosion of the non-intervention norm. The key paradox here is that respect for 
state sovereignty, a core principle of international law, is incompatible with the 
right (and in the case of genocide, the obligation under the 1948 Genocide 
Convention) to intervene to defend human rights. The implication for future 
practice is that, if state sovereignty is no longer paramount, it is to be expected 
that there will be more frequent recourse to intervention. However, it will be 
argued that intervention in the 1990s has also been characterised by an attempt to 
marry the public demand and media-fuelled imperative for ostensibly 
humanitarian interventions (the 'something must be done' syndrome), with more 
traditional concerns for economic and strategic interests, the latter often 
dissimulated behind the former. (This will be discussed as a case study in 
Chapter 6, in the context of Operation Turquoise. The theoretical context will be 
the focus of Chapter 1 . )  
As a case study, however, French military intervention in Africa necessitates a 
consideration of the specific bipolar axis along which it operates. France's regular 
activation of a mechanical response to a perceived intervention stimulus may be 
explained in light of France's exceptional role in Africa since decolonisation. In 
his most recent collection of essays, Stanley Hoffman writes of the current 
15 
international system, 'in which, long after decolonisation, the failure of the 
colonizers to prepare adequate state institutions for the peoples they had 
dominated, and the failure of many of the leaders of the newly emancipated 
peoples to build such structures, have led to violence and disintegration.'13 
However, it will be argued here that the emergence of weak, client states and 
dictatorships in francophone sub-Saharan Africa was not the result of the former 
colonists' failure to prepare elites and institutions to govern in their image, but 
rather a deliberate policy - 'withdraw the better to remain' - to ensure those 
states would remain dependent on the colonial (or neo-colonial) power. Pierre 
Biarnes, in Les Franc;ais en Afrique Noire, de Richelieu a Mitterrand describes the 
deliberate retention of French influence in Africa, what he calls 1a presence 
maintenue', which is seen by Biarnes and the majority of French observers as an 
essential prerequisite for the stability of francophone African states which have 
seen massive demographic growth since independence (from 30 million to a 
projected 120 million at the turn of the century) unmatched by economic 
development. The infrastructure and basic services of those states, notably the 
payment of civil service salaries, has been possible only through massive and 
sustained French assistance in terms of aid and personnel (cooperants). 14 From 
the early 1960s, there was consensus in the West that a French-managed bloc 
would be an efficient means, indeed the only obvious means, of retaining these 
new and potentially radical African states in the pro-Western (or at least not 
actively anti-Western) camp. Accordingly, France was given carte blanche 
throughout the Cold War to intervene in its exclusive African sphere, where the 
statist paradigm (which deemed sovereignty paramount and borders sacrosanct) 
did not apply.15 This derogation from international norms was made possible by 
the French-controlled creation of the new states to emerge from decolonisation, 
13 Stanely Hoffman, World Disorders, Lanham, Maryland & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 1998, p.viii 
14 Pierre Biarnes, Les Franc;ais en Afrique Noire, de Richelieu a Mitterrand, Paris: Armand Colin 1987, p356 
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the sovereignty of which was circumscribed by military treaties and accords, and 
where intervention became an automatic feature of interstate relations along the 
Franco-African axis. The creation of this interventionary sphere will be discussed 
in Chapter 2.  
Practice: Mechanics of French military intervention 
Debate on French intervention within the political and military establishment has 
tended to focus on issues of practicality and power projection rather than on 
morality or intervention's legal-political effect. Indeed, the initial raison d'etre of 
recently-emerged pressure groups - notably the Observatoire permanent de la 
cooperatioon franraise and Agir Ici/Survie - has been to provoke debate within 
France, amongst the public and parliamentarians, on the nature and effect of 
French power in Africa in its various manifestations, most obviously military. 
The commission chaired by Socialist deputy Paul Quiles in 1998, four years after 
the start of the Rwandan genocide, was the first such parliamentary 
consideration of French African policy, and we will conclude by considering 
whether this marks, as has been claimed, a new era in which parliamentary 
checks and balances will exert unprecedented control over policy-making on 
Africa. In Chapter 3, it is intended to consider the generality of French military 
interventions and the chain of cause and effect - from the intervention stimulus 
to the intervention response - which leads to the deployment of troops. 
This study's empirical focus - the uniqueness of the Franco-African axis in the 
international system - was demonstrated by the continuity of French 
interventionary behaviour in the early 1990s, with no immediate change 
correspondent to the global shift in the balance of power and in the use and 
justification of military intervention. A perceived need to rework the 
legitimisation of French intervention, it will be argued, only came about in 1994 -
15 See for example Richard Hodder-Williams, An Introduction to the Politics of Tropical Africa, London: 
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Operation Turquoise in Rwanda - following the first failure of intervention in 
France's African sphere. Although the justificatory discourse of French military 
intervention was changed in 1994 to embrace a humanitarian agenda under a UN 
mandate, its practice - a reluctant observance of the non-intervention norm - was 
only altered (and against France's will) by a transformation of the political and 
military environment in central Africa. 
Other studies of external military involvement in post-colonial Africa have 
focused on the Cold War as the context and rationale for the phenomenon. The 
only study which specifically considers external military intervention in Africa is 
Keith Somerville's Foreign Military Intervention in Africa (1990); the only 
significant work focusing on French power (as distinct from 'cooperation' and 
development aid) on the continent is John Chipman's French Power in Africa 
(1989). These volumes overlap by just one chapter each; Somerville only 
considers French involvement in his fourth chapter ('The war in Chad: France 
and Libya fight it out'), and Chipman deals with French military power only in 
his fifth. Both works were written in the last years of the Cold War, and since 
that time only two monographs have dealt specifically with French military 
intervention in Africa: Alain Rouvez's  Disconsolate Empires16 (in which France is 
considered as one of three interventionary powers along with Belgium and 
Britain), and Inger bsterdahl's La France dans l'Afrique de l'apres-guerre froide: 
Interventions et justifications (1997) . 17 
Considering the three decades from decolonisation to his time of writing (in the 
late 1980s), Somerville notes that: Many of the wars fought since 1960 have not 
just been between competing African states or rival movements within states, 
Unwin Hyman 1984, Chapter 7: 'African States and the External World' 
16 Alain Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-Colonial 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Lanham: University Press of America 1994 
17 Inger bsterdahl,  La France dans I' Afrique de l ' apres-guerre froide: Interventions et justifications, 
Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 1997 
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they have also involved outside powers, whose presence has escalated, 
prolonged and frequently prevented the conclusion of the conflicts'. 18 Inevitably, 
his overview is shaped by the Cold War, and he groups together interventions ­
by 'the Belgians, UN forces, the French, the British, the Cubans and the Israelis'19 -
into conflicts which Christopher Clapham has since sought to classify separately 
as wars of decolonisation, secession, reform (internal opposition to dictators), 
and 'warlord' insurgencies. Indeed, Clapham's 1996 monograph Africa and the 
International System: The Politics of State Survivaf0 and 1998 collection African 
Guerrillas21 offer a clear analysis of the key post-Cold War shift, whereby the 
legitimacy (and international tolerance) of African insurgencies has grown as the 
effectiveness of states has declined. Valuable here is Clapham's diagnosis of some 
common characteristics of insurgencies: they derive from blocked political 
aspirations, and are only likely to be undertaken in 'extreme political conditions' .  
This provides a useful foil to those commentators who deliberately confuse 
'warlord' and 'reform' insurgencies in order to dismiss all African revolts as 
driven solely by a scramble for loot. 
Chipman's chapter, 'French Military Power and Black Africa since 1960', draws 
on his influential 1985 Adelphi Paper, French Military Policy and African Security. 
In both, he supports the explanation of French African policy, common to much 
of the literature on the subject, that Africa has been an essential prerequisite of 
France's maintenance of medium power status on the superpower-dominated 
world stage: 
[A] medium power must be able to exert control or influence in places where 
no other power can do quite the same. To compensate for an incapacity to 
exert influence in all parts of the globe, as would a superpower, a medium 
" Keith Somerville, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa, London: Pinter Publishers & New York: St 
Martin's Press 1990, p.IX 
19 ibid 
2° Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: 
CUP 1996 
21 Christopher Clapham, African Guerrillas, London: James Currey 1998 
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power, such as France, must try to preserve for itself a certain exclusive 
influence in a region.22 
Chipman concludes that French militarism is an essential underpinning of 
France's influence, and of French power, in Africa, without which France might 
soon be no more influential than the other former colonial powers, or its 
presumed arch-rival on the continent, the USA. By this logic, as we intend to 
argue, any diminution of French military power must also mark a reduction of 
French power generally, and if that decline may be shown to be involuntary, 
then the diminution of French power becomes retreat. 
In conclusion, it will be argued that although IR intervention scholars have not 
used the Franco-African interventionary system for empirical support, it can 
serve as a useful case study for the following reasons: France acts in defence of its 
allies and interests as Realism tells us it will, but a consideration of France's 
legitimisation - its derogations from the non-intervention norm - allows us to 
identify a unique French interventionary dynamic which outlived the end of 
bipolarity, and was only altered by its failure in a changed African environment, 
shaped by newly-assertive regional powers, post-1994. 
22 John Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, Adelphi Paper no.201 ,  London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1985, p l  
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Chapter I: Theory of military intervention 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the theory of military intervention. It is 
intended to proceed from definitions of intervention to an analysis of the non­
intervention norm (as encapsulated by international law in Article 2 of the UN 
Charter), and derogations from that norm, i .e. the most frequent justifications 
offered by intervenors. These derogations typically include intervention with the 
consent of the target state and by invitation; intervention justified by treaty; 
counter-intervention; intervention in self-defence, including protection of the 
intervenor's nationals; and humanitarian intervention, both 'old style' (which 
overlaps with self-defence to imply protection of the intervenor's and its allies' 
nationals) and 'new style', by which is understood intervention to protect a 
threatened population against its own government in cases of massive violations 
of human rights/ and which, in a consideration of recent French practice, may be 
traced to the French-promoted concept of the droit d'ingerenci. A degree of 
overlapping is common in intervenors' justifications of their interventions, and 
contrasts with the clarity with which intervention is prohibited by international 
law. Indeed, it has been argued that: 'State practice is confused: at first sight, 
justifications properly concerning internal conflicts (such as consent) are usually 
intermingled with justifications typical of international conflicts (such as self-
1 This is the definition of humanitarian intervention, as an acceptable derogation from the nonintervention 
norm, offered most recently by Stanley Hoffman in World Disorders :  Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War 
Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 1998. Interestingly, the Australian-led intervention in East 
Timor in September 1999 has been justified and granted UN-sanction as a humanitarian imperative, 
although it could also have been legitimsed as counter-intervention, i .e. a legal armed response to 
Indonesia 's  occupation and annexation of the territory. Such a claim, however, would have been opposed by 
Indonesia, and would also have highlighted the inconsistency and belatedness of the international response; 
to be counter-intervention, it should have happened in1975. 
2 See especially Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein, Droit d' ingerence ou obligation de reaction: Les possibilites 
d'action visant a assurer le respect des droits de la personne face au principe de non-intervention, Brussels: 
Editions Bruylant, Editions de l 'Universite de Bruxelles 1992 
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defence or the protection of  nationals abroad) . '3 
Intervention will be discussed as a general phenomenon in this chapter. 
Subsequently, Chapter 2 will explain the historical context and the geopolitical 
theatre of France's interventionism, and Chapter 3 will, before we move on to 
specific case studies (Chad, Zaire and Rwanda), discuss the pattern of French 
interventionary practice over 30 years, from 1960 to 1990. It is intended here, 
therefore, to establish firstly the international norms prohibiting intervention, by 
which to identify the exceptionality of France's African interventions. Secondly, 
through considering common derogations from these rules of nonintervention, it 
is hoped to establish a framework through which to consider the permissibility 
of intervention in general, and of French intervention in particular. The chapter 
will conclude with an assessment of the current debate on humanitarian 
intervention in light of post-Cold War attempts, including those of France, to 
reinvent military intervention as a manifestation of humanitarianism while 
creating a new role for the armed forces .4 
Definitions of intervention 
International Relations generally characterises intervention as endemic and 
ubiquitous in world affairs5, 'the propensity displayed by states for intervening 
3 Antonio Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993, p10 
4 This structure is intended to mirror that of the concluding two chapters of this study, where France's first 
two interventions in Rwanda (Operations Noroft and Amaryllis) were justified by the full range of 
traditional or 'old-style' legitimisations, but were followed, subsequent to what will be termed the 1994 
watershed in French interventionary legitimisation, by the adoption by France of new-style 'humanitarian' 
legitimisation for its third Rwandan intervention (Operation Turquoise). 
5 See especially: M. Janowitz & J. Van Doom eds., On Military Intervention, Rotterdam: Rotterdam 
University Press 1971; RJ Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1974; Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, London: Martin 
Robertson 1975; Hedley Bull ed. ,  Intervention in World Politics, Oxford: OUP 1984; Peter J. Schraeder ed., 
Intervention into the 1990s: US Foreign Policy in the Third World, Boulder CO & London: Lynne Rienner 
1992; Ian Forbes & Mark Hoffman eds. ,  Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of 
Intervention, Basingstoke: Macmillan 1993; Ariel E. Levite, Foreign Military Intervention, New York: 
22 
in one another's domestic affairs [being] a persistent feature of the international 
system'/ to the extent that intervention has been declared a 'subject [which] is 
practically the same as that of international politics in general from the beginning 
of time to the present'.7 
Despite the phenomenon's ubiquity, we may begin its identification from a 
familiar starting point, the dictionary definition which covers 'any interference in 
the affairs of others, especially by one state in the affairs of another', and which 
in the age of globalisation could be expanded to include practically all 
international interactions, political, economic, and cultural.8 It has therefore 
proved easy to confuse intervention as it is commonly understood - the Good 
Samaritan's impulse to help one's distressed neighbour - with intervention as 
used by states and state proxies (mercenaries, clients etc.) to further national 
interests. This confusion is often deliberately fomented by intervenors in an 
attempt to conceal prosaic economic, political or geostrategic interests m an 
altruistic wrapping of reluctant obligation or humanitarianism. It is the 
contention here that our case study - French military intervention in sub-Saharan 
Africa - fits this model. The authors and actors in France's interventionary 
sphere have always claimed to act in defence of the distressed, the weak and the 
legitimate; while its interventions have invariably been driven by perceptions of 
French interests which, although they sometimes matched Western interests in 
general, were sufficient in themselves to trigger intervention. Despite multiple, 
Columbia University Press 1994; Andrew Dorman & Thomas Otte, Military Intervention: From Gunboat 
Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention, Aldershot: Dartmouth Press 1995 
6 Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, London: Martin Robertson 1975, pl5  
7 Stanley Hoffman, The Problem of  Intervention' in Hedley Bull ed. ,  Intervention in  World Politics, Oxford: 
OUP 1984, p7 
8 Martin Shaw, arguing the centrality of global society, suggests that states are so interlinked as to render the 
traditional concepts of sovereignty and nonintervention irrelevant: 'In terms of economy, culture and even 
politics . . .  , the sovereignty of territorially-bounded nation-states is in crisis. When a state intervenes 
externally to its own territory, it enters society which in these more fundamental senses is already linked in 
a million ways to society within its own borders. When a state is intervened upon by other states, its society 
is already l inked in all sorts of ways to society in the intervening state or states'. Martin Shaw, 'The Global 
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multi-layered justification, French intervention in Africa, it will be argued, has 
never been disinterested or altruistic, and has never benefited the people (as 
distinct from the elites) of the intervened state. 
Our understanding of intervention therefore is that identified by Hedley Bull, for 
whom intervention was 'dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside party 
or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state'.9 Other common 
definitions are mutually reinforcing: 'Forcible interference, short of declaring 
war, by one or more powers in the affairs of another power'; 'Coercion short of 
war' . 10 Intervention therefore is dictatorial or coercive interference, dictatorial 
because it is undertaken without the consent of (at least some of) the intervened, 
coercive because it is achieved through force, i.e. militarily. Hence for our 
purposes, intervention equals military intervention. Theorists concur that: 
'[T]here is a preference for restricting the concept to military activity. This move 
is often justified on the grounds that such a limitation is consistent with the 
manner in which the word is commonly used with reference to events in 
international politics'.11 
The collection of essays edited by Hedley Bull from which this definition is 
drawn (and in which France enjoyed what its author, Dominique Mo'isi, called 
the 'dubious honour' of being the only non-superpower to merit a chapter on its 
interventionism12) concludes that: '[I]ntervention in the sense of coercive 
interference by outside parties in the sphere of jurisdiction of a state is an 
State and the Politics of Intervention', paper presented to the BISA annual conference , University of 
Warwick, 1 6  December 1993 
9 Hedley Bull in H. Bull ed., Intervention in World Politics, Oxford: OUP 1984, p 1  
10 JE Hare & Carey B .  Joynt, 'The Ethics of War' in Lawrence Freedman ed., War, Oxford: OUP 1994, 
p 1 82 
11 Richard Little in Ian Forbes & Mark Hoffman eds., Political Theory, International Relations and the 
Ethics of Intervention, Basingstoke: Macmillan 1993, p16  
12 Dominique Moi'si, 'Intervention in French Foreign Policy' in Hedley Bull ed., Intervention in World 
Politics, Oxford: OUP 1984, p67 
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endemic or built-in feature of our present international arrangements' . 13 Theory 
of intervention has therefore been shaped by this sense of centrality, and also by 
a prevailing Realist - i.e. power-based - presumption that intervention has always 
been, and will continue to be, endemic in the absence of a world government able 
to enforce a prohibition on the practice. Indeed as early as 1921, when a 
generation of interwar Idealists sought to create such a government and a set of 
rules by which states would be bound, Ellery Stowell declared that: 'No subject 
in the whole range of man's relations merits a more careful consideration than 
does the question of the justice of international intervention' .14 
Most usefully for our purposes, Stowell starts with a rule governing 
interventionary behaviour, i .e. determining the only circumstances where 
intervention is permissible, by which to judge the actions and justifications of 
intervening states. From this legalist perspective, a simple and readily verifiable 
benchmark emerges: 'Intervention in the relations between states is . . .  the rightful 
use of force or the reliance thereon to constrain obedience to international law.t15 
Accordingly, all other recourse to intervention is illegal: ' [A]ll the other just 
grounds of intervention can be discovered and defined so that all states of good 
will may give heed to the law and cooperate to check the transgressions of the 
evil-doer' .16 
To the late twentieth century reader this formula seems pitifully naive; but it 
does offer a useful starting point. It might have been assumed that Idealists 
would advocate unequivocal support for a ban on intervention. However, faced 
with breaches of international law or convention, Idealists could support a moral 
imperative to intervene (approving the US intervention in World War I, 
advocating intervention by Britain and France in the Spanish Civil War etc.) . A 
13 Hedley Bull ed., Intervention in World Politics, Oxford: OUP 1984, p 1 8 1  
14 Ellery C .  Stowell, Intervention i n  International Law, Washington DC: John Byrne & Co. 192 1 ,  p.v 
15 Ellery C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, Washington DC: John Byrne & Co. 1921 ,  p.vi 
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world war later, Idealists Eleanor Roosevelt and Rene Cassin sought to have this 
imperative enshrined, in response to the Holocaust, in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention's obligation to intervene to prevent a recognised genocide. This 
Idealist belief in counter-intervention to defend democracy, or more recently, 
human rights - in 1930s Spain or 1990s Yugoslavia - often leads to a call for 
interventionary action from sources otherwise opposed to power politics. 
However, Stowell offered an important caveat: ' [T]he decision as to the justice of 
the grounds of intervention or non-intervention in any particular instance must 
in a democracy be determined by the prevailing opinion of its citizens. Each 
citizen, therefore, bears his part of this supreme responsibility'.17 
Certainly, intervention may be limited, constrained or abandoned as a result of 
popular will, generally understood to mean 'public opinion', itself shaped by 
media, party-political and pressure-group opinion-formers whose motives are 
not always disinterested. This is more apparent if the intervenor suffers 
casualties: the speed of the US and French withdrawal from Lebanon in the 
1980s, of the US and others from Somalia in 1992, and of the first UN Assistance 
Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR I) in 1994 (following the murder of ten Belgian 
troops), testifies to the power of this 'home front' pressure.18 That intervention is 
not always cost-free for the intervenor was a lesson learnt by both of the Cold 
War's superpowers. When by 1970 the Vietnam war turned definitively against 
the US as a result of media and public pressure at home coupled with stalemate 
on the battlefield, Urs Schwarz19 offered the following recipe for successful 
intervention; it should be: 
. . .  conceived as a strategy to limit the use of armed force and to keep events 
16 ibid 
17 Ellery C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, Washington DC: John Byrne & Co. 1921, p.63 
18 Hence the quest for the 'clean war ' ,  i.e with no casualties for the intervenor; Mark Danner notes that 
'Kosovo represents the grail which American leaders have been seeking for decades: the politically cost­
free war ' .  Mark Danner, 'Kosovo: The Meaning of Victory' ,  The New York Review of Books XL VI: 12, 15 
July 1999, p54 
19 Urs Schwarz, Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World, New York: Oceana Publications 1970 
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under the control of the actor in its pursuit of its national goals. It involves an 
act by a powerful state in relation to one much weaker; it is intended by the 
intervenor to vindicate a rule or principle or pattern of politics, morality, or 
law; it is aimed at the structure of political authority in the target society 
which it seeks either to change or to protect against a change imposed by 
others; it represents a sharp break with the pre-existing attitudes and 
behavior of the intervenor; and it is limited in character, scale and time.20 
But in the absence of significant casualties or irrefutable evidence of abuses by 
the intervenor (both factors instrumental in the West's failure in Somalia), there 
is little evidence of popular will, as distinct from politicians' caution, sufficient to 
prevent intervention. This factor is particularly relevant to our study of French 
policy, where thirty years of interventions in Africa provoked little public debate 
- or parliamentary scrutiny - until charges of French complicity through its 
interventions in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. 
The decision to intervene, therefore, is one taken by rulers, not peoples, and 
intervention is conducted by states .  For Clausewitz, resort to the military 
instrument by the state was a rational policy option, one deeply embedded in 
political judgements. For Morgenthau, politics is about the pursuit of power, and 
the use of the military instrument by the state is one means of developing that 
power. Accordingly, the study of military intervention is defined as 'deeply 
rooted in the most traditional aspects of the study of international relations and 
security studies, connected with states, their motivations (national interests, the 
exercise of power and the development of security), and their relations (through 
balances of power)'.21 Realism argues that in a bipolar balance of power system, 
as obtained from 1945 to 1989, instability within the international system is 
minimised by the threat of war. But the balance of power is not equipped to 
contend with instability within a state; such instability undermines the power of 
2° Foreword by Milton Katz to Urs Schwarz, Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World, New 
York: Oceana Publications 1970, pp.v-vi 
21 Stuart Croft & Adrian Treacher, 'Aspects of intervention in the South' in Andrew Dorman & Thomas 
Otte eds., Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention, Aldershot: 
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that state and creates an area of uncertainty in the international system. If the 
unstable state falls within the sphere of influence of a hegemonic state, which 
perceives that the uncertainty is undermining security or stability within its 
sphere, then the hegemonic state will intervene. Similarly, and pertinent for any 
examination of Franco-African relations, Richard Little has stated that: 'When 
there is a high level of interaction between two states, the decision-makers in one 
must respond to the emergence of civil war in the other'22; France's response to 
perceived crises in African states has invariably been interventionary (including, 
as we shall make clear, cases of deliberate nonintervention where intervention is 
expected) .  Intervention may also be used by strong states as punishment, in 
defence of perceived rights - to pride and prestige - which are in fact enjoyed 
only by those states, i .e. those strong enough to exercise military force with near­
impunity against another state.23 
However while Realists would defend the right of powerful states to intervene in 
order to maintain the international balance of power, to assure the stability of a 
sphere of influence, or to safeguard other perceived strategic or economic 
interests, they would be quick to invoke sovereignty and international law to 
avoid unwanted interventionary commitments .  By this logic, states do not 
intervene for ideological, sentimental, moral or other non-power reasons. If an 
actor fails to intervene, and retrospectively it can be shown that such a policy 
would have been advantageous, this apparent rectitude cannot be attributed to 
an acceptance of the non-intervention norm; states make reference to the norm 
only as a diplomatic device. Indeed, by June 1999 there had been no satisfactory 
Dartmouth Press 1995, p 1 36 
22 Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, London: Martin Robertson 1975, p.x 
23 Stowell tells how, in the 19'h century, 'Lord Elgin recognised the criticism which his act [burning the 
Chinese dynasty' s  Summer Palace] would arouse, but considered that it was impossible in any other way to 
bring home to the Chinese the superior force at the command of the Europeans and their ability to command 
respect for their rights' (Emphasis added). Could such considerations have been entirely absent from the 
minds of NATO strategists during the Spring of 1999? And to reinforce his point, Stowell offers us an 
interesting sense of historical continuity: 'A more recent example of drastic action was the French 
bombardment of Casablanca in 1907 in punishment for the treatment of Europeans in that place' . 
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explanation, except one of bald Realism, for the inconsistency whereby massive 
intervention in Yugoslavia (albeit at 15,000 feet) was justified to prevent 
violations of human rights in Kosovo, but had not been justified in Russia during 
that state's war against secessionist Chechnya in the mid-1990s. It is evident 
therefore that strong powers, and especially nuclear powers, are not subject to 
intervention. Hence there could be no intervention in Chechnya, or Tibet, or 
indeed Northern Ireland, to protect those states' populations against human 
rights abuses by their governments. As there can be no intervention by militarily 
weak powers in the affairs of a strong state should large-scale repression take 
place within the latter's borders, especially if that state is one of the Security 
Council's permanent five, it may be argued that there can be no consistent 
criteria for humanitarian intervention. Moreover, such intervention, to be legal 
(which NATO's aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia was not) would require the 
mandate of the UN Security Council, on which each permanent member enjoys a 
right of veto. Accordingly, there could never be legally-sanctioned intervention, 
no matter how morally imperative, against one of the Security Council 
permanent five. By the same logic, in the absence of counterintervention by 
another strong state, there might appear to be few constraints on the same 
permanent five intervening at will in the affairs of other states. 
Given the identifiable biases of the dominant Realist paradigm of power politics -
a focus on northern hemisphere (or 'Great Power') relationships, and its statist 
'billiard ball' model of international relations - Richard Little identified the 
central weakness of the Realist analysis of intervention: 'From the power 
politician's perspective, intervention is just another manifestation of the fact that 
"weak" states must submit to the power possessed by "strong" states. 
Intervention, therefore, does not warrant special attention; it is encompassed by a 
general theory of power.'24 Bull agrees that, by his own definition: 'If intervention 
24 Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, London: Martin Robertson 1975, p.ix 
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is dictatorial interference by outside powers in the sphere of jurisdiction of a state 
or independent political community, and this is inherently something that is 
done by the strong to the weak, then it does indeed make sense to seek the chief 
illustrations of it in our times in the relations between the advanced industrial 
states . . .  and the states of the so-called Third World.'25 Should it be concluded 
from this that legal prohibitions on intervention have proved useless?; or simply 
that because such prohibitions can only be enforced by strong states, those strong 
states are only subject to these prohibitions de jure and not de facto? 
It is important in this context to consider the variable nature of the state. If we 
agree that intervention only happens in weak states, we should also consider 
postcolonial states which by their nature are weak - economically, politically and 
militarily - and hence susceptible to intervention.26 Stanley Hoffman points out 
that: 'Many of these [post-colonial] states are remote indeed from the model of 
unitary and rational players that realists . . .  had described as the basic units of the 
international system . . .  The new states were often states in name only and, within 
borders artificially drawn by colonial masters, certainly not nation-states'.27 For 
Hoffman, these states represent the 'floor' of unworkable states (the ceiling being 
developed states pooling their sovereignty through economic blocs (EU) and 
globalisation), and points out that: ' [M]any of the formerly colonized, nonaligned 
or developing countries . . .  remain suspicious even of collective interventions, 
both because of the prominent role played by the major powers, with their 
imperialist past, in promoting such enterprises and because most of the cases of 
25 Hedley Bull ed. ,  Intervention in World Politics, Oxford: OUP 1984, p 135 .  Earlier in the same volume, the 
central paradox was spelled out: that ' . . .  under the influence of Third World majorities in the political organs 
of the United Nations, legal prohibitions of intervention have multiplied; on the other hand, interventionary 
activity of one kind or another is so widespread that it is sometimes said to be endemic or 'structural ' in 
nature.' Ibid p5 
26 On the crisis of the African state, see especially Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International 
System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: CUP 1996, and Leonardo A. Villal6n & Phillip A. 
Huxtable eds., The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration, 
Boulder CO & London: Lynne Rienner 1998 
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intervention in domestic wars have occurred in Africa, Asia, or Latin America 
and affected small and poor states'.28 Hence intervention is something that the 
strong do to the weak, and its application is therefore inconsistent. 
Accordingly, it might be supposed that left-leaning 'Development' and 
'Dominance-and-Dependence' theorists (eschewing the arguably inappropriate 
label 'Marxist' in the pre-industrial African context) would condemn all 
interventions as coercion of the weak by the strong. Such theory typically argues 
that: 'The decline of the nineteenth century empires during the first two-thirds of 
the twentieth century was dramatic, but it did not imply that the processes of 
dominance and dependence had disappeared. In fact, it was possible to discern a 
distinctive process of "underdevelopment" which consolidated the continuing 
dominance of the centre at the expense of the periphery'.29 Anti-colonialist 
theorists have viewed issues of intervention along north-south (or even south­
north) lines, perpendicular to the axes of 'international institutions' or the West­
East balance of power upon which the perspectives of the northern hemisphere's 
Idealists and Realists, respectively, have been centred. Moreover, if imperialism 
is the highest stage of capitalism as Lenin argued,30 then military intervention is 
inherent in a perceived neo-imperial world order; Bull notes that: 'The Leninist 
or neo-Leninist theory of imperialism or dominance and dependence encourages 
us not merely to recognise a high incidence of intervention by the advanced 
capitalist states in the affairs of Third World countries but also to see 
intervention as systematic or structural in nature, a built-in feature of present 
arrangements.'31 
27 Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield 1 998,  p 1 54 
28 Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield 1998, p 1 72 
29 Richard Little & Michael Smith eds., Perspectives on World Politics 2nd edn., London & New York: 
Routledge 199 1 ,  p9 
30 V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, New York: International 1939 
31 Hedley Bull, 'Intervention in the Third World' in H.Bull ed. ,  Intervention in World Politics, Oxford: OUP 
1984, p 1 35 
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One of the anti-imperialist texts which most inspired the leaders of the 1980s-
1990s 'New African Political Order' is Waiter Rodney's How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa32• President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has described 
Rodney's influence on students at Dar es Salaam University in the late 1960s, 
many of whom were to become influential in African politics in subsequent 
decades: 
At Dar es Salaam University we found a very good political and intellectual 
atmosphere with a lot of modernist revolutionary thinkers such as Waiter 
Rodney . . .  We became exposed to new ideas and this gave us a very good 
chance to become familiar with pan-Africanist and anti-colonialist ideas, the 
most dramatic of which was the exposure to the role imperialism had played 
in distorting socio-economic development in Africa. This played a large part 
in focusing our own political outlook as far as internal and external issues 
were concerned. We had previously had a vague nationalist feeling but it now 
took definite shape because it was backed by a coherent ideological outlook.33 
The exposure to radical ideas of this generation was to prove key to events 
discussed throughout this study, and to their potential outcome. For many anti­
imperialists, interventionary activity among 'weak' (i.e. developing) states - what 
might be termed 'horizontal intervention' (Tanzania's intervention in Uganda, 
Vietnam's in Cambodia, or even, arguably, the more recent Nigerian/ECOMOG 
intervention in Sierra Leone and Uganda-Rwanda's in the former Zaire) - could 
be accepted and even applauded as morally imperative. 
In a post-Cold War development of Bull's theory, Croft and Treacher argue that: 
'Intervention is important in understanding the security politics of the South 
but . . .  this is only true if intervention is defined in a wide sense; it is not enough to 
32 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Dar es Salaam: Tanzanian Publishing House 1972; 
and Washington DC: Howard University Press 1982 (revised edition). An imporant collection of essays by 
several of those inspired by Rodney and now influential in ' new generation' African politics, including 
Museveni, former Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie leader Prof. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, 
and OAU Secretary-General Salim A. Salim, is Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem ed., Pan Africanism, London: 
Pluto Press 1996 
33 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, London: Macmillan 1997, p24 
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explain the high levels of violence by applying Northern interpretations of 
intervention, as these only have a limited relevance in the South.'34 They examine 
three ideal types of intervention in the South: Regional Power Intervention, 
Humanitarian Intervention and Internal Intervention. Interestingly, they treat 
intervention in the South as a phenomenon apart which cannot be adequately 
assessed through the distorting prism of Northern-centric intervention theory, 
which implies, as Bull does above, that intervention is primarily something that 
the North, the strong, does to the South, the weak. Seeking to broaden the use of 
the term, they argue that intervention in the South cannot be solely attributed to 
the action of state against state, but should also be taken to mean the intervention 
of military force into political discourse. Significantly, in suggesting that: 'If 
intervention is to be a useful tool in a broader approach to Security Studies, 
especially in the South, its definition must move beyond the inter-state levet and 
consider intra-state dynamics'/5 they venture the conclusion that 'traditional 
patterns of conflict, although perhaps exacerbated or minimised by the effects of 
the Cold War, were not dependent on the East-West confrontation for their 
existence . . .  [T]he Cold War and its termination has not been the vital variable in 
assessing military intervention in the South.'36 
And our case study - French policy in Africa - indicates that intervention does 
not represent a sharp break with pre-existing attitudes and behaviour (according 
to Schwarz's 'ideal intervention' criteria above); rather it demonstrates a pattern 
of behaviour so well-established as to become mechanicat i.e. decided without 
consideration of the uniqueness of each case, or without the checks and balances 
34 Stuart Croft & Adrian Treacher, 'Aspects of Intervention in the South' in Andrew Dorman&Thomas Otte 
eds., Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention, Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Press 1995, p l 35 
35 Stuart Croft & Adrian Treacher, 'Aspects of lntervention in the South' in Andrew Dorman&Thomas Otte 
eds., Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention, Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Press 1995, p153  
36 Stuart Croft & Adrian Treacher, 'Aspects of Intervention in the South' in Andrew Dorman&Thomas Otte 
eds., Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention, Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Press 1995, pp153- 154 
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presumed normal in the decision-making processes of a democratic state. 
Mechanical intervention implies a singularity in the relationship between the 
intervenor and the intervened; rather than an extraordinary deviation from 
normal behaviour, intervention becomes a routine response to crisis, becomes, in 
the French term, 'banalised' (banalise) . 
This is particularly pertinent to a consideration of French interventionary 
activity, where the supposed conceptual shift which has led to the current debate 
on humanitarian intervention was not apparent until France's belated 
assumption of the humanitarian mantle in 1994. Moreover, this phenomenon 
seemed short-lived given the apparent reversion to type of French interventions 
after Rwanda, in the Comoros and the Central African Republic. Consideration 
of legitimisation is essential to allow this study's subsequent assessment of the 
validity and effectiveness of French attempts to invoke humanitarianism to 
justify its own interventions, which were driven by a specifically French set of 
motives. 
Identifying intervention 
To establish a working definition of intervention, it will be useful to identify its 
principal characteristics, and to establish whether intervention may readily be 
recognised as such when it happens, or whether it is easily concealed. How then 
do we know an intervention is taking place? Is it simply when the armed forces 
of one state enter the territory of another? Frederic Pearson concludes that: 
'Foreign military intervention is defined as the movement of troops or military 
forces by one independent country . . .  across the border of another independent 
country, or actions by troops already stationed in the target country'.37 Similarly, 
Thomas Otte defines military intervention as 'overt military activity, i.e. the 
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organised and systematic physical transgression of recognised state borders. '38 
Accordingly, Otte goes on to offer a seemingly definitive definition of the 
phenomenon: 
Military intervention is the planned limited use of force for a transitory 
period by a state (or a group of states) against a weaker state in order to 
change or maintain the target state's domestic structure or to change its 
external policies; it is the continuation of politics with the limited addition of 
means of military force in order to re-establish the normal pattern of bilateral 
relations by forcing the opponent into compliance. Military intervention is a 
rigid instrument that does not leave any room for concessions to be made to 
the intervened and that embraces the risk of escalation.39 
So the movement of troops from one state to another, say from France to 
Germany as part of NATO exercises, does not constitute intervention as it is by 
invitation, does not seek to influence the target state's internal or foreign policies, 
takes place in the absence of internal conflict and is unopposed by any party 
within the host state (which can only be classed an 'intervened' state if such 
troop movement is coercive, i .e. opposed by a party to a conflict within that state; 
however in this example, the German Greens and anti-militarist groups might 
argue that such manoeuvres are in fact opposed by significant numbers of the 
host state's citizens, and the presence of foreign troops and weapons, especially 
nuclear, does diminish their sovereignty and right to self-determination). 
Accordingly, to be intervention as we understand it here, it must be coercive, and 
hence can only be something that the strong (or at the very least the stronger) do 
to the weak. Bull explains that: 'A basic condition of any policy that can be called 
interventionary in this sense is that the intervener should be superior in power to 
the object of the intervention: it is only because the former is relatively strong 
37 Frederic S. Pearson, 'Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes ' ,  International Studies 
Quarterly 18 :3 ,  September 1974, p261 
38 Thomas Otte in A. Dorman & T. Otte eds., Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to 
Humanitarian Intervention, Aldershot: Dartmouth Press 1995, p4 
39 Thomas Otte in A. Dorman & T. Otte eds., Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to 
Humanitarian Intervention, Aldershot: Dartmouth Press 1995 , p10 
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and the latter relatively weak that the question arises of a form of interference 
that is dictatorial or coercive.'40 
Hence movement of troops across a border and into another state's territory 
becomes intervention when it is coercive. But, from certain legalist perspectives, 
such intervention only becomes 'internationally relevant' when it breaches 
international law; Antonio Tanca notes that: 
[A]lthough the crossing of one State's boundaries by the armed forces of 
another State is generally of international concern (and attracts the 
application of the rules on international conflicts), in cases of internal conflict, 
it is the status of the fighting factions and their alleged power to request an 
intervention which is considered to be relevant.41 
This implies an international legal prohibition on intervention, Vincent's 'legalist 
paradigm'. What is it, and what are its effects and implications? For some 
analysts, intervention is limited to cases when there is 'blatant use of military 
force in another country' but where resistance is not sufficient to constitute war. 
However, all analyses of intervention take as a starting point the theoretical 
notion that sovereignty is inviolate, equally applicable to all states weak or 
strong, and is the defining principle of the international order: what is known as 
'the nonintervention norm.' 
The nonintervention norm 
This concept, the focus of Little's and Vincent's mid-1970s studies, is based on 
state sovereignty, which is not inviolate.42 However, both authors suggest that 
40 Hedley Bull, Introduction' in H. Bull ed., Intervention in World Politics, Oxford: OUP 1984, p l  
4 1  Antonio Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993, p9 
42 Hoffman notes that: 'The case against military intervention has a hard core: it is the defense of the norm 
of sovereignty, cornerstone of the interstate order since the seventeenth century . . .  The sovereign state is 
deemed to be the protector of the security and property of its subjects, as in Hobbes' Leviathan; or the 
guardian of their rights, as in John Locke and John Stuart Mill ;  or the expression of the collective will ,  as in 
Rousseau. Even if, in practice, the state is one that violates some of these rights, assaults the security and 
property of some of its subjects, and lacks a "general will" because of a clash of antagonistic group wills 
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actors in the international system will seek to re-establish the norm, either 
through restoration of the original system or through system transformation.43 
The typical starting-place in the search for a norm of nonintervention is the 
Idealist catechism, which elevates international law as a means of determining 
norms of international relations. International law offers simple, some would 
argue simplistic codes of right and wrong by which to judge the actions of 
international actors, primarily states.44 Except for very select, special 
circumstances, not all of which are universally accepted by international legal 
experts, intervention by one state into the affairs of another state for the express 
purpose of changing the latter's policies or conditions is flatly prohibited by 
international law. The cornerstone of this prohibition is Article 2, paragraph 4 of 
the United Nations Charter, which prohibits 'direct, overt aggression capable of 
objective and persuasive proof', and states that: 'All members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. '45 If we agree that 
intervention is 'dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside party or parties, 
in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state,'46 or 'forcible interference, short 
of war, in the affairs of another power'/7 it is a violation of sovereignty, and 
therefore illegal. Belatchew Asrat, in his comprehensive studies of Article 2(4), 
emphasises that: 'The Article interdicts not only war but also the illegal unilateral 
that tear the society apart, foreign intrusion is still seen as a greater evi l . '  Stanley Hoffman, World 
Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 1998, p158 
4 3  'The nonintervention norm is premised on the assumption that a clear distinction can be drawn between 
domestic and international politics. Its accompanying metanorm sustains this distinction, but indicates that 
the boundary of the nonintervention system must be redrawn in the event of civil war, changing the point of 
equilibrium in the system to include a third actor. ' Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in 
Civil Wars, London: Martin Robertson 1975, p58 
44 'The traditionalist literature has always acknowledged the complexity and ambiguity associated with 
intervention. To resolve the problem of definition, traditionalists have tended to rely on the formulation of 
intervention provided by international lawyers. It follows that intervention is seen in normative terms, 
representing a deviation from the norm of non-intervention. '  Richard Little, 'Revisiting intervention: a 
survey of recent developments ' ,  Review of lnternational Studies 13 ( 1987), p5 1 
45 Article 2( 4) , Charter of the United Nations, New York: UN Dept. of Public Information 
46 Hedley Bull, 'Introduction' in H. Bull ed. ,  Intervention in World Politics, Oxford: OUP 1984, p1  
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threat and use of force by States in their relations.'48 
Article 2(4) was subsequently reinforced by the UN Definition of Aggression 
enshrined in General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) . Although this norm of 
nonintervention as expressed by the UN Charter initially appears of little value 
for assessing much interventionary activity - 'objective and persuasive proof' of 
'direct, overt aggression' often proving elusive - it does, according to Christopher 
Joyner, entail 'a minimum condition for public order and has come to be 
regarded as the core provision of the Charter with respect to the use of force. '49 It 
will be necessary to assess the validity of this norm applied universally, before 
using it to measure French interventionary activity, and thereby establish the 
uniqueness of the French case. 
Derogations from the nonintervention norm 
To what extent is Article 2(4) binding? It appears incontrovertible that a state's 
violation of Article 2(4) through an act of intervention would constitute an act of 
aggression, unless legitimising circumstances could be convincingly 
demonstrated. Any breach of the prohibition on intervention would, by this 
analysis, depend on the ability of the intervenor to portray its actions as the 
exception to its normal behaviour in the international arena, and to claim 
legitimising circumstances to justify this deviation which might, if recurrent, 
form a code of accepted derogations from the nonintervention norm. The forms 
these derogations may take will be considered now, while bearing in mind two 
questions to be addressed in Chapters 2 and 3: did France's African interventions 
1960 to 1990 represent the exception or the rule of its behaviour along the Franco-
47 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Harmondsworth 1979, px 
48 Belatchew Asrat, Prohibition of Force Under the UN Charter: A Study of Art. 2(4), Uppsala: Iustus fi:irlag 
199 1 , p37 
49 Christopher C. Joyner in Peter J. Schraeder ed. ,  Intervention into the 1990s: US Foreign Policy in the 
Third World, Boulder CO & London: Lynne Rienner 1992, p23 1 
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African axis?; and until 1994, was there any need or popular clamour for France 
to demonstrate legitimising circumstances for its frequent interventions, in 
France, internationally, or indeed to the intervened? 
Intervention by invitation 
Where there is consent by the intervened - as in cases of intervention by 
invitation - there is not coercion and hence no intervention according to the 
definitions we have considered. What remains unclear is who is in a position to 
give consent. In most cases where a strong patron state is invited to intervene by 
a weak client, the representative credentials of the client are at best 
questionable.50 Joyner allows for intervention 'in response to an explicit, wilful 
invitation by the legitimate government of a state'; but what if the incumbent 
government is illegitimate and/ or unable to exercise jurisdiction over all its 
territory? Need that state's sovereignty be respected? To return to the essential 
criteria for military intervention offered earlier - troops crossing borders -
Michael W alzer is swift to qualify his own assertion of the primacy of 
sovereignty - 'the only way we have of establishing an arena within which 
freedom can be fought for and (sometimes) won' - by questioning the 
inviolability of borders such sovereignty implies: 
[T]he ban on boundary crossings is not absolute - in part because of the 
arbitrary and accidental character of state boundaries, in part because of the 
ambiguous relation of the political community or communities within those 
boundaries to the government that defends them . . . .  [I]t isn't always clear when 
a community is in fact self-determining, when it qualifies, so to speak, for 
nonintervention.'51 
50 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has predicted that the UN would follow the example of the 
Organisation of African Unity which, at its July 1999 summit in Algiers, refused to accept military coup­
leaders as legitimate heads-of-state; Reuters reported: 'Annan said [the OAU] "in a welcome change from 
an earlier era", insisted that governments which came to power through unconstitutional means "could no 
longer expect to be received as equals in an assembly of elected heads of state. I am sure the day will come 
when the General Assembly . . .  will follow Africa's lead, and apply similarly stringent standards to all its 
members". '  Anthony Goldman, 'Annan predicts UN will one day snub coup leaders' ,  Reuters 30 September, 
1999 
51 MichaelWalzer, Just and Unjust Wars, London: Penguin 1980, p89 
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However, Antonio Tanca argues that the intervenor is under an international 
obligation to all states (and not just to the potential intervened state) to recognise 
sovereignty as an objective principle: 
[T]he very validity of the rule concerning the exclusive right of the incumbent 
government to express consent to a foreign intervention, and the claim that 
such an intervention is by definition outside the scope of Article 2(4) is in need 
of validation ( . . .  ) The crossing of a State's borders by the armed forces of 
another would suffice to breach the obligation toward the other members of 
the international community, since its object is simply to prohibit the use of 
armed force outside one's own territory. The consent or invitation of the target 
State would certainly be capable of precluding the wrongfulness of the 
conduct of the "attacking" State, but only in their bilateral relations; that 
conduct would remain wrongful vis-a-vis all other members of the 
international community; for them, the consent given by the target State is 
irrelevant. 52 
And Asrat concludes that: ' [Concerning] invitation which is alleged to justify the 
intervention and presence of foreign forces in another State, it is indicated that 
such an allegation is not valid where the inhabitants' free exercise of political 
self-determination is thwarted by the intervention. This kind of invitation does 
not absolve the intervention from being an illegal use of force against the 
political independence of the particular State.'53 What if the government is one 
side of a bifurcated actor, and there is an alternative government claiming 
legitimacy? When two authorities exist within a state, which may legitimately 
call for external assistance and which may not? If one authority, or an identifiable 
section of civil society is opposed to the external interference, such interference 
becomes coercive and hence intervention.54 
52 Antonio Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict, Dordrecht: Nijhoff 1993, pp 10, 2 1  
53 Belatchew Asrat, Prohibition of Force Under the UN Charter: A Study of Art. 2( 4), Uppsala: Iustus forlag 
1991 , p 17 
54 Although Stanley Hoffman argues in this regard that: 'If the sovereignty and independence of a state 
begins to break down (internal instability), then other states can no longer rely on it to fulfil its obligations 
to international society . The effects of domestic instability may 'spill over' and destabilise the international 
system, and some form of change in established behaviour patterns may have to be sanctioned. In the case 
of civil war, the nonintervention norm is superseded by a metanorm of nonintervention which permits actors 
in the international system to acknowledge the existence of a second authority structure in the target state 
( . . .  ) Insofar as the phenomenon of failed, troubled, and murderous states is a disease of the Westphalian 
system, interventions can be interpreted as attempts at restoring a modified Westphalian state system -
40 
Intervention to respect treaty obligations 
Intervention may be deemed permissible in situations in which an existing treaty 
permits it. Joyner notes that: 
Under certain conditions, acts of intervention may be granted through treaty 
arrangements made by one state with another state. Some states have, in fact, 
concluded special bilateral treaties of "friendship and cooperation" specifying 
the possibility of intervention by the protector state in certain discretionary 
circumstances. Under these special, bilaterally negotiated conditions, the 
acceptability of treaty rights clearly is viewed in international law as a 
legitimate exception to the norm of nonintervention. The precondition here, of 
course, is that the treaty must still be in force and duly respected by both 
governments at the time an intervention occurs.'55 
To this precondition we might add, with particular reference to the Rwandan 
case study, that if there is to be intervention, the treaty must allow for direct 
military support on the ground for the state's armed forces, and post hoc 
amendments to any existing treaty do not make earlier interventions 
retrospectively legal. Practice suggests that intervenors rarely abide by the letter 
of this derogation; the terms of treaties invoked to justify intervention are 
frequently disregarded once the intervention is underway. More recently, the 
same issue has arisen where the intervenor finds himself exceeding the terms of 
the mandate under which the intervention was originally deemed permissible, 
the Vietnam phenomenon which would resurface latterly in Somalia as 'mission 
creep.'  
As with the derogation claiming invitation, questions might also be asked about 
the legitimacy of those who negotiated the treaty: is a treaty signed by a dictator 
who seized power in a military coup legitimate and representative of the popular 
modified insofar as sovereignty can be curbed or overridden in certain circumstances ' .  Stanley Hoffman, 
World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 1998, 
p 160 
55 Christopher Joyner in Peter J. Schraeder ed., Intervention into the 1990s: US Foreign Policy in the Third 
World, Boulder CO & London: Lynne Rienner 1992, p236 
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will? Similarly, the circumstances in which treaties are negotiated will always 
disfavour the weaker party to the negotiations, as was especially apparent when 
the leaders of Africa's postcolonial states signed 'cooperation' agreements with 
the former colonial power. (The details of this process in the Franco-African 
context will be considered in Chapter 2.) 
Counter-intervention 
Taken to mean assisting a weak state against invasion and occupation or 
annexation by a strong one, John Stuart Mill supported this derogation, and 
wrote in 1867 that: 
A people the most attracted to freedom, the most capable of defending and 
making good use of free institutions, may be unable to contend successfully 
for them against the military strength of another nation much more powerful. 
To assist a people thus kept down is not to disturb the balance of forces on 
which the permanent maintenance of freedom in a country depends, but to 
redress that balance when it is already unfairly and violently disturbed.56 
Nonintervention by Western democracies during the 1930s, particularly in Spain 
(where counter-intervention would have been justified), demonstrate that self­
interested but short-sighted Realism, and not Stowell's and the League's 
Idealism, was dominane7 The question remains, however, of whether an 
externally-imposed solution can ever benefit a state's people. Often 
counterintervention is used as a justification where the nature of the original 
intervention to be countered is deliberately distorted, often post hoc (i.e. after the 
counterintervention has already been launched); notable in light of our case 
studies Djibouti (Chapter 3) and Rwanda (Chapters 5 and 6), is the portrayal by 
the counterintervening power of its opponents as invaders, rather than (as was 
the case in these two examples), as militant exiles. 
56 Quoted in James Mayall, 'Non-intervention, self-determination and the "new world order"' ,  International 
Affairs 67:3  ( 199 1)  p423 
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Walzer has argued that counterintervention must be more clearly defined: 'A 
legitimate government is one that can fight its own internal wars. And external 
assistance in those wars is rightly called counter-intervention only when it 
balances, and does no more than balance, the prior intervention of another 
power, making it possible once again for the local forces to win or lose on their 
own. The outcome of civil wars should reflect not the relative strength of the 
intervening states, but the local alignment of forces. '  Incidences of unevenly 
balanced counterintervention may be identified throughout the postcolonial 
period, a phenomenon Aime Cesaire identified as neocolonial 'collective 
hypocrisy, skilled at distorting problems all the better to legitimise the odious 
solutions which are provided'.58 
Intervention in self-defence (including protection of the intervenor's and other foreign 
nationals) 
The right to intervene in self-defence is enshrined in UN Charter Article 51, and 
is also defined as protection of vital interests and overseas territories; Asrat notes 
that: '[The right to] self-defence constitutes the defence of the totality of the basic 
components of States, namely territory, people and government. . .  [I]t is 
submitted that the forcible protection of nationals abroad . . .  constitute[s] a 
legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence. '59 Parallel with the major plank of 
justificatory discourse identified above - honouring a treaty in defence of a 
friendly state against external aggression - is the equally frequent invocation of 
risk to French and other foreign (i .e. Western) civilians: thus Foccart, to justify 
the French intervention (or mobilisation of garrisonned troops) in the Central 
African Republic during April and May 1996, stated: 
57 Spain is of course one of Little's case studies in Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, 
London: Martin Robertson 1975 
58 Aime Cesaire, Discours sur le colonialisme, Paris :  Presence africaine 1972, pp7-8 
59 Belatchew Asrat, Prohibition of Force Under the UN Charter: A Study of Art. 2(4) , Uppsala: Iustus forlag 
199 1 ,  p l7  
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La justification de !'intervention de nos troupes etaient ailleurs: il 
s' agissait de defendre les ressortissants fran<;ais menaces par les mu tins et 
autres emeutiers. Hors cela, je vous rappelle que la doctrine a ete definie a 
plusieurs reprises par le general de Gaulle, en des termes quasiment 
identiques, et qu'aucun de ses successeurs ne l'a remise en cause. C'est 
ainsi qu'il ecrivait en janvier 1966, a propos des tensions ethniques qui se 
manifestaient alors en Mauritanie: "Nous appliquerons nos accords de 
defense s'il y a lieu, c'est-a-dire clans le cas d'une subversion visant a 
porter atteinte a la personne ou a la fonction du chef d'Etat, et clans le cas 
de l'attaque de la Mauritanie par un autre pays [ . . . ] .  En dehors de ces 
obligations, nous n'avons pas a prendre parti par les armes.60 
However, Bruno Delaye, head of the Cellule africaine at the Elysee from 1992 until 
early 1995, underlined that the French military role would always exceed mere 
protection of French citizens: 'A quoi servirait de maintenir une force de 10 000 
hommes en Afrique si c' est seulement pour evacuer nos ressortissants?'61 And 
Fran<;ois Mitterrand, while First Secretary of the Socialist Party in opposition in 
1978, criticised the despatch of Legion paratroops to Kolwezi (discussed in 
Chapter 4), declaring that: 'L'armee fran<;aise y va pour assurer la securite de nos 
compatriotes, mais aussi pour atteindre d' autres objectifs que nous ne 
connaissons pas. '62 Notably, in contradiction of France's frequent classification of 
interventions to evacuate its nationals as 'humanitarian', Asrat points out that: 
'[A] distinction is drawn between intervention for the protection of nationals and 
humanitarian intervention; the latter term is reserved for cases that related to the 
protection of persons other than nationals of the intervening State. '63 
60 Jacques Foccart, Foccart Parle 2: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique 1997, 
pp497-498 
61 Bruno Delaye quoted in Observatoire permanent de la Cooperation franr,:aise, Rapport 1995, Paris :  
Desclee de Brouwer 1995, p 123 
62 Franr,:ois Mitterrand (as first secretary of the Parti socialiste in 1978) quoted in Observatoire permanent 
de la Cooperation franr,:aise, Rapport 1995, Paris :  Desclee de Brouwer 1995, p125 
63 Belatchew Asrat, Prohibition of Force Under the UN Charter: A Study of Art. 2( 4), Uppsala: Iustus forlag 
199 1 ,  p 1 8  
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Humanitarian intervention 
'I have never believed that foreign troops could restore peace. '64 
With the notable exception of Michael Walzer, questions of the morality of 
intervention - or nonintervention - although traceable to Grotius, rarely arose in 
the normative literature until the contemporary (i.e. post-Cold War) 
'humanitarian intervention' debate. Or as Hoffman puts it: ' [T]he just war 
doctrine traditionally tried to reconcile order and justice, whereas a theory of just 
intervention risks putting justice (to individuals and groups within a state) above 
order (which the states presumably ensure)'.65 Walzer added the following moral 
revisions of the legalist paradigm: states can be invaded and wars justly begun to 
assist secessionist movements; to balance the prior interventions of other powers; 
and to rescue peoples threatened with massacre.66 But in his search for 'just 
intervention', he also offered a moral critique of the practice, arguing along with 
John Stuart Mill that: '[F]oreign intervention, if it is a brief affair, cannot shift the 
domestic balance of power in any decisive way toward the forces of freedom, 
while if it is prolonged or intermittently resumed, it will itself pose the greatest 
possible threat to the success of those forces. '67 
As a doctrine, humanitarian intervention dates from as early as the 18th century, 
when military involvement by one state in the affairs of another was justified in 
terms of protecting the intervened state's citizens. Indeed Stowell reached even 
further to quote the Vindicae Contra Tyrannos of 1579, published during the 
64 Foreign Minister of Burundi Venerand Bakevyumusaya, 5 July 1996, quoted in Glynne Evans, 
Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 
Adelphi Paper 3 1 1 , 1997 
65 Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield 1998, pp159- 1 60 
66 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, London: Penguin 1980, p 108 
67 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, London: Penguin 1980, p89 
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sixteenth century's religious wars in France, which justified interference 'in 
behalf of neighbouring peoples who are oppressed on account of adherence to 
the true religion or by any obvious tyranny'. In the course of his exemplary text, 
Stowell cites Grotius, Wheaton, Heiberg, Woolsey, Bluntshchi and 
contemporaries Westlake and Borchard68 as authorities who, throughout modern 
history, have recognised the legality of humanitarian intervention. Little 
similarly invokes 'the founding fathers of modern international law, such as 
Pufendorf and Grotius [who] conceived of individuals, not states, as the subjects 
of international law. Grotius argued that intervention to assist individuals in 
conflict with the state is perfectly legitimate provided the cause is just. '69 
Nigel White sounds a cautionary note, pointing out that: 'It goes without saying 
that in this period [18th and 19th centuries] these actions were operated outside of 
any universal collective security system. Decisions were reached by governments 
and their allies to intervene, often with the intention of securing some wider 
political and military objective as well as protecting the lives of the population'.70 
And as early as 1860, Professor Montague Bernard expressed his concerns at the 
concept of humanitarian intervention in a pamphlet which might usefully be 
republished today: ' [I]n fact, good is hardly ever done by it - good, I mean, in 
any degree commensurate with the evil. On the contrary, even when it dethrones 
a tyrant, puts an end to a ruinous anarchy, or staunches the effusion of blood in a 
68 Prof. Edwin M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, New York 1915 ,  p 14: ' [W]here 
a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its own citizens, over whom presumably 
it has absolute sovereignty, the other states of the family of nations are authorized by international law to 
intervene on the grounds of humanity. When these "human" rights are habitually violated, one or more 
states may intervene in the name of the society of nations and may take such measures as to substitute at 
least temporarily, if not permanently, its own sovereignty for that of the state controlled ' .  
6 9  Richard Little, 'Recent Literature on Intervention and Non-Intervention' in Ian Forbes & Mark Hoffman 
eds., Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of lntervention, Basingstoke: Macmillan 1993, 
p23 
70 Nigel D. White, 'Humanitarian Intervention ' ,  International Law and Armed Conflict Commentary 1: 1 ,  
June 1994, ppl5- 1 6  
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civil war, it has a direct tendency to produce mischief worse than it removes' .71 
Similarly, in 1910 Antoine Rougier, a supporter of a legal right of humanitarian 
intervention, noted that: 'It must be recognised that the ground of humanity is 
the most delicate of the causes which may be expected to justify the right of 
intervention and that it raises juridical difficulties in regard to the basis and 
extent of this right' .72 
Generally, the debate on humanitarian intervention was characterised by a 
preoccupation with questions of international law at the expense of broader 
political, social and cultural considerations, a concentration on the politico­
military definition of humanitarian intervention to the exclusion of other 
dimensions of international action and concern, and an orientation in terms of a 
tension between rigid conceptions of 'universal humanitarian principles' (justice) 
and 'state sovereignty' (order) . In 1921 Stowell offered the following definition: 
'Humanitarian intervention may be defined as the reliance upon force for the 
justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment 
which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that 
authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice'. 
Indeed, this implies an apparently precocious circumscription of sovereignty to 
make its enjoyment conditional on human rights. 
Typically, the pro-intervention lobby argues that the activity is wholly justified if 
it meets two key criteria: when it is undertaken to defend the rights of foreign 
subjects of an oppressive ruler; and when it is collectively authorised by the 
international community through an international organisation, general or 
regional, which today is understood to imply a UN mandate. These criteria 
71 Montague Bernard ( 1 820-82), On the Principle of Non-Intervention: A lecture delivered in the hall of All 
Souls' College, Oxford and London: JH & J Parker 1 860, quoted in Ellery C .  Stowell, Intervention in 
International Law, Washington DC: John Byrne & Co. 192 1 ,  p9 
72 Antoine Rougier quoted in Ellery C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law, Washington DC: John 
Byrne & Co. 192 1 ,  p478 
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correspond to what Walzer categorises as revisions of the legalist (ie non­
intervention) paradigm; and although he argues that: 'Humanitarian 
intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of 
success) to acts "that shock the moral conscience of mankind",'73 he insists that 
intervenors must legitimise their interventions in one of these ways, and 
'demonstrate that their own case is radically different from what we take to be 
the general run of cases. '74 
There are few workable definitions today of humanitarian intervention, a 
concept which some observers, given its apparent inapplicability, consider an 
unsustainable contradiction; notable among these is Edward Said who, asked if 
humanitarian intervention represents a step forward for humanity, replied 
unequivocally: 
I hope when you use the phrase humanitarian intervention you've got 
inverted commas around it because I don't regard it as such at all .  This idea 
that this is a form of the new military humanism is absolute tommyrot and 
ought to be exposed for the barbaric lie that it is. You know military 
humanism is an oxymoron.75 
Nigel White, referring to 'doubtful doctrine of humanitarian intervention', notes 
that 'the simple provision of humanitarian aid . . .  does not normally include the 
use of troops, except in a consensual peacekeeping capacity'.76 And even former 
French defence minister Pierre Joxe pointed out that: 'L'aide humanitaire 
suppose une attitude de stricte impartialite, alors qu'une operation militaire 
exige des objectifs clairement definis' .77 Given this apparent contradiction 
inherent in the term 'humanitarian intervention', wider definitions have become 
increasingly evident, including 'non-forcible humanitarian intervention', 'NGO 
73 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, London: Penguin 1980, p l 07 
74 ibid 
75 Professor Edward Said (Columbia University New York), on BBC Radio 4 'Analysis ', 9 August 1999 
76 Nigel D. White, 'Humanitarian Intervention' ,  International Law and Armed Conflict Commentary I : 1 ,  
June 1994, p l7  
77 Pierre Joxe, interviewed in  'Le mariage manque du blinde et du  sac de  riz', Le Nouvel Observateur 1 8  
November 1993, p37 
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humanitarian intervention', and a whole range of cross-border activities in 
response to human suffering which, according to Oliver Ramsbotham 'are 
difficult to classify. All of them play a significant role and should come under a 
framework for principled humanitarian intervention if it IS to be 
h . !78 compre ens1ve. 
Given the longevity of the debate, it should come as no surprise that arguments 
for and against a right or duty of humanitarian intervention should have re­
emerged so prominently in the post-Cold War era. With the end of bipolarity, 
Western-centric analysts were freed from the rigid certainties through which the 
world's conflicts could be interpreted. Suddenly intervention too was freed from 
the constricting spheres of influence within which it had been corseted, and 
could be exercised free of the stays of the rigid statist girdle. With the erosion of 
the statist model, apparent humanitarian and idealist aims, albeit tempered by 
realities of new global rivalries, moved intervention centre stage in IR debates; 
Richard Little stated in 1996 that: 'Whether or not to intervene in civil wars 
seems to me to raise one of the most important issues confronting the 
contemporary international community. '79 
The end of the Cold War brought about an apparent conceptual shift with regard 
to intervention, based on the interwar Idealists' notion of sovereignty as it 
applies to people, and not just to territory and borders kept inviolate by the 
frozen superpower bipolarity. What value then is Cold War intervention theory 
in a transformed international system where failure to intervene sustains 
dictators in power or leaves aggressors unpunished? James Mayall pinpoints the 
dilemmas faced by the architects of the 1990s 'New World Order', where 
concepts of intervention and non-intervention are still based on disputes 
78 Oliver Ramsbotham, 'Towards an Ethical Framework for Humanitarian Intervention', paper presented to 
BISA annual conference, University of York 1994, p6 
79 Professor Richard Little, External Involvement in Civil Wars: The Intervention Paradox,  inaugural 
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between states, and not, as has been most often the case since 1989, on disputes 
within states between peoples/nations/ ethnicities or opposing political groups 
trapped within borders not of their making: 
Wherever powerful and unassimilated national communities must coexist 
within a single polity, they are likely to use the institutions of democracy to 
gain preferential access to state power (and the patronage that goes with it) at 
the expense of their ethnic rivals. The competition to establish their respective 
national rights is likely to prove sufficiently ferocious to ensure that any 
commitment to uphold the merely human rights of all citizens will remain 
theoretical. 80 
Whereas the typical intervention situation during the Cold War was one of over­
assertive government, now 'humanitarian intervention' tends to take place in 
areas of intercommunal conflict, contested sovereignty or state collapse. 
Considering the changes in intervention theory and practice during the 1990s, 
Hoffman notes that since the Cold War: ' [T]he emphasis has shifted from 
unilateral interventions - by the superpowers, by former colonial states like 
France or Belgium in their erstwhile colonies, or by countries such as [India in 
Bangladesh, Tanzania in Uganda, Vietnam in Cambodia, i.e. horizontal 
intervention], taking advantage of the paralysis of a Security Council plagued by 
East-West rivalry - to collective interventions, mainly by the UN, now that the 
Security Council is no longer the victim of this contest'.81 Nigel White clarifies the 
legal position, noting that: 
[The] breach [of human rights] is not accepted by states as justifying military 
intervention. Enforcement of human rights laws must be undertaken by non­
military methods if it is to remain lawful. ( . . .  ) [T]he sole clearly legitimate 
humanitarian intervention is that authorised on a collective basis by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter ( . . .  ) [T]he trend is to 
move away from illegitimate unilateral or multilateral humanitarian 
address, University of Bristol 9 February 1996 
80 James Mayall, 'Non-intervention, self-determination and the "new world order'" , International Affairs 
67:3 ( 1991 )  p423 
8 1 Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield 1998,  p 153 
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intervention, to more genuine collective humanitarian intervention.82 
But in the optimism of the immediate post-Cold War, Hoffman notes that: 
'Traditional interpretations of international law and of the UN Charter that 
denied the legality of such forcible intrusions were declared obsolete, partly 
because of the salience of human rights, partly because the newly favored 
intrusions were presented as collective ones, authorized by the UN, rather than 
unilateral resorts to force'.83 And James Mayall, one of the principal exponents of 
a post-Cold War 'new interventionism', justified strong states' intervention in the 
affairs of the weak by reinvoking Mill's 1867 essay ('to assist a people thus kept 
down is not to disturb the balance of forces on which the permanent 
maintenance of freedom in a country depends, but to redress that balance when 
it is already unfairly and violently disturbed'),84 and argued that Western 
intervention in Somalia in 1992 - Operation 'Restore Hope' - was evidence of the 
New World Order's shift to disinterested, purely humanitarian intervention.85 
But is it plausible to argue that Idealism has come true and humanitarian 
intervention is motivated, in the mediatised West, by concern for human rights 
in states perceived as repressive? Terry Nardin, while advocating that states 
adopt a presumption against intervention in the affairs of another state, claims 
with Walzer and Joyner that, under certain circumstances, this presumption may 
be overridden to further human rights.86 
However, other voices suggest 'Restore Hope', and more recently NATO's 
82 Nigel D .  White, 'Humanitarian Intervention' , International Law and Armed Conflict Commentary I: 1 ,  
June 1994, p22 
83 Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield 1998,  p 156 
84 John Stuart Mill, On Freedom ( 1867) quoted i n  James Mayall, 'Non-intervention, self-determination and 
the "new world order'" ,  International Affairs 67:3  ( 1991)  p423 
85 See James Mayall ed. ,  The New Interventionism 1991- 1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, 
Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, Cambridge: CUP 1996 
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intervention i n  Kosovo, were driven not so much by concern for those countries' 
populations as by the need for short-term political gain at home. The volume of 
Western coverage of recent African crises is almost always in direct proportion to 
the scale of direct Western involvement (NGO or military interventions), or to 
the degree of clamour for such interventions (the 'something must be done' 
response) . No Western troops or high-profile, publicity-hungry NGOs, means no 
media coverage. Mass murder far from the Western lens is small news (as a 
comparison of coverage of conflict in Israel and the Israeli-occupied territories on 
the one hand, and Algeria on the other, suggests) .  Mass epidemic (albeit in man­
made circumstances), with the potential for Western intervention, is big news. In 
this light, the real exigencies of 'humanitarian' intervention were already 
apparent at the time of its post-Cold War reinvention, most clearly in the agenda 
for Operation Restore Hope. Gerard Prunier, East Africa specialist and sometime 
adviser to the French defence ministry, tells how he met Bruno Delaye, head of 
the cellule africaine in December 1992 while French troops were preparing to join 
the US-led operation; Delaye explained French involvement thus: 
You see, it is soon going to be Christmas and it would be unthinkable to have 
the French public eat its Christmas dinner while seeing on TV all those 
starving kids. It would be politically disastrous . . .  But don't worry, as soon as 
all this stuff blows over and TV cameras are trained in another direction, we 
will quietly tiptoe out. With luck it shouldn't last more than three to four 
months and in the meantime we will try our best not to do anything foolish.87 
Later, Medecins sans Frontieres eo-founder and Minister for Humanitarian Action 
Bernard Kouchner would be seen on French television shouldering a bag of rice 
with which he splashed ashore on a Somali beach. This manipulation of images 
has been well documented elsewhere; however, similar manipulation became a 
key determinant of the nature of the 'humanitarian' interventionary response to 
86 Quoted in S .  Caney, 'Human rights and the rights of states: Terry Nardin on Nonintervention ' ,  
International Political Science Review, 1 8 : 1 ,  January 1997 
87 Gerard Prunier, 'The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope' in W. Clarke and J. 
Herbst eds. ,  Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Boulder CO: 
Westview 1997, p 135 
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the Rwandan genocide.88 
Accordingly, Hoffman has emphasised most recently that the failure of practice 
has led to a reassessment of theory: 
In the earlier phase, the opponents of even a collective droit d'ingerence seemed 
to lose the debate with the enthusiasts. Now, the opposite appears to be the 
case. It is as if the motto "we should, therefore we must" had been replaced 
with "we can't, therefore we ought not"; or as if the imperative of doing good 
had yielded to a far more pessimistic appraisal: "there is little good we can do, 
and some of the good we try to do produces more harm than good - so let us 
above all not do harm, even if it means caring less about doing good.89 
In the spirit of this new scepticism, commentators began to dismiss humanitarian 
intervention as nothing more than a cloak for the self-interest of states and some 
non-state actors; Jan Nedervenn Pieterse concludes that: ' " [H]umanitarian 
intervention" serves as a mirror of global politics as they really exist. '90 
But even if the superpowers underwent a Damascene conversion in 1989, no 
conceptual shift was apparent in French interventionary practice until 1994, 
which arguably marked a watershed for French African policy, following the 
first failure of its old-style intervention on the continent. France's subsequent 
conversion to the humanitarian intervention agenda seems all the more 
implausible given the apparent reversion to type of French interventions 
elsewhere since Rwanda (Comoros 1995; Central African Republic 1995-96) . 
Practice did not change during this period, but the 1994 invocation of 
humanitarianism marked a shift in discourse, not least because it had rarely been 
felt necessary hitherto to offer public justification for interventions in Africa. 
Consideration of legitimisation is therefore key to any assessment of the validity 
88 See Mel McNulty, Media Ethnicization and the International Response to War and Genocide in Rwanda' 
in Tim Allen and Jean Seaton eds., The Media of Conflict, London: Zed Books 1999 
89 Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield 1 998, p 156 cf 
90 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 'Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia 
Compared', International Political Science Review ( 1997) 18 : 1 ,  p90 
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and effectiveness of French attempts to invoke humanitarianism, on the 
international and particularly the US modet to justify interventions driven by a 
specifically French set of motives. Attempts by theorists to extrapolate forcible, 
i .e. military intervention justified as 'humanitarian', from straightforward, power 
politics military intervention, hint at the ambiguity inherent in France's 
assumption of humanitarianism for one intervention (new-style legitimisation), 
and its continuation of traditional justifications (evacuating citizens, fulfilling 
treaty obligations, responding to an explicit invitation) for interventions 
elsewhere (old-style legitimisation). Ramsbotham points to this in his contention 
that: 'To count as humanitarian intervention, forcible military action must come 
under the framework principles for humanitarian intervention as a whole. If this 
does not happen, forcible humanitarian intervention is not distinguished from 
forcible non-humanitarian intervention, and military actions are not integrated 
into the wider enterprises of which they should be part.'91 
Conclusion 
Can such outside help be disinterested and genuinely humanitarian? Walzer 
concludes that: '[C]lear examples of what is called "humanitarian intervention" 
are very rare. Indeed, I have not found any, but only mixed cases where the 
humanitarian motive is one among several. States don't send their soldiers into 
other states, it seems, only in order to save lives. The lives of foreigners don't 
weigh that heavily in the scales of domestic decision-making.'92 Hoffman quotes 
Lea Brilmayer, ' [who] has argued that selectivity is ethically acceptable if there is 
a principle, or a set of principles, that explains and justifies choice. In reality, the 
cases of nonengagement risk being determined by purely political and pragmatic 
considerations, such as excessive scope of the crisis, insufficient media attention 
91 Oliver Ramsbotham, 'Towards an Ethical Framework for Humanitarian Intervention', paper presented to 
BISA annual conference, University of York 1994, p l  
92 Michael Walzer , Just and Unjust Wars, London: Penguin 1980, plOl  
54 
to prod states into action, disagreement among [UN] members, or a desire on 
their part to put what they deem their vital imperatives and preferences ahead of 
the more unselfish and long-term considerations that justify intervention in 
distant places' .93 
Accepting this Realist and apparently unchanging fact, Walzer nonetheless 
leaves us with a pertinent moral formula to which to aspire: 'People who initiate 
massacres lose their right to participate in the normal (even in the normally 
violent) processes of self-determination. Their military defeat is morally 
necessary.'94 But in the absence of a general political will to do so, the UN may 
find itself 'licensing' the powerful state most willing to intervene, for reasons of 
its own which do not necessarily correspond with those of the UN or fulfil the 
criteria of humanitarian intervention. Hoffman describes these as cases where the 
UN, 'either in order not to lose face or because of its own limited resources, will 
endorse or license great power interventions . . .  In some cases, this may be much 
better than inaction. In others, this may be no more than a fig leaf covering a 
classical case of great-power arbitrariness or neo-imperialism'.95 
A robust theory of intervention, then, should consider both motivation and 
outcomes in assessing the humanitarian character of such action. Croft and 
Treacher agree with Walzer that: 'Often, military intervention, driven by other 
motives, has been "dressed-up" as humanitarian concern. Hence, the relief of 
physical suffering has been used as the pretext for the military intervention in 
one state by the forces of another as the latter pursues its own interests. '96 Most 
93 Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield 1998, p l 75 
94 Michael Walzer , Just and Unjust Wars, London: Penguin 1980, p l 06 
95 Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield 1 998, pp 17 5-17  6 
96 Stuart Croft & Adrian Treacher, 'Aspects of Intervention in the South' in Andrew Dorman& Thomas Otte 
eds., Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention, Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Press 1995, p l 37 
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importantly, they conclude that: 'Although Humanitarian Intervention exists as 
an ideal type, it is a theory without practice in the South.'97 
The root problem, as the US discovered in Somalia, is that intervenors are asked 
(or claim) to intervene non-politically (which is what humanitarian intervention 
implies) in intensely political arenas. However, no matter what their intentions, 
they are interpreted as partisan; delivering aid is seen to prolong the fighting, 
helping refugees is said to further ethnic cleansing, protection of threatened 
minorities to promote secession. Or as Richard Gott put it, in the context of 
NATO intervention in Kosovo: ' [P]roviding assistance from outside is endlessly 
problematic. You cannot bomb people from the air with food parcels, you cannot 
shower them with gold, you cannot even provide them with water, without 
asking a whole series of questions, of which the most significant is who will 
benefit?'98 
This crisis of credibility and legitimisation caused by post-Cold War efforts to 
reclassify military intervention as 'forcible humanitarian intervention' is central 
to this study. The civil war, genocide and continuing instability in Rwanda are 
due in no small part to Western involvement, provoking a crisis which 
necessitated further Western interventions, latterly characterised as 
humanitarian. Jan Nederveen Pieterse sums up the paradox neatly: 
'H[umanitarian] I[ntervention] is a two-faced operation, idealism caught in the 
wheels of realism, realism outflanked by realities. '99 Hoffman concludes that: 'It 
may well be that none of the "currently leading moral theories inside the 
97 Stuart Croft & Adrian Treacher, 'Aspects of Intervention in the South' in Andrew Dorman& Thomas Otte 
eds. ,  Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention, Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Press 1995, p l 54 
98 Richard Gott, 'The drive to intervene' , The Guardian 20 May 1999 
99 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 'Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia 
Compared', International Political Science Review (1997) 1 8 : 1 ,  p72 
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academic community can really help us decide when we should rescue . . .  (and 
whom first), and how".'100 
It is intended in this study to discuss the applicability of criteria permitting 
humanitarian intervention to France's Operation Turquoise, particulary in light of 
that intervention's elevation in much current IR literature as a model of the 
genre; a notable example is Hoffman, who cites Turquoise as an example of 
legitimate intervention because authorised by the UN, what he calls 'the Security 
Council's "licensing of France in Rwanda"' .  Despite the apparent dominance of 
this view, the countervailing argument has appeared in recent assessments; 
Stephen Chan points out that: 'Even in non-Chapter VII peacekeeping, as was 
originally the case in Rwanda, a powerful member of the Security Council, 
France, insisted upon a leading role - not least to protect its interests in an area it 
still saw in crude geopolitical terms' . 101 
In the context of Franco-African relations since 1960, the French commitment to 
one side of a bifurcated actor (i.e. the ruling elite) was an integral part of the 
state's creation; hence France's relationship is inherently interventionary. 
According to the logic of this relationship, France always intervenes. This 
excludes the notion of the second actor's choice between intervention and non-
intervention: because of the interpersonal 'networks' and treaty-ratified support 
for the internal status quo which normally prevails, there is always an 
interventionary response to a threat to that status quo, even through non­
intervention which represents a conscious choice to abandon a disappointing 
leader and (re )establish an acceptable internal order . 102 
100 Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham /Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield 1998, p l 6 1  
101 Stephen Chan, 'And What D o  Peacekeeping Troops D o  Apart From Burying the Dead, Then?' , 
International Relations XIII: 5, August 1997, p31  
102 Such was the case, to be discussed in Chapter 3, with Presidents Fulbert Youlou in Congo-Brazzaville 
( 1963) and Hamani-Diori of Niger ( 1974). Usually the justification for these non-actions was that 
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As NATO bombing of Yugoslavia reached its crescendo in May 1999, Richard 
Gott wrote that: 
[T]here is nothing new about this project [Western intervention in Kosovo] . It 
is a throwback to the colonialism of the last century, when the imperial 
powers intervened at will in the affairs of independent states and peoples . . .  
[A] powerful imperial drive still survives in the British cultural make-up. 
Two significant historical strands in national life, the military and the 
missionary, are still very much to the fore . . .  We want to tell foreigners who to 
worship and how to behave, and we still want to use our strong right hand to 
smash them into submission if they disobey. That is old-fashioned 
imperialism resurrected' .103 
It is intended in the chapters which follow to discuss the extent to which this 
assertion may be applied to French policy in sub-Saharan Africa since 1960. 
intervention would exceed the terms of a military and technical assistance treaty, but with a clear subtext 
emphasising the lack of credibility of the deposed leader. 
103 Richard Gott, 'The drive to intervene' , The Guardian 20 May 1999 
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Chapter 2:  
Decolonisation and the creation of France's interventionary sphere in Africa 
'Despite the legacy of conflicts and unresolved issues dominating the recent political scene, 
the years after 1940 must be seen as a heroic and creative time in francophone African 
politics. Nations were created, and took their place in a position of legal equality with the 
great world powers. ' 1  
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the essential context for one of this study's 
principal arguments, i .e., that contemporary French African policy, underpinned by 
recourse to military intervention, operates according to a unique bilateral dynamic 
without parallel in Euro-African relations since formal decolonisation, and has been 
conducted independently of global balance-of-power politics (although occasionally 
caught up in larger issues of regional security, as during the Chad-Libya dispute). 
Historically, the exceptionality of French involvement in Africa should be viewed in 
the context of a specifically French set of foreign policy motives which, although 
parts may resemble comparable imperialist motives elsewhere - the settling of inter­
European (or even domestic) disputes on the African continent, and compensation 
for weakness, defeat or loss of territory at home - the sum, which includes the 
concepts of gloire, grandeur, rayonnement, mission civilisatrice and la plus grande 
France2, gave French involvement in Africa such centrality and durability in France's 
world view that it remained a keystone of French foreign policy, and France's 
perceptions of its world status, until very recently. 
The principal argument here will be that this post-1960 sphere of influence has been 
a deliberate French creation, in reaction to what preceded it. France was forced to 
abandon its colonial territories firstly in Indochina and then, amidst a trauma that 
1 Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1 880- 1985, Cambridge: CUP 1988, p l36 
2 On grandeur see Phi! Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological aspects of de Gaulle's foreign policy, 
Cambridge: CUP 1980, and most recently Maurice Vai'sse, La grandeur: Politique etrangere du general de Gaulle 
59 
devasted Algeria and brought France itself to the brink of civil war, in North Africa. 
Partly as a result of this experience, France never relinquished total control of its 
empire south of the Sahara. In fact, as its self-appointed role as the gendarme of post­
colonial Africa took shape, it sought to expand its influence to include Belgium's 
former colonial territories. Its apparent decolonisation of its colonies in sub-Saharan 
Africa was characterised instead by what has been called une decolonisation ratee, a 
failed decolonisation, or what perhaps could be termed more appropriately a 
'pseudo-decolonisation'. Indeed, the ambiguity surrounding even the term 
'decolonisation' in this context has been the subject of discussion, although perhaps 
primarily among non-French commentators, such as Swiss historian Albert Wirz 
who asked: 'La decolonisation ne cacherait-elle pas en fait une victoire des 
colonisa teurs?'3 
Samora Machel, first president of post-revolutionary Mozambique, offered the 
following definition of what decolonisation should be: 'To decolonise a state means 
essentially to dismantle the politicat administrative, cultural, financial, economic, 
educational, juridical and other systems which, as an integral part of the colonial 
state, were solely designed to impose foreign domination and the will of the 
exploiters on the masses. '4 The diplomatic defeat and international discrediting of 
France in Algeria left de Gaulle with little option but to dismantle the French 
presence there to the extent of repatriating its settlers. However, by this same 
definition, there was no real decolonisation of France's colonies in sub-Saharan 
Africa; there was instead a limited concession of autonomy to French-fostered elites, 
and the institutionalisation of patron-client relationships, whereby the patron's 
influence hinged on the client's survival, while the client's survival often depended, 
as we shall see, on the patron's protection. Christopher Clapham notes that: 'The 
complex of relationships between the francophone African states and France formed 
1 958- 1969, Paris: Fayard 1998; on 'la plus grande France ', see Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of 
French Overseas Expansion, London: Macmillan 1 996 
3 Albert Wirz, 'La decolonisation de I' Afrique noire: Iorsque I' avenir paraissait ouvert' ,  Relations 
internationales 77, printemps 1994, 37-5 1 
4 S amora Machel , Establishing the People' s Power to Serve the Masses, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing 
House 1980, p6 
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by far the most comprehensive set of mechanisms for maintaining African states and 
their rulers, and had no equivalent either among the other colonial powers, or in the 
clientele networks established by the United States and the Soviet Union'.S 
This chapter will discuss these relationships and mechanisms, and it is intended 
thereby: to establish the background to the decolonisation process in France's 
African empire and to the bilateral military cooperation agreements which were 
made a condition of independence; to assess the forms these agreements took, from 
outright defence treaties to military technical assistance accords; and to consider the 
implications of this process for Franco-African military relations. 
Empire 
'In size, population and resources, French Africa is one of the great achievements of modern 
times. '6 
Before considering the unique bilateral axis linking France to 'francophone' Africa ­
the former colonial territories of France and Belgium - it may be useful to discuss 
firstly the creation of France's sub-Saharan African empire - Afrique Occidentale 
Franr;aise (AOF) and Afrique Equatoriale Franr;aise (AEF) - and examine the motives 
and justifications for empire as well as African responses to French imperialism. 
If we accept, along with most European historians of French empire, that there was 
no masterplan or overarching strategy in its construction, can we argue accordingly 
that France's retreat from empire, however circumscribed, was equally haphazard? 
Did it not instead result from a learning curve, whereby French policy-makers in 
general and Charles de Gaulle in particular, tempered by the experience of the loss 
of colonial territories in Indochina and North Africa, sought to ensure that there 
5 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: CUP 
1996, p88 
6 G. Vassal and E.  Wright, 'France: Her Colonial Empire & Its Native Races' in J.A. Hammerton ed. ,  Peoples of 
All Nations Vol. III, London: Educational Book Co. Ltd. c l922 
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would be no actual loss of  empire south of  the Sahara, merely reform and 
repackaging? 
The 1920s assertion that: 'In 1830 a new period of empire-building opened without 
aim or plan' still prevails in the most recent accounts; Robert Aldrich wrote in 1996 
that Paris had 'no master plan'7 for colonial acquisition: 
However logical the territorial consolidation of the AOF and AEF might 
seem, there existed no grand plan for achieving it, and most land was 
acquired at the expense of armed forays, negotiations with African chieftains 
and great efforts to secure posts over which the French flag had tentatively 
been raised. Such endeavours took place in the face of persistent African 
resistance, hardships imposed by difficult terrain, tropical disease and 
inadequate supplies, and divided opinion at home about the value of 
expansion. Colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa was an incremental 
achievement made possible only by the determination of colonial promoters, 
explorers and military officers, the force of arms, an ideology of racial 
domination, and the fear that if France did not take over new territories, its 
rivals would step into the brink.8 
The processes, actors and perceived motives of French imperial expansion in sub­
Saharan Africa have been extensively documented, the volume of this literature in 
itself reflecting the significance of empire and post-imperial world influence for 
French national identity.9 Images of Africa both during and after the period of 
formal empire also carry considerable resonance in French popular culture, most 
notably in cinema but also in the popularity of African music, art and food. In 
contrast, intolerance in France towards those originating from the former empire is 
on the increase, and is demonstrated not only in intimidation and violence, but in 
7 Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion, London: Macmillan 1 996, 
p86 
8 Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion, London: Macmillan 1 996, 
p36 
9 Key texts in French and English used here include: Jacques Thobie, Gilbert Meynier, Catherine Coquery­
Vidrovitch & Charles-Robert Ageron, Histoire de la France coloniale 1 914- 1990, Paris: Armand Colin 1990; 
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occasional demonstrations of violent racism and, of course, the electoral rise of the 
far right. 
As the process of French imperial expansion was not continuous but extended over 
different periods of the late 19th century according to domestic needs (or perceived 
needs), contemporary historians and commentators could overlook the breaks in 
continuity and see the conquest as involving simply 'the visible entry of Africa into 
the empire of civilisation', ' the one barbarous continent parcelled out among the 
most civilised powers of Europe.'lO Most subsequent accounts by European 
historians (excepting Marseille1 1) typically analyse France's imperial motives in 
terms of the 'Three Cs': civilisation, christianisme, commerce. It may be argued that a 
fourth 'c' should be added, to better reflect the African perception of French 
imperialism: conquete; and by extension, that an appetite for conquest was an integral 
part of European capitalist development. It is important to bear in mind that this 
traditional historiographic focus on the three Cs not only implies African passivity 
faced with foreign invasion and subjugation, but also suggests that African peoples 
were in some way recipients - and hence beneficiaries - of the European values on 
offer. 
There are countervailing arguments to these prevailing accounts of French imperial 
expansion - the 'reluctant imperialists' thesis - which argue instead that imperialism, 
which Lenin defined as the highest stage of capitalism, was an inevitable product of 
capitalist expansion in Europe. More critical analyses emphasised the influence of 
capitalists and their desire to maintain the rate of profit by finding lucrative and 
secure outlets for investment overseas. As demands for decolonisation grew during 
the 20th century, Eurocentric Marxist theory began to be superseded by the anti­
imperialist writings of imperialism's subjects. Interestingly, Aldrich's otherwise 
comprehensive bibliographical essay fails to mention any African-authored accounts 
of the experience of colonisation by France; notable omissions are Joseph Ki-Zerbo's 
10 Emile Banning, Le Partage Politique de l 'Afrique, Bruxelles 1 888, quoted in RF Betts, The Scramble for 
Africa, Boston 1966, p 1  
1 1  Jacques Marseille, Empire colonial et capitalisme fran�ais: Histoire d'un divorce, Paris : Albin Michel 1984 
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Histoire de l' Afrique Noire and Albert Adu Boahen' s Africa under Colonial Domination 
1880-1935. Thomas Hodgkin emphasised the scant attention paid in Western 
accounts to imperialism as experienced by its victims (or in Hodgkin's term, its 
'consumers') : 
[U]nderstandably, third-world theorists have not in the main been deeply 
interested in that particular group of problems with which Western writers . . .  have 
tended to be preoccupied: What . . .  was the nature of the drives, or contradictions, 
or structural changes in the advanced capitalist countries, or within the Western 
world in general, which generated, or helped to generate, modern Western 
imperialism? ( . . .  ) [T]hey have . . .  asserted or assumed that these drives arose 
directly out of the interests of the ruling classes in the advanced countries, 
whether these were interests in loot, or raw materials, or markets, or investment 
outlets, or job opportunities for the bourgeoisie, or military glory for the officer 
class, or varying combinations of these at different historical moments. 12  
Hodgkin identifies where the third , world overlapped with Marxist theory on 
questions of empire: the dehumanising effects of imperialism on the colonised 
societies and the reimportation of the ideas, attitudes, institutions and techniques 
which had been used by the bourgeoisie of the colonising countries to impose and 
maintain their domination over the colonised into the metropolitan societies for use 
against their own people. For Aime Cesaire (Discours sur le colonialisme 1972) and 
Franz Fanon (Les Damnes de la Terre 1960), 'the idea of the terrible feedback effects of 
imperialism [had] a new and pivotal significance. Fascism and Nazism are 
essentially imperialism turned inwards. The Western bourgeois liberal who permits 
non-Western people to be treated as non-human by "his" imperialists is preparing 
the same eventual doom for himsel£.'13 
Other themes to emerge from this discussion of France's transition from empire to 
sphere of influence suggest that phenomena to be analysed in later chapters - the 
motivations and mechanics of French military interventions after 1960 - have their 
roots in the period of formal empire. Those characteristics - inter-French rivalry, 
inter-European (or later, inter-Western) rivalry political, economic and even 
linguistic (often characterised as 'the Fashoda syndrome')  - and legitimisation of 
1 2  Thomas Hodgkin, 'Some African and Third World theories of imperialism' in R. Owen and B .  Sutcliffe eds. ,  
Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, London: Longman 1972, p97 
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intervention through treaties or humanitarianism, are constants of French African 
policy which, it could be argued, may be traced not only from 1960, but from 1880 
when France first consolidated its hold on sub-Saharan Africa. Certainly, with 
regard to justifying intervention, accounts of early colonialism strongly suggest that 
plus fa change; for example, Aldrich tells how in the 1880s, 'Using the pretext of 
danger to French residents and inventing an appeal from the sultan to justify their 
action, French troops occupied Fes. '14 Similarly, 'Incidents could usually be found to 
justify intervention: the pillaging of a French ship which had run aground in 
Djembering in 1864 provided an excuse to send in soldiers, occupy a village, levy a 
fine on its inhabitants, institute a head-tax, then sign a peace treaty. '15  
Similarly, French responses to perceived crises in Africa after decolonisation were 
characterised by multipolar and uncoordinated decision-making to an extent 
reminiscent of France's original imperial expansion. A.S. Kanya-Forstner, in his 
analysis of the myths and illusions that were decisive influences on France's African 
policy, draws attention to 'the way in which decisions were made by officials in 
Paris . . .  the shared assumptions of policy makers . . .  the activities of pressure groups 
and . . .  the general lack of coordination and control exercised by the politicians.'16 
Regarding the race to Tombouctou in 1893 which pitted Captain Bonnier against his 
compatriot Boiteux, Aldrich notes that this conquest 'endowed France with a colony 
largely devoid of use except prestige. '17 Redolent of the back-channel decision­
making which characterised much of French interventionary practice during the 
1980s and 1990s, Kanya-Forstner also focuses on those 'members of the French 
colonial army who had interests of their own which were often very different from 
those of their political masters [ . . .  ] Professionally, military expansion offered them 
1 3  Aime Cesaire, Discours sur le colonialisme, 1 972, p 1 1 1  
14 Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion, London: Macmillan 1996, 
p35 
15  Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion, London: Macmillan 1 996, 
p37 
16 A.S.  Kanya-Forstner, 'French expansion in Africa: the mythical theory' ,  in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe eds. ,  
Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, London: Longman 1972 
17 Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion, London: Macmillan 1 996, 
p45 
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tempting prospects of rapid advancement in a peacetime army whose regular 
channels of promotion were hopelessly clogged by the rules of seniority. '1 8  
World War II watershed 
Despite its mission civilisatrice and the inscription of 'Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite' on the 
public buildings of Algiers and Dakar, France was as rapacious an empire-builder as 
any of her European neighbours, and the cities of Bordeaux, Lyon and Marseille had 
grown rich from the guaranteed access to African raw materials and markets that 
empire provided. At its peak in the interwar years, France had the largest African 
empire of any of the European colonial powers, a source of prestige, wealth, 
influence and, in times of need, soldiers. All these factors contributed to the healing 
of French national amour propre and the wounds inflicted on civil and military pride 
by the loss of France's first empire in North America, defeat by the Prussians in 1870, 
and the trauma of the First World War. 
Africa proved essential to France again during the Second World War, both as a 
source of soldiers, and as French territory from which the Free French opposition to 
the Vichy regime could be rallied. Many commentators ascribe de Gaulle' s personal 
interest in African affairs to his wartime experience when Guyanese-born Felix 
Eboue, governor of Chad, was the first to rally to de Gaulle and the Free French. (De 
Gaulle subsequently appoint Eboue governor general of AEF in its entirety). 
Moreover, de Gaulle's claim to legitimacy as leader of France in exile was declared 
in Algiers, on 'French soil'. 
Moreover, France used empire as a vehicle for self-redefinition after the Second 
World War, at a time when the trend of international events in the American-defined 
post-war order was towards the end of empire; and only in France did the process of 
decolonisation so intrude as to threaten the state and bring the 'mother country' to 
the brink of civil war. Unlike Europe's other major colonial power Britain, the 
postwar agenda in France was set by soldiers, divided and embittered by the 
1 8  A.S .  Kanya-Forstner, 'French expansion in Africa: the mythical theory' , in R. Owen and B .  Sutcliffe eds., 
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combined traumas of defeat in 1940, occupation, collaboration and subsequent 
recrimination. The hierarchy of the post-war army survived remarkably intact from 
the Vichy period, and sought redemption through imperial glory, which, it was 
hoped, would unify and restore the French army, and regenerate France itself. 
However, the primacy given to militarism following the humiliation of 1940 led to 
demoralising counter-insurgency wars, further defeats, and direct military 
involvement in politics, to the extent that from 1944 to 1962, the French army would 
enjoy no more than a few weeks of true peace. Alfred Grosser points out the 
distorting effect of this period on French foreign policy-making: 
[1]1 a fallu attendre, a part deux brefs intermedes, 17  annees supplementaires 
[apres la Liberation] pour qu'aucun probleme tragique n'oberat plus la politique 
exterieure de la France . . .  Pour comprendre les dirigeants et leurs difficultes, on 
doit tenir compte de la coupure qu'a consitue la fin de la guerre d'Algerie. Depuis 
1962 seulement, la politique exterieure de la France n'est plus liee a du sang verse, 
ce qui a accorde a ses responsables sinon la liberte d'action, du moins la liberation 
d'une hantise.l9 
Any assessment of French policy beyond the Hexagon also requires consideration of 
the international context, particularly in a post-war climate of bipolar strategic 
alignment antithetic to the maintenance of formal empire by the now second-rate 
European powers, and favourable to secure, superpower-led spheres of influence. 
This pattern - of superpower dominance and a rising anti-colonial tide - was already 
apparent in the period of postwar reconstruction preceding 1956. In the Franco­
African context, many commentators take as their starting point the Brazzaville 
conference of February 1944, which sought to secure France's African empire 
through restyling the anti-democratic system of colonial governments-general (in 
Brazzaville, administrative centre of Afrique equatoriale fran(aise, and Dakar, seat of 
the governor-general of Afrique occidentale fran(aise), substituting an all-embracing 
Union fran(aise which, it was hoped, would bind France and its African colonies 
together in a demographically dominant nation of '100 million Frenchmen'. Anthony 
Clayton points out that: 
The French nation [was seen] as one endowed with particular truths and wisdom, 
and also one entrusted with a mission to pass on these truths and wisdom to 
Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, London: Longman 1972 pp277, 289 
19 Alfred Grosser, Affaires exterieures, La politique de la France 1944- 1989, Paris: Flammarion 1989, p8 
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others, even if necessary by force. Behind all the differing policies pursued by 
France in different parts of her Empire lay, firmly rooted, this common mentality; 
France and French possessions must form an indivisible whole, and related to 
this, thinking on problems in absolute, rather than compromise, terms. Secession 
to the French mind was not an emancipation, it was a heresy.20 
However, Brazzaville and the Union franc;aise failed to take account of the 
educational, politicising and liberating effects of World War II on Africans, 
particularly those who had fought in regiments of the French army (notably the pan­
West African Tirailleurs sem?galais), who, while not necessarily promised a land fit for 
heroes, had seen through the image of French invinciblity; indeed, they had seen 
France defeated, occupied, divided and dependent on African and other external 
help for liberation. Cinema, and an epic poem by Senegalese poet-president Leopold 
Sedar Senghor, tell of the 1944 mutiny at Camp Thiaroye when demobilised 
Tirailleurs senegalais, denied overdue back pay and equal treatment with French 
soldiers, rebelled and briefly took their French commanding officer hostage. The 
mutiny was suppressed by force and 35 soldiers killed. 
Despite an international climate shaped by superpowers without formal empires, 
and the creation of the United Nations which gave voice to Third World and non­
aligned nations, French policy sought to put a brake on the increasingly irresistible 
impetus for decolonisation. Basil Davidson points out that: '[T]he tide of popular 
pressure was gathering strength elsewhere: time and again, the British and French 
were obliged to shorten the timetables with which they envisaged serious 
concessions to African demands.'21 
Contestation 
The final break-up of France's African empire is normally placed between 1958 (the 
Communaute franr;aise referendum and Guinean independence) and 1962 (final 
independence of Algeria) . Claude Wauthier suggests that, unlike the British, France 
20 Anthony Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization, London: Longman 1994, pp2-3 
2 1  Basil Davidson, Modern Africa: A Social and Political History 3rd edn.,  London: Longman 1994, p 122 
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had foreseen from the mid-1950s an organised, French-initiated transition through 
gradual reforms to full independence, grooming African leaders through including 
them in the French parliamentary system: 
En Afrique fran<;aise, la loi-cadre de Gaston Defferre de 1956, qui avait donne aux 
territoires africains d'outre-mer un regime de semi-autonomie, avec une 
Assemblee elue, puis la semi-independance accordee en 1958 dans le cadre de la 
Communaute, les avait egalement prepares a ! 'administration de leurs propres 
affaires. Le Parlement britannique n'avait jamais ouvert ses portes a des elus 
africains, alors que la Chambre des deputes et le Senat fran<;ais en avaient accueilli 
des 1946, quand l 'Union fran<;aise avait succede a l 'Empire fran<;ais. Plusieurs 
d'entre eux avaient ete ministres du gouvernement fran<;ais, dont MM. 
Houphouet-Boigny et Leopold Senghor, futurs chefs d'Etat de la Cote d'Ivoire et 
du Senegai.22 
However, the post-war decade and a half preceding this period was characterised by 
a series of political and ideological developments within both France's colonies and 
the colonised world generally, which would have a direct bearing on the timing and 
nature of the decolonisation process. Pressure for decolonisation in France's African 
empire came from three major sources: the colonised African subjects of French 
colonialism; the international community, both the postwar superpowers which had 
no formal empires, and by example from other imperial powers, notably Britain; and 
from critics of colonial rule at home on both right and left (from Cartier to Sartre), 
with countervailing pressure against decolonisation from the colonial/ settler lobby 
(most notably in Algeria). French responses to this pressure, under the Fourth 
Republic and in the early years of the Fifth, took the form of limited legal reform, 
notably the 1956 loi cadre; an attempt to create dominions or a commonwealth (Union 
fram;:aise, Communaute jran9aise); concession of independence (to Morocco and 
Tunisia); military suppression (Algeria); and neutralisation of African nationalism by 
'divide and rule', balkanisation and treaties. 
The return to power of Charles de Gaulle in June 1958 allowed for a unified, 
coherent French strategy towards the decolonisation process for the first time. The 
Cold War global system of bipolarity was hostile to nineteenth century empires, and 
with the worsening of the Algerian war, France's Western allies feared radical, anti-
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Western decolonisation if the process were delayed. Given his personal and 
historical connections with Africa, de Gaulle realised that an evolution in strategic 
thinking, following logically from the precedent in 1956 of peaceful transition to 
independence in the former protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, would be the only 
way for France to retreat from empire on its own terms - what Pierre Biarnes called 
'un repli en bon ordre·23 - and shape postcolonial Africa in its own image. This 
conclusion was reinforced by the possibility that the French style of counter­
insurgency war in Algeria had simply outlived its usefulness in the new 
international climate, where France could be embarrassed diplomatically at 
international fora; Michel Martin notes that the guerre algerienne strategy, ' [I]n 
operation almost continuously from the end of the first half of the 19th century . . .  
lost its significance in the 1960s, though not through the erosion of its efficiency. The 
quasi-military victory on the field in Algeria would not have prevented France from 
ultimately losing this war.'24 Under the politico-military confusion of the Fourth 
Republic, French strategy in Algeria was a military success, but a political failure. De 
Gaulle's resolution of the war on terms not unfavourable to metropolitan France and 
over the heads of the pieds noirs and the Organisation de l 'Armee Secrete (OAS) which 
sought to frustrate such a resolution, can be taken as the converse: a military failure ­
that is, an acceptance that the military could achieve no more - but a political 
triumph. 
Another factor in de Gaulle's success was his ability to distinguish between local 
nationalism, and the Cold War bogeyman of international communist conspiracy. 
Many French military commanders in Algeria, who had lived through the army's 
humiliations in 1940 and at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, believed their fight in Algeria was 
in defence not just of Algerie franfaise and French glory, but also against communist­
inspired subversion which threatened France's southern flank. This point is 
emphasised by Anthony Clayton in reference to Alphonse Juin, the pied noir Chief of 
22 C1aude Wauthier, '11 y a trente ans: 1es independances africaines', Le Monde 23-23 December 1990 
23 Pierre Biarnes, Les Frans;ais en Afrique Noire de Riche1ieu a Mitterrand, Paris: Armand Colin 1 987, p289 
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the Defence Staff in the immediate post-war period (1945-47): Many, notably Juin, 
held the view that nationalism in North Africa would and did equate with Soviet 
Communism, posing a direct strategic threat to France hersel£. '25 This 
misinterpretation of the post-war anticolonial impulse led to a short-sighted belief in 
a domino theory of loss of empire: any concession or compromise to anti-colonial 
and nationalist movements would weaken France's imperial flanks and leave the 
metropole itself vulnerable to subversion. As Michel Martin notes in relation to his 
guerre algerienne model above, such Cold War paranoia 1ed to confusion between 
local nationalisms and socialism and communism, between decolonisation and a 
threat to the free world, and as such rendered any compromise - the very objective 
for which it [the guerre algerienne strategy] was originally devised - impossible.'26 
Instead of this failed politico-military tactic, De Gaulle was able, through 
identification and grooming of interlocuteurs valables, to ensure the transfer of power 
to a French-favoured elite, negotiating with them the removal of the obvious 
colonial apparatus while securing French strategic and economic interests and the 
isolation (in the short term at least) of more radical anti-colonial forces, be they Arab 
nationalists, pan-Africanists, communists or Islamists. This was not an entirely 
original tactic; de Gaulle would have been aware that it had been used with some 
success in Afrique occidentale fran<;aise where French colonial administrators had, 
early in the century, identified Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal as a means of 
underpinning France's transition to a system of indirect rule. This shrewd 
identification of the powerful restraining influence of the nzarabouts on indigenous 
demands extended to French support for Islamic schools - in direct contradiction of 
the republican principle of secular schooling - which would create, in the words of 
the French lieutenant governor when the first such school was established in 
Mauritania in 1930, 'A Muslim intellectual foyer [which] will help maintain West 
24 Michel Martin, 'From Algiers to N'Djamena: France's  Adaptation to Low-Intensity Wars 1 830- 1 987' in DA 
Charters, D.A. & M. Tugwell eds., Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis, London: 
Brassey' s  Defence Publishers 1 989, p99 
25 Anthony Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization, London: Longman 1994, p7 
7 1  
African Islam in its present mood which renders i t  much more malleable and open to 
our administrative action than in any other region with a Coranic influence. '27 
Mahmood Mamdani emphasises the significance of these religious intermediaries for 
the durability of French rule and influence in West Africa: 
In the kaleidoscopic reality of Islam in Africa, it would be difficult to find many 
instances of a lips-and-teeth relationship between an occupying colonial power 
and an indigenous Islamic hierarchy . . .  In the referendum of 1958, the marabouts 
campaigned against independence "with the help and encouragement of the 
French administration." The final vote, overwhelmingly in favour of the French 
Community, was popularly termed "the marabouts' Yes".28 
Nonetheless, events beyond France's  African territories also added momentum to 
the anti-colonial tide. Kwame Nkrumah's anti-colonial agitation in neighbouring 
British colony the Gold Coast (post-independence Ghana) both inspired other West 
Africans, and fuelled further European fears of a communist conspiracy. The 
accession to power in 1954 of Camel Abdel Nasser in Egypt offered a role model and 
material support to anti-colonial activists in France's north African possessions and, 
during the Suez crisis of 1956, a clear illustration of the new global power equation 
for the humiliated former imperial powers. 
Parallel with and partly in response to these events was the development of 
anticolonialism in France, most notably amongst intellectuals, journalists and 
writers. The motives for this opposition to empire were not universal, but crossed 
the political spectrum from right (those who thought empire too costly) to left (those 
who considered it immoral). The former perspective is often labelled Cartierism, 
after Raymond Cartier, a journalist with Paris-Match who in 1956 advocated that 
26 Michel Martin, 'From Algiers to N'Djamena: France's  Adaptation to Low-Intensity Wars 1 830- 1987' in DA 
Charters, D.A. & M. Tugwell eds., Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis, London: 
Brassey 's  Defence Publishers 1 989, p91 
27 Christopher Harrison, France and Islam in West Africa 1 860- 1960, Cambridge: CUP 1988, p 1 90. The 
colonial rulers' astute assimilation of local organised religion, the leaders of which had previously opposed their 
rule, is most strongly redolent to this author of the successful transformation of the Irish Catholic Church, 
following the establishment of Maynooth College in the late eighteenth century and Catholic emancipation in the 
early nineteenth, into a bulwark of the colonial status quo, with exclusive control over the education from 
elementary to university level of the island's 'aboriginals'. As Joyce would lament, 'Oh Ireland my first and only 
love, where Christ and Caesar are hand in glove ! '  
28 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, 
Princeton N.J. : Princeton University Press; London: James Currey 1 996, p86 
72 
government spending prioritise underdeveloped and economically-depressed areas 
of France before considerations of empire. This sentiment gave rise to an isolationist 
anti-colonial lobby whose sentiments were encapsulated by the maxim: la Correze 
plut8t que la Zambeze.29 However the major force for anticolonialism was on the left; 
during the Algerian war, some pro-FLN sympathisers even lent practical support to 
the movement, acting as a Fifth Column to the extent of hiding and transporting 
arms and explosives for the movement's bombing campaign within France30. Others 
formed an articulate anticolonial lobby which brought pressure to bear on the 
government and military both in specific terms of torture, aerial bombardments and 
other crimes which continued involvement in Algeria entailed, and in a general 
condemnation of France's failure to decolonise in the immediate post-war period. In 
his celebrated preface to Albert Memmi's Portrait du colonise, Jean-Paul Sartre 
identified colonialism as a denial of human rights through force, poverty and 
ignorance, a negation of the values successive French republics claimed to represent: 
'En fait, le racisme est inscrit dans le systeme . . .  Le colonialisme refuse les droits de 
l 'homme a des hommes qu'il a soumis par la violence, qu'il maintient de force dans 
la misere et }'ignorance, done, comme dirait Marx, en etat de "sous-humanite" '  .31  
Not all supported Sartre's militant anti-colonial stance, most famously Albert 
Camus, born into a poor, pied noir Algerian family, who declared that he could not 
support the FLN and its attacks on white Algerians as he valued 'his mother more 
than freedom'.  Historian-of-record Charles-Robert Ageron went further, dismissing 
anti-colonial intellectuals as communist party dupes: 'L'hegemonie intellectuelle du 
PCF . . .  fut dans la decennie 1944-54 assez incontestee pour faire accepter par les 
ecrivains "engages" et les publicistes de gauche, une denonciation globale du 
"colonialisme". '32 But the most articulate and persuasive contribution to the anti-
29 See Jacques Thobie, Gilbert Meynier, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch & Charles-Robert Ageron, Histoire de la 
France coloniale 19 14- 1990, Paris:  Armand Colin 1 990, Chapitre 24: 'Le Cartierisme' pp475-484 
30 See Herve Hamon & Patrick Rotman, Les porteurs de valises, Paris: Seuil 1979 
31 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Preface' in Albert Memmi, Portrait du colonise, Paris: Payot 1973, pp25, 26 
32 Charles-Robert Ageron, La decolonisation fran<;aise, Paris: Armand Colin 199 1 ,  p 109; Ageron is particularly 
contemptuous of Sartre, whom he lampoons as 'le pape de l 'anticolonialisme' and dismisses as an ill-informed 
and subjective polemicist: 'Sur le terrain colonial qu'il ne connaissait pas, Sartre ne fut pas un maltre a penser, 
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colonial intellectual movement was provided by Franz Fanon who, like Albert 
Memmi, was himself a colonial subject, from the French-ruled island of Martinique. 
In the most celebrated works of his short life Fanon, a psychiatrist by profession, 
offered a philosophical analysis of the effects of colonisation and, as one of its 
foremost advocates, of decolonisation: 
Decolonisation never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and 
modifies them fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with their 
inessentiality into privileged actors, with the grandiose glare of history's 
floodlights upon them. It brings a natural rhythm into existence, introduced by 
new men, and with it a new language and a new humanity. Decolonisation is the 
veritable creation of new men. But this creation owes nothing of its legitimacy to 
any supernatural power; the "thing" which has been colonised becomes man 
during the same process by which it frees itself.33 
But one could go further than Fanon and argue that, given the depths to which 
French society was riven by the decolonisation process, this transformation may be 
seen to have affected the coloniser as much as the colonised; decolonisation - the loss 
of its Asian and North African colonies - undermined French society to an extent 
unimaginable in Europe's other colonial powers. Such a loss - forced and hasty 
retreat from empire - could not be sustained again. 
Reform 
Pierre-Fran<;ois Gonidec identified two stages in the evolution of African nationalism 
in the French empire: the contestation phase and the nationalism phase: 'Nationalism 
is most often preceded by a period of contestation, that is, a period during which the 
colonised strive to penetrate the colonial system to acquire situations to which, in 
their opinion, they are entitled. This is a struggle within the colonial system, but not 
against the system.'34 
mais un polemiste, seulement convaincu de la fin de ! 'Europe . . .  , de la culpabilite des colonialistes fran'<ais et de 
la victoire du tiers monde.' Ibid p l lO 
33 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, London: Penguin 1967 
34 P-F Gonidec, Les Systemes Politiques Africains, Premiere partie, Paris: Librairie generale de droit et de 
jurisprudence - Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 197 1 ,  p64 
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Both the nature of resistance to colonisation, and French reaction to this resistance, 
were fundamentally different south of the Sahara. Was this because of the distance 
and barrier, both physical and psychological, provided by the Sahara itself? Was it 
because France had learned from Algeria, or because, unlike Algeria, there were few 
French settlers to impede any disengagement? Does the decolonisation process in 
the French empire south of the Sahara represent an evolution in French policy, or 
was it merely a combination of the facts that the demands on France in Algeria were 
too great, sub-Saharan Africa was less important politically, economically and 
strategically; and the change of regime in France facilitated a coordinated, unified 
politico-military strategy which was lacking in Algeria? 
The unique circumstances of the end of formal French empire in sub-Saharan Africa 
resulted from a combination of factors suggested by these questions. The nature of 
anti-colonial pressure from below was shaped by the nature of French rule in the 
sub-continent since the Berlin Conference of 1884. Important for any understanding 
of the decolonisation process was the decision as early as 1854, under the West 
African governorship of Louis de Faidherbe, to abandon any thought of colonisation 
by settlement in the region. The principal reason for this contrast with later North 
African policy was highlighted by anglophone Ghanaian leader K wame Nkrumah, 
who is said to have suggested upon independence of his country from Britain in 
1957, that the newly-independent state build a commemorative statue to the 
Anopheles mosquito, as it, the bearer of malaria, had saved Ghana from white 
settlement. In her biography of Senghor, Janet Vaillant points out that the non­
arrival of colons in French West Africa was due similarly to tropical circumstances, 
not European qualms: 'The document announcing the decision not to pursue a 
policy of French settlement in Senegal contained the observation that the climate 
there, unlike that of Algeria, was too unhealthy for French settlers. It suggested that 
the land be left for native cultivation and that the French concentrate on controlling 
the lucrative import and export trade. '35 
35 Janet Vaillant, Black. French and African: A Life of Leopold Sedar Senghor London & Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press 1990, p9 1 
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Despite the small European presence and notwithstanding the impression given by 
many Eurocentric accounts of the period, sub-Saharan Africa was not immune to the 
flowing tide of international affairs in the post-war period. In any case, despite a 
comparatively successful (for France) colonial system of indirect rule, acceptance of 
French jurisdiction in sub-Saharan Africa had never been total. As early as 1946, the 
Bamako congress, attended by delegations from most French African colonies, 
created the Rassemblement democratique africain (RDA).  The RDA, led by Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire and Gabriel d'Arboussier of Senegal, would 
dominate the politics of French West Africa for a decade which saw repeated French 
efforts to legitimise colonial rule, a period during which, as Patrick Manning puts it, 
'a dizzying series of elections and electoral changes cascaded past the African 
voters. ·36 
Meanwhile, throughout francophone sub-Saharan Africa, growing politicisation 
increased the pressure from below in response to insufficient change from above: in 
Cote d'Ivoire, where in 1949, French-educated evolues such as Houphouet-Boigny, a 
founder-member of the RDA and considered then a communist sympathiser, clashed 
with the reactionary colonial administration; in Cameroun, which saw growing 
challenges to French trusteeship by the Union des Peuples du Cameroun (UPC); in 
Guinea, where Sekou Toure developed the popular trade union base which brought 
him to prominence to create the anti-colonial grass-roots organisation of the Parti 
democratique de la Guinee; and in Senegal where in Dakar, capital of Afrique occidentale 
fran�aise, Leopold Sedar Senghor's Bloc democratique senegalais propounded 'African 
socialism.' 
This widespread and seemingly unstoppable clamour for change, from mere reform 
to total self-determination, led the colonial powers to conclude that change was 
imperative and, as John Hargreaves suggests, 'reinforced the warning that the 
dangers of rapid decolonisation might be less than those of excessive caution.'37 
36 Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1 880- 1 985, Cambridge: CUP 1988, p 143 
37 John D. Hargreaves, The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa, London: The Historical Association (General 
Series pamphlet 88) 1976, p27 
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Limited legal reform: the loi-cadre 
The culmination of this activity, electoral and extra-parliamentary, French or African 
initiated, was the 1956 loi-cadre ('enabling law') . The loi-cadre reforms provided for 
two broad categories of government services: territorial services and state services. 
By passing some important services to the territorial level, France's policy was 
cautious in avoiding African participation in areas essential to true independence, 
such as defence and external affairs. It came, however, as too little too late, and was 
denounced as a pretext for the continuation of French colonialism. 
The journal Presence africaineL the forum in which much of the anti-colonial sentiment 
of the new generation of French-educated Africans was articulated, gave its analysis 
of the loi-cadre in early 1958 (i.e. before the collapse of the Fourth Republic and De 
Gaulle's return to power). An editorial argued that the loi-cadre was: 'un des signes 
que !'evolution vers l'independance est inevitable. Con<;ue et promulguee au 
moment ou les evenements du Maghreb parvenaient a un niveau de gravite 
exceptionnelle, elle signifie que 1' opinion publique metropolitaine et celle des 
peuples africains interesses ont oblige les gouvernements a franchir une etape 
necessaire. '38 The origins of this too-little-too-late colonial response were clearly 
spelt out: 
Nul ne pouvait de bonne foi se faire des illusions sur l'oeuvre de balkanisation 
entre les peuples, de division escomptee entre les masses et leurs ministres, ni sur 
le cout de cette nouvelle experience [ . . .  ] [L]a loi-cadre est depasse par !'opinion 
publique africaine. Sous la pression des jeunes etudiants, des syndicalistes et des 
partis politiques, 1' autorite meme de la loi-cadre s' effrite pour laisser paraltre 
l'autorite de peuples s'appretant a decider eux-memes de leur propre destin.39 
38 ' . . .  one sign that evolution in the direction of independence is inevitable. Conceived and promoted at a time 
when events in the Maghreb were taking on an exceptional seriousness, it signifies that metropolitan [French] 
public opinion, and that of the African peoples concerned, have obliged government to take an essential step 
forward.' Presence africaine 1 7- 1 8 ,  fevrier-mai 1958, p68 
39 'No-one could genuinely be taken in by this work of balkanisation between peoples, of division sown between 
the masses and their ministers, nor by the cost of this new experiment. . .  [T]he loi-cadre has been overtaken by 
African public opinion. Under pressure from young students, trade unionists and political parties, the very 
authority of the loi-cadre is disintegrating, to reveal the authority of peoples preparing to decide themselves their 
own destiny . . .  ' :  Presence africaine 1 7- 18 ,  fevrier-mai 1958, p68 
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Its principal effect was the dismantling of the two governments-general in Dakar 
(Afrique occidentale franraise) and Brazzaville (Afrique equatoriale franraise) and the 
redistribution of power to the governments of the fourteen individual colonies. This 
dilution of power and balkanisation of the federations emerged four years later as 
the vehicle of sub-Saharan decolonisation, but paved the way for an only partial 
concession of independence by the imperial power. Addressing the National 
Assembly in Paris on 1 February 1957, Leopold Sedar Senghor protested the 
government was offering only 'a semi-autonomy . . .  not the reality, but the 
appearances of power'; he also condemned the inadequacy of the proposed new 
status, in words with a prophetic ring even when the loi-cadre had indeed been 
overtaken: 
Nous ne sommes plus les grands enfants qu'on s'est plus [sic] a voir en nous, et 
c'est pourquoi les joujoux et les sucettes ne nous interessent pas. Sur les questions 
essentielles, comme le service des douanes, des pastes, telephones et telegraphes, 
la radiodiffusion, l'enseignement superieur, les services interterritoriaux, le 
Gouvernement est reste sourd a nos arguments et n'a voulu faire aucune 
concession importante.4o 
Senghor's view did not enjoy unanimity among African deputies. In contrast, Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny declared in November 1956 that: 
La loi-cadre concernant les TOM, due a la genereuse initiative de mon excellent 
ami Gaston Defferre, ministre des Territoires d'outre-mer avec qui j 'ai le plus vif 
plaisir a collaborer, constitue dans son ensemble institutionnel, politique, 
economique et social, une reelle promotion pour l'Afrique.41 
Algeria should not be forgotten in this context. The sheer scale of France's 
commitment of men, money, material and political credibility during the Algerian 
war between 1954 and 1962 meant that it could not afford the opening of a second 
front. Such basic strategic considerations had had a direct bearing on the rapid 
40 We are no longer the big children we were once taken to be, and that is why toys and lollipops do not interest 
us. On the essential questions like the customs, postal, telegraph and telephone service, radio transmission, 
higher education, interterritorial communications, the Government has remained deaf to our arguments and has 
not been prepared to make any important concession'. L.S.  Senghor, Debats de I' Assemblee Nationale 1 .2 .57, in 
Presence africaine 1 7- 1 8, fevrier-mai 1958, Les elus des T.O.M. et la loi-cadre' ,  p 122 
41 'The loi-cadre concerning the TOM (French overseas territories), due to the generous initiative of my 
excellent friend Gaston Defferre, Minister of Overseas Territories which whom I have the greatest pleasure in 
cooperating, constitutes in its institutional, political, economic and social entirety, real progress for Africa'. F. 
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concession of independence to Morocco and Tunisia. And, as John Hargreaves 
points out, the success, for France and for de Gaulle, of the sub-Saharan 
independences, was both necessitated by Algeria, and would subsequently make the 
Algeria settlement less traumatic: 
The connection between events in Algeria and in AOF should not be forgotten. 
On the one hand, France's readiness to accept the political reforms which led from 
the loi-cadre of 1956 to the independences of 1960 was clearly influenced by the 
need to avoid further military commitments on Algeria's southern borders; but in 
turn the apparent initial success of this exercise in decolonisation made the 
prospect of Algerian independence less unthinkable.42 
While African leaders tried unsuccessfully to solve some of the problems created by 
the loi-cadre reforms, a series of events brought down the Fourth Republic, mostly 
related to France's conduct of its war in Algeria, notably the bombing of the Tunisian 
border village of Sakiet in February 1958. By 1960, with de Gaulle returned to power, 
the first round of Franco-FLN talks, UN recognition of Algeria's right to self­
determination (20 December 1960), and, despite OAS attacks, a situation of 
comparative political stability in France, pressure from within and from without for 
the dismantling of the rest of France's African empire brought the sub-continent to 
centre stage. 
Transition 
The tendency of European (and therefore, almost invariably, Eurocentric 
commentators) is to attribute the dismantling of formal French empire in sub­
Saharan Africa to one man, contributing in no small part to the African cult of de 
Gaulle, the architect of French decolonisation but also, it may be argued, of its 
neocolonialism. Alastair Horne notes that: '[B]y France's non-white subjects he was . . .  
revered as the "man of  Brazzaville" in memory of his historic speech there of  January 
1944, when he declared that it would be French policy "to lead each of the colonial 
peoples to a development that will permit them to administer themselves and, later, 
Houphouet-Boigny, La Concorde, no1 ,  1 novembre 1 956, in Presence africaine 17- 1 8 ,  fevrier-mai 1958 ,  Les elus 
des T.O.M. et la loi-cadre' ,  p 1 2 1  
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to govern themselves . . .  " He viewed "integrity of the French empire" as an adjunct ­
and therefore secondary - to the mystic grandeur of France, rather than something 
with any more practical value in itsel£.'43 
Similarly, John Chipman explains France's retention of control south of the Sahara 
from the same perspective: 'As France's individual position and strength in North 
Africa began to fade, French leaders, and particularly de Gaulle, saw in Black Africa 
the one area where France's military power could still be relevant, and where its 
acceptance would symbolise the retention of unique national influence ( . . .  ) A special 
relationship could therefore be nurtured between de Gaulle, who was trying to 
preserve French greatness, and African leaders who knew that if they could share in 
the creation of a new France they would also have a part in her success. '44 And at a 
1994 symposium commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Brazzaville conference, 
Edouard Bustin spoke of: 'The image of Charles de Gaulle . . .  [as] a man endowed with 
a special empathy for Africa, capable of developing a privileged rapport with 
African leaders and masses, and symbolic of the best that France has to offer to 
mankind - her mission emancipatrice as well as her mission civilisatrice. '45 
Accordingly, the preamble to the new constitution in 1958 included the declaration 
that: 'Le peuple fran<;;ais proclame solennellement son attachement aux Droits de 
l'Homme et aux principes de la souverainete nationale tels qu'ils ont ete definis par 
la Declaration de 1789, confirmee et completee par le preambule de la Constitution 
de 1946. En vertu de ces principes et de celui de la libre determination des peuples, 
la Republique offre aux territoires d'outre-mer qui manifestent la volonte d'y 
adherer, des institutions nouvelles fondees sur l'ideal commun de liberte, d'egalite et 
de fraternite et con<;;ues en vue de leur evolution democratique.'46 Chapter XII of the 
1958 Constitution, with dealt with the Community's institutions, also allowed for the 
42 John Hargreaves, The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa, London: The Historical Association (General 
Series pamphlet 88) 1976, p30 
43 Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-62, London: Macmillan 1977, p28 1  
44 John Chipman, French Power i n  Africa, Oxford: Blackwell 1989, ppl l5, 103 
45 Edouard Bustin, Une certaine idee de l 'Afrique: De Gaulle's vision of Africa between mythology and 
pragmatism', paper presented to Brazzaville +40 conference, Boston University, 7-8 October 1994, p5 
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accession to independence of Community members via 'un transfert de competences 
communes' .  This proviso allowed for transition to independence via a confederal­
style community (approved by parliamentary vote in 1960) with which independent 
states could co-exist - a system approximating to dominion status - but to which only 
six states (the four former AEF states Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad and 
Oubangui-Chari (later CAR), along with Senegal and Madagascar) were prepared to 
associate themselves. This transitional communaute renovee was rejected by Cote 
d'Ivoire, Upper Volta (later Burkina Faso), Niger, Dahomey (later Benin), Mauritania 
and Mali (i.e. the state which emerged from the break-up of the Federation du Mali 
which had been formed in 1959 by the French territories of Senegal and Soudan), 
and the project was abandoned officially in March 1961 .47 
Claude Wauthier notes that: '[De Gaulle] confortait l'image d'une France genereuse 
et sans rancune envers ses anciennes possessions qui avaient choisi l 'independance 
plutot que de rester institutionnellement clans le giron de la metropole. '4s None of 
this fits with de Gaulle's vindictive treatment of Guinea at the 1958 referendum 
which offered a choice of immediate independence, or membership of a Franco­
African federation, the Communaute franfaise. Sekou Toure declared that Guinea 
preferred 'poverty in liberty to wealth in slavery', and alone in West Africa, the 
people of Guinea, politicised by Sekou Toure's PDG, chose outright independence. 
This was followed by precipitate French disengagement and, as threatened, a 
merciless withdrawal of all French economic aid and infrastructure. In contrast, the 
transition to formal independence in 1960 of the remaining territories of the fomer 
French empire was an agreed process in which French control of the new states' 
currency and (through military accords) defence and foreign policy was ensured. 
Indeed, the rulers of the new states reciprocated through withholding criticism of 
France's policy in Algeria; Wauthier notes that: 
Autant la rupture entre Paris et Conakry [capital of independent Guinea] avait ete 
brutale . . .  , autant le processus qui devait conduire finalement a la disparition de la 
46 Assemblee nationale: Service de la communication, Constitution du 4 octobre 1 958: Preambule, p5 
47 Wauthier gives a brief account of the communaute renovee in 'Il y a trente ans: les independances africaines', 
Le Monde 23-23 December 1990 
48 Claude Wauthier, Quatre presidents et l'Afrique, Paris :  Seuil 1995, p l 72 
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Communaute se  deroula sans trop d'acrimonie: ceux qui choisirent 
l 'independance en 1960 conclurent tous des accords de cooperation avec la France 
et resterent dans la zone franc. Bien plus, ils prirent pour la plupart le risque de ne 
pas desavouer la politique algerienne du general de Gaulle: echange de bons 
procedes avec le chef de l'Etat, qui leur avait precisement accorde ce qu'il avait 
refuse a Sekou Toure . . .  49 
Neutralisation of African nationalism, Balkanisation and the Plan raisonnable 
De Gaulle's blueprint for decolonisation a la jran9aise was the Plan raisonnable, which 
was characterised by three principal objectives: to guarantee the territorial integrity 
within colonial boundaries of the individual African states, ensuring they remained 
small and dependent on France; to secure in office the pro-French elites to which 
France would transfer power; and to integrate the bloc of newly independent states 
and their armies into France's global geo-strategy, ensuring both a pro-French voting 
bloc at the United Nations and a French-managed sphere of influence in the sub­
continent. 
These objectives were put into effect without democratic consultation, and with little 
effort to conceal France's true strategic motives; John Chipman notes that: The Plan 
raisonnable made clear that the establishment of African national armies and the 
reorganisation of France's overseas defence were inseparable. In fact, the Plan was 
drawn up without any consultation with the emerging states of Africa. '50 Similarly, 
Guy Martin explains the system of linkage whereby those to whom France 
tranferred power were tied into allegiance to the ex-coloniser: The small 
francophone political elites . . .  now unreservedly acquiesced to the new cooperation 
agreements in so far as these helped to sustain their own power base . . .  Having a 
stake in the franco-African system, one understands why these particular elites 
generally opted for a gradual process of decolonisation rather than a radical break 
with the past. '51  This was a mutually advantageous relationship, for France and for 
the French-fostered ruling elites; Martin also points out that: 'Through the linkage 
49 Claude Wauthier, 'Il y a trente ans: les independances africaines', Le Monde 23-23 December 1990 
50 John Chipman, French Power in Africa, Oxford: Blackwell 1989, p 146 
5 l  Guy Martin, 'Continuity and Change in Franco-African relations', The Journal of Modern African Studies 
33 : 1  ( 1995), p4 
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established between the accession to international sovereignty, the signing of model 
accords de cooperation, and the wholesale adoption of the constitutional model of the 
Fifth Republic, France managed to institutionalise her political, economic, monetary 
and cultural pre-eminence over her former African colonies, which thereby 
remained excessively dependent on her.'52 
Richard Hodder-Williams points out that limited independence was accepted by 
many African leaders who, despite their nationalism, were still francophile, and 
could also foresee the extent to which their own position might depend on French 
support: 
De Gaulle had no intention of weakening the bonds which tied [the] new states to 
France more than was absolutely necessary and the leaders of most of the new 
states, like [Malagasy leader Philibert] Tsiranana, realised the benefits that might 
accrue by establishing bilaterally economic, technical and military links with 
France. For some, and Houphouet-Boigny was perhaps the prime example, links 
with France were positively desired because emotional attachment remained 
strong.53 
The states which emerged from subdivisions of the former French colonial blocs 
were therefore mostly small, artificial and weak. Christopher Clapham notes the 
effectiveness of this reapplication of 'divide and rule': 'The fact that the francophone 
states of West Africa were all much smaller in population than the two large 
anglophone ones of Nigeria and Ghana can only have encouraged the great majority 
of them to have remained in close association with France.'54 
The new states were also highly centralised, on the model of the French Fifth 
Republic, and their governments were hidebound by effective French control of their 
economies, which denied them access to the basic political levers of the state.55 
52 ibid. 
53 Richard Hodder-Williams, An Introduction to the Politics of Tropical Africa, London: Unwin Hyman 1984, 
p215 
54 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: CUP 
1996, p64 
55 Richard Rathbone explains how de Gaulle modelled the newly independent states on his own, highly 
centralised republic led by a dominant president: The independence constitutions all seemed to have been run off 
on a copying machine that had been programmed very closely indeed by the French Fifth Republic. Like the 
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Many of the conflicts which have blighted the post-colonial development of 
Francophone Africa are the direct result of the realisation by disenfranchised and/ or 
disadvantaged social groups, often trapped within states not of their making, that 
capture of the state was the key to altering what they considered the unfair 
distribution of wealth and opportunity in society. 
The issue of sovereignty is central to this study's discussion of the French military 
presence and use of military intervention after decolonisation, which will test 
Clapham's suggestion that: '[T]he maintenance of a regime in power by external 
military forces could plausibly be regarded as a negation of national sovereignty.'56 
The argument here is that French policy has been to create and maintain a sphere of 
satellite or client states in a treaty-fastened federation not dissimilar to the short­
lived Union franfaise. Albert Wirz points to the deliberate circumscription of 
independence, where it is made conditional on acceptance of the colonist's terms: 
Une multitude d'accords de cooperation et l'insertion dans la zone franc, 
promettant la stabilite, transformerent, de facto, les nouveaux Etats en satellites de 
la metropole. Une fois les ceremonies terminees et les premiers credits epuises, les 
Africains se trouvaient a nouveau relegues a la deuxieme place, souverains et 
malgre cela dependants, suspendus a la bonne volonte de crediteurs etrangers.57 
To what extent were the new states of France's African sphere independent? To what 
extent were they states? International law offers a definition: 'The State as a person 
of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent 
population; b) a defined territory; c) a Government; and d) a capacity to enter into 
relations with other states. 'ss J.G. Starke identifies point (d) here as the most 
important; but although the states which emerged from France's African empire 
may be seen to possess attributes a, b and c, Starke specifies with regard to d that: 'A 
master document, they all placed a great deal of power into presidential hands . '  Richard Rathbone, 'Independent 
West Africa' in JFA Ajayi and Michael Crowder eds . ,  History of West Africa Vol.II, 2nd edn.,  London: 
Longman 1987, p796 
56 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: CUP 
1996, p83 
57 Albert Wirz, 'La decolonisation de I' Afrique noire: lorsque I '  avenir paraissait ouvert' ,  Relations 
internationales 77, printemps 1994, p41 
58 'The Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States', Article 1 ,  quoted in J.G. Starke, 
Introduction to International Law, lOth edition, London: Butterworth's 1989, p95 
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state must have a recognised capacity to maintain external relations with other 
states. This distinguishes states proper from lesser units such as members of a 
federation, or protectorates, which do not manage their own foreign affairs . '59 
Revealing in this context are the following articles, representative of the bilateral 
accords signed here by France on the one hand, and the states which emerged from 
the former AEF: 
Article 3: [L]a Republique centrafricaine, la Republique du Congo et la 
Republique du Tchad tiennent la Republique fran<;aise informee des mesures 
generales ou particulieres qu' elles se proposent de prendre en ce qui concerne la 
recherche, 1' exploitation et le commerce exterieur des matieres premieres et 
produits strategiques. [ . . .  ] 
Article 4: La Republique centrafricaine, la Republique du Congo et la Republique 
du Tchad reservent a la satisfaction des besoins de leur consommation interieure 
les matieres premieres et produits strategiques obtenus sur leur territoire. Elles 
accordent a la Republique fran<;aise une preference pour 1' acquisition de surplus 
et s' approvisionnent par priorite aupres d' elle en ces matieres et produits. Elles 
facilitent leur stockage pour les besoins de la defense commune et, lorsque les 
interets de cette defense 1' exigent, elles prennent les mesures necessaires pour 
limiter ou interdire leur exportation a destination d'autres pays.60 
Accordingly, the states in question do not manage their own foreign affairs, 
including defence policy, because in the post-colonial period, they have not yet 
achieved full statehood in the sense understood in international law. The main legal 
impediments to the achievement of this statehood are the bilateral treaties with 
France which were signed at the time of independence and since; and the principal 
manifestation of this lack of statehood is the French military presence and/ or use (or 
threat) of military intervention. 
Military cooperation 
Underpinning the retention of control of these new states' economies, currency, and 
of their foreign and defence policy, was a system of military cooperation. Military 
cooperation, in the strict sense, implies only the business of training, technical 
assistance and the supply of material aid. However, Franco-African military 
59 J.G. Starke, Introduction to International Law, lOth edition, London: Butterworth's 1989, p96 
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cooperation has been the key to the maintenance of France's sphere of influence in 
Africa; it is based on a patron-client relationship, and means in effect a one-way 
transfer of funds, material, expertise and personnel. It thereby presupposes an 
assymetrical relationship between donor and recipient. 
The key legal safeguard for the former coloniser and its proteges was provided by 
French-drafted military agreements which, as Alain Rouvez notes, 'form the 
cornerstone of France's military edifice in Africa and provide the legal basis for one 
of Africa's most extensive and lasting security alliances with a foreign power'.6 1 The 
number and extent of these agreements means that the states of francophone Africa ­
the former colonies of France and Belgium - are militarily linked to a major ex­
colonial power in a unique bilateral axis far surpassing any comparable north-south 
military pact. Moreover, the military cooperation accords signed by France and the 
African states concerned make provision for the stationing of French forces in some 
states and the maintenance, by the Mission Militaire de Cooperation (formerly based at 
the Ministere de la Cooperation, rue Monsieur) of a Mission d'Assistance Militaire 
attached to the French embassy.62 The accords are also invoked as one of the two 
most frequent justifications for direct military intervention. 
The agreements take two basic forms: defence treaties (of which eight have been 
signed), and cooperation and military (or 'military technical') assistance accords (of 
which there are 26, including eight which operate in tandem with defence treaties). 
The former are concerned with French military power in Africa, the latter with the 
French army's creation and ongoing support of the armies of its African allies. The 
accords were drafted according to a standard model, and are as a result identical in 
most respects; as an example, of the Accord concernant ! 'assistance militaire technique 
entre la Republique franr;aise et la Republique centrafricaine, signed in Bangui on 13 
60 'Accord concernant I '  assistance militaire technique entre la Republique franc;aise et  la Republique 
centrafricaine', 13 aout 1960, Annexe Ill, Paris: Journal officiel 
61 Alain Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub­
Saharan Africa, Lanham: University Press of America 1994, p 101  
62 Official updates on  the Mission Militaire de Cooperation were published in  the bi-monthly publications La 
Lettre de la rue Monsieur and Freres d'Arrnes. 
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August 1960 by Jean Foyer (Secretaire d'Etat aux relations avec les Etats de la 
communaute, pour le gouvernement de la Republique fran�aise et par delegation du Premier 
ministre), and David Dacko, first president of the Central African Republic, the 
following details are noteworthy: 
Article 1 :  [L]a Republique fran\aise [hereafter RF] apporte son concours a la 
Republique centrafricaine [hereafter RCA] pour la constitution de sa gendarmerie 
et de son armee nationale; 
Article 5: La RCA s' engage a faire appel exclusivement a la RF pour 1' entretien et 
les fournitures ulterieures des materiels et equipements destines a ses forces 
armees; 
Article 7: Un bureau d'aide militaire fran\ais est mis a la disposition de la RCA 
pour faciliter la mise sur pied, l'encadrement, !'instruction et !'administration de 
ses forces armees; 
Article 10: Les personnels militaires mis a la disposition de la RCA demeurent 
sous juridiction militaire fran\aise . . .  ; 
Article 1 1 :  La RCA s'engage a ne faire appel qu'a la RF pour la formation de ses 
cadres . . .  La RF prend a sa charge les frais d'instruction des eleves et stagiaires 
clans les grandes ecoles et etablissements militaires fran\ais .63 
In eight cases, full defence treaties operate in tandem with military cooperation 
agreements such the one examined above. For example, the Franco-Gabonese 
defence treaty of 17  August 1960 stipulates that: 'Installations and emplacements 
determined by common accord are placed at the disposal of the French armed forces 
on the territory of the Republic of Gabon to permit them at all times and in all 
circumstances to prepare and carry out their common defence missions. '  More 
explicit is the 1961 Franco-Ivoirian defence accord, applicable to Dahomey (now 
Benin) and Niger, which states that the three new states: 'place entirely at the 
disposal of the French Republic those military installations necessary for defence 
needs.' Accordingly, French troops have been garrisoned in six states (Senegal, 
Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Chad, Djibouti) .  Although troop 
numbers in these garrisons have diminished, their purpose - rapid response to 
threats to French nationals, interests, or clients posed by internal insurgency through 
power projection capacity (since the formation in 1983 of the army's rapid-response 
Force d'Action Rapide); Chipman notes that: ' [T]he existence of permanent French 
63 'Accord concernant ! ' assistance militaire technique entre la Republique franc;:aise et la Republique 
centrafricaine', 13 aofit 1960, Paris:  Journal officiel 
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garrisons increases the reach of the FAR and allows it to have at least some capacity 
to intervene in almost any African area of direct interest to France.'64 
In return: 'The French Republic commits itself to provide the Republic of Cote 
d'Ivoire, the Republic of Dahomey and the Republic of Niger with the assistance 
necessary for the constitution of their armed forces. '  Under the terms of military 
technical assistance agreements, not only the states, but also their armies (including 
the gendarmerie), and by extension their overall military infrastructure, were to be 
French creations. Supplementary accords typically specified that: 'At the request of 
the governement of [for example] the United Republic of Cameroon, the 
Government of the French Republic commits itself to supply, insofar as its means 
allow, assistance in military personnel to the Cameroonian armed forces . '65 
This is significant, as the French military presence and interventions have been and 
continue to be justified in terms of the legality of interstate treaties signed between 
French governments and African ruling elites. In response to journalist Philippe 
Gaillard's question on the future of French military intervention in Africa, Jacques 
Foccart revealed that little in his own perception or discourse had changed; he 
replied that an intervention would be legitimate: 'Dans les cas couverts par les 
accords de defense, ce qui n'est pas nouveau et ce qui est tres clair, c'est-a-dire pour 
defendre un pays ami contre une agression exterieure. Nous n'avons pas a prendre 
parti clans les luttes intestines, encore mains a y intervenir. '66 Except, Foccart 
specifies, if there is external support (i.e. from a neighbouring state) for an internal 
rebellion; that would 'change everything.' This was to be a key factor in French 
legitimisation of its interventions in the principal case studies to be considered, 
Chad, Zaire and Rwanda. 
The framework for France's permanent intervention was thereby established; the 
regular recourse to military intervention was as a result most often justified by a 
64 John Chipman, French Power in Africa, Oxford: Blackwell l 989, pl46 
65 Paris: Journal officiel 
66 Jacques Foccart, Foccart Parle 2: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, Paris:  Fayard!Jeune Afrique 1997, p497 
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request from the incumbent African government or  head of  state, or  to  honour a 
bilateral treaty. Accordingly, France has intervened militarily over 30 times since 
1960. The pattern of these interventions will be the focus of the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
Decolonisation south of the Sahara was in essence swifter, less violent, less traumatic 
for France, less damaging to France's international image, and less costly because it 
was less complete, and decided on French terms. One explanation for differences in 
approach, conduct and conclusion of French sub-Saharan decolonisation is that 
France, in the person of Charles de Gaulle, learned from the mistakes of Algeria and 
adapted, or evolved, his political and military strategy accordingly; France's sub­
Saharan African territories would become independent, but it would be 
independence a la franr;aise. De Gaulle made this plain in an interview with L 'Echo 
d 'Oran in 1960: 'On dit que l 'abbe Fulbert Youlou [first president of the newly­
independent Congo-Brazzavillle] est independant. Mais c'est moi qui paie sa solde. 
Alors, pour moi, l'abbe Fulbert Youlou n'est pas independant. '67 
Even when the post-decolonisation heads-of-state were cemented in power with 
French intervention and protected by French-trained armies, direct French 
intervention continued. Indeed, by the early 1970s, France's African sphere seemed 
an anachronism; Herbert Tint concludes: 
If it is argued that the degree of dependence which the sub-Saharan and Malagasy 
republics exhibit in their relations with France is scarcely compatible with real 
independence, the answer must be that there is nothing to prevent any or all of 
the states concerned from successfully denouncing their ties with Paris at any 
time. But at the beginnng of the 1970s the emotional dependence of France - quite 
apart from dependence in other fields - was still so great, that at least their 
governing elites seemed to be incapable of even contemplating the severance of 
ties.68 
67 Charles de Gaulle, in an interview with Pierre Laffont of L Echo d 'Oran, November 1960, reported in Jean 
Lacouture, De Gaulle, tome 3, Le Souverain, p l37 
68 Herbert Tint, French Foreign Policy since the Second World War, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1972, 
pp202-203 
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This assessment may be debatable; but there is broad agreement on France's motives 
for the maintenance of a French presence in sub-Saharan Africa 1960-1969: resource 
security as a source of strategic minerals; commerce, trade, and influence both 
economic and political in an arena of East-West ideological competition during the 
Cold War. All of these characteristics may be considered as mutually dependent, and 
it may be argued that France's Africa policy is interventionary on many levels, and 
compromises the sovereignty which is the legal entitlement, according to the UN 
Charter, of independent states, and which is enshrined in France's foremost legal 
document, its Constitution.69 
The concept of a painful but valuable learning process is given considerable credence 
by Michel Martin who, in his 1989 analysis of France's role in low-intensity wars 
including its wars of decolonisation, offers a second strategic model to replace the 
discredited guerre algerienne model cited above: the guerres africaines model - post-
1960 engagements, affecting a more polymorphous pattern but restricted essentially 
to sub-Saharan Africa, and determined in form by the frozen bipolarity of the Cold 
War: 'The now bi-polar international arena, under the umbrella of nuclear 
deterrence, had entered a period of ambiguous peace with peripheral confrontations 
from which most former colonial powers are abstaining, with the exception, 
paradoxically, of once more, France. '70 Africa was perceived as essential for French 
and particularly Gaullist world standing as the only part of the world still 
69 'La Republique fran�aise, fidele a ses traditions, se conforme aux regles du droit public international. Elle 
n'entreprendra aucune guerre dans des vues de conquete et n 'emploiera jamais ses forces contre la  liberte 
d'aucun peuple. 
La France forme avec les peuples d'outre-mer une Union fondee sur l 'egalite des droits et des devoirs, sans 
distinction de race ni de religion. 
L'Union fran�aise est composee de nations et de peuples qui mettent en commun ou coordonnent leurs 
ressources et leurs efforts pour developper leurs civilisations respectives, accroitre leur bien-etre et assurer leur 
securite. 
Fidele a sa mission traditionnelle, la France entend conduire les peuples dont elle a pris la charge a la liberte de 
s'administrer eux-memes et de gerer democratiquement leurs propres affaires; ecartant tout systeme de 
colonisation fonde sur I' arbitraire, elle garantit a to us I' egal acces aux fonctions publiques et I' exercice 
individuel ou collectif des droits et l ibertes proclames ou confirmes ci-dessus. '  
Assemblee nationale: Service de l a  communication, Constitution du 27 octobre 1946: Preambule 
70 Michel Martin, 'From Algiers to N'Djamena: France's Adaptation to Low-Intensity Wars, 1 830- 1987' in DA 
Charters & M. Tugwell eds., Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: a Comparative Analysis, London: Brassey' s 
Defence Publishers 1989, p99 
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susceptible to French influence, where, with a few hundred men, France could 
change the course of history. 
As we shall discuss in Chapters 3 and 4, the dynamic of French military intervention 
in Africa was driven by a specifically French set of motives; it occasionally chimed 
with broader Western geostrategic priorities - resistance to Soviet or Cuban 
influence, containment of Libya's regional ambitions, securing access to strategic 
minerals - and this was apparent in France's repeated interventions in Chad and 
Zaire. Nonetheless, the generality of French interventions were not driven by a Cold 
War imperative; there were few global geostrategic issues at stake in Cameroun, 
Gabon, Niger or the Central African Republic; the motives for those interventions 
were French. Accordingly, former US assistant secretary of state for Africa George 
Moose is sceptical about France's record as the gendarme of Africa; he points out 
that: 
As with the offical pronouncements made by all governments, French 
descriptions of its African policy have had a self-serving quality, and it has not 
always been easy to square the often altruistic and disinterested rhetoric with the 
actions taken. More importantly, the as yet imcomplete historical record does not 
permit as definitive an answer as French officials might suggest to the question of 
whether French actions have in fact made a lasting contribution to peace and 
stability on the continent. What the record does attest to, however, is the level of 
French concern over stability and security in Africa, and the extent of French 
willingness to engage in the often murky international and intraregional politics 
of the continent?l 
Unlike Zaire and Chad, no other power would have intervened in Cameroon, Gabon 
or Niger in France's stead. As we have discussed in this chapter, France's response to 
perceived crises in those states (even if such a crisis was exaggerated or 
manufactured by an insecure head-of-state) remained inherently interventionary, 
even (as we shall see in Chapter 3) where an anticipated intervention was withheld 
to allow an unsatisfactory head-of-state to be overthrown, and especially when 
France itself conducted the overthrow. The Realist school of International Relations 
has told us that strong states will intervene in the affairs of weak states when it is 
7 1  George E. Moose, French Military Policy in Africa' in WJ Foltz & HS Bienen eds., Arms and the African, 
New Haven & London: Yale University Press 1985, p68 
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expedient to do  so. However, i t  i s  important to note again that France's 
interventionary response was mechanical and perceived as such, and hence 
interfered at all levels with the political development of the intervened states. 
Questions remain about the durability of France's interventionary sphere in Africa, 
primarily in the absence since 1990 of the cloak of Cold War justification. A 
submission to a French Defence Ministry seminar noted that: 'La cooperation 
militaire a longtemps constitue une forme privilegiee de soutien a des Etats 
etrangers, notamment africains . . .  [L]a fin de la bipolarisation strategique, !'extension 
du role de l'ONU et la responsabilite de membre permanent du Conseil de securite 
incitent la France a participer, le plus en amont possible, a la stabilisation de certains 
pays, afin d' eviter toute crise qui pourrait la conduire a de couteuses interventions 
exterieures. '72 In Chapter 6, we shall discuss the extent to which this strategy has 
been adopted, and what new legitimisation was found for France's interventions in 
the changed climate of the 'new world order' .  
72 Rapport de  I 'ENA, Promotion 'Victor Schoelcher' ,  Seminaire a theme commun 'La Defense, de  la  Nation a 
! 'Europe' Groupe 3: Cooperation militaire et politique de defense, Paris: decembre 1995, p 1  
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Chapter 3: French interventionary practice in the pre carre, 1960-90 
Introduction 
Louis de Guiringaud, first French ambassador to Ghana and subsequently 
Foreign Minister under President Giscard d'Estaing1, stated that: 'L' Afrique est le 
seul continent qui soit encore a la mesure de la France, a la portee de ses moyens. 
Le seul ou elle peut encore, avec cinq cents hommes, changer le cours de 
l'histoire' .2 Accordingly, France's use of military intervention in sub-Saharan 
Africa from 1960 ('the year of Africa' or 'the year of independence' of most of its 
African colonies) to 1990 (France's first intervention in Rwanda) has been used to 
assert its power and guarantee its access to strategic resources on the continent. 
But as a generation and four presidencies of intervention culminated in support 
for the pro-genocide regime in Rwanda, some voices in the press, NGO 
community and academia asked in apparent exasperation: 'Est-ce la "vocation 
naturelle" de Paris d'intervenir, avec son reseau de bases et de forces 
prepositionnees, son dispositif d'accords de defense et de cooperation technique 
militaires sans equivalent sur le continent qui l'ont deja pousse, depuis 1962, a 
effectuer dix-huit operations majeures sur le continent, certaines etalees sur 
plusieurs annees, au Tchad, a Djibouti, au Rwanda?'3 
These overt military operations - of which there were over thirty during the 
period under consideration, an average of one per year - are the most salient 
feature of Franco-African military cooperation, a system given legal personality 
' De Guiringaud became Foreign Minister in 1976 in the first government of prime minister Raymond 
Barre. 
2 Quoted in Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et I '  Afrique, Paris:  Seuil 1995, p363 
3 Philippe Leymarie, 'Litigeuse intervention fran<;:aise au Rwanda' ,  Le Monde diplomatique, July 1994 
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through bilateral treaties although equally influenced by traditions, personal 
interests, networks, covert operations and 'bad habits'.4 Guy Martin notes that: 
Although camouflaged under the mantle of cooperation, France's African 
policy is, in fact, primarily motivated by a narrow conception of its national 
interests, and blatantly disregards African concerns and interests. As former 
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing once bluntly declared, "I am dealing with 
African affairs, namely with France's interests in Africa" ' . 5  
The resultant dynamic of French military intervention in Africa is based on a 
pyramid of militarism, built in the first instance, as we have seen, on the defence 
treaties and military assistance accords which were often a condition of 
independence, and which obtain between France and nearly half (26) of Africa's 
53 states. France is the only ex-colonial power which retains this number of 
military agreements and such a complex system of military cooperation with so 
many states. This baseline of exceptionality, dating from the very inception of the 
African states concerned, has provided a firm foundation for the other aspects of 
French militarism in Africa. France is the only country to station its own troops 
in Africa - constituting what has been called 'a permanent intervention'6 - despite 
an OAU resolution as early as 1978 condemning the existence of foreign military 
bases on the continent.7 France is the principal supplier of weaponry and military 
equipment to Africa and, since 1996, the leading arms merchant to the 
developing world as a whole and, after the US, the world's largest arms 
4 'En Afrique, la France n'a plus de politique, seulement des mauvaises habitudes ' ;  Jean-Marie Kalfeche, 
L'Express 4 November 1988 
5 Guy Martin, Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations, Journal of Modern African Studies 33 : 1 
( 1995), p6 
6 Robin Luckham, 'Le militarisme fraw;ais en Afrique' ,  Politigue africaine 2:5,  fevrier 1982, p96 
7 Keith Somerville notes that: 'At the Khartoum summit of the Organisation of African Unity in late July 
1978, France came under very heavy attack for the role it had played in Zaire, Benin and Sao Tome . . .  
President Giscard d'Estaing's calls for a pan-African military force (backed by France and other Western 
powers) was denounced by President Nyerere of Tanzania as "the height of arrogance" . He went on to say 
that "it is quite obvious, moreover, that those who seek to initiate such a force are not interested in the 
freedom of Africa. They are interested in the domination of Africa". ( . . .  ) Resolutions of the summit and of 
the earlier OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Tripoli denounced foreign military intervention in Africa 
and the use of mercenaries to overthrow or threaten governments. '  Keith Somerville, Foreign Military 
Intervention in Africa, London: Pinter Publishers & New York: St Martin's Press 1990, pl04 
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exporter.8 It is also the principal creator and instructor of African armies. This 
creation of military proteges on the French model is seen as a key aspect of 
Franco-African cooperation; Guy Martin notes that: 
French leaders tend to link the concepts of security and development by 
arguing that their help in creating strong national armies has contributed to 
the stability and hence to the economic benefit of all concerned. In fact, the 
French government's Gbjective in creating African national armies at the time 
of independence was to build up units that could work closely with French 
units and effectively serve as branches of the French army overseas.9 
These familial relations between French and French-fostered African armies are 
demonstrated by annual or biennial joint military operations, and celebrated in 
the military association and monthly review Freres d 'Armes. 10 
Inextricably linked with these factors, dependent on them and, arguably, their 
logical result, is France's frequent recourse to armed force in post-colonial Africa: 
military intervention, which we have defined in Chapter 1 as 'coercive or 
dictatorial interference in the affairs of another state. '  Dominique Mo!si has 
referred to 'a pattern of iotervention in French foreign policy';11 further to the 
historical context provid�d in Chapter 2, this chapter will consider this pattern, 
the means by which France has maintained a military presence on the continent, 
and the legitimisation <1t1-d mechanics of the generality of French military 
interventions during the 1960-1990 period. We will proceed by considering the 
exceptionality of France's role suggested by the factors above as a context for its 
interventions, with a view- to providing a template against which to judge the 
8 Jacques Isnard, 'Selon le Congre s <tillericain, la France a ete le deuxieme exportateur d'armes en 1998', Le 
Monde 10 September 1999 
9 Guy Martin, 'Francophone Afric a ill the Context of Franco-American Relations' in John W. Harbeson & 
Donald Rothschild eds., Africa in �rid Politics: Post Cold-War Challenges, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 
2nd edn. 1995, p l 76 
1° Freres d'Armes: Revue de liaise>�orces armees franc,:aises, africaines et malgaches, published bi­
monthly by CMIDOM Section Communication, Service Publications, Caserne d'Artois, 9, rue Edouard 
Lefebvre, 78013 Versailles cedex 
11 Dominique Moi"si, 'Intervention in French Foreign Policy' in Hedley Bull ed., Intervention in World 
Politics, Oxford: OUP 1984, p67 
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principal case studies - Chad, Zaire and Rwanda - which form the second half of 
this study and follow in Chapters 4 to 6. 
As we shall see in Chapter 4, France was assisted and applauded by the US in its 
Chadian and Zairean interventions, which were in tune with Cold War 
imperatives and hence perceived as a key element in Western containment of 
Soviet penetration and/ or Libyan expansionism. However in this chapter, it will 
be argued that these cases aside, the generality of interventions were undertaken 
for economic reasons, to support clients, and for grandeur. These varied 
according to case, but overall these interventions were driven by purely French 
motives and were not dressed up with Cold War imperatives (unlike Chad and 
Zaire in Chapter 4) .12 
It is also intended to demonstrate the pattern of interventions which allowed the 
dynamic of intervention to continue up to and including support for Rwanda' s 
genocidal regime, and to assess the factors, French, African and international, 
which have made this unique interventionary dynamic possible. For France in 
Africa, the nonintervention norm did not apply, except insofar as interventions 
were justified in terms of the traditional derogations from that norm. Instead, the 
norm was to intervene, and deliberate non-intervention (where intervention 
would have been expected) was simply another form of intervention. By way of 
conclusion here, it will be asked what evidence emerges, if any, of a learning 
curve. France's interventions in Chad in the 1980s, and its Rwandan 
interventions of the early 1990s, suggest that France's interventionary response 
had become over 30 years increasingly mechanical and less subject to debate or 
12 These interventions chimed with US interests at the time, were materially supported by the US (indeed the 
second Zairean intervention in 197 8 - 'La Legion saute sur Kolwezi ' - would not have been possible without 
US C- 1 1 1  transport aircraft), and were to this extent conducted at the Americans' behest. Although the very 
idea of acting as 'America's Cuba' (i.e. as a proxy intervenor) might have been anathema in Paris, it was 
perceived in these cases as essential for the preservation of an exclusively French pre carre. French 
planners saw that France had to intervene in its recognised sphere of influence when Cold War imperatives 
were at stake, or the US would do so in its stead. 
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public scrutiny. Regular interventions had, as we have suggested, become 
banalised. 
Generality of interventions 
Of the fourteen states to emerge from France's colonial territories south of the 
Sahara, France retained (until the Jospin government's reforms in 1997) 
permanent garrisons in five - Senegal, Central African Republic (CAR), Djibouti, 
Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, and quasi-permanently in Chad - and intervened militarily 
in each of those countries, i .e. troops were deployed on the streets from the 
existing garrisons. It has also projected forces from those bases and from bases in 
France into the following states: Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), Cameroon, Congo­
Brazzaville, Mauritania, Niger and Togo. France has also intervened in the 
former Belgian colony Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), the former 
Belgian protectorate Rwanda, and supplied military aid and training for specific 
periods in the other former Belgian protectorate, Burundi. (Given the scale and 
significance of the French military interventions in Chad, Zaire and Rwanda, 
these will be discussed separately, in Chapters 4 to 6.) 
It should be understood that 'French military intervention' here refers to 
unilateral operations at France's initiative, which may or may not involve the 
support of the armies of the intervened states. Occasionally a French intervention 
may have taken place in tandem with interventions by other Western states, 
notably Belgium, to evacuate that state's nationals, but it is notable that France's 
interventions are often easily distinguished by their length, military capacity and 
effect. It is not intended here to consider multilateral operations with a UN 
mandate in which French forces participated but did not lead - as in Angola, 
Mozambique and Somalia - which are, however, often grouped (disingenuously, 
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it might be argued) with unilateral French interventions in official accounts of 
France's military role in post-colonial Africa.13 
It is intended to consider a representative sample of interventions, and their 
official justification in light of the accepted derogations from the nonintervention 
norm discussed in Chapter 1 .  For an overview of the extent and variety of French 
military interventions during the period 1960 to 1990, a table may be useful: 
13  See especially 'Interventions exterieures de 1961 a 1995' ,  Comite National des Traditions des Troupes de 
Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo, Paris: Lavauzelle 1996, p l 3  
98 
Figure 1 :  FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTIONS I N  FRENCH EX-COLONIAL STATES SINCE 1960 
Country Date Nature Of Intervention Outcome Of Intervention 
Benin 1 977 Intervention by French Failure: suvival of regime of President 
mercenaries led by Bob Denard Mathieu Kerekou 
Burkina Faso 1 987 Nonintervention/clandestine Assassination of President Thomas 
support for coup leader Blaise Sankara 
Compaore 
Cameroon 1 960- Suppression of internal revolt 'Success' 
1 964 (UPC) 
CAR 1979 Operation Barracuda: deposition Overthrow of Emperor Bokassa, 
of client reinstallation of President David Dacko 
Chad 1 960- Suppression of internal revolts, 
1 963 'law and order' 
1 968 Repeated interventions to restore 
client 
1 983 Operation Manta 
1 987 Operation Epervier Ongoing 
Congo-Brazzaville 1 960- 'Law and order' ,  suppression of 
1 962 riots 
1 963 Voluntary nonintervention Overthrow of President Fulbert Youlou 
Djibouti 1977 Operations Lovada and Saphir in 
support of Djibouti regime against 
'Somali irredentism' 
1 9 9 1  Troops deployed along Ethiopian Consolidation of President Hassan 
border to resist FRUD Gouled 
Gabon 1 960 'Law and order' I 
1962 suppression of riots 
1 964 Restoration of client Reinstallation of President Lean M ' B a  
1 990 Support for President Omar Status quo 
Bongo 
Mauritania 1961 'Law and order' 
1 977- Air support during operations 
1 978 against Polisario front 
Niger 1 973 Support for President Hamani Status quo 
Diori against military coup 
1 974 Voluntary nonintervention Overthrow of Hamani Diori 
Senegal 1 960- 'Law and order' ;  suppport for Status quo 
1 962 President Senghor following the 
break up of the Mali federation 
and attempted coup d'etat 
Togo 1 963, Non-intervention Allowed assassination, although 
1 967 forewarned, of President Sylvan us 
Olympia, installation in 1 967 of Col. 
Etienne (later Gnassingbe) Eyadema 
1 986 Suppression of internal revolt Consolidation of regime 
1 99 1  Non-intervention; French troops Status quo 
deployed in neighbouring Benin 
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In Chapter 1, we identified common derogations from the nonintervention norm, 
i.e. the most frequent justifications offered by intervenors: intervention with the 
consent of the target state and by invitation; intervention justified by treaty; 
counter-intervention; intervention in self-defence, including protection of the 
intervenor's nationals; and humanitarian intervention. Accordingly, this chapter 
will proceed by considering broad categories of French military intervention 
according to theory (including their justifications legal and other), and practice 
(i .e. their conduct and effect) . We can identify the following categories of 
interventionary practice: suppression of internal (civilian) revolt; restoration of 
client faced with a serious internal military threat and/ or external threat; 
overthrow of client; and voluntary nonintervention. Each of these interventions 
was justified according to theory: most frequently in terms of legality (honouring 
treaties) and self-defence (evacuating nationals), but also in more general terms 
of invitation (at the request of the government of the intervened state), and the 
most nebulous category, humanitarianism both 'old-style', which overlaps with 
self-defence, i .e. protection of French and other Western nationals, and 'new­
style', protection of the intervened state's nationals. ('New-style' 
humanitarianism, although part of the justificatory discourse for earlier 
interventions, was not invoked as the sole justification until Operation Turquoise 
in 1994, to be discussed in Chapter 6.) 
Some interventions might be included in more than one category, and for some, 
particularly those 'suppression of internal revolt' interventions which followed 
the creation of postcolonial states in the early 1960s, accessible documentation is 
insufficient to offer a thorough account. We shall therefore consider a number of 
case-types which fit the pattern described in this study of mechanical 
interventionary responses driven by the Franco-African interventionary 
dynamic, independent of Cold War imperatives; that is, such interventions 
would have taken place even had the Cold War not been the dominant 
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determinant of global geostrategy, and indeed they continued for at least seven 
years after the Cold War, arguably until 1996 and France's first involuntary 
nonintervention (in the former Zaire) . 
Therefore, we shall consider examples of intervention in the following categories: 
suppression of internal revolt (Cameroon 1960-64); restoration of client facing 
internal threat (Gabon 1964); voluntary nonintervention (Congo 1963, Togo 1967, 
Burkina Faso 1987); counter-intervention or restoration of client facing external 
threat (Djibouti 1979, Mauritania 1977); and deposition of client (Central African 
Republic 1979). Only in the unique case of the CAR was defence of human rights 
invoked along with other, more traditional justifications. It is important to note 
that the absence of overt military intervention (since the early 1960s post­
independence stabilisation/ suppression of internal revolt missions) in other 
states of the pre carre - notably Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire - does not imply the 
absence of a French military role in those states' politics. Although difficult to 
gauge, the benefit to a long-serving political incumbent - such as former 
President Senghor (of Senegal) or the late President Houpouet-Boigny (of Cote 
d'Ivoire) - of the 'permanent intervention' represented by the French garrisons in 
those countries should not be disregarded. It is noteworthy that at the 1978 
Organisation of African Unity summit at which French militarism in Africa was 
condemned, those countries which housed French bases or whose leaders had 
been kept in power by French intervention - Senegal, Cote d 'Ivoire, Togo, Gabon 
and Zaire - supported France's military role, and President Houphouet-Boigny 
stated his belief that: ' [E]uropeans have understood the absolute necessity to see 
to it that our development takes place in an atmosphere of absolute security. ,]4 
Moreover, the threat or expectation of a French military intervention often had a 
direct influence of the direction of a political crisis; Guy Penne tells how in 
Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), following the arrest of then prime minister 
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Thomas Sankara on 17 May 1983: 'La rumeur completement fallacieuse d'une 
eventuelle intervention des troupes fran<;aises stationnees en Centrafrique se 
repand, et des manifestants, jeunes pour la plupart, defilent devant l 'ambassade 
de France en cassant quelques vitres' . 15 
Principal primary sources used in this chapter, in addition to press reports, are 
France's bilateral treaties with the intervened states; and the official account of 
the participation in interventions of one of the two branches of the French armed 
forces used for that purpose, the Troupes de Marine ( 'les Marsouins' ) .  There has 
not yet been published an official account of the role of that other branch of the 
French army used exclusively for overseas interventions, the Foreign Legion, and 
it has been necessary to rely on biographies and autobiographical accounts 
(allowing that the subjectivity of those sources often makes them of more 
anecdotal than historical value) .16 Of decision-makers, the principal available 
memoirs and interviews used are those of Jacques Foccart, Presidents De Gaulle, 
Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand and, most recently, former presidential advisor 
on African affairs Guy Penne. 
Context and motives 
It may be useful firstly to consider the context in which these interventions could 
take place. What were France's interests in the post-decolonisation period which 
caused it to maintain a costly policy of military involvement in its own and 
latterly Belgium's former colonies, including expensive military bases, training 
programmes, arms transfers and most extravagantly, direct military 
interventions? 
14 Quoted in Keith Somerville, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa, London: Pinter Publishers & New 
York: St Martin's Press 1990, p104 
" Guy Penne, Memoires d'Afrique, Paris: Fayard 1999, p89 
16 Ironically, France's Rwandan interventions (discussed in Chapters 5 & 6) have turned out to be the most 
thoroughly documented thanks in large part to the work of the Quiles Commission. 
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Since the fall of the Third Republic, Africa has been used for the reassertion of 
France and its army; former defence minister Arthur Conte notes that: 
[I]l fallait apporter les preuves que la France n' est pas un pays decadent, 
qu'elle n'est pas recroqueville sur elle-meme, que le desastre de mai-juin 1940 
n'a pas abime toutes ses energies, que ses fils sont toujours capables, 
intellectuellement, moralement et au besoin avec intrepidite, de jouer un role 
mondiat dans la lumiere de l'humanisme, au service des bonheurs et de la 
justice. La France continue a vivre dans !'esprit, dans l 'esperance et dans 
l'audace . . .  [C]omme le proclamait Georges Clemenceau un grand jour de 
gloire, "la France, hier soldat de Dieu, aujourd'hui soldat de l 'Humanite, sera 
toujours le soldat de l'Ideal."17 
France's role in sub-Saharan Africa has been the focus of growing scholarly 
attention; the most comprehensive text in French this decade has been Wauthier's 
Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique (although there have been few major studies in 
English since Chipman's 1989 French Power in Africa) . There is a general 
consensus among scholars on the reasons, stated and unstated, for continued 
direct French military involvement in African affairs after formal decolonisation; 
Alain Rouvez suggests that: 'France has . . .  learned that steadfast intervention 
policies, though costly, can be rewarding if maintained over a sufficient period of 
time. These interventions are a dramatic demonstration of France's commitment 
to an original and highly effective system of collective security which it has 
underwritten, often implicitly, with numerous African nations. '18 Similarly, in his 
co-edited volume Political Reform in Francophone Africa, David Gardinier points 
to: 
. . .  a remarkable continuity in French policy concerning Black Africa since at 
least the 1870s. France's involvement in the sub-Saharan regions of the 
continent has resulted, above alt from a desire to maintain and increase its 
power and prestige in Europe and in the world . . .  It is this persistent vision of 
Africa as an arena for advancing French power that has contributed to the 
17 Arthur Conte (Ancien Ministre, Ancien PDG de l 'ORTF, Historien, Auteur de "l'Epopee Coloniale de la 
France"), Preface, Comite National des Traditions de Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les 
Troupes de Marine dans les operations exterieures de 1961 a 1994, Paris :  Lavauzelle 1995 , p7 
18 Alain Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-Colonial 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Lanham: University Press of America 1994, p 1 33 
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maintenance of such a strong French presence on the continent throughout 
the postcolonial era. 19 
In light of this repeated theme, Tony Chafer has pointed out that 'reference to 
continuity has become almost a cliche of surveys of French African policy'/0 
French African policy-making 'is not determined by imperatives that have 
anything intrinsically to do with Africa, but by the way in which Africa is 
supposed to contribute to France's prestige and international status on the world 
stage'.21 And in 1990, Robert Grey noted that: 
While the presence and behaviour of Americans and Soviets are intrinsically 
interesting, it is quite clear that France remains the most active and "weighty" 
outside actor. No matter what indices are used - economic assistance, 
technical advisers, military bases, even armed interventions - let alone such 
unique phenomena as la zone franc and the annual conference between the 
President of France and the Heads of State of francophone Africa, all show 
the magnitude of the continuing French presence.22 
French military policy in Africa has also been driven by interministerial and 
intra-ministerial rivalry within the French polity. As we have seen in Chapter 2, 
African affairs were retained under the Fifth Republic as one of the presidential 
domaines reserves. Until its absorption into Foreign Affairs under the 1997 Jospin 
administration, the Cooperation Ministry carried out the President's directives 
with regard to the technical and financial aspects of French military cooperation 
in Africa. 
Strictly speaking, military cooperation was carried out in fulfilment of the 
military technical assistance accords only. The defence treaties are administered 
directly by the Ministry of Defence. However, military cooperation is conducted 
in practice by a number of competing poles of power and decision-making in 
19 David E. Gardinier, 'Historical Origins of Francophone Africa' in John F. Clark & David E. Gardinier 
eds., Political Reform in Francophone Africa, Boulder CO: Westview Press 1997, p l O  
20 Tony Chafer, 'French African Policy: Towards Change', African Affairs Vol.9 1 ,  1992 p37 
21 ibid p39 
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Paris. These include the Prime Minister's office (Matignon), the Foreign Ministry 
(Quai d'Orsay) and the military chiefs-of-staff (Secretaire general de la Defense 
nationale - SGDN) . Military intelligence (Direction generale de la securite 
exterieure - DGSE) is also directly involved in military cooperation missions in 
Africa (Missions d' assistance militaires based at the French army's permanent bases 
or the French embassy in the African state), answerable in theory to the Defence 
Minister but often acting independently in the field to the extent of initiating 
military action, subsequently reported to Paris as a fait accompli.23 Jean-Fran�ois 
Bayart notes that when considering 'France' as an actor: ' " [L]a France" . . .  consiste 
. . .  en une multiplicite de centres de decision que n'agissent point de concert ni 
meme d'une fa�on particulierement harmonieuse. Hormis les lignes de clivages 
internes a la classe politique, !'administration n'est pas une. Aux classiques 
rivalites entre les ministeres concernes par les questions africaines s'ajoutent 
d'autres nuances plus subtiles, au sein de chaque departement'.24 However, it is 
also important to note that until the Rwandan genocide, almost total 
bipartisanship prevailed in French political life concerning African policy; Guy 
Martin notes that the first two periods of cohabitation (under the premierships of 
Chirac 1986-88 and Balladur 1993-94) 'revealed the broad agreement that exists 
across party lines on the substance of France's African policy'.25 Indeed, despite 
domestic criticism of this policy since 1994, Africa has not emerged as an issue to 
trouble the current Chirac-Jospin cohabitation and the French government's stated 
'nouvelle politique africaine1 •  26 
22 Robert D. Grey, 'A Balance Sheet on External Assistance: France in Africa' ,  The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 28 : 1  (1990), p 101 
2 3  O n  failures of military accountabi lity, see especially Agir Ici/Survie, 4e "Dossier noir" de la politique 
africaine de la France: Presence militaire frans;aise en Afrique: derives . . .  , Paris 1995 
24 Jean-Franr;ois Bayart, La politique africaine de Frans;ois Mitterrand, Paris :  Kathala 1984, p13 
25 Guy Martin, 'Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations', The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 33 : 1  ( 1995), p7 
26 This term was coined shortly before the publication of the Quiles Commission's report in December 1998. 
See Lionel Jospin, 'Evolution generale de la politique de defense de la France' , Defense nationale, 
November 1998, pp5-20 
105 
INTERVENTIONARY CASES AND THEIR LEGITIMISATION 
It will be useful to bear in mind Little's definition of intervention and 
nonintervention: 'Confronted by a bifurcated actor [i.e. civil war which splits the 
state's authority, between president and army, for example, or where two 
competing authorities emerge and each asserts legitimacy], a second actor will 
have to modify the established dyadic pattern of interaction to take account of 
the bifurcation. The actor can either form a relationship with both units - a 
response defined as non-intervention; or establish a commitment with one side of 
the bifurcated actor - a response defined as intervention' .27 The outcome of this 
response, it is argued, will be the restoration of the original system, i.e. the 
former pattern of dyadic interaction, or a transformation of the relationship with 
the second actor's [the intervenor's, here France's] commitment shifting to the 
side of the bifurcated actor which challenged the original system. Guy Martin 
has observed that: 'According to the official French doctrine, military 
interventions in Africa are ad hoc, always conducted at the concerned 
government's specific request, operated within the framework of an existing 
defence agreement, and designed to counter actual or potential external 
aggression.'28 In order to establish a template of interventionary activity, it is 
intended to consider examples of different styles of French intervention 
(practice), and the justification offered in official accounts for the breach of the 
nonintervention norm they represented (theory) . 
Suppression of internal revolt/stabilisation 
In the years immediately following their assumption of power, the post­
independence leaders of the states to emerge from French Africa were often beset 
by militant internal opposition, rivalries and displays of popular discontent. 
27 Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, London: Martin Robertson 1975, p6 
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Military cooperation policy as a whole was designed primarily to protect the 
incumbent president against internal opposition rather than external invasion; 
Alfred Grosser notes that: 
La cooperation militaire prevue dans les accords conclus avec les Etats 
consiste . . .  davantage, au mains par moments, a defendre les hommes qui les 
dirigent contre leurs ennemis du dedans, plut6t qu'a proteger leur pays contre 
des attaques du dehors. Et ce n'est certes pas necessairement parce que 
l 'homme en place s'inspire mieux que les rebelles des principes de la 
democratie pluraliste ou des droits de l'homme.29 
In multiple cases - Senegal, Mauritania, Gabon, Congo and Chad - the leader was 
secured in office as a result of direct French military assistance. Indeed, in 1964 
de Gaulle's information minister Alain Peyrefitte stated that: 'It is not possible 
that a few gunmen be left free to capture at any time any presidential palace, and 
it is precisely because such a menace was foreseen that the new African states 
have concluded with France agreements to protect themselves against such 
risks. '30 Accordingly, Robin Luckham notes that after formal decolonisation: 'The 
first [priority] was to guarantee the security of the African states themselves and 
of the group of leaders to whom France had transferred power.'31 Most of the 
1960s interventions were justified in this context; France was obliged to intervene 
because of its treaty commitments with its African partners. 
But such interventions were already 'coercive interference in the affairs of a 
sovereign state', and an intrusion into the internal affairs of African states, 
mostly in support of French-favoured rulers, in situations where other leaders 
might have emerged. Even the earliest works on international law draw attention 
to this phenomenon; Tanca quotes a 1924 study which argued: 'Supposing [the 
intervention] to be directed against rebels, the fact that it has been necessary to 
28 Guy Martin, 'Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations', The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 33 : 1  ( 1995), p 1 3  
29 Alfred Grosser, Affaires exterieures, La politique de la France 1944- 1989, Paris:  Flammarion 1989, p177 
30 Alain Peyrefitte, Minister of Information, Le Monde 28 February 1964 
31 Robin Luckham, 'Le militarisme fran�ais en Afrique' ,  Politique africaine 2:5 ,  fevrier 1982, p97 
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call in foreign help is enough to show that the issue of the conflict would without 
it be uncertain, and consequently that there is a doubt as to which side would 
ultimately establish itself as the legal representative of the State. '32 
French interventions in the early post-independence period were frequent and 
unsubtle. There was an obvious recognition that the new states' independence 
was severely circumscribed. Describing such interventions, Tanca points out that: 
' [T]he countries concerned still maintained a "special relationship" with the 
intervening States, which had administered them only a few years earlier. This 
factor is obviously not enough to assert that these States had a right to intervene, 
but it is certainly true that they kept a closer eye on the target States to ensure 
that these new countries, in their first years of independence, did not take a path 
too far from the one originally planned.'33 (Emphasis added) Similarly, Ernest 
Wamba dia Wamba wrote in 1987 of how: 'Constraints linked to the existing 
state of oppression and exploitation are invoked to deny the masses of people . . .  
the right to demand broad democratic rights, to justify paternalist tendencies on 
the same basis as that of the balance sheet analysis used to support colonialism.'34 
A clear, but little documented, illustration of these tendencies were displayed in 
the suppression of internal opposition in Cameroon. 
Repression of UPC rebellion in Cameroon 1960 
France itself created the circumstances in newly independent Cameroon which 
necessitated a military intervention. In May 1955, one of Cameroonian nationalist 
leader Ruben Urn Nyobe's collaborators, who had just returned from China, said 
at a public meeting that Urn Nyobe, like Mao and Ho, had taken to the jungle to 
32 W. Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed., Oxford 1924 (republished 1979, Aalen, Scientia), 
p346ff., quoted in Antonio Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict, Dordrecht: Nijhoff 
1993, p23 note33 
33 Antonio Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict, Dordrecht: Nijhoff 1993, p28 
34 Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, 'The Experience of Struggle in the People's Republic of Congo' in Peter 
Anyang' Nyong' o  ed., Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa, London: Zed Books 1987, p98 
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organise a revolution.35 De Gaulle's first Fifth Republic prime minister Michel 
Debre tells in his memoirs how, given the state of insurrection among the 
Bamileke of Cameroon, he decided 'to undertake a veritable reconquest.'36 The 
intervention - or 'pacification mission' - was placed under the command of 
General Max Briand who deployed five batallions, an armoured platoon and a 
squadron of fighter-bombers. Debre recounts how, by late summer 1960, 
'General Briand could give me an account of his success: six months had sufficed 
for him.'37 
Wauthier points out laconically that, although unmentioned by de Gaulle in his 
memoirs, the number of Cameroonians killed is estimated at 3000, including Urn 
Nyobe, who would remain a martyr-hero of Cameroonian nationalism: 'Could 
the General. . .  have considered the operation to reconquer the Bamileke region 
ordered by his Prime Minister as a digression which was not worth mentioning? 
Yet it was the first time - although not the last - that French troops would 
intervene in a former colony to save a regime in difficulty. '38 Fran<;ois-Xavier 
Verschave also points out the continuity from colonial to post-colonial 
operations, even in terms of the troops used: 'Les regiments fran<;ais 
d'intervention "outre-mer" (Legion et Infanterie de Marine) sont passes sans 
transition des guerres d'Indochine et d' Algerie au maintien de 1' ordre post­
colonial.'39 Thus might some of those regiments demoralised by Dien Bien Phu 
and the perceived sell-out in Algeria hope to regain military glory in the manner, 
and the military theatre, for which they were best prepared. 
Nonetheless, this seminal intervention remains little-discussed, and is unlisted in 
most reference works; the otherwise comprehensive Troupes de Marine makes no 
35 Robert Aldrich, Greater France, London: Macmillan 1995, p300 
36 Quoted in Claude Wauthier, Quatre presidents et l 'Afrique Paris: Seuil 1995, p92 
37 ibid 
38 Claude Wauthier, Ouatre presidents et l'Afrique Paris:  Seuil 1995, p93 
39 Francois-Xavier Verschave, La Francafrique, Paris :  Stock 1998, p 1 7  
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mention of Cameroon, and the closest reference in the index of histories of the 
Legion is 'Camerun', the legendary 19th century battle in which a handful of 
Legionnaires overcame enormous odds and vastly superior numbers of Mexican 
troops. ('Camerun day', April 30, is still marked annually by Legionnaires 
present and former.) Michel Debre offers a favourable interpretation of this 
amnesia: 
L'intervention militaire de la France au Cameroun est peu connue. L'attention 
des journalistes n'a pas ete attiree par la decision que j 'ai prise et son execution 
qui se prolonge pendant plusieurs mois. Jusqu'a present, les historiens ont fait 
preuve de la meme discretion. Cet oubli est sans doute du au fait que cette 
intervention militaire s'est terminee par un succes.40 
Nonetheless, as we shall see, other perceived 'successes', notably the 1978 
intervention at Kolwezi in Zaire (to be discussed in Chapter 4), have featured 
prominently in official accounts and military historiography. 
Restoration of client 
Gabon: Operation Libreville, February 1964 
The purpose of France's 1964 intervention in the oil-rich state of Gabon was to 
restore President Leon M'Ba, who was faced early that year with popular revolt 
and the unhappy precedent of neighbouring Congo's trois glorieuses which swept 
away that state's unpopular first president Fulbert Youlou. Elikia M'Bokolo notes 
that: 'The invasion [in Gabon] was sufficiently effective to reassure France's client 
presidents throughout the region that, although Paris had not intervened to 
protect the Congo government from revolution in 1963, it was able and willing to 
restore its friends to power when necessary'.41 
40 Michel Debre, Memoires, tome 3: Gouverner, 1958- 1962, Paris: Albin Michel 1988, p336, quoted in 
Wauthier 1995 p92 
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The situation in Gabon was significantly different due to that state's 
indispensability for French power in Africa; France's first ambassador there, 
Pierre Dabezies, concedes that in Gabon, France may have overstepped its 
official role of trading partner and economic and military advisor: 'Le Gabon, 
pour la France, c'est tres important, parce qu'il y a l'uranium, parce qu'il y a du 
petrole, parce qu'il y a du manganese, parce que c'est une base strategique, parce 
que tout <;a, oui, la peut-etre il y a [eu] des plans, des plans mal-formules, mais il 
y a[vait] des raison tres precises'.42 Among these reasons, according to some 
observers, was a long-standing fear of US economic encroachment in the 
mineral-rich state.43 
In contrast, Dabezies told a Bordeaux conference in 1979 that the generality of 
early, 'law and order' interventions were not 'mal-formules' but appropriate to 
local political circumstances: 
Des accords de maintien de l'ordre sont . . .  passes sans faire l'objet de 
publication. A cet egard, la France parait conserver un pouvoir discretionnaire 
en matiere d'intervention. Elle se porte au secours du Gabon, mais n'intervient 
ni au Congo ni au Dahomey [Benin] : sa regle de conduite parait etre de preter 
son concours aux mesures de protection de vies humaines, mais non aux 
mesure dirigees contre une opposition politique a fondement populaire.44 
This account is representative of official discourse concerning France's role as a 
force for stability in early post-colonial Africa. However, there was considerable 
41 Elikia M'Bokolo, 'Comparisons and contrasts in equatorial Africa: Gabon, Congo and the Central African 
Republic' in David Birmingham & Phyllis M. Martin eds., History of Central Africa: The Contemporary 
Years, since 1960, London & New York: Longman 1998, p74 
42 Pierre Dabezies, interviewed at Universite de Paris I, rue Malher, May 1996 
43 M'Bokolo notes that: 'French fear of rivals dated back to their earliest trading settlements in the mid­
nineteenth century and focused on an obsessive antagonism to the United States . . .  When US Steel won the 
1 959 contract to build a Gabon railway, French fear of American encroachment increased yet further. It 
resurfaced again even more dramatically in the attempted 1964 Gabon coup d'etat which French networks 
perceived as an American plot. American influence . . .  was especially active in the economic sphere when 
the United States became the principal trading partner in oil. By 1990 more than 4 1  per cent of Gabon's 
petroleum exports went to the United States . . .  ' Elikia M'Bokolo, 'Comparisons and contrasts in equatorial 
Africa: Gabon, Congo and the Central African Republic' in David Birmingham & Phyllis M. Martin eds. ,  
History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years, since 1960, London & New York: Longman 1998, p76 
44 Quoted in Claude Wauthier, Quatre presidents et I 'Afrique Paris: Seuil 1 995, p21 5  
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scope in official accounts of the 1964 Gabon intervention for post-hoc 
justification. President Mba having been detained incommunicado by putchist 
generals, his vice-president was found available to request a French intervention 
which would, accordingly, be an 'intervention by request' in accordance with 
military accords; the Franco-Gabonese defense accord of 1960 states that: 'La 
Republique gabonaise a la responsabilite de sa defense interieure, mais elle peut 
demander a la Republique fran<;aise une aide dans les conditions definies par les 
accords speciaux' .45 (These latter accords are, unlike the defence agreement, 
unpublished.) Agir ici/Survie note that: 'L'accord de Defense autorise aussi 
l'armee fran<;aise a utiliser les infrastructures gabonaises, a faire usage des 
balisages necessaires sur le territoire et dans les eaux territoriales de la 
Republique gabonaise, les postes et telecommunications locaux . . .  , etc. L'armee 
fran<;aise est pour ainsi dire chez elle au Gabon - comme dans tous les pays avec 
lesquels elle a des accords de Defense. '  (We have noted that eight such accords 
have been signed since 1960: with Cote d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, 
Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, Cameroon, Comoros and Togo. Unlike military 
technical assistance agreements (of which there are 26), the defence accords give 
the French army a direct role in the signatory state's internal as well as external 
security.) 
Troupes de Marine describes succinctly the intervention stimulus in Gabon, the 
rapid (i.e. mechanical) intervention response, and the operation's motives: 
[L]e vice-president de la Republique (gabonaise), qui a echappe au 
traquenard, fait appel au governement fran<;ais lie a la Republique gabonaise 
par des accords de defense et de cooperation. La reaction de Paris est rapide: 
le 18 fevrier au soir, le general Kergaravat, delegue pour la defense de la ZOM 
[Zone d'outre-mer] no.2 [regional military command post], en poste a 
Brazzaville [Congo], re<;oit l'ordre de delivrer au plus vite le President M'Ba et 
son gouvernement et de les aider a retablir l 'ordre legal. L'operation sera 
caracterisee par le souci d'agir vite pour eviter que le comite revolutionnaire 
ne s'organise et ne soit l'objet d'une eventuelle reconnaissance internationale 
45 Journal officiel (Paris), 21 November 1960 
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par certaines puissances etrangeres ayant deja montre leur interet pour les 
richesses minieres du pays.46 
Indeed Gabon was and remains a state central to French interests in Africa, and 
in recent years its president, Omar Bongo, has presided with French support 
over what Douglas Yates has qualified as Africa's quintessential 'rentier state', its 
ruler and foreign companies thriving on the profit extracted from the state's 
strategic mineral resources.47 Arthur Conte points out in this regard that: ' [D]ans 
un. . .  contexte de globalisation des interets vitaux, l'interdependance des 
problemes en jeu fait qu'un Etat ou un groupe d'Etats ne peut plus fixer les 
limites de sa securite a la region ou il se trouve geographiquement. Sa securite 
implique la securite de ses approvisionnements en matieres premieres, et done la 
securite de ses lignes de communications, surtout maritimes. Consequence: il est 
vital que la France sache se doter de puissantes unites d'intervention rapide. '48 
However, Urz Schwarz offers a sceptical account of France's legitimisation of this 
operation: 
Paris alleged that the military intervention was conducted under the terms of 
the treaty for mutual defence of May 19, 1961, and that the step had been 
taken unilaterally, yet within the treaty, because the president being prisoner 
had not been able to make the corresponding appeal for help . A few days 
later, when they discovered in Paris that there was a Vice-President of Gabon, 
a new and improved version was given to the effect that the Vice-President 
had invited the French intervention.49 
Schwarz also quotes Union Africaine et Malgache secretary general Germain Mba 
who 'hinted that, since Gabon is a source of manganese and uranium ore, the 
46 Comite National des Traditions de Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine 
dans les operations exterieures de 1961 a 1994, Paris: Lavauzelle 1995, p42 
47 See Douglas A. Yates, The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the 
Republic of Gabon, Trenton NJ & Asmara: Africa World Press 1996 
48 Arthur Conte (Ancien Ministre, Ancien PDG de l 'ORTF, Historien, Auteur de "l 'Epopee Coloniale de la 
France"), Preface, Comite National des Traditions de Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les 
Troupes de Marine dans les operations exterieures de 1961 a 1994, Paris :  Lavauzelle 1995, p7 
49 Urs Schwarz, Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World, New York: Oceana Publications 1970, 
p 1 1 8- 1 19 
1 1 3 
intervention has served only France's economic interests. France had not found it 
necessary to intervene in other less interesting instances, as for example when 
President Fulbert Youlou of Congo-Brazzaville appealed for help, or when 
President Hubert Maga of Dahomey [now Benin] was overthrown . . .  [W]hen the 
pro-communist Mali President Modibo Keita was overthrown on November 20, 
1 968, nobody intervened in his favor'.50 Indeed, as we shall see, voluntary 
nonintervention where intervention is expected is much the same as 
intervention, in that it allows an unwary leader to be overthrown when 
anticipated French protection is withheld. Because intervention is the norm, local 
actors behave as if it would be forthcoming; how many opposition campaigns, 
where the local balance of power would favour a change of regime, have been 
abandoned for fear of the repression which would follow a French-backed 
restoration of the status quo ante? 
Again m 1990, Gabon's economic importance and the centrality of President 
Omar Bongo to the Franco-African family generated another mechanical 
interventionary response to a perceived crisis (the intervention stimulus) there; 
Elikia M'Bokolo notes that: ' [P]arachute troops were again called on in 1990 to 
protect the government from the hostility of its own people and to protect French 
oil workers from an uprising in the installations at Port-Genti1' .51 M'Bokolo goes 
on to conclude that: 'In Gabon . . .  those in power (i.e. President Bongo) had kept 
the military in check by using the threat of French military intervention' .52 
50 Urs Schwarz, Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World, New York: Oceana Publications 1970, 
p 1 19 
51 Elikia M'Bokolo, 'Comparisons and contrasts in equatorial Africa: Gabon, Congo and the Central African 
Republic' in David Birmingham & Phyllis M. Martin eds., History of Central Africa: The Contemporary 
Years, since 1960, London & New York: Longman 1 998, p74 
52 Elikia M'Bokolo, 'Comparisons and contrasts in equatorial Africa: Gabon, Congo and the Central African 
Republic' in David Birmingham & Phyllis M. Martin eds., History of Central Africa: The Contemporary 
Years, since 1960, London & New York: Longman 1998, p87 
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Voluntary nonintervention 
To go 
Togo was (like Cameroon) a German colony. Occupied by a Franco-British 
expeditionary force in 1914, it was placed under a joint League of Nations 
mandate after the First World War. Britain merged the western territory it 
controlled with the neighbouring British colony of Gold Coast (post­
independence Ghana), leaving the east as an autonomous territory under French 
administration, granted a greater degree of autonomy earlier than the constituent 
states of AOF and AEF. As a result of nationalist and pan-Africanist agitation by 
Sylvanus Olympio and his Comite de l'Unite Togolaise (CUT), by 1956 France 
retained control only of currency, foreign affairs and defence/3 and in 1960 Togo 
became an independent state with Olympia as president. 
In post-colonial Africa's first violent coup d'etat, President Olympio was 
assassinated in Lome on 13 January 1963. The military brought the pro-French 
former premier Nicolas Grunitzky back from exile in neighbouring Dahomey 
(later Benin) to replace the left-leaning and French-hostile Olympio.54 The 
assassin has never been identified, but observers agree that it was most probably 
the assassination's chief beneficiary, Sergeant (later General) Etienne (later 
Gnassingbe) Eyadema of the French-trained Togolese army, who had served as 
sergeant-major in the French army in Indochina and Algeria, and who became 
Togolese army chief after Olympia's death. Pierre Biarnes offers the following 
observation: 
Est-ce le sergent Eyadema qui a tire? En l'etat actuel des temoignages dignes 
de foi qui sont fort peu nombreux, la chose ne peut etre affirmee, meme si de 
53 Robert Aldrich, Greater France, London: Macmillan 1 996, p300 
54 Wauthier notes that: '[L]es relations franco-togolaises etaient relativement tendues: Sylvanus Olympia 
n'avait pas cache sa sympathie pour Sekou Toure, pour Lumumba (qu'il avait re�u a Lome) et pour le FLN 
algerien'. Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l'Afrique, Paris: Seuil 1995, p l l5 
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bonnes raisons donnent effectivement a penser que c'est bien l 'actuel chef de 
l'Etat togolais qui a personnellement tue son predecesseur.55 
Claude Wauthier notes that: 'Plusieurs journalistes ont emis l'hypothese que 
l 'assassinat d'Olympio avait ete sinon commandite, du moins teleguide par 
Jacques Foccart' .56 (Foccart himself sheds no light on this suggestion) . Wauthier 
also notes that: 'La nuit du meurtre, l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, Gaston 
Poullada, s 'etait vu conseiller la "plus grande prudence" par l 'ambassadeur de 
France, Louis Mazoyer, qui avait ete alerte par les officiers fran<;ais de la 
gendarmerie togolaise du complot qui se tramait' .57 
Eyadema took power and named himself president on the fourth anniversary of 
the assassination in 1967. As president, Eyadema (who, following the deaths of 
Mobutu and Hassan II, is now Africa's longest-serving autocrat), was received 
with full honours by President Georges Pompidou during the former's official 
visit to France in December 1971; the French President praised his Togolese 
counterpart for having brought order to his country through a single-party 
dictatorship: 
Bannissant les luttes politiques, vous avez rassemble dans un grand 
mouvement national toutes les energies. Vous avez pu ainsi rapprocher des 
populations diverses et parfois opposees. Toutes vos forces ont tendu a 
abaisser la barriere qui faisaient obstacle a !'unification de votre pays.58 
Through his military consolidation of power, and his africanisation campaign, 
Eyadema modelled his rule in Togo on that of Mobutu in Zaire; Agir ici/Survie 
note that: 'Le detournement de la rente . . .  et la tenue militaro-milicienne du pays 
ont beaucoup de points communs avec le Zaire. C'est pourquoi, malgre quelques 
55 Pierre Biarnes, L'Afrique aux Africains, p265, quoted in Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique, 
Paris: Seuil l995, p l l5  
56 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l'Afrique, Paris: Seuil 1995, p 1 14 
57 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l'Afrique, Paris: Seuil 1995, p 1 1 5  
58 Quoted i n  Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique, Paris:  Seuil 1995 , p24 1 
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facheries superficielles, le Togo est un enfant cheri de la Fran<;afrique' .59 Jean­
Fran<;ois Bayart points out that the regime's suppression of opposition has been 
uncontested by Eyadema's French backers; and as would be demonstrated in 
Rwanda, such support could contribute to the state's hardening, leading 'a coup 
sur a la "haltisation" du Togo et de tous les pays africains dont les dirigeants 
autoritaires en mal de restauration n'hesitent pas a "macoutiser" leur pouvoir' . 60 
Eyadema, like Mobutu, has benefited from the services of former French army 
chief of staff Jeannou Lacaze, and Togo's sizeable army of 13,000 troops (one 
soldier for every 300 citizens) is trained at the French managed military academy 
in Pya, Eyadema's home town. La Croix notes that: 'L'armee . . .  sur laquelle 
s 'appuie le regime pour entretenir la terreur et eradiquer toute forme 
d 'opposition a ete formee, aidee par la France qui a fourni du materiel et une 
soixantaine d'instructeurs et de conseillers militaires.'61 
In contrast to France's nonintervention which facilitated Eyadema's seizure of 
power, there was direct intervention by several hundred French paratroops in 
September 1986 to protect him against a coup attempt. Wauthier offers the 
following account: 
Le general Eyadema n'en demande pas moins l 'aide militaire de la France, et 
cinq Jaguar et deux cents parachutistes fran<;ais debarquent dans les quarante­
huit heures au Togo, d'ou ils repartent neuf jours plus tard sans avoir tire un 
coup de feu. [ . . . ] Fran<;ois Mitterrand . . .  declare avoir agi en vertu de l'accord 
de defense franco-togolais de 1963. C'est, dit-il, "une question d'honnetete, de 
loyaute, d'amitie". Jacques Chirac et Jacques Foccart ont d'ailleurs approuve 
l 'envoi de troupes fran<;aises, ce dernier faisant valoir que le Togo est menace 
59 Agir ici/Survie, 2eme "Dossier noir" de la politique africaine de la France: Les liaisons mafieuses de la 
Fran�afrique, Paris: Agir ici/Survie 1995, p1 1 
60 Jean-Fran<;:ois Bayart, La Croix 7 September 1993, quoted in Agir ici/Survie, 2eme "Dossier noir" de la 
politique africaine de la France: Les liaisons mafieuses de la Fran£afrigue, Paris :  Agir ici/Survie 1995, p12  
6 1  'Le general Eyadema, !'ami retrouve' in La Croix 13 September 1994, quoted in Agir ici/Survie, 2eme 
"Dossier noir" de la politique africaine de la France: Les liaisons mafieuses de la Franc;afrigue, Paris: Agir 
ici/Survie 1995, p 1 3  
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par les trois Etats "progressistes" qui l'entourent, le Benin, le Burkina et le 
Ghana.62 
There was, however, a further example of deliberate non-intervention in 1991 
(Operation Verdier), when President Eyadema failed to implement the 
democratisation agreement drawn up by the National Conference earlier that 
year. Three hundred French troops were despatched to neighbouring Benin, but 
stopped short of intervening rnilitarily to force Eyadema to comply; Lacoste 
notes simply: 'Il lui a ete reproche [a la France] de ne pas soutenir une democratie 
menacee et de continuer a faire le jeu de la dictature d'Eyadema' .63 Despite 
President Mitterrand's declaration of support for democratisation at La Baule, 
the networks and personal friendships developed by his African advisor - his son 
Jean-Christophe - militated against any intervention to constrain Eyadema to 
comply; Wauthier points out that: 'Paris ne bouge pas davantage. Pour les 
opposants togolais, la France tient un "double langage" . . .  d'autant plus vivement 
condamne au Togo que l'on y voit la main de Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, ancien 
correspondant de l'AFP a Lome, notoirement en tres bons termes avec 
Eyadema'.64 
Despite a change of president and African advisors at the Elysee, and his well­
documented human rights abuses, Eyadema remains a close ally of France. On 
the eve of President Chirac's visit to Togo in July 1999, the Ligue beninoise pour la 
defense des droits de l 'homme (LBDH) confirmed an earlier Amnesty report of 
extra-judicial executions by the Eyadema regime; its investigations in coastal 
villages in Benin, according to reports, 'left little doubt that the more than 100 
bodies found there, some headless, handcuffed or riddled with bullets, "were 
pushed from low-flying planes and helicopters coming during the night from 
Togo". [ . . .  ] Mr Chirac's spokeswoman, Catherine Colonna . . .  said: "Of course, 
62 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique, Paris: Seuil 1995, p523 
63 Yves Lacoste ed., Dictionnaire Geopolitique des Etats, Paris: Flammarion 1994, p565 
64 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique, Paris: Seuil 1995, p590 
1 1 8 
human rights will be high on the president's agenda - although much of the 
evidence is confused".,65 
Niger 
In 1973, President Georges Pompidou authorised the despatch of 270 troops to 
Niger to help that state's first president Hamani Diori, 'l 'un des allies les plus 
fideles de la France en Afrique et . . .  l'un des architectes de la francophonie',66 to 
maintain power at at time of severe drought and internal unrest. Keith 
Somerville notes that: 'The French were keen to help maintain stability in Niger 
because of concern [for] continued access to uranium deposits, [and] also wanted 
to give a clear message to Libya not to interfere in Niger' . 67 However the 
following year, a few days after Pompidou's death in April, Hamani Diori was 
overthrown in a coup led by Nigerien army chief Colonel Seyni Kountche, a 
former NCO of the French army and (like Eyadema) a veteran of Indochina and 
Algeria. This time there was to be no mechanical interventionary response 
(which Hamani Diori might understandably have expected); Wauthier tells how: 
Le coup d'Etat s'etait produit pendant ! 'interim a la presidence d'Alain Poher, 
qui convoqua plusieurs ministres et responsables militaires pour examiner 
l 'eventualite d'une intervention, notamment de la garnison fran<;;aise 
cantonnee a Niamey [Niger] .  Jacques Foccart et le ministre de la Defense, 
Robert Galley, etaient pour: Diori etait un "ami loyal" de la France en faveur 
duquel il fallait faire jouer les accords de defense. Le Premier ministre Pierre 
Messmer et le general Maurin, chef de l'etat-major, etaient contre, craignant de 
voir la France accusee de "neo-colonialisme": ils l 'emporterent et Diori fut 
"lache" par Paris.68 
Years of economic mismanagement by a president mistakenly confident of 
automatic French support may have sufficed to bring about his downfall; Lacoste 
observes simply that: 'Les famines provoquees par les secheresses ne sont pas 
65 Jon Henley, Massacres mar Chirac visit to Togo', The Guardian 2 1  July 1999 
66 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et I'Afrique, Paris :  Seuil 1995, p235 
67 Keith Somerville, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa, London: Pinter Publishers & New York: St 
Martin's Press 1990, p 105 
68 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique, Paris: Seuil 1995, p237 
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etrangeres au renversement en 1974 de Diori . . .  : la misere rendit insupportable la 
corruption de son entourage et le detournement de l 'aide alimentaire' .69 
However, it is not insignificant that Diori had allied himself with radical and 
non-aligned regimes - Algeria and Sekou Toure's Guinea (the only 'francophone' 
African state to have rejected de Gaulle's Communaute jran9aise in 1958) - and had 
sought good relations with Colonel Gadaffi's Libya, with which Niger shares a 
vulnerable border. Diori may have been a victim of a Foccartian plot which 
sought his overthrow when suspected of pursuing an independent foreign policy 
which would distance his state from the francophone bloc; it seems likely that 
these concerns, rather than any fear of accusations of neo-colonialism, led to the 
deliberate nonintervention response on this occasion. Wauthier protests that 
France can thereby find itself in a no-win situation, damned if it does intervene, 
and damned if it does not: 
La France - inquiete du rappochement avec la Libye - avait-elle joue un rOle 
dans le putsch, ne serait-ce qu'en laissant faire, ou avait-elle tente, apres coup, 
de l'enrayer? ( . . .  ) Ainsi se trouvait une fois encore confirmee la regie, quasi 
generale lors des changements de regime en Afrique francophone, selon 
laquelle la France, quoi qu'elle ait fait et meme si elle n'avait rien fait, etait 
soup<;onne d'avoir tout manigance.70 
Congo-Brazzaville 
Congolese independence in 1960 was, according to Ernest Wamba dia Wamba71, 
'a well-prepared imperialist scheme of French neo-colonialism'/2 which installed 
former priest Fulbert Y oulou as president. The importance of retaining the 
independent Congo within a French sphere of influence is readily apparent; 
Elikia M'Bokolo notes that: 'From the first discoveries of offshore petroleum in 
1957, the growth of the industry turned the Congolese economy upside down. 
Between 1969 and 1984 petroleum rose from 5 per cent of export revenue to 90 
69 Yves Lacoste ed. ,  Dictionnaire geopolitique des etats, Paris:  Flammarion 1994, p413  
70 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l'Afrique, Paris: Seuil 1995, p238 
71 Wamba is former professor at the University of Kinshasa and currently leader of the Rassemblement 
Democratique Congolais faction in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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per cent [ . . .  ] Oil companies, in particular, overshadowed the sovereignty of any 
state . . .  In Congo the state apparently surrendered to international business ' . 73 
Youlou's three year regime 'pleased only former colonialists and neo­
colonialists';74 and even John Clark's more restrained assessment suggests that: 
'The neocolonial Youlou regime is best described as mildly corrupt, directionless 
in domestic policy, and deferential to France. '75 In a climate of trade union 
agitation and popular demands for the president's overthrow, the regime 
claimed to have discovered a communist plot to destroy it, and responded to 
popular protest with censorship and a ban on rights of association, organisation 
and public assembly. During Congo's trois glorieuses (13-15 August 1963), a civil 
insurgency involving a strike of 35,000 workers succeeded in forcing Youlou 
from power. Even though the president blamed international communism for his 
overthrow, Wamba notes the then unprecedented situation whereby: 
Not even the French army, still stationed in Brazzaville, dared to intervene to 
save the pro-French neo-colonial regime, as the whole population seemed so 
determined and so united against it. Even neo-colonialists felt that such an 
intervention was likely to precipitate a civil war. The initiative to transform 
the character of the state, so it seemed clearly, belonged to these rebelling 
masses of people who unfortunately had no political revolutionary leading 
76 core. 
Why did France not intervene to support Youlou? Foccart regretted that the 
regime had not been saved: '[J]e pense encore qu'il est dommage que nous 
72 Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, 'The Experience of Struggle in the People's Republic of Congo' in Peter 
Anyang' Nyong'o ed., Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa, London: Zed Books 1987, p l02 
73 Elikia M'Bokolo, 'Comparisons and contrasts in equatorial Africa: Gabon, Congo and the Central African 
Republic' in David Birmingham & Phyllis M. Martin eds., History of Central Africa: The Contemporary 
Years, since 1960, London & New York: Longman 1998, p72 
74 Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, 'The Experience of Struggle in the People's Republic of Congo' in Peter 
Anyang' Nyong'o ed., Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa, London: Zed Books 1987, p102 
75 John F. Clark, 'Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate' in John F. Clark& David E. Gardinier 
eds., Political Reform in Francophone Africa, Boulder CO: Westview Press 1997, p63 
76 Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, 'The Experience of Struggle in the People's Republic of Congo' in Peter 
Anyang' Nyong'o ed. ,  Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa, London: Zed Books 1987, p l05 
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n'ayons pas soutenu Fulbert Youlou . . .  , et plus tard Hamani Diori, en 1974. '77 But 
importantly, the leader to emerge from the popular revolt was, despite his 
espousal of 'scientific socialism', not hostile to France. Alphonse Massemba­
Debat, was 'seen as an honest politician . . .  [but] [a]lready, French colonialists 
were quite satisfied with and relieved at the movement's choice of the head of 
the new government' .78 
Subsequently, the renamed People's Republic of Congo was ruled under a one­
party state system when Marien N'Gouabi, commander of the armed forces, 
became head of state in 1968. N'Gouabi's regime was 'widely repected by many 
ordinary Congolese for his intelligence, incorruptibility, and hard work179, until 
his murder outside his residence in 1977. N'Gouabi's successor Yhombi Opango 
was in turn ousted in a coup led by Denis Sassou Nguesso (current Congolese 
president) in February 1979. 
Throughout this turbulent period and the despite the Congo's apparently 
Marxist regimes, French influence continued uninterruptedly and, with the 
discovery of oil, became central to the country's economy. Wamba emphasises 
that: ' [N]o politico-ideological break took place, nor did any real curtailment of 
neo-colonialism come out of it. If anything, more imperialist capital started 
flowing in again, especially after the discovery of new oil deposits, and reliance 
on France for the regular payment of civil service salaries increased.'8° Clark 
corroborates this assessment: 
77 Jacques Foccart, Foccart Par le 2: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique 1997, 
p138  
78 Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, 'The Experience of Struggle in the People's Republic of  Congo' in Peter 
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80 ibid p 1 10; Wamba also offers the following explanation for the Congo's multiple coups and 
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Perhaps surprisingly, Congo retained relatively close relations with France 
throughout its twenty-eight-year socialist period ( . . .  ) France . . .  remained 
Congo's largest trading partner and a far larger source of foreign aid [than 
other socialist states] throughout the whole period [1963-91 ]  . . .  [D]espite its 
anti-neocolonialist rhetoric, Congo allowed the French firm Elf-Aquitaine to 
become the chief exploiter of the country's petroleum, the production and sale 
of which accounted for more than 90 percent of Congo's foreign earnings 
during the 1980s.81 
Is this a surprise? French intervention operated along a unique bilateral axis 
which transcended and outlived Cold War ideology. By this logic France, which 
emphasised elsewhere [as we shall see in Chapter 4] that it was the West's 
gendarme in Africa, could intervene without contradiction in support of an 
avowedly Marxist leader in Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, in 1987. Foccart offers 
a helpful insight into French thinking at the time: ' [C]e pays dont l'etiquette 
marxiste-leniniste est avalisee par l'Union sovietique . . .  s'accommode tres bien de 
la presence d'entreprises capitalistes et de la cooperation avec la France. Et il 
n'est pas bien difficile a gerer en cette periode [i.e. 14 years under Denis Sassou 
Nguesso, 1979-93] ' .82 Or as Wamba, in describing the attempt to consolidate the 
revolution under the MNR, puts it: 'French imperialism still controlled the 
economy . . .  [A]ll [the Movement's] decisions . . .  were unable to offset radically the 
imperialist domination of the economy; the latter's structures remained 
completely integrated into the French neo-colonial system.'83 
bourgeois state apparatus and of democratising the army - still patterned after the French armed 
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With unfortunate timing, John Clark wrote in 1997 (shortly before the outbreak 
of civil war which returned Sassou Nguesso to power) that: 'Congo has had to 
overcome an entrenched authoritarian regime and grapple with economic 
p aralysis and ethnic confrontations; meanwhile, the French response to 
democratization in Congo has been ambivalent . . .  [but] [p]erhaps Congo's 
favourable social features make it a good candidate for membership in the small 
club of stable, durable African democracies'.84 But French nonintervention again 
in 1997 was dictated by radically changed circumstances, and was, it may be 
argued, involuntary nonintervention for the first time in a state which, unlike 
Rwanda, Burundi and the former Zaire, is a former French colony and hence an 
integral part of the original pre carre. This hints not so much at tumbling 
dominoes, but at the phenomenon of rollback, to be discussed in this study's 
conclusion. 
Burkina Faso 1 987 
It may also be worth mentioning in passing here the assassination on 15 October 
1 987 of 'new generation' President Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, a militant 
opponent of neo-colonialism out of step with his francophone African colleagues, 
and a frequent critic of France. In contradiction of practice throughout West 
Africa during Fran<;ois Mitterrand's November 1986 tour, President Sankara 
used the opportunity of the French president's visit to voice a wide-ranging 
attack on French African policy. Le Mo.nde reported that during a diplomatic 
dinner, 'le president de la Republique [Mitterrand] dut en effet ecouter une 
etrange mise en cause, non pas de sa politique mais de celle de la France, dans 
des termes pour le moins inhabituels en ce genre de circonstance' .85 Mitterrand in 
turn abandoned diplomatic language to declare that: 'Le capitaine Sankara est un 
homme derangeant ( . . .  ) Je n'ai pas a me meler de votre politique interieure 
84 John F. Clark, 'Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate' in John F. Clark& David E. Gardinier 
eds., Political Reform in Francophone Africa, Boulder CO: Westview Press 1997, p62 
85 Jacques Amalric, 'Le "vieux sage" et le jeune impertinent. . . ' ,  Le Monde 19 November 1986 
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[meme si] vous constituez une equipe jeune [Sankara was 37], derangeante, 
insolente' .86 Sankara's independent stand, and perceived arrogance before the 
French president, could have been considered an encouragement to groups 
opposed to francophile heads-of-state throughout francophone Africa. Sankara's 
murder and his administrations's overthrow the following year provoked no 
overt response in Paris, and only muted expressions of regret. Fran<;ois-Xavier 
Verschave suggests that: 
Ce n'est pas Foccart personnellement qu'affrontait Sankara: c'est cette 
Fran<;afrique possessive - dont, bien sur, Foccart palpait toutes les pulsions. Il 
n'a peut-etre pas signe lui-meme l'arret de mort de Sankara, mais deux au 
moins des feaux-clients-complices qu'il avait au telephone plusieurs fois par 
semaine, Houphouet [Cote d'Ivoire] et Eyadema [Togo], ont beni le complot 
meurtrier. 87 
Counter-intervention 
Djibouti 
The French intervention in Djibouti is the only clear-cut case of counter­
intervention driven by French interests alone (as opposed to French support for a 
key ally, as would be the case with Morocco in Western Sahara) . However, such 
a counterinvention may be interpreted on another level, i.e. as intervention to 
counter or more precisely pre-empt an intervention by the US should France fail 
in its obligations as the gendarme of Africa. 
The tiny Horn of Africa state of Djibouti is a unique case. It is physically cut off 
from the rest of the pre carre, and represents in many respects France's Gibraltar, 
guarding the southern approaches to the Red Sea and Suez Canal. It is also the 
site of France's largest overseas base, which has housed up to 5000 French troops 
in a state with a population of just 400,000. A majority of this population voted 
86 ibid 
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for independence from France in May 1977, and the stated purpose of France's 
reinforcement of its garrison in that year was to resist Somali irredentism. 
George Moose notes that: 1t was feared [in the West] that the territory would 
become a microcosm of the growing tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia and 
that Somalia's assertion of its irredentist claims to Djibouti could provoke an 
Ethiopian move to take over the territory in order to protect its access to the 
port . . .  Such a move, if successful, would give Ethiopia's Soviet backers a 
foothold on both sides of the narrow strait of Bab el-Mandeb, which controls the 
southern access to the Red Sea'.88 Similarly, although its Cold War strategic value 
would seem to explain fully the maintenance of such a large and costly garrison 
there, it was justified primarily in terms of regional security in the volatile Horn; 
John Chipman noted that: ' [T]he French presence there serves as much to keep a 
precarious balance between opposing states in the area as it may serve to support 
a purely Western interest'.89 
Moreover, the French garrison remained at full strength post-Cold War. It is the 
largest industry in Djibouti, representing half the state's gross domestic product 
and 41% of its resources90; without the French army, the tiny oil-less state's 
quintessential dependency economy would be destitute. This is par excellence 
what Robin Luckham has called France's 'permanent intervention' .  Christopher 
Clapham notes that such garrisons 'could also be taken as indicating tacit 
support for the government in power, since even if they were nominally there for 
other purposes, they constituted a deterrent to intervention by the army of the 
state concerned.'91 Troupes de Marine is noteworthy in light of this theory that the 
88 George E. Moose, 'French Military Policy in Africa' in WJ Foltz & HS Bienen eds. ,  Arms and the 
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effects of the presence of pre-positioned troops on the domestic politics of the 
states concerned vary from outright interference in internal affairs, such as the 
protection of a president against his own citizens or army (as in the Central 
African Republic 1996-97), to a more subtle deterrence of opposition; the official 
regimental account lauds France's defence of Djibouti during the first Ethiopian­
Eritrean war as: 
. . .  exemplaire par la demonstration eclatante du role de forces de presence 
comme celles de Djibouti qui ont su faire face instantanement a une crise 
locale majeure. Sans elles et dans le meilleur des cas celle-ci n'aurait pu etre 
affronte qu'apres un delai d'au moins 72 heures par des elements 
d'intervention transportes par voie aerienne sur des milliers de kilometres et 
que leur faible connaissance des forces en presence, du terrain et une 
acclimatation difficile n'auraient pas rendus instantanement disponibles; [et] 
exemplaire par la remarquable demonstration d'entente et de cooperation 
entre les militaires fran<;ais et djiboutiens habitues depuis longtemps a une vie 
commune et a une connaissance reciproque et a des exercices menes ensemble 
sur le terrain de l'engagement.92 
'Un avant-gout de Rwanda ' 
French Marines and Legionnaires m Djibouti were mobilised again in 1991 .  
Although beyond the strict Cold War timeframe of  this chapter, the 1991 
intervention merits inclusion here in its role as a foretaste of the post-Cold War 
militaro-humanitarian justification for intervention. Troops from the French 
garrison in Djibouti were deployed this time along the border with Ethiopia, to 
resist incursions by exiled Djiboutian FRUD (Front pour la restauration de l'unite 
et de la democratie) guerrillas based in that country. Agir ici/Survie quotes the 
following account: 
L'armee fran<;aise s'interpose, au nom d'interets pretendus humanitaires - aller 
porter de l'eau, des aliments, des medicaments aux populations qui sont 
derriere la ligne de la guerilla -, mais elle pousuit en realite un but totalement 
militaire. A l'abri de cette espece de "ligne Maginot nouvelle maniere", l'armee 
djiboutienne recrute en Somalie de nombreux mercenaires et quadruple ses 
effectifs. Mais, a la fin de l'annee 1992, cette interposition cesse 
92 Comite National des Traditions des Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine 
dans les operations exterieures de 1961 a 1994, Paris: Lavauzelle 1996, p7 1 
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miraculeusement, alors que les conditions objectives qui avaient justifie sa 
mise en place n'ont pas cesse. Se produit alors une offensive de l 'armee 
reguliere qui, compte tenu de son renforcement, balaye la guerilla et la 
repousse vers l 'Ethiopie.93 
When the French counter-intervention (based on the premise that the FRUD 
constituted a foreign invasion, the same rationale used for France's intervention 
in opposition to the RPF in Rwanda) was completed, the account tells how there 
ensued, 'un veritable genocide tribal. Les gens sont massacres par centaines, 
repousses dans le meilleur des cas vers les frontieres erythreennes, le regime 
dictatorial [du President Hassan Gouled] ayant toujours pretendu que le FRUD 
n'etait pas djiboutien. La repression est feroce: des temoignages de deputes de la 
majorite attestent que les routes sont jonchees de cadavres. A travers cette 
operation militaire, on cherche a liquider une fois pour toutes ! 'opposition dans 
ce pays, et celle-ci etant en grande partie afar, a exterminer cette ethnie' .94 The 
French troops which had returned to their Djibouti garrison were not redeployed 
on this occasion. 
Mauritania (Operation Lamantin 1977-1980) 
In late 1973, having successfully renegotiated his country's cooperation accords 
with France, President Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania stated that he 
believed those accords, signed in 1961, were 'neo-colonial', and that he did not 
believe in 'la philanthropie erigee en systeme, surtout entre un Etat hier colonise 
et un Etat hier colonisateur. '  He also declared that: 
Je dirai que nos rapports avec la France n'ont jamais ete excellents malgre les 
apparences et les formes. 11 y a eu des tensions aigues a propos de la guerre 
d'Algerie, des experiences nucleaires fran<,;aises au Sahara et de notre refus 
d'adherer a !'Organisation commune des regions saharaiennes. Desormais, 
93 Antoine Comte, 'De Kigali a Djibouti', Maintenant 8 February 1995, quoted in Agir ici/Survie, 4eme 
"Dossier noir" de la politique africaine de la France: Presence militaire frans;aise en Afrique: derives . . .  , 
Paris: Agir ici!Survie 1995, p2 1 
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nous ne voyons plus que des avantages a cooperer avec notre ex­
colonisa teur. 95 
President Daddah's words were to prove prophetic, as four years later his 
country was attacked by Polisario columns fighting for the independence of the 
neighbouring Western Sahara and opposed, with Algerian support, to the 
October 1974 agreement (ratified by Spain and internationally approved in 
November 1975) between Mauritania and Morocco to divide the territory 
between them. The stated purpose of the resultant French intervention was to 
counter these incursions, although this dispute - labelled 'Querelle autour d 'un 
"Etat fant6me"'96 - is primarily of interest to military historians as a 
demonstration of France's adaptation of its power-projection capacities to fight 
low-intesity wars, and as a showcase of French weaponry; one account notes 
that: 
The spearhead of the interventionary forces comprises ground forces and 
marine infantry units. The Navy and Air Force also play an important role. 
The Navy protects communications, provides transportation and, in certain 
cases, offers artillery and aero-naval support . . .  With its sophisticated and 
powerfully-armed tactical fleet (FATAC), with combat aircraft like the in-flight 
refuelable Jaguar and Mirage F1, the Air Force can be called in for long-range 
pin-pointed actions against concentrated forces, as against the Polisario forces 
in Western Sahara in 1977-78 . . .  [A]ir power is an intimate component of 
intervention, not only at the logistical level but also the operational level.97 
President Giscard d'Estaing ordered the aerial bombardment of Polisario 
columns in June 1977 following the signing of a new military agreement with 
Mauritania, and again in 1978 following the retaliatory kidnapping by Polisario 
of a group of French mining engineers. However, as George Moose noted: 
'Despite French intervention and the rapid expansion of the Mauritanian military 
from three thousand men in 1975 to more than fifteen thousand by 1978, 
95 Quoted in Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et I' Afrique, Paris: Seuil 1995, pp243-244 
96 Claude Wauther, Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique, Paris :  Seuil 1995, p339 
97 Michel Martin, 'From Algiers to N'Djamena: France's Adaptation to Low-Intensity Wars, 1830- 1997' in 
DA Charters, D.A. and M. Tugwell eds., Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict, London: Brassey's  1989, p1 1 1  
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Mauritania's position continue[d] to worsen.;Js Claude Wauthier emphasises that 
France's support for the Moroccan-Mauritanian annexation of the Western 
Sahara provoked the worst crisis in Franco-Algerian relations since Algerian 
independence, with Algerian president Boumediene famously accusmg 
President Giscard d'Estaing of having 'revetu la gandoura et la djebella dans 
lesquelles il cache un poignard marocain' .99 Certainly, the closeness of the 
military relationship between Paris and Rabat was to be demonstrated most 
clearly in the same year as the Western Saharan crisis, 1977, by Morocco's 
despatch of several hundred troops in French military planes to spearhead the 
Zairean army's defence of Shaba against Angolan-based anti-Mobutu insurgents 
(the first Shaba intervention, discussed in Chapter 4); France also supplied 
Morocco with a total of 49 French-built fighter aircraft (Mirage and Alpha-Jet) 
and a new air-defence system at the same period.100 
Significantly, France's support for Morocco - and by extension for its territorial 
claim in Western Sahara - was to set the direction of Western practice on the 
issue; George Moose notes that in 1979: 
[T]he Carter administration brought its own position closely in line with that 
of the French by offering to sell OV -10 reconnaissance aircraft and helicopter 
gunships sought by the Moroccans for use in their fight against Polisario, but 
without endorsing Morocco's territorial ambitions. The rationale for the 
decision, like that given by French officials in support of their military aid, 
was that . . .  Morocco would come to the bargaining table only if it was assured 
of Western support and could do so from a position of relative strength.101 
So in this case, instead of acting as the West's policeman, France was able to 
direct Western policy through military intervening to support one side in an 
African conflict. 
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This was one of the busiest periods (1977-78) for French militarism in Africa. 
Fran<;ois Mitterrand condemned President Giscard's 'neocolonialism and 
condescending paternalism' in Africa, and his interventions as 'operations in 
catastrophe'; Jacques Chirac, following the 1978 interventions in Shaba, Chad and 
Mauritania, 'accused Giscard variously of souring the climate for the pursuit of 
important French political and commercial interests in Algeria and Libya, 
undermining Moroccan security by encouraging its involvement in Shaba, 
setting back de Gaulle's early efforts at detente with Moscow, and becoming "a 
scout for the Americans" in Africa' .102 However, the rewards - for French 
influence and French-supported heads-of-state - of an interventionary policy in a 
number of conflicts simultaneously seemed to outweigh any domestic criticism 
or accusations of neo-colonialism from President Giscard's political opponents. 
These opponents would themselves adopt similar interventionary policies 
during their own subsequent presidencies. 
Deposition of client: Central African Republic (CAR) 
An overt French intervention to overthrow and replace a former client regime 
happened only once. (Such operations have been a more frequent feature of 
American military intervention in US client states, as in South Vietnam and 
Panama.) The 1979 Operation Barracuda in the Central African Republic (then 
entitled the Central African Empire) was one of the few military interventions of 
the Giscard presidency to provoke controversy, as it involved the deliberate 
removal of the head-of-state of a sovereign country, and his replacement by a 
candidate chosen by the intervenor. Even Foccart called it 'la derniere expedition 
coloniale'.103 Dominique Mo"isi underlined the singularity of this form of 
102 George E. Moose, French Military Policy in Africa' in WJ Foltz & HS Bienen eds., Arms and the 
African, New Haven & London: Yale University Press 1985, pp85-86 
103 Foccart Parle 2, p255 ; see also Jacques Le Bourgeois ,  Une Intervention militaire frans:aise en Afrique: 
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intervention: 'Non-support to an endangered leader may sometimes take a more 
active form, as is the case of the Central African Republic where France, having 
supported the Bokassa regime, actually intervened to replace him, with the man 
Bokassa had himself deposed, Dacko.'104 
Central to French interests in the CAR were its reserves of uranium, essential to 
the French nuclear industry, which were estimated at 15,000 tons when 
extraction began in 1976, and the strategic location which the state's name 
implies. From 1960 to 1997 France maintained two major military bases in the 
CAR, at Bouar and in the capital Bangui. These bases were essential for France's 
power projection throughout central Africa, particularly for its repeated 
interventions in Chad and Rwanda, and the maintenance of this significant 
military presence has been at the heart of France's often difficult relations with its 
former colony. 
Jean-Bedel Bokassa came to power in 1966 when he overthrew the elected 
president David Dacko. He initially modelled his rule on that of Charles de 
Gaulle, but on 4 December 1977 he appointed himself emperor of the renamed 
Central African Empire (CAE) . Bokassa became the Western media's caricature 
grotesque of an African dictator (often with a subtext questioning the wisdom of 
decolonisation), but parallel with Bokassa's self-aggrandisement was systematic 
repression of opposition; Amnesty reported his involvement in the massacre of 
over one hundred schoolchildren detained following demonstrations on 18 April 
1979. A commission of African jurists set up to report on Bokassa's human rights 
abuses corroborated reports of the Emperor's involvement in the massacre, and 
criticised France for its military support and financial subventions which assured 
Bokassa's grip on power. Faced with censure at home and abroad and unable to 
justify its continued support through external threat, Paris announced the 
104 Dominique Moi'si, 'Intervention in French Foreign Policy' in Hedley Bull ed. ,  Intervention in World 
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cessation of aid to the CAE, while President Giscard and his Africa advisors 
began to manoeuvre to find a replacement for Bokassa who would be more 
frequentable. The now disfavoured Bokassa turned to Libya for financial and 
military help, which Colonel Gadaffi offered in exchange for access to the CAE's 
uranium and permission to establish a Libyan military base; but when Bokassa 
went to Tripoli on 20 September 1979 to meet Gadaffi, the French seized the 
opportunity to install their chosen successor, former president David Dacko, 
who travelled to Bangui with the French intervention force in a military Transall. 
The intervention - codenamed Operation Barracuda - was unique in that an 
African head-of-state, was directly installed in power by the French army, 
although Dacko was widely considered weak and entirely dependent on French 
support. George Moose notes that: ' [T]he French dropped all pretence of non­
involvement after Dacko's own statements acknowledging the French role in 
planning and executing the coup and reports that Dacko's return to Bangui was 
simultaneous with the arrival of some four hundred French paratroopers.1105 
Apart from the predictable hostility of Libya, only Benin and Chad condemned 
the French action. Key among the stated justifications for Operation Barracuda 
were containment and humanitarianism. With regard to the former, Troupes de 
Marine tells how: 'Libya and the Soviet Union . . .  had begun to put in place in 
Bangui aid, material and above all advisors, the quality and quantity of which 
had only little to do with the well understood needs of the country. 1106 Key 
participants in Operation Barracuda, Marine Colonels Mazza and Degenne, 
conclude that: 
[L]'echec de notre tentative aurait entraine une purge sanglante dans les 
milieux centrafricains, 1' eviction de la France de tous les inten�ts qu' elle 
pouvait avoir sur place et !'acceleration de la manoeuvre tentee par l'Union 
Politics, Oxford: OUP 1984, p73 
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Sovietique d'encercler l'Europe par le sud . . .  Autre caracteristique cl' execution 
majeure, plus serieuse, !'intervention doit etre accomplie sans faire usage des 
armes, sauf en ultime recours. Notre arrivee en soutien du nouveau 
gouvernement d'un pays ami justfiait cette prescription, mais son application 
ne coulait pas de source. C'etait vraiment le moment d'etaler vigoureusement 
sa force pour ne pas a voir a s' en servir. 11 fallait quand meme des troupes 
rudement disciplinees et un peu de chance pour que cela marche! 107 
Humanitarianism was invoked here on the basis that France claimed to have 
acted in response to the human rights report prepared by African jurists . Teson is 
sympathetic to this viewpoint, and concludes that: 
The humanitarian motives of France can hardly be doubted. To be sure, the 
French determination to overthrow Bokassa arose out of a guilty conscience 
for having supported the tyrant in the past. But the course of events showed 
an unmistakable shift of policy by the French government. That shift was 
directly caused by the reports about Bokassa's schoolchildren massacre and 
the generally atrocious nature of the emperor's regime ( . . .  ) Statements by 
French officials and President Dacko immediately after the coup confirm that 
humanitarian concerns were crucial to the French decision to overthrow 
Bokassa . . .  Moreover, the null cost in human lives makes the Central African 
case an instance of humanitarian intervention par excellence. French troops 
provided the necessary and proportionate help the Central African citizens 
needed to depose a dictator who had undoubtedly rendered himself guilty of 
the gravest crimes against humanity.108 
In contrast, Foccart considered this most exceptional intervention to have been a 
step too far, a blatant interference condemned by the world which risked 
drawing attention to and revealing too much about France's interventionary role 
in Africa: 
On est alle chercher David Dacko pour le ramener a Bangui clans un avian 
militaire; on aurait pu choisir quelqu'un d'autre, cela n'aurait rien change a la 
nature du coup d'Etat. 11 s'agissait de renverser Bokassa en profitant de son 
absence. On m' a reproche mon neo-colonialisme, mais Barracuda ce n' est pas 
du neo-colonialisme, c'est du colonialisme, la derniere expedition coloniale! 
J'ai alors pense que les initiateurs de cette operation avaient abime l'image de 
107 Comite National des Traditions des Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine 
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la France en Afrique . . .  [T]ous les ingredients de ce qu'il fallait pour nous faire 
condamner par la communaute internationale etaient reunis: une expedition 
militaire dans un pays etranger, avec dans l'avion l'homme que nous voulions 
• 1 109 Imposer. 
Notable here is Foccart's greatest concern: not the independence and self­
determination of the CAR's people, but the tarnishing of France's international 
image. (This concern, a constant throughout the period under consideration, 
would re-emerge most recently with the internal French debate over a last-ditch 
intervention to save Mobutu in early 1997.) Hugo Sada supports Foccart's 
conclusion, that: ' [L]'operation Barracuda en Centrafrique suscita de fortes 
controverses et symbolisa la survivance de pratiques neo-coloniales tres 
defavorablement pen;ues en France et dans le monde' .110 However, from an 
American perspective George Moose points out that: 'In contrast to the uproar 
that followed the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the overthrow of its 
government, which bore at least superficial similarities to the French action, there 
was no concerted attempt by the Africans to bring the matter before the United 
Nations or even to debate it seriously in the OAU. '111 This most explicit 
demonstration of French military power in Africa, and an apparent breach of 
international norms, could nonetheless be considered normal within the context 
of French interventionary practice. 
Conclusion 
What do we mean by a mechanical interventionary response to an intervention 
stimulus? We mean, in sum, that intervention or the threat of intervention is 
109 Jacques Forccart, Foccart Parle 2, Paris; Fayard/Jeune Afrique 1997, p255 
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always a factor, directly influencing the domestic politics of the potentially 
intervened states. 
Notable in this respect is France's help to pro-French regimes regardless of their 
positioning on the Cold War left-right spectrum. Wauthier notes that military 
interventions to help both a pro-Western military dictator (Eyadema in 1986) and 
a self-proclaimed Marxist (Sassou-Nguesso in 1987) by the same French 
a dministration is evidence of successful cohabitation in Paris: 
Le fait que Sassou-Nguesso dirige un regime au moins theoriquement 
marxiste, tandis qu'Eyadema se montre ouvertement pro-accidental, ne peut 
que conforter l 'opinion que le "tandem" Mitterrand-Chirac fait passer l 'amitie 
avec les pays du pre carre avant les querelles ideologiques, et qu'au moins 
pour l 'Afrique la cohabitation fonctionne.112 
However, this apparent paradox may also be seen as a clear demonstration of the 
independence of France's interventionary dynamic, which operated during the 
Cold War regardless of globally-defined ideologies. 
Similarly, there was continuity in the use of military intervention over five 
presidencies and numerous governments despite apparent ideological 
differences on other policies. It is now well documented that the two terms as 
president of Fran<;ois Mitterrand, from 1981 to 1994, were the most 
interventionary; Dominique Mo1si pointed out that: 'In Africa, Socialist France is 
caught between two contradictory objectives: the need to differentiate herself 
from Giscard d'Estaing's policy with its neo-paternalistic taint, and the need to 
reassure all those countries [i.e. leaders] whose stability depends on French 
p olitical, economic, and all too often military support, in what can be considered 
as the last French sphere of influence in the world'.113 And as late as November 
1 994, President Mitterrand reasserted the traditional importance of Africa for 
1 12 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique, Paris: Seuil l995 , p524 
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France: 'La France ne serait plus tout-a-fait elle-meme aux yeux du monde si elle 
renon<;ait a etre presente en Afrique'. 1 14 
The cumulative effect has been the creation of an independent (and, until 1994, 
seemingly unstoppable) dynamic by means of which France acted militarily in 
Africa free from many of the constraints, domestic or international, which 
international law and France's own constitution suggest should normally apply 
to relations between states in general, and between strong and weak states in 
particular. France has been a more prolific intervenor in Africa than the Cold 
War superpowers or the post-Cold War United States; one of the latter's policy­
makers, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs George Moose, 
notes that: 'The French . . .  have given the appearance of being immune to either 
the domestic foibles or the international constraints that have led other Western 
nations to eschew an active military role in Africa. '115 France's response was 
always interventionary, even when, through deliberate withholding of 
intervention where expected, it allowed a regime's opponents the time and space 
for a coup d'etat (the very absence of the expected interventionary response 
sending a signal of French approval for the disfavoured leader's eventual 
overthrow) . 
The generality of French interventionary practice from 1960 to 1990, including its 
first intervention in Rwanda (to be discussed in Chapter 5), was driven primarily 
by a mechanical interventionary response, operating independently of Cold War 
imperatives, except insofar as the Gaullist world vision saw influence in Africa as 
one means of standing up to both superpowers; Phil Cerny (in The Politics of 
Grandeur) pointed out that from the late 1950s, Gaullist foreign policy was 'far­
sighted, in that it was built upon a vision of a post-cold war world, in which the 
1 14 Fran�ois Mitterrand, quoted in Marie-Pierre Subtil, 'Fran�ois Mitterrand affirme que la France doit 
"refuser de reduire son ambition africaine"', Le Monde 10 November 1994 
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mature nations of the old world and the newly independent states of the Third 
World would act to counterbalance the political, economic, technological and 
military hegemony of the two recently emerged "superpowers"'. 116 And John 
Chipman, although placing France's interventions in Africa until the late 1980s 
firmly in their Cold War context, notes that: 'French policy has rarely been aimed 
overtly at keeping the Soviet menace at bay or at propagating a particular 
"Western" policy. The French have traditionally been reasonably relaxed about 
Soviet influence on the continent'.117 France's interventions were motivated in the 
first instance by French priorities and determined by the unique bilateral 
dynamic of Franco-African relations, primarily support for client regimes. 
France, as its policy-makers repeatedly insisted, understood Africa and could 
ensure stability where it could project its power; and this arrangement was 
accepted by the US and others as the Monroe Doctrine a la franfaise which would 
retain those countries' links with the West. Patrick Manning emphasises that: 
With the exception of civil wars in Zaire and Chad, the nations of francophone 
sub-Saharan Africa experienced less political disjuncture than most other areas 
of the continent. 118 
We shall proceed in Chapter 4 by considering these exceptions. 
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Chapter 4: Major interventions in the Cold War context 
Introduction: 'La France "gendarme de l'Occident"'1 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider France's major interventions in post­
colonial sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War, i .e. during a period delimited 
by the 'year of independence' 1960, and the end of global bipolarity, 1990. We 
shall focus on France's best known and most significant theatres of intervention, 
Chad (where France has intervened from 1969 to the present) and Zaire (where 
France intervened periodically from 1977 to 1997), as two contrasting examples, 
for the intervenor, of success - Chad is now a comparatively stable, territorially 
intact state governed, it may be argued, as a French protectorate - and failure: 
repeated French interventions in Zaire to support Mobutu, Africa's longest­
serving dictator, failed to ensure the long-term viability of his regime and led to 
its overthrow in 1997 when France's capacity for overt intervention was newly 
curtailed. 
Claude Wauthier notes that these interventions allowed France to play the role, 
and to be cast by the US, as the guardian of Western interests in Africa: 
[T]outes ces operations ont alimente les critiques de ceux qui accuserent la 
France . . .  d'etre le "gendarme de l'Occident" ou encore le "Cuba des Etats-
Unis" . . .  On ne faisait d'ailleurs guere mystere a Washington du role qu'on 
entendait confier a la France: "Notre interet est de continuer a laisser les 
Fran�ais s'occuper du maintien de la paix et des ventes d'armes au Za1re"2 
Similarly, George Moose notes that throughout the Cold War: ' [T]he United 
States, confronted by more serious and immediate security concerns in Europe, 
Asia and the Far East, was largely content to leave Africa to the ministrations of 
its European allies' .3 However, this study will suggest that a distinction may be 
' Title of Chapter 7 in Claude Wauthier, Ouatre Presidents et 1' Afrique, Paris: Seuil 1995, p363 
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139 
drawn between France's mechanical interventionary responses to perceived 
intervention stimuli within its pre carre - the dynamic which drove its 
interventions in Gabon, the Central African Republic and elsewhere (as we have 
seen in Chapter 3) - from those which were driven equally by Cold War 
imperatives of containment and superpower geostrategy. Some interventions 
would have happened with or without a Cold War backdrop; indeed, such 
interventions continued after the Cold War as we saw during the early and mid-
1990s in the CAR, Djibouti, the Comoros Islands and of course Rwanda. But 
other interventions - the most militarily ambitious which often depended 
logistically on the support of another power (i.e. the US) - served a dual purpose: 
they defended France's interests in its only sphere of influence, but they also 
relieved the US of a perceived Cold War obligation to support pro-Western 
heads-of-state or contain presumed threats of Soviet/Cuban penetration or 
Libyan expansionism. 
It may be useful therefore to discuss briefly the Cold War division of Africa into 
competing but immovable spheres of influence. If the US claims to have taken a 
back seat in much of the continent, the Soviet Union declared its policy in Africa 
to be implacably anti-imperial throughout the period of decolonisation and 
subsequently (until the collapse of the USSR in 1991; Africa has no apparent 
strategic significance today for the USSR's successor states) .  Soviet leaders took 
credit for the dismantling of formal empire in Africa; official Soviet discourse 
maintained that: 'The process of decolonization was to a large extent expedited 
by the consistent and unwavering policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries which have always supported the struggle for national liberation.'4 The 
same pamphlet quotes then US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Brown, who said that: 
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[T]he African continent merited being in the centre of constant attention, since 
the southern part of Africa has six very important minerals, including chrome, 
cobalt, industrial diamonds, manganese, platinum and vanadium, that are 
badly needed by modern industrially developed societies. The US economy . . .  
at present is greatly dependent on this source of raw materials, and besides, 
access to airfields and seaports and also to communications inside Africa and 
around it is of special importance in defence planning.5 
As we shall see, US political and military support was provided on those 
occasions when France's actions chimed with the US' strategic or resource 
interests as identified here, at a time - throughout the 1970s and 1980s - when the 
Vietnam legacy and losses in Lebanon militated against direct US military 
intervention 'out of area' . Peter Schraeder points out that: 
Throughout the Cold War era, the White House expected its European allies ­
most notably France - to take the lead in their former colonial territories. As 
put succinctly by George Ball, undersecretary of state in the Kennedy 
administration, the United States recognized Africa as a "special European 
responsibility," just as European nations were expected to recognize our [U.S.] 
particular responsibility in Latin America." In short, the White House 
intended for its European allies to take responsibility for thwarting communist 
and other "radical" powers from exploiting instability in Africa.6 
France, the 'Gendarme of Africa', would intervene where the US could not or 
would not. Official accounts emphasise that France, with its permanent garrisons 
of acclimatised troops, a support network of French-trained and armed local 
armies, and a knowledge and understanding of the African context unmatched 
in the West, was uniquely well-placed to conduct swift and effective military 
operations there; Troupes de Marine also highlights the historically amicable 
relations between French troops and local populations: 'Il y aussi que son passe 
colonial. . .  la fait beneficier d'un capital de confiance dans l 'esprit et dans le coeur 
des ex-colonises ( . . .  ) [I]l convient de souligner aussi a quel point les 
"permanents" concourent au developpement des contacts humains avec la 
5 Vladimir Simonov, Seething Continent: The Soviet Viewpoint, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing 
House 1980, pp9- 10 
6 Peter J. Schraeder, 'African International Relations' in April A. Gordon & Donald L.  Gordon eds., 
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p opulation locale, jusqu'a tisser des liens avec elle, ce qui ne manque pas de 
£rapper les observateurs' .7 
As  we have seen in Chapter 3, during the 1960-90 period French interventionary 
p ractice took a variety of forms, including suppression of internal revolt 
(Cameroon 1960-64), restoration of client (Gabon 1964, Togo 1986), counter­
intervention (Djibouti 1977), and deposition of client (Central African Republic 
1 979) .  Overall, these interventions were considered successes by France's army 
and policy-makers and, with the exception of Operation Barracuda in the CAR, 
generated little public interest or international concern, except insofar as they 
w ere understood to guarantee stability in Africa's francophone bloc, considered 
(in France) to be the envy of the continent's often troubled anglophone and 
lusophone states. Hugo Sada, journalist with Radio France Internationale (RFI) 
and Defense nationale's Africa columnist, points out that: 
La plupart des interventions militaires fran<;aises en Afrique n' ont . . .  suscite 
aucune reaction internationale negative d' ampleur significative et ont en 
general ete, sur le plan militaire, couronnees de succes. Mis a part le Tchad, le 
bilan strategique etait plutot positif. La zone francophone s 'est revelee etre 
plus stable que le reste du continent, alors que les pays concernes pouvaient 
maintenir leurs budgets militaires a un niveau peu eleve.8 
And throughout the Cold War, the contrast between the well-managed pre carre 
and poles of instability elsewhere was stark. By the early 1970s, following the 
attempted Biafran secession from Nigeria and the outbreak of armed liberation 
struggles in Portugal's African colonies and minority-ruled Rhodesia and South 
Africa, the continent became, like south-east Asia in previous decades, a theatre 
of superpower confrontation by proxy. In this context, we need to ask whether 
there was a specific, authentic Cold War dynamic to French intervention policy 
Understanding Contemporary Africa 2"ct ed. ,Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 1996, p 147 
7 Comite National des Traditions des Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine 
dans les operations exterieures de 1961 a 1994, Paris: Lavauzelle 1996, ppl l - 12 
8 Hugo Sada, France-Afrique: Du Tchad au Rwanda, ! 'evolution des interventions militaires, Medias France 
Intercontinents/ Radio France Internationale 'Politique-Diplomatie' discussion paper no. 835 presented to 
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(i .e. containment of Soviet influence and discouragement of leftist regimes), or 
whether France was just as concerned to contain perceived American ambitions 
on the continent; Dominique Mo"isi points out that at this period, ' [T]he rationale 
for French intervention shifted from internal to external threats . . .  [W]hen 
intervention by proxy of the Soviet Union took place in Africa [from 1975] . . .  
French action could be  presented not as a remnant of  colonialism . . .  but as a 
responsible Western answer to Soviet imperialistic ambitions'.9 Such 
interventions proved easier to justify, particularly when presented for 
international consumption as a defence of NATO's vulnerable southern flank 
when faced with a Soviet policy of contournement; accordingly, a Cold War 
j ustification was applied to French interventions in Zaire in 1977 and 1978, and 
Chad from 1978 onwards. 
Chad 
The first presidential election by universal suffrage took place in Chad in June 
1 996 and confirmed President Idriss Deby in power. It was largely French­
organised10, and seemed to indicate that France's open-ended investment of 
money, military might and political credibility in what often seemed Africa's 
most untenable state might have borne fruits of reconciliation and stability. A 
countervailing interpretation is that Chad's problems and inherent fragility as a 
state have been plastered over by a massive investment of French support for 
whichever leader seems likely to guarantee stability, regardless of that leader's 
corruption and human rights abusest and Yves Lacoste's Dictionnaire geopolitique 
des etats notes that: 'Depuis un quart de siecle la confusion de guerres civiles a 
Biarritz Franco-African summit, 24 October 1994 
9 Dominique Mo"isi, 'Intervention in French Foreign Policy' in Hedley Bull ed. ,  Intervention in World 
Politics, Oxford: OUP 1984, p7 1 
10 See Thomas Sotinel, 'L'election presidentielle au Tchad a ete essentiellement organisee par la France' , Le 
Monde 2-3 June 1996 
11 The latter, anti-Deby analysis is expounded most effectively by Agir Ici/Survie in Dossiers noirs de la 
politique africaine de la France no.S :  Tchad, Niger, Escroqueries a la democratie, Paris :  L'Harmattan 1996 
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repetition et !'imbroglio des interventions militaires fran<;aises ont passablement 
obscurci les problemes d'un pays pauvre et enclave, sans ressources 
d'exportation, et dont l'unite [est] beaucoup plus fictif que reelle' . 12 
The prolonged expenence of French military intervention in Chad did not 
presage a 'successful' outcome for that country's people. It is intended here to 
establish the extent to which France's interventionary response to conflict in 
Chad was a product of the Cold War in France's African sphere - driven by the 
perceived Cold War imperative to contain Soviet expansion into the sub­
continent via Libya - or simply the result of continual French attempts to 
preserve the Chadian state, often against the will of its people, and to retain in 
power any leader likely to safeguard France's interests in the country and the 
region of which it is the strategic centre. 
French policy in Chad, it may be argued, thus offers a mirror image of that of 
Libya. According to Keith Somerville, Libya sought to support any faction and 
political arrangement which would hasten Chad's break-up/3 France conversely 
sought to preserve Chadian unity at all costs, despite evidence that the state itself 
and its centralised structure were among the principal sources of conflict.14 
William Foltz notes that: 'While, as elsewhere in Africa, colonization had the 
effect of accentuating, and indeed creating, ethnic group solidarity, the 
extraordinary pressures of the post-1965 conflicts in Chad more often broke 
12 Yves Lacoste ed., Dictionnaire geopolitique des etats, Paris: Flammarion 1994, pp556-557 
13 Somerville notes that in the late 1970s, 'Libya clearly was not interested in a final solution to the Chadian 
struggle that would result in a unified central government but was happy to see an unstable coalition in 
power that would be unlikely to last long and to challenge Libyan control of Aouzou. In late 1979, there 
were indications that Libya favoured a federal solution in Chad that would weaken central authority and 
create a Muslim entity in the north that could be effectively controlled by Libya'. Keith Somerville, Foreign 
Military Intervention in Africa, London: Pinter Publishers & New York: St Martin's Press 1990, p65 
14 On the postcolonial state as a source of conflict, see especialy Christopher Clapham, Africa and the 
International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: CUP 1996; on the collapse and 
reconstruction of Chad, see William J. Foltz, 'Reconstructing the State of Chad' in I. William Zartman ed., 
Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder CO and London: 
Lynne Rienner 1995, pp 15-32 
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solidarities down to lineage or family level, instead of promoting and sustaining 
cohesion of larger social groups'. 15 
Hugo Sada has noted that by the late 1960s, following the successful 
'stabilisation' of the post-colonial regimes in France's sphere through 
interventions in Cameroon, Mauritania, Senegal, Congo and Gabon, it appeared 
that France's job was done, and the tendency was towards a progressive French 
military disengagement from those countries. However, there was one state 
which was to prove the exception to this rule; for the next two decades, 'la crise 
tchadienne . . .  allait durablement marquer !'evolution de la politique de Paris en 
matiere d'intervention.'16 From an international lawyer's perspective, Antonio 
Tanca notes that: 
Taking only the main events from 1978 to 1983 into account, the country's 
internal conflict had been practically continuous. During that period, Chad 
had suffered three different foreign interventions - two by France and one by 
Libya, each at the request of the "legitimate" government, i.e., the government 
that at that moment controlled the capital N'Djamena. . . .  The French 
intervention of 1978 was justified by the need to protect French nationals and 
as a reaction against alleged Libyan involvement. In 1983, French intervention 
was again defended as a reaction to a previous Libyan attack. The Libyan 
intervention of 1980, which was also carried out at the request of the 
government (then led by the former chief of the rebels) while the civil war was 
still going on, was justified as technical and humanitarian aid and by the 
"fusion of the Chadian and Libyan peoples". It seems clear that nobody had ever 
been fully in control of the country. Consequently, the intervening powers conferred 
legitimacy on the party that had invited them.17 [Emphasis added] 
There have in fact been five direct French military interventions during the first 
four decades of Chadian independence, the latest of which, Operation Epervier, is 
still ongoing. The scale and frequency of interventions and changes of regime 
15 William J. Foltz, Reconstructing the State of Chad' in I. William Zartman ed. ,  Collapsed States: The 
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder CO and London: Lynne Rienner 1 995 , p 1 7  
16 Hugo Sada, France-Afrique: Du Tchad au Rwanda, ! 'evolution des interventions militaires, Medias 
France lntercontinents/ Radio France lnternationale 'Politique-Diplomatie' discussion paper no. 835 
presented to Biarritz Franco-African summit, 24 October 1994 
1 7  Antonio Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993, pp3 1 -
145 
during this period was such that Rene Lemarchand could point out that the 
foreign intervenors in the conflict 'have exchanged partners so many times that 
no single faction can claim to have received political or military support 
exclusively from France or Libya. Such is the irony of international clientelism in 
Chad that every faction or government, including the Tombalbaye government, 
had had at one time or another, though seldom simultaneously, either France or 
Libya as its external patron'.18 
By 1989, three years before the collapse of Somalia and five before the Rwandan 
genocide, Chad seemed to encapsulate all that was wrong with the African state; 
Basil Davidson quotes the observation that: 
" [T]he vexatious feuds of the warlords have troubled the whole continent, 
embarrassed the Organisation of African Unity, burnt the fingers of all but the 
most resilient peace-makers, and provided endless opportunities for 
international mischief-makers to dabble to their hearts' content." Chad was 
now "a shell of a country"; yet this same Chad, "with its petty and violent 
political conflicts, its drought and its under-development, and its systematic 
self-handicapping, sometimes seems a paradigm of Africa's dilemma". 19 
The root of Chad's tragedy is the state's artificiality, although in this respect it is 
far from unique. Richard Rathbone points out that: '[E]ach colonial state was a 
sum of pre-colonial parts, often crudely assembled on the basis of the dictates of 
the theodolite and imperial rivalry rather than the reality of pre-colonial political 
topography.'2° Chad, however, is exceptionally heterogeneous. Fruit of the 
Franco-British conference of 1899 at which Britain sought to safeguard its 
interests in the area bounded by the Nile, the Niger, Sudan and Nigeria, Chad 
was the name given to the territory which remained, taken from the lake of the 
32 
" Rene Lemarchand, 'The Crisis in Chad' in GS Bender, JS Coleman & RL Sklar eds. ,  African Crisis Areas 
and US Foreign Policy, Berkeley & LA: University of California Press 1985, p246 
19 B asil Davidson, The B lack Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, London: James 
Currey 1992, pp12- 13 ,  quoting West Africa, 1 1  September 1989 
20 Richard Rathbone, 'Independent West Africa' in JFA Ajayi and Michael Crowder eds., History of West 
Africa Vol .II, 2nd edn.,  London: Longman 1 987, p774 
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same name north of the modern capital NDjamena (formerly Fort Lamy). The 
French occupation of Chad: 
. . .  corresponded to the grander design of linking together the two 
components of the new French colonial empire [AOF and French North 
Africa] . . .  The extent of the French advance into Chad was governed by the 
1898 Anglo-French Spheres of Influence Agreement which, according to the 
1899 Declaration, divided Central Africa between the two countries along a 
line "which shall start from the point of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer 
with the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich . . .  shall run thence south­
east until it meets the 24th degree of longitude east of Greenwich" .21 
The seeds of one of Africa's most enduring border disputes - over the Aozou 
Strip (Bande d'Aouzou) - and the source or pretext for the foreign interventions 
and counter-interventions Chad endured throughout the 1970s and 1980s, were 
sown at this time of colonial carve-up. George Joffe points out that: 'Libya has 
never accepted the 1919 line as its boundary with Chad, arguing instead that no 
boundary has ever been properly delimited and that the closest approach to such 
a delimitation is the 1935 Mussolini-Laval Treaty.'22 Libya's claim to a large area 
of northern Chad has been based on uti possidetis juris, and on the argument that 
the French occupation of the northern desert Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region 
was never 'effective' in the sense that a permanent and effective administrative 
presence was established. Indeed, the post-independence Chadian state's hold on 
the region was so tenuous that French military control of the BET ended only in 
1964, four years after independence.23 
It has become commonplace in analyses of the state to refer to its 'useful' and 
'useless' regions (le Tchad utile and le Tchad inutile) . The former covers barely a 
third of Chad's 1 .28 million square kilometres in the relatively fertile south of the 
2 1  George Joffe & Valerie Day-Viaud, World Bibliographical Series Vol . l 77:  Chad, Oxford: ABC-Clio 
1 995, p.xx 
22 George Joffe & Valerie Day-Viaud, World Bibliographical Series Vol. l 77: Chad, Oxford: ABC-Clio 
1995, p.xii 
23 The International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled on 3 February 1994 that the Aouzou strip is part of 
Chad; Libya has accepted this decision. See ICJ Communique 94/4, 'Case concerning Territorial Dispute 
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country, used primarily for the growing cotton and ra1smg livestock. Three­
quarters of Chad's six million people live in the South, and are generally 
characterised as French-speaking, Christian, settled and black. The north, an area 
larger than France, is principally sparsely-populated desert, with its inhabitants 
concentrated in oases or small settlements which have experienced economic 
decline in tandem with the decline in trans-Saharan trade. These people, made 
up of many ethnic groups, are usually given the shorthand labels of Arab (or 
arabise), nomadic and Muslim. (The same bi-polar distinction has been drawn in 
recent studies of the Sudanese conflict.24) Joffe notes that: ' [W]hat economic 
activity there is can be traced back directly to Chad's colonial past under French 
rule, as can the current political crisis that faces the country. '25 The creation of the 
state-owned Cotontchad was accompanied by an administrative decision to 
favour the south in educational terms, in order to create a native administration 
based on the Sara, while the Muslim regions of the country were left to stagnate 
through social and administrative neglect. 
Throughout the 1950s, as a politicised generation of leaders emerged throughout 
France's African territories, politics in southern and northern Chad developed 
separately. The south was represented at the founding conference of Houphouet­
Boigny's Rassemblement Democratique Africain in 1951, and in 1952 the Parti 
Progressiste Tchadien (PTT), dominated by the southern Chadian Sara, was 
founded in N'Djamena by Gabriel Lisette, a Guadeloupian administrative 
official. Northern Chad was organised politically in the Mouvement Socialiste 
Africain, which was dominated by the Muslim elite of the old sultanates, who left 
in 1958 to form the Union Nationale Tchadienne (from which would emerge the 
Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Tchad, FROLINAT). As a result, by the time of 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Chad)' 
24 See especially Franc is M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institution 1995 
25 George Joffe & Valerie Day-Viaud, World Bibliographical Series Vo1. 177:  Chad, Oxford: ABC-Clio 
1995, p.xviii 
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independence in 1960, the pre-colonial disposition of power inside the new state 
had been inverted; Joffe explains that: 
Chad had become, as a result of the colonial experience, an embryonic unitary 
state, although it was far from being a nation as well . . .  The simple fact was 
that the administrative structure of Chad failed to coincide with any other 
political or cultural reality . . .  The outbreak of Chad's first civil war was, in 
essence, an attempt to redress the geopolitical balance inside the country.26 
Southerner Fran<;ois Tombalbaye was installed as president upon independence 
in 1960. The choice was not fortuitous; until his assassination in 1975, 
Tombalbaye was to conduct systematic discrimination and repression against 
Chad's Muslims, whom he regarded as inherently disloyal. 
French interests in Chad have been heavily conditioned by their historical 
origins, reinforced by Charles de Gaulle's Second World War experience when 
the governor of AEF, Felix Eboue, declared for the Free French. Troupes de Marine 
states that: 'L'attachement de la France au Tchad tient pour une bonne part au 
fait qu'il fut la base de depart du General Leclerc lors de la conquete du Fezzan 
en novembre 1940't and Robert Buijtenhuijs suggests that France's major 1969-71 
intervention was motivated in part by De Gaulle's sentimental attachment: 'Le 
Tchad, faisant partie integrante de l'epopee de la France libre, ne pouvait pas etre 
abandonne au "triste" sort que lui preparaient les insurges du Frolinat'.28 
More importantly, Chad is situated in the centre of trans-Saharan Africa, and 
hence is considered to be at the geostrategic heart of French power projection 
capacity on the continent. Military accounts note that: '[L]e Tchad occupe une 
situation strategique qui en a fait longtemps la plaque tournante de nos 
26 George Joffe & Valerie Day-Viaud, World Bibliographical Series Vo1. 177:  Chad, Oxford: ABC-Clio 
1 995, p.xxiv 
27 Comite National des Traditions des Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine 
dans les operations exterieures de 1961 a 1994, Paris:  Lavauzelle 1996, p77 
28 Robert Buijtenhuijs, 'Les interventions militaires franyaises: le cas du Tchad' in Daniel Bach & Anthony 
Kirk-Greene eds., Etats et societes en Afrique francophone, Paris :  Economica 1993, p238 
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interventions en Afrique (Paris est a 4.700km, Dakar a 3.800, Djibouti a 3.050 et 
Bangui a 900) . '29 Maintenance of a pro-French regime and French military 
influence in Chad allowed France to oversee events in the Middle East and north, 
west and central Africa, and secure its overall position in the region, while 
reassuring the leaders of nearby states Niger, Cameroon, Gabon, CAR and Cote 
d'Ivoire of the proximity of French support. By 1961, a network of bilateral 
cooperation agreements was complete, including the Franco-Chadian military 
technical assistance agreement, signed by Presidents de Gaulle and Tombalbaye. 
Such an agreement, although less than an outright defence treaty such as those 
signed with Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, CAR and Gabon (by which France retained 
responsibility for both external and internal security), nonetheless permitted the 
maintenance of large, permanent French garrisons. Moreover, such military 
technical assistance agreements, signed with Chad and twelve other African 
states in the early 1960s, guaranteed continued French military tutelage, with 
occasional deployment of expeditionary forces and permanent French advisers 
and instructors exercising exclusive control over the training and arming of the 
new states' armies and gendarmeries. Such agreements excluded any negotiation 
of military treaties with other partners by their African signatories, effectively 
neutering independent foreign policy initiatives by the new states. 
French economic and particularly strategic mineral interests were served by the 
troops' presence, reinforcing the protection of important sources of uranium in 
Niger and Gabon which supply much of the demand of the French nuclear 
industry. In Chad itself, although there is little evidence for the claimed presence 
of significant mineral resources in the contested Aouzou strip, uranium has been 
found in the south-western prefecture of Mayo Kebbi and, following successful 
prospecting in the 1970s and 1980s, Chad was considered to have significant oil 
potential. 
29 Comite national des traditions des Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine dans 
1 50 
As a result, French military involvement in Chad has overshadowed other 
aspects of Franco-Chadian cooperation. John Chipman suggests that: 
There seems, at least, to be "only one Chad" in Africa. In no other country 
could one have expected French troops to be deployed so often, in such 
numbers, on behalf of so many different leaders, for so long, and with so little 
ultimate effect on regional stability. The political commitment to Chad should 
be thought of as being separate and distinct from the commitment to other 
francophone African countries. Chad has a special claim on France and her 
own internal logic.30 
A chronological summary of key developments may be useful at this point. 
Chronology of French interventions in Chad31 
There was a brief dress rehearsal for France's multiple interventions in Chad. In 
1968, a mutiny of Toubou members of the nomad guard took place at the border 
post of Aouzou in the northern region of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) . Many of 
the garrison were killed and the Chadian army could not restore order. President 
Tombalbaye appealed to France and a small force of French Foreign Legion 
paratroops lent logistical support to Chadian soldiers. The Legionnaires were 
withdrawn after a few weeks when the mutineers had been defeated. 
The first major intervention, from 1969 to 1971, tackled the symptoms of 
instability but not the key problem: that without its foreign military prop, Chad 
would collapse.32 The French commader at this time was General Jeannou Lacaze, 
whose views on French military intervention merit consideration here: 
les operations exterieures de 1961 a 1994, Paris: Lavauzelle 1995 , p77 
30 John Chipman, French Power in Africa, Oxford: Blackwell 1989, p161  
3 1  This section i s  based in  part on  one of the most succinct accounts of the subject, Robert Buijtenhuijs, 'Les 
interventions militaires franc;:aises: le cas du Tchad' in Daniel Bach & Anthony Kirk-Greene eds . ,  Etats et 
societes en Afrique francophone, Paris: Economica 1993 
32 On the durability of this problem, see Bernard Lanne, 'Chad: Regime Change, Increased Insecurity, and 
Blockage of Further Reforms' in John F. Clark & David E. Gardinier eds., Political Reform in Francophone 
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[L]e Tchad a fait jouer les accords de defense signes avec la France et a 
demande !'intervention de nos soldats. Pierre Messmer [De Gaulle's Defence 
Minister in 1969] m'a appele, pour m'annoncer que le 2e REP [Regiment 
etranger parachutiste] avait ete choisi pour cette mission. C'est la premiere 
fois que la Legion etait envoyee sur un theatre d' operation normalement 
reserve aux troupes coloniales . . .  Nous etions en 1969, c'etait la premiere 
intervention fran<;aise au Tchad, la premiere mission proprement africaine 
pour le 2e REP, mais pas la derniere . . .  Et pour moi, la premiere d'une longue 
serie de missions sur ce continene3 
The justification for this, the opening episode of the French army's 'Chadian 
saga', is described in conventional terms. Although the forces seeking to 
overthrow Tombalbaye were disparate and characterised by 'un esprit tribal', we 
are told that their attacks (real or imaginary) on French civilians and the French 
garrison in N'Djamena posed a sufficient threat to necessitate military 
intervention: 
Ils [the Chadian rebels] parvenaient. . . a s'entendre pour des attaques 
conjointes contre les Fran<;ais, des civils ou les quelques elements des troupes 
de marine en poste avant notre arrivee. 
Armes de vieux fusils et parfois de sagaies, quelques dizaines de rebelles 
attaquaient des petits detachements isoles de soldats tchadiens voire fran<;ais, 
parvenaient a leur prendre leurs armes, et parfois leurs vehicules, et 
s'equipaient ainsi sur le dos de l'ennemi. L'intervention du 2e REP a done ete 
determinan te. 34 
Lacaze emphasises that it was an unequal contest; French troops had the most 
modern equipment, and the elite forces of a first world army were - almost 
naturally - superior to the 'Africans' .  But Lacaze is less forthcoming concerning 
the quagmire that Chad would represent for the French military: 
Au debut ce fut assez facile, militairement parlant, pour des troupes aussi 
en trainees que 1' etaient les legionnaires . . .  Notre armement nous donnait une 
suprematie importante, presque totale sur les Africains, dont certains en 
etaient restes a l'age de fer. Nous n'avions pas de chars, peu d'helicopteres, 
Africa, Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press 1997, pp267-286 
33 Jeannou Lacaze, 'Tchad' in Sophie Huet ed., Quand ils faisaient la guerre, Paris :  Pion 1993, p376 
34 ibid 
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nous n'utilisions pas de bombes, mais l'armement classique en dotation dans 
les unites suffisait pour controler la situation.35 
Between 1969 and 1971, the increasing success of the northern-based, anti­
government guerrillas of FROLINAT (Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad) in 
east and central Chad meant that effective control of much of the country passed 
to the rebels, and further appeals were made to France by President Tombalbaye. 
Substantial number of French troops were committed (2,500 by January 1970), 
though conscripts were soon withdrawn in response to domestic political 
pressures; indeed, despite only limited military success, this bulk of the force was 
withdrawn in June 1971, leaving the N'Djamena garrison, and advisers to the 
Chadian army. It has been argued that domestic political pressure made the 
withdrawal premature, necessitating further interventions in the following years 
to ensure the survival of a sympathetic Chadian regime. 
During the early 1970s, Franco-Chadian relations degenerated, with President 
Tombalbaye expressing resentment over the administrative reforms suggested 
by a France increasingly embarrassed by coverage of their favoured client's anti­
Muslim excesses. Following the assassination of Tombalbaye in April 1975, 
another Southerner, Felix Malloum came to power and pursued similarly 
sectarian policies. He elevated a local sous-prefet and former student at the 
Sorbonne, HissEme Habre, to the post of prime minister. Habre used the 
opportunity to enhance his reputation as 'the strong man of Chad,' an image due 
in no small part to his abduction in April 1974 of the French ethnologist 
Fran�oise Claustre (whom he held captive until January 1977), and to the 
assassination of Commandant Galopin, the French emissary sent to negotiate her 
release. This low point in Franco-Chadian relations resulted in the expulsion of 
all French personnel by 1975. However, new cooperation agreements were 
signed in 1976, leading to an increase in aid to FF40m, debt forgiveness, and re-
35 Jeannou Lacaze, 'Tchad' in Sophie Huet ed. ,  Ouand ils faisaient la guerre, Paris: Pion 1993, p376-377 
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establishment of a budget subsidy, as well as restored military technical 
assistance. 
It was under the terms of these agreements that troops were deployed in March 
1978 after the Libyan-backed northern rebel forces of Goukouni Oueddei 
threatened to reach NDjamena. This intervention force was an essential element 
of government victories at the battles of Ati and Djedaa, although from a political 
perspective the very intervention was an admission of the failure of earlier 
attempts to reinforce the Chadian government army, and to prevent external, 
primarily Libyan, assistance reaching FROLINAT. Despite their reservations 
about him, French support in 1978 brought Habre into the Conseil Superieur 
Militaire (CSM) government with Malloum. Thereafter, French forces adopted a 
lower profile when fighting broke out between the Habre and Malloum factions 
in February 1979.  This policy shift was made tangible in the replacement of 
General Raul Bredeche, the belligerent French commander who had wanted to 
advance against FROLINAT, by General Louis Forest, who signed the 
withdrawal pact (accord de degagement) which later allowed Goukouni's forces 
into NDjamena. 
This change of personnel reflected a new French desire to bring Goukouni into 
the national government as a more acceptable leader than Habre, and to 
disengage from Chad, again in response to growing 'home front' pressure. 
Following the putsch which ousted Malloum in April 1979, there was press and 
public hostility to the continuance of the Chadian intervention, coupled with 
internal government disputes over the issue, and a daily cost of nearly $1m. 
There was also opposition from Nigeria, with which country France was 
searching for a new economic relationship beyond the boundaries of 
francophone Africa; the Lagos Commonwealth Conference in August 1979 
passed a resolution that 'the continued presence of French troops in Chad is an 
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impediment to finding a peaceful reconciliation and solution to the Chadian 
question.'36 
Joffe points out that the subsequent internal split in FROLINAT 'had been 
p owerfully aided by the former colonial power, France . . .  By the . . .  1970s, Chad 
had not only collapsed in civil war, it has also become the arena for a surrogate 
conflict between outside powers. '37 Most problematic was Libya, which was both 
an important source of oil supplies for France, and a large market for the French 
armaments industry. As early as March 1979, the French government had 
announced its intention to withdraw France's intervention forces, but the 
withdrawal was postponed in light of Libyan support for FROLINAT in the 
north and the latter's military success along the Aouzou strip on the Libya-Chad 
border. The withdrawal of the French intervention force finally began in 
September 1979, but was halted, ironically, following an appeal by Goukouni on 
behalf of the provisional Gouvernement d 'Unite Nationale du Tchad (GUNT), which 
had detached itself from its Libyan backers and now sought the removal of all 
foreign troops from Chad. The final 1,100 French soldiers were withdrawn in 
May 1980, France having decided that the Libyan threat had been contained. 
Of even greater significance than the withdrawal was French inaction five 
months later, in October 1980, when the Libyans relaunched their offensive in 
northern Chad. Observers concluded that Giscard's hand was stayed by the 
imminence of the presidential election, and by ongoing commercial negotiations 
over oil imports between Libya and Elf Aquitaine. Attention was also focused on 
an alleged secret Franco-Libyan deal which would partition Chad into a Libyan­
controlled northern zone (1e Tchad inutile' although with possibly larger 
36 Quoted in Roy May & Roger Charlton, Chad: France's "Fortuitous Success"', Modern and Contemporary 
France 37 ( 1989), p8 
37 George Joffe & Valerie Day-Viaud, World Bibliographical Series Vol . 177:  Chad, Oxford: ABC-Clio 
1995, p .xxv 
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reserves of fossil fuels than anticipated), and a French-controlled southern zone 
(the cultivated and comparatively better-developed 'Tchad utile'.)38 
Many commentators view the French withdrawal in 1980, which left the field 
open for Libya, as capitulation; Roy May concluded that: ' [I]t is certainly difficult 
to disagree with the view that at this stage France's vacillations and conspicuous 
diplomatic and military failures had transformed its image as the gendarme of 
Africa into that of a traffic warden waving the Libyan troops on.'39 French 
diplomatic efforts increased after the announcement in January 1981 of Colonel 
Gadaffi's plans to merge Chad and Libya, and focused on Libyan withdrawal. 
Attempts both diplomatic and financial were made in an effort to introduce an 
Organisation of African Unity peacekeeping force into the Chadian equation, to 
replace the Libyans who were playing this role, de facto if not de jure. 
The intervention of 1978 to 1980 was also used, in the run-up to the 1981 
presidential election in France, to criticise the incumbent government, President 
Giscard in particular and Giscardian foreign policy in general. Presidential 
candidate Fran<_;ois Mitterrand attacked the intervention as a 'return to the era of 
colonial expeditions'; and Mitterrand's electoral platform included the foreign 
policy statement that: 'French imperialism in Africa, which does not hesitate to 
have recourse to military means, has had its day'.40 
38 There was also an ethnic element to this proposed partition: Colonel Gadaffi allegedly suggested that 
Giscard ' leave me my Muslims, and I will leave you your blacks ' .  See V. Thompson & R. Adloff, Conflict 
in Chad, London: Charles Hurst 198 1 ,  p 140 
39 Roy May & Roger Charlton, Chad: France's "Fortuitous Success'", Modern and Contemporary France 37 
( 1 989), p8 
40 Roy May & Roger Charlton, Chad: France's "Fortuitous Success'", Modern and Contemporary France 37 
( 1 989), p8. See also Jean-Fran<;ois Bayart, La politique africaine de Fran!l'ois Mitterrand, Paris: Karthala 
1984 
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Operation Manta 
However, there was little surprise when the Mitterrand administration began to 
plough the same interventionist furrow as its predecessors, often with greater 
energy; John Chipman notes how: 'Despite early socialist rhetoric, the [new] 
government did much both to sustain and then to improve France's capacity to 
bring military power to bear on the African continent. . .  The level of security 
assistance to Africa offered by Fran<;ois Mitterrand was effectively even higher 
that that provided by France in the Giscard years. '41 Ironically, this was the same 
administration which had been quick to tighten sanctions against South Africa, 
condemn UNITA/South African-backed attacks in Angola, and recognise, and 
sell arms to, the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Only in France's own 
sphere of influence, notably in Chad, was the Socialist government's foreign 
policy agenda characterised more by continuity with its predecessor's than 
change. This supports the contention that the Cold War was not an engine of 
French foreign policy; despite their fulfilment of a Cold War agenda, France's 
Chadian interventions were driven primarily by French motives. In fact, it could 
be argued that it was the Cold War which was used to suit France's purposes, 
and not vice versa as might more readily be supposed. 
France quickly found itself drawn once again into the 'Chadian trap' which some 
domestic political opinion was already comparing with Algeria.42 Initially, acting 
Chadian president Goukouni received French political support and some 
military supplies, mainly of light arms. However, his refusal to concede to the 
Chad-Libya merger, continuing OAU hostility to this idea and domestic factors 
within Libya, notably Colonel Gadaffi's wish to become OAU Chairman in 1982, 
led to the unexpectedly rapid withdrawal of Libyan troops in November 1981, 
before the French-inspired OAU force arrived. However, only three of the six 
41 John Chipman, French Power in Africa, Oxford: Blackwell 1989, p 136 
42 Jean-Francois Bayart noted that: '[D]es 1982, le piege tchadien se refermait sur la gauche'. Jean­
Franc;ois Bayart, La politique africaine de Fran�ois Mitterrand, Paris: Karthala 1 983 
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African countries originally named sent troops (Nigeria, Zaire and Senegal); the 
others (Algeria, Cameroon and Togo) had in the meantime concluded individual 
agreements not to intervene with Colonel Gadaffi . Moreover, there were 
differing expectations on the ground about the OAU troops' role. Goukouni 
believed the OAU forces were there as the French had been previously: to 
support his government. He told West Africa in December 1981 :  'They [the OAU 
troops] should fight [against Habre or any other Chadian anti-government 
faction] otherwise their presence has no sense. '43 On the other hand President 
Abdou Diouf of Senegal, who had committed troops to the force, argued that 
they should not wage 'war against any of Chad's factions but. . .  restore peace and 
maintain security.'44 These opposing definitions muddied the waters around the 
OAU presence, and there is evidence that troops with the Zairean contingent 
favoured Habre's advance against the Goukouni government, which eventually 
proved successful. 
William Foltz notes that, although conflict had been a frequent element of local 
rivalries in colonial and pre-colonial Chad: ' [B]y 1982 a full generation of civil 
war waged with artillery and automatic weapons had raised the level of social 
disruption to a point unknown since French conquest at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. War-weariness was a fact of life and to much of the 
p opulation any sign of governmental stability and effectiveness was attractive' .45 
By 1983, Hissene Habre was in power in N'Djamena, and calling for French 
assistance to fight his old opponents and their Libyan backers. 
The 1983 intervention, Operation Manta, was different from those of Giscard's 
tenure as it clearly went beyond the terms of the Franco-Chadian military 
43 Quoted in Roy May & Roger Charlton, Chad: France's "Fortuitous Success" ', Modern and Contemporary 
France 37 ( 1989), p9 
44 Quoted in Roy May & Roger Charlton, Chad: France's "Fortuitous Success" ', Modern and Contemporary 
France 37 ( 1989), p9 
45 William J. Foltz, Reconstructing the State of Chad' in I .  William Zartman ed. ,  Collapsed States: The 
158  
technical assistance agreement. I t  was the largest overseas expedition launched 
b y  France since Algeria; almost 10,000 men completed a period of service during 
the first thirteen months. At the time, President Mitterrand justified the 
intervention as resulting from a request by the Chadian government in situ, 
which France regarded as legitimate. George Moose notes that: 'The deployment 
was described by Paris as "a warning to Colonel Qaddafi". French troops were to 
b ack up Chadian commando units, but not become directly involved in combat 
themselves'.46 As the intervention endured, the legitimisation evolved; at the 
December 1984 Franco-African summit in Burundi, Fran�ois Mitterrand stated 
that the intervention was launched because France 'believed it necessary to 
maintain a favourable balance of power in Central Africa. '47 
Offering a textbook ethnic north-versus-south explanation for Chad's difficulties 
- and the perceived threat posed by Libya - the then commander of French 
forces General Jeannou Lacaze emphasises the purity of France's motives: 'Les 
populations du Nord ont d'ailleurs toujours pu compter sur l'appui de la Libye, 
alors que la politique de la France consistait a rechercher, dans le cadre des 
frontieres heritees de la colonisation, un equilibre entre ces peuples et a les faire 
vivre en harmonie. '48 Indeed Lacaze, the most seasoned 'old Africa hand' of the 
French army until his retirement in 1985, is one of French military intervention's 
most ardent proponents, arguing that such intervention is not only welcomed by 
the people of the intervened state, but is in fact beneficial for that state (and 
hence, it might logically be assumed, should become a permanent arrangement 
for that state's greater good) : 
Pendant toute ma carriere, je suis souvent revenu au Tchad, au point de passer 
pour un "specialiste" de ce pays. Et le meme souvenir me revient sans cesse: 
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder CO and London: Lynne Rienner 1995, p 1 8  
46 Moose, George, 'French Military Policy in Africa' i n  WJ Foltz & H S  Bienen eds . ,  Arms and the African: 
Military Influences on Africa's International Relations, New Haven and London: Yale University Press 
1985, p76 
47 ibid. 
48 Jeannou Lacaze, 'Tchad' in Sophie Huet ed. ,  Quand ils faisaient la guerre, Paris :  Pion 1993, p378 
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celui d'une population africaine se rejouissant de nos interventions militaires, 
parce que pour elle cela signifiait la paix et la securite. Lorsque nos troupes 
etaient la-bas, nous ne demandions pas grand-chose aux autochtones. Nous 
payions (normalement, c' est-a-dire bien) ce que nous achetions, nous 
founissions un minimum d' eau aux civils et nous les protegions des pillages 
effectues par les rebelles.49 
Lacaze's account of the periodic withdrawals of the French interventionary 
forces in Chad is couched in terms of abandonment; in traditional soldier's style, 
he explains such withdrawals (as in Algeria) as the fruit of political 
manoeuvring, against the will of the local population which implored the French 
troops to stay as their only safeguard against starvation. The neo-colonial agenda 
is clear; Africans and African states ('ces pays') are unfit for self-government, and 
the French military presence is the only bulwark against chaos. It may be 
assumed that Lacaze, who occupied the supreme post as Chef d' etat-major des 
armees from 1981 to 1985 and hence throughout Operation Manta, conveyed this 
impression forcefully to those in his command, and also to less experienced 
civilian decision-makers; the continuity of the intervention dynamic was assured 
not least by those entrusted with its implementation. Lacaze' s justification for 
French intervention is worth quoting at length: 
Dans ces pays, la misere est tellement epouvantable que, si vous enlevez a ces 
gens le peu qu'ils possedent. . .  , il ne leur reste, au sens premier du terme, qu'a 
"crever de faim". Voila pourquoi ces populations voyaient avec plaisir et 
soulagement ces Blancs, nous les Fran<;ais, "occuper" le pays. Et lorsque le 
retrait de nos troupes etait annonce et entame, c'etait chaque fois les memes 
scenes terribles et bouleversantes, qui m' ont fait penser a la fin de la guerre 
d' Algerie. Car ces hommes et ces femmes comprenaient que le depart de nos 
soldats allait les replacer dans un univers d'insecurite et de misere. Et ils 
voulaient tous partir avec nous.50 
Lacaze makes clear that these Chadians were not 'harkis' as in Algeria, i.e. locals 
recruited to work for the French and fearful of reprisals after the latter's 
departure; it was the population at large which, facing the loss of the economic 
49 Jeannou Lacaze, 'Tchad' in Sophie Huet ed. ,  Ouand ils faisaient la guerre, Paris: Pion 1993, p378 
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lifeline which the French military presence represented, was opposed to its 
removal: 
Seule la peur de la misere, la probabilite de mourir de faim les poussaient a 
s'accrocher a nos camions . . .  Ce sont des images affolantes. Les femmes et les 
enfants pleuraient; les hommes se hissaient par grappes dans nos vehicules. 
Nous leur laissions le maximum de vivres, d'aides, d'equipements. Mais que 
faire d'autre? Au gre de nos retraits, dus au retablissement apparent de l'ordre 
public, a des considerations politiques ou a des accords intervenus avec le 
puissant voisin libyen, les soldats fran<;ais au Tchad on vecu ces scenes en 
ayant un horrible sentiment d'impuissance, car leur role se reduisait a une 
goutte d' eau. 
Lacaze explains France's failure to contain Libyan irredentism and secure Chad 
in the short term as a failure of political will: 
Longtemps, le reve de Kadhafi a ete de retablir 1' empire des Sables qui 
s' etendait, il y a plusieurs siecles, de 1' Atlantique a la Mer Rouge, en 
commen<;ant bien entendu par les regions nord du Tchad, voisines de la Libye. 
En soutenant financierement et militairement les rebelles du Nord, voire en 
envoyant ses propres troupes occuper ces regions, Khadafi a largement 
contribue a maintenir le Tchad . . .  clans cette situation de guerre civile. Certains 
ont cru pouvoir guerir le dictateur libyen de ce reve fou; ce fut le cas de 
Fran<;ois Mitterrand lorsqu'il accepta de le rencontrer en Crete, pour 
concretiser un accord de retrait simultane de nos troupes, alors que nos 
informations montraient clairement que les Libyens ne respectaient pas leurs 
engagements. Ce fut un echec reel de la diplomatie fran<;aise.'51 
It has been suggested that: 'Technically, Operation Manta itself was a success, 
since it prevented Libyan-supported forces of the GUNT [taking] over 
N'Djamena. '52 However, over time it became apparent that swift, occasional 
interventions would not suffice to secure a vulnerable francophile president; 
French military support would become a long-term quasi-occupation, what 
Robin Luckham has called 'a permanent intervention'. Lacaze acknowledges this 
- and the interventions' failure to 'restore order', their stated purpose - but 
50 Jeannou Lacaze, 'Tchad' in Sophie Huet ed. ,  Quand ils faisaient la guerre, Paris :  Pion 1993, p379 
51  Jeannou Lacaze, 'Tchad' in Sophie Huet ed. , Quand ils faisaient la guerre, Paris: Pion 1993, p379 
52 Michel Martin, 'From Algiers to N'Djamena: France's  Adaptation to Low-Intensity Wars 1 830- 1987' in 
DA Charters & M. Tugwell eds. ,  Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: a Comparative Analysis, London: 
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explains this failure by the incompatible ethnic composition o f  the Chadian state, 
the survival of which, he seems to argue, it was France's duty to support despite 
that state's apparent untenability: 'Le regiment au complet est reste un an sur 
place. L'ordre n'a done pas ete retabli tout de suite. A vrai dire, il ne l'est 
toujours pas [in 1993] . . .  Cela tient a la nature profonde de ce pays.'53 
Operation Epervier 
I t  has been suggested that even before the 1993 Somalia debacle, there was a US 
State Department dictum that it is no longer possible to buy an African state; 
they can only be rented by the day. This implies a continual investment of time, 
money and manpower, regardless of domestic disquiet, military fatigue and, 
often forgotten, the consequences for the population and stability of the state 
concerned. Anthony Clayton notes that the 1983 French intervention forces in 
Chad 'brought with them some of France's newest and most sophisticated anti­
aircraft, anti-tank and electronic equipment for which Chad was to be a proving 
ground . . .  [There was] a risk of open-ended military commitment, but one that 
nevertheless might have to be met if France's military credibility was to be 
maintained in other more important African territories. In some of these any loss 
of credibility could have serious repercussions for French strategic and economic 
interests. '54 
However in 1985 after the withdrawal of Operation Manta, Rene Lemarchand 
pointed out how 'after completing their third military withdrawal since 1975, 
and after lending their grudging support to almost every contestant, from the 
late Tombalbaye to Malloum, from Malloum to Goukouni, and from Goukouni 
to Habre, the French are back to square one, desperately trying to shore up a 
Brassey's  Defence Publishers 1989, p l 24 
53 Jeannou Lacaze, 'Tchad' in Sophie Huet ed. ,  Ouand ils faisaient la guerre, Paris: Pion 1993, p377 
54 Anthony Clayton, France, Soldiers and Africa, London: Brassey's Defence Publishers 1988, p387 
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client state on the shifting sands of factionalism and civil strife. Plus <;a change, 
plus c'est la meme chose.'55 
This analysis was to prove prophetic the following year, when the threat of 
further Libyan incursions in northern Chad, and internal instability, provoked 
Operation Epervier, with an initial deployment of 900 troops. Epervier failed to 
bring stability, and the irreconcilable differences within Chad's artificial 
b oundaries led to a military coup in 1990, whereby Hissene Habre was ousted by 
current leader Lieutenant General Idriss Deby. 
The 1996 election was organised more than five years after Deby's seizure of 
power on 1 December 1990. Le Monde reported how: 'In a country twice the size 
of  France, without roads, it was the planes of the French military detachment 
"Epervier" . . .  which undertook the transportation of electoral material and the 
coordination of the count. Paris also took responsibility for printing the ballot 
papers and posters, as well as equipping the polling booths. In a country without 
electricity, 5,700 hurricane lamps were supplied. The total cost of French 
assistance during the referendum and presidential votes was 8.75 million 
francs. '56 
Operation Epervier continues despite Deby's 1996 election victory, with on 
average 500 troops stationed in Chad, and many thousands on standby 
elsewhere in the region, and at the base of the Force d' Action Rapide at Toulon. 
Chad, in which France has invested unprecedented military time, effort and 
credibility to ensure its survival at the heart of the Franco-African sphere, is now 
defined as a 'quasi-state' in IR parlance, with negligible infrastructure and little to 
55 Rem! Lemarchand, 'The Crisis in Chad' in GJ Bender ed. ,  Africa Crisis Areas and US Foreign Policy, 
Berkeley: University of California Press 1985, p246, quoted in Roy May & Roger Char! ton, Chad: France's 
"Fortuitous Success"' ,  Modern and Contemporary France 37 ( 1989), p l 2  
56 Thomas Sotinel, ' L  'election presidentielle a u  Tchad a ete essentiellement organisee par l a  France' ,  Le 
Monde 2-3 June 1996 
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show for 36 years of independent statehood. The overall bilan of France's military 
interventions in Chad, however, is favourable; Chad is intact, at peace and 
governed by a pro-French administration; indeed, an interesting historical link 
between Chad and the former Zaire, the two most important theatres of French 
military intervention in post-colonial Africa, was provided in 1 998-99 when the 
Chadian government of President Idriss Deby sent troops to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to support President Laurent-Desire Kabila against the 
rebellion of the Rassemblement Democratique Congolais, which was backed by 
Kabila' s erstwhile supporters Uganda and Rwanda. A BBC report noted: 
Chad was forced to admit it had troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
supporting President Kabila when they were ambushed by rebels in the north 
of the country. The government said two soldiers were killed but the rebels 
said they had killed at least 100. A senior opposition figure and former prime 
minister, Jean Alingue, has called on the government to withdraw. He said 
President Idriss Deby had not consulted parliament before deploying the 
troops. Chadian officials say Chad is showing gratitude for the support given 
by Kinshasa - under President Mobutu - to Chad during its war with Libya in 
the 1980s.57 
We shall now consider the role of French military intervention in President 
Mobutu's Zaire, the second key pillar of France's Cold War role as gendarme of 
Africa. 
French intervention in Zaire 
The origins and duration of conflict in Zaire date from Fanon's time, when the 
Congo was 'the trigger of Africa', the strategic linchpin of Western Cold War 
influence on the continent. Central to any examination of the longevity of conflict 
in Zaire is the issue of external involvement and intervention. It is intended here, 
having considered the role of external (i.e. non-African) players in creating Zaire 
and Mobutuism, to assess the role of France in sustaining it. These foreign 
p owers, as one commentator observed: 'so mismanaged Zaire's affairs 35 years 
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ago as to exacerbate its civil war and eventually deliver the country into the 
hands of a man who established a militarised lootocracy that exceeded in 
corruption and waste all others in the continent. '58 
Background: What was Zaire? 
The first independent Congo, born June 30 1960, was the premature offspring of 
Belgian decolonisation, a process which, it is generally accepted, was precipitate 
and badly thought-out. As elsewhere on the continent, the end of formal empire 
was motivated not by the needs and aspirations of the colonised, but by the 
perceived threat, if the coloniser dragged its heels, of a radical anti-Western 
regime coming to power by force, presenting an appalling vista of 
nationalisation of the country's resources and, in the dominant Cold War 
environment, of Soviet penetration. However, unlike Africa's other major 
colonial powers Britain and France, Belgium had done little to promote a local 
elite to govern on its behalf and assume the reins of state power. As a result, 
there was not the smooth transition to Western-favoured regimes which largely 
characterised independence elsewhere; instead, the Congo began rapidly to 
implode, the new administration faced with mutiny and multiple secessions 
which foreign interests did much to foment. 
None of the players in the resultant Congo crisis of 1960-63 - Belgium, the 
superpowers, the UN - emerges with much credit, and foreign complicity in the 
murder of the new state's first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, was to set the 
tone for the country's fate for the next three decades. Attempts by the UN to 
prevent Katangese secession were sabotaged by Cold War politics, culminating 
in the death in September 1961 of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold. 
Alan James, in a recent reappraisal of the crisis, places it and the subsequent 
creation of Zaire firmly in the Cold War context: 'The prevailing pardigm . . .  was 
57 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 1  March 1999 
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that of the Cold War. Willy-nilly, the Congo was to be pulled within it'; James 
also points out the failure among Western policy-makers to examine 'whether a 
Westward-leaning government would necessarily be a credit to its sponsors, or . . .  
exactly how it  might be an asset to their cause. On the other hand, very close 
attention was given to the means whereby a government of the requisite political 
complexion might be installed and maintained . . .  At an early stage the CIA is said 
to have decided that a man to back was . . .  Mobutu. '59 As chief-of-staff of the 
Belgian-created Congolese army, General Joseph Desire Mobutu had long been 
identified as a reliable strongman to hold the ring against Congolese nationalism 
and/ or communism; in 1963, President Kennedy told him, 'General, if it hadn't 
been for you, the whole thing would have collapsed and the Communists would 
have taken over' .60 He had also been in the pay of Belgian military intelligence 
since the start of his army career.61 Backed by the Western states most concerned ­
the US, France and Belgium - Mobutu was chosen as a reliable client in a state 
which was key to Western Cold War strategy in Africa. 
In his study of state collapse, I. William Zartman argues that: ' [T]he Congo case 
is of. . .  relevance for its lessons about state reconstitution. An international 
intervention to restore law and order, a strongman installed with foreign 
connivance: these were the means of restoring the state and the elements in its 
gradual collapse again two or three decades later'.62 To which could be added in 
light of our discussion of intervention: the Congo case is key for what it reveals 
about foreign intervention, and the long-term effects of outside imposition and 
maintenance of dictatorship. By the time of his overthrow, Mobutu had failed for 
58 Martin Woollacott, The Guardian 10 April 1997 
59 Alan James, 'The ex-Belgian Congo and the Cold War, 1960-63 ' ,  paper presented to the EISA annual 
conference, Durham University 1996, p5 
60 Alan James, 'The ex-Belgian Congo and the Cold War, 1 960-63 ' ,  paper presented to the EISA annual 
conference, Durham University 1996, p6 
61 Colette Braeckman, Le Dinosaure: Le Zaire de Mobutu, Paris :  Fayard 1992, p36 
62 I .  William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, 
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too long to respond to easily satisfiable demands for change because he believed 
that his Western allies would always rally to his support. This belief was fostered 
b y  those allies in word and deed, and as late as December 1996, Mobutu had 
little reason to believe they would behave any differently. 
For over two decades, Zaire's principal military supporter had been France 
which, as the gendarme of Africa had by the mid-1970s assumed the patron's 
mantle from the US, which itself had earlier assumed it from Belgium, 
discredited by the post-independence debacle. President Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, aware of the possibilities - commercial, political and strategic -
presented by Zaire, signed cooperation agreements in terms of aid, trade and 
cultural exchanges which marked the formal expansion of France's African 
sphere of influence from its own former colonies to include the ex-Belgian 
territories - Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire - perceived as francophone and hence as 
natural inclusions in the Franco-African 'family'. French companies were 
contracted for a number of prestige infrastructure projects - major contributory 
factors to Zaire's national debt which would top $8 billion by 1996 - in exchange 
for guaranteed French protection for Mobutu, a former American client now seen 
as a key African friend of France. The complicity of France's rulers with Mobutu 
would cast doubts on the declared motives - humanitarian or democratic - of 
French involvement in Zaire; Fran<;ois-Xavier Verschave points out that: 'Tous 
ceux qui ont adore Mobutu ou profite de ses largesses sont complices de son 
systeme de vases communicants. Cela inclut. . .  tous les presidents de la 
Republique fran<;aise depuis 20 ans, et leurs coteries - soit tout le spectre des 
"partis de gouvernement" . '63 Crucially, a military technical assistance agreement 
was signed in 1975, and Mobutu's regime was saved with French military 
assistance on two separate occasions. 
63 Agir ici/Survie, France-Zaire-Congo 1960- 1997 : Echec aux mercenaires, Paris :  L 'Harmattan 1997 (Les 
167 
Shaba I: 'Operation Mazurka' 1977 
In March 1977, anti-Mobutu Zairean dissidents (the former police and other 
exiles from the secessionist province of Katanga, who had formed themselves 
into the Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo, FLNC) launched an attack 
from Angola across the border into Shaba province (formerly Katanga). The 
Mobutu regime, facing economic collapse and internal opposition, was 
vulnerable, and the pieces were in place for a potentially successful alliance 
b etween the exiled 'Katangese gendarmes' and militants of the internal Zairean 
• • 64 oppos1t1on. 
Confused reports as to the nature and gravity of this attack led to a cautious 
Western response, and despite precedents to the contrary, there was no 
immediate intervention. Three weeks after the first attack, Mobutu's appeals for 
Western help in the face of what he characterised as a concerted Soviet-Cuban 
plot brought little more than a promise of speeded-up deliveries of previously­
ordered military supplies. However the following month, with Mobutu's army 
routed and his regime nearing collapse, Moroccan King Hassan II, acting under 
French pressure, offered to send 1,500 troops. President Giscard announced that 
French military planes would be provided to transport the Moroccan soldiers 
and, in a televised address on April 23, he told the French people that the airlift 
demonstrated France's 'commitment to combat the subversion of friendly 
African countries'.65 By mid-May the FLNC had been driven back to Angola, 
although they promised to return. 
Subsequent official French accounts are clear about the Cold War imperatives 
behind the Shaba interventions; Mobutu's opponents - the 'Katangese 
gendarmes' of the FLNC - were 'taken up in 1976 by the communist government 
"Dossiers noirs" de la  politique africaine de la France no.9), p 1 3  
64 The militant internal opposition was led by Laurent-Desire Kabila, a figure less 'obscure' than suggested 
by some accounts of the eventual overthrow of Mobutu twenty years later in 1997. 
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m Luanda. Once they were reorganised and trained by Cubans and East 
Germans, the Soviets, who were the powerbrokers in Angola, launched them 
into Shaba on 9 March 1977, against Mobutu's Zaire. '66 There has been little 
consensus about this view; Rouvez suggests the Cold War was a pretext used by 
Mobutu to quell internal opposition to his rule: 'The popularity of the FLNC in 
Shaba was more than the result of ethnic links; it was also the expression of 
serious discontent with the behaviour of the Zairian authorities and the brutality 
of the armed forces, particulary in Shaba.'67 
This French-instigated operation was a direct intervention in both the military 
and the historical sense. It was a direct and deliberate stemming of the flow of 
Zairean history, through which local and regional forces could have allied to 
overthrow Mobutu's dictatorship a generation before a similar alliance could be 
formed to achieve this goal. But the Cold War, and Western mining interests, 
ensured as in 1963 that there could be no real self-determination for Zaire. 
Wauthier notes that France was responding to a shared imperative of the West 
(and some Western clients); as in Chad, its particular interests chimed with those 
of the West in general: 
Si la France, "avec la benediction", selon Pierre Biarnes [author Les Fran9ais en 
Afrique noire. De Richelieu a Mitterrand], de Bruxelles, Washington, Abidjan, 
Dakar et quelques autres capitales, s'est lancee dans cette aventure, c'est que 
l'Occident est d' accord pour faire echec a une invasion qui lui parait 
d'inspiration sovietique, et qu'il veut empecher que le Zaire, ou tout au moins 
le cuivre (et le cobalt) du Shaba, ne tombe aux mains de dangereux 
revolutionnaires marxistes, comme c' est le cas alors non seulement dans les 
ex-colonies portugaises, mais aussi en Ethiopie.68 
65 Le Monde, 24 April 1977 
66 Comite national des traditions des Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine dans 
les operations exterieures de 1961 a 1994, Paris: Lavauzelle 1995 , p202 
67 Alain Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-Colonial 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Lanham: University Press of America 1994, p 170 
68 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et I' Afrique, Paris :  Seuil 1995, p365 
169 
This was an exemplary operation for France: swift, effective, reinforcing French 
credibility with all its African clients, and providing a fine practical showcase for 
French military prowess and equipment; although Africa (in the person of 
Emperor Bokassa) was to contribute to his 1981 downfall, in the late 1970s 
Giscard was still enthusiastic about France's role in Africa and his own 
reputation as 'Giscard 1' Africain'. Despite some critical voices on the French left 
questioning France's true motives, Wauthier notes that: 'Le president fran�ais 
est . . .  plutot content de ses soldats, que ce soit pour I' intervention des Jaguar en 
Mauritanie [discussed in Chapter 3] ou l'emploi des Transall au Za'ire. Dans un 
message de voeux aux armees en janvier 1978, il estime que ces actions et 
quelques autres "ont accru dans l 'opinion nationale et internationale le prestige 
et le renom de nos armes". '69 Africa was to remain an indispensable theatre for 
the expression of French military grandeur throughout Giscard's presidency. 
Shaba II: 'Operation Leopard' 1978 
France's second Shaba intervention was to prove key for understanding the 
legitimisation process of France's military interventions, as well as the 
importance of controlling information in the interventionary theatre. It is by far 
the best known French military intervention in modern Africa - celebrated in the 
book and film La Legion Saute sur Kolwezi as one of the Legion's finest hours70 -
and apparently fulfilled all the criteria permitting deviation from the 
nonintervention norm: the intervention was requested by the intervened state; it 
was necessitated by the urgent imperative to prevent the further massacre of 
French nationals and other Europeans; it was legal under the terms of a bilateral 
defence agreement; it was part of a multilateral effort; and it was brief and 
successful. 
69 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l' Afrigue, Paris: Seuil l995, p365 
70 The film, directed by Raoul Coutard, was based on the book of the same name by Legionnaire Pierre 
Sergent: La Legion Saute sur Kolwezi, Operation Leopard: Le 2e REP au Zaire, mai-juin 1978, Paris: 
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A year after their first defeat the FLNC, as promised, launched a further 
incursion into Shaba, this time crossing from Zambia to take the key mining 
centre of Kolwezi. The stakes were higher and the Cold War imperatives were a 
key part of the justificatory discourse throughout. Wauthier notes that: 
Le president Mobutu a brandi 1' epouvantail du peril sovietique, en declarant 
que "le continent africain est l'objet d'une veritable agression ideologique", et 
le Premier ministre fran<;ais, Raymond Barre, a surencheri en affirmant qu'il 
fa ut situer ces evenements dans le cadre general des "efforts de 
destabilisation" du continent. Giscard affirme, quant a lui, que "la France ne 
peut rester indifferente quand la securite de certains de ses amis est mise en 
cause" .71 
Despite extensive arming and training by French advisors, the Zairean army 
again proved unequal for the contest, and Mobutu turned once more to France 
for protection, obtaining on this occasion a spectacular direct intervention by 
several hundred paratroops of the 2e REP (Regiment Etranger Parachutiste) . 
Crucially, the US provided long-haul transport planes to allow the Legionnaires 
to be transported directly from their French bases; French military Transalls were 
only sufficient for operations within Africa. 
Giscard tells in his memoirs Le Pouvoir et la Vie how he received news of the 
mission's success, a defining moment in his life and one of the apparent 
crowning glories of his septennat: 
Une seconde d'attente, de vertige, entre la mauvaise nouvelle a laquelle il faut 
que je sois pret a faire face et la delivrance que serait une bonne nouvelle. 
"Monsieur le President, ici le general Vanbremeersch [chef d' etat-major des 
armees] . . .  L'etat-major des armees a re<;u a 20h30 un message radio du colonel 
Gras [military attache at the French embassy in Kinshasa] disant: 'Premier 
largage effectue, operation reussie.' La premiere vague a saute entre 15h40 et 
16 heures locales. Erulin [commander of the 2e REP paratroops at Kolwezi] a 
installe son PC [poste de commandement] au sol. Le choc est assez dur, mais il 
pense avoir la situation en main." Ainsi tout s'est passe comme nous le 
voulions, comme nous 1' esperions! Main tenant, connaissant la qualite des 
Presses de la Cite 1978 
7 1  Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et I '  Afrique, Paris :  Seuil 1995, p365 
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hornmes, je  ne doute pas qu'ils vont reussir. Je prends ma tete entre les deux 
mains. Je ferme les yeux pour mieux respirer. Est-ce que je pleure? Je n'en sais 
rien. Mais cela y ressemble.72 
This high-risk operation was justified in Paris as protection for French and other 
European nationals, an explanation largely accepted at the time. Wauthier, in his 
generally reliable work-of-reference Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique, notes that the 
situation in 1978 was 'more serious' ('plus dramatique') than the previous year: 
'Cette fois, en effet, les anciens gendarmes on penetre plus avant au Shaba, 
jusqu'a Kolwezi, et surtout ils s'en prennent aux Europeens qu'ils massacrent au 
hasard de leurs pillages. Plusieurs centaines d' entre eux periront avant que la 
France et la Belgique . . .  ne repoussent les forces du FLNC. '73 Similarly, one of the 
key texts used in the study of IR, Calvocoressi's World Politics since 1945, offers 
the following figures: 'One hundred and thirty Europeans were killed and in 
order to save further lives 700 French and 1,700 Belgian paratroopers were flown to 
Zaire in US aircraft'74 (Italics mine) . Wauthier concludes: 'Le parachutage de la 
Legion sur Kolwezi a certainement contribue a sauver la vie de nombreux 
E ' ,75 uropeens. 
However, Zairean opposition leaders and Belgian journalist Colette Braeckman 
have queried these figures, and the presumed 'humanitarian' justification for the 
French operation which, Braeckman argues, was carried out 'under a double 
pretext: to protect Zaire against the communist peril, and to intervene for 
humanitarian reasons in order to save Europeans in danger . . .  What is less well 
known is that the humanitarian pretext was provided by Mobutu himsel£'.76 This 
'pretext' appeared on 19 May, shortly before the paratroops' intervention, when 
a massacre of thirty Europeans in Kolwezi was attributed to the FLNC. However, 
72 Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Le Pouvoir et la Vie, Tome 1: La Rencontre, Paris :  c l985, p260 
73 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique, Paris: Seuil l995, p366 
74 Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics since 1945 4'h edn. ,  London: Longman 1982, p367 
75 Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et l 'Afrique, Paris: Seuil 1995, p368 
76 Colette Braeckman, Le Dinosaure: Le Zaire de Mobutu, Paris: Fayard 1992, p66 
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testimony from witnesses interviewed by Braeckman suggests that the 
Europeans were in fact killed by the Zairean army, as a deliberate tactic to ensure 
intervention (from an apparently hesitant France) in order to militarily reinforce 
the same army and protect Mobutu's regime.77 Fran<;ois Mitterrand himself, in 
1 978 while First Secretary of the Socialist Party and still in opposition, criticised 
the despatch of the Legion to Kolwezi, declaring that: 'The French army went 
there to assure the security of our compatriots, but also to achieve other 
objectives which we do not knowm: namely, to defeat the FLNC, protect 
European mining interests and restore Mobutu. 
Despite this low-key controversy - and the deaths of four paratroopers - Kolwezi 
was a textbook intervention. All the justificatory factors were present. The 
intervention was classed 'humanitarian' - in the guise of protecting French 
nationals and property - and legitimised as France's duty under the terms of 
Franco-Zairean military cooperation, although the treaty specifying these terms 
(the military technical assistance accord of 1974) would only be published later 
that year. Rouvez notes that: 
For France, it was militarily cost effective and politically rewarding. The 
French were credited for the full success of the operation and for chasing the 
rebels out of Zaire. The Belgian authorities . . .  did not support the French idea 
of an intervention geared toward the rescue of the Mobutu regime ( . . .  ) At all 
levels, France came out the winner in the Shaba operation. Mobutu 
congratulated the French for their zeal in coming to the rescue of his country 
and rapidly stabilizing the situation. France's subsequent access to Zaire's 
commercial and economic assets served to further French influence in the 
• 79 region. 
France was already by this stage the principal arms supplier to Zaire, and had 
provided Mobutu's armed forces with hardware including Mirage fighter 
77 Colette Braeckman, Le Dinosaure: Le Zaire de Mobutu, Paris :  Fayard 1992, p66-68 
78 Quoted in Observatoire permanent de la cooperation franc;aise, Rapport 1995, Paris: Desclee de Brouwer 
1 995, p125 
79 Alain Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-Colonial 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Lanham: University Press of America 1994, pp336, 339 
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aircraft, helicopters and transport planes. However, the worsening reputation of 
Mobutu, and the repression and profligacy of his regime, would subsequently 
tarnish Giscard's triumph. Wauthier concludes: 'En definitive, ce qui est le plus 
genant pour le president de la Republique, c' est qu'il est de notoriete publique 
que le regime za'irois est singulierement corrompu et sinistrement repressif. Or, 
!'intervention militaire fran<;aise a eu surtout pour resultat de le maintenir au 
pouvoir. '80 Indeed; France's interventions kept Mobutu in power, and created the 
time and space for his worst excesses, twenty years longer than might otherwise 
have been the case. 
By the late 1980s, Jeannou Lacaze's expertise was acknowledged throughout 
France's African sphere, and in 1988 Mobutu asked the French government of 
then prime minister Jacques Chirac if Lacaze could come to Zaire to revaluate its 
military capacity, supposedly to resist perceived regional security threats posed 
by Angola, Uganda, Sudan (by which one might understand the SPLA), and the 
Katangais, undefeated despite the repeated interventions to repulse them. Lacaze 
asks: 
L'  armee zairoise pouvait-elle s' opposer a tous ces dangers? J' ai done dresse un 
plan et propose a Mobutu de reserrer les structures de son armee autour de 
quelques points des (installation de centres strategiques dans les chefs-lieux 
de province), et de privilegier . . .  les communications et les moyens de 
transport, c' est-a-dire la capacite de reaction face a ces situations belligenes. Le 
president Mobutu a accepte mes propositions, mais elles impliquaient un 
effort financier qu'il n'a pas pu faire parce que son pays etait en voie 
d' ecroulement sur le plan economique.81 
It is worth pointing out that Mobutu himself was not facing financial ruin; and 
the country's destitution was directly attributable to its president's world-class 
prosperity. But most importantly, Lacaze's 'evaluation' of the Forces Armees 
Zairoises (FAZ) did more to protect Mobutu than to preserve regional security; 
8° Claude Wauthier, Quatre Presidents et I '  Afrique, Paris:  Seuil 1995, p369 
81 Jeannou Lacaze, 'Tchad' in Sophie Huet ed. ,  Quand ils faisaient la guerre, Paris: Pion 1993, p38 1  
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from the late 1980s until Zaire's collapse in 1997, the FAZ were deployed against 
the internal opposition and the population generally rather than to resist any 
invading army. 
Significantly, although rioting by opposition supporters and looting by the army 
in 1991 provoked the intervention of several thousand French troops, officially to 
evacuate French and other Western nationals, subsequent requests by opposition 
leader Etienne Tshisekedi, during further army rioting in 1992, for foreign 
intervention to protect the population and help topple Mobutu fell on deaf ears. 
The FAZ was simply learning the lesson that was to be their rulebook for the 
remaining years of the regime; in the absence of pay, they should 'live off the 
land' ('vivre sur le terrain'), i.e. through theft and extortion from the population. 
However, as Weiss points out, this was an opportunity missed: ' [H]ad they 
wanted to, this was a moment when Belgium, France and the US could have 
ended the regime's tenure of power with relative ease.'82 This key foreign failure 
is directly attributable to Mobutu's shrewd reading of the runes of regional 
security; France (as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6) still needed him. 
In sum, it may be seen that throughout the Cold War, particularly during the 
1970s when superpower rivalry was played out against the backdrop of Africa's 
final decolonisations - in Angola, Mozambique and minority-ruled Rhodesia and 
South Africa - Mobutu made himself indispensable for his external patrons, 
through shrewd self-casting as an anti-communist bulwark bordering socialist 
and Soviet-supported Angola and Congo-Brazzaville, while occasionally 
threatening to turn to the Soviets himself if Western support was not 
forthcoming. And, in a vast country replete with strategic minerals - diamonds, 
gold, cobalt, copper, uranium, and oil - Mobutu could guarantee security of 
access for foreign mining interests. In this context, French support for Zaire fitted 
82 H. Weiss in I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 
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into a larger pattern of Cold War patron-client relations. Christopher Clapham 
notes that: 
Mobutu's capacity not merely to survive these pressures [for democratisation 
and human rights], in the course of which the French ambassador to Zaire 
was assassinated by his troops, but to emerge as eo-chair of Mitterrand's 
farewell Franco-African summit at Biarritz in November 1994, provided the 
clearest example of the way in which a skilful African leader could 
manipulate the francophone relationship to his own advantage.83 
Conclusion 
The Cold War served as an occasional pretext to justify France's own 
independent bilateral dynamic of Franco-African relations, a common thread of 
Franco-African policy throughout the period. France's interests were almost 
always exclusively French, and France's interests in Africa predated and 
survived the Cold War. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Africa was of special strategic importance to France (in 
the person of de Gaulle) during and immediately after the Second World War, as 
a source of troops and legitimacy before 1944, and as a key pillar of France's 
world standing and independence of the superpowers after. The apparent 
shouldering of the West's burden, faced with perceived Soviet/Cuban 
interference or Libyan irredentism, was incidental or accidental; in any case, it 
was not always well received at home, with either left or Gaullist right. Michel 
Martin points out that: 
Interventions mounted under . . .  Giscard faced . . .  criticisms from . . .  Gaullist, 
Communist and Socialist leaders [who] together supported the accusation that 
France was becoming NATO's policeman, proxy power of the West, or even 
the 'West's Cuba', to use Franc;ois Mitterrand's formula at the time . . .  [T]he 
continuing concern of the French political leadership to demonstrate that such 
Authority, Boulder CO & London: Lynne Rienner 1995, p 1 63 
83 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1996, p93 
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actions . . .  are free of any Western entanglement [have] prevented these 
operations from becoming involved with East-West issues. '84 
The Cold War, therefore, was a flag of convenience displayed purely for 
international perceptions. In considering two of France's most significant 
theatres of intervention during the Cold War period, this chapter has sought to 
demonstrate that the net effect of these interventions - although perceived by 
decision-makers in Paris as successful in terms of safeguarding France's interests 
- was to create an impression internationally that French intervention was not 
driven exclusively by French interests (and those of francophile African elites), 
but also by the imperatives of international geostrategy. Accordingly, these 
interventions would be unopposed by other Western powers and unchallenged 
in the UN Security Council from which, in any case, France would not seek 
approval for an African intervention until the changed circumstances of 1994 so 
dictated. 
84 Michel Martin, 'From Algiers to N'Djamena: France's Adaptation to Low-Intensity Wars 1 830-1987' in 
DA Charters & M. Tugwell eds., Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: a Comparative Analysis, London: 
Brassey's Defence Publishers 1989, p l l7 ;  see also P. Lellouche, P & D. Moi"si ,  'French Policy in Africa: A 
Lonely Battle Against Destabilization' ,  International Security 3 :4, April 1979, p 124 
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Chapter 5 - French military intervention in Rwanda I 
Introduction 
Observers of France's role in Rwanda - press, NGO and academic - are divided 
into two increasingly hostile camps, difficult to label but broadly defined by, on 
the one hand, criticism of France as the principal supporter of a regime which 
planned and implemented genocide, and on the other, support for France as the 
only state prepared to intervene to protect fleeing 'Hutus' thereby forestalling a 
second genocide. These arguments may be simplified as promoting a theory of 
genocide v. double genocide, the former demanding the 1994 genocide be 
recognised as a deliberate crime of unique proportions (in modern Africa and the 
post-1945 world), the latter alternately blaming the Rwandan Patriotic Front for 
provoking massive retribution against its natural support base, and portraying 
the 1994 genocide as just a point of detail in the long and ongoing history of 
'Hutu-Tutsi' strife.1 
' An understanding of the hardening of the Rwandan state and its evolution - from hard state to weapons 
state to genocidal state - necessitates a rejection of ethnicity as the principal motor or major dynamic of 
conflict there. Instead, it is essential to view ethnicity in the African Great Lakes region, and the 
sectarianism of which it is the expression, as a symptom, not the cause of the region's  wars. It is the 
product, indeed often the only product, of dictatorships for whom ethnic exclusion was often their sole 
means of holding power, and of justifying their monopoly of power to the population. 
However, it is not easy to find an account of current events in the region which eschews ethnicity 
as an interpretive framework. Indeed, there is little consensus even on the basic dynamics of Rwandan 
history, and interpretations of that history have been coloured retrospectively by contemporary events. Just 
as there are competing frames of analysis of the current situation, so are there opposing historical schools, 
explaining conflict as the result either of ethnicity, or of neocolonialism. 
Dominant in the West, even in the most 'enlightened' circles, is the interpretation enthusiastically 
promoted by the former Rwandan regime - organisers and perpetrators of the 1994 genocide - and which is 
reproduced with little question by most of the Western media: that the country' s  quarrels are centuries-old, 
ethnically-driven and inevitable. By this reckoning, it was a quirk of a cruel Fate which trapped Hutu and 
Tutsi within states - Rwanda and its unfortunate 'twin' Burundi - where they are predestined to massacre 
each other. It would be better by far to accept that they can never live together and (as was suggested in all 
seriousness by commentators during the Zairean war) to create a separate, ethnically-cleansed 'Hutuland' 
and 'Tutsiland' in the region, perhaps giving Rwanda to one group and Burundi to the other. By this 
analysis, the sclerosis of the hard state which led it to kill a million of its population was not the nadir, a 
crime which made imperative the regime' s  overthrow, but part of an ongoing process in an inevitable ethnic 
cat-and-dog struggle in which blame is universal, where perpetrators of genocide cannot be judged because, 
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It is important to note that France's Rwandan interventions were exceptionat 
even in the context of 30 years of interventionary theory and practice, on a 
number of counts: all possible justifications were deployed - self-defence, 
invitation, treaty obligation, and counter-intervention; and by 1994, faced with 
the unprecedented failure of its earlier interventions, humanitarianism backed 
up by a UN Security Council mandate, became the leitmotif of a French 
intervention. All the contradictions and discrepancies between theory and 
practice were assembled within a short period 1990 to 1994, to a greater extent 
than in Chad, where intervention is ongoing and deemed a success, or in any of 
the other intervened states we have considered. Rwanda - particularly in light of 
the subsequent, resultant, unprecedented involuntary nonintervention response 
in Zaire in 1996 - provides us with a model case study of French interventionary 
activity in Africa. 
The official account of events may be readily collated from political and military 
statements, reports in much contemporary press coverage, specialist - notably 
military - publications2, interviews with planners and participants and, more 
recently, depositions to the Quiles Parliamentary Information Commission. 
Conversely, the practice (the conduct and effect) of those interventions is less 
well documented, and enquiries to official sources during 1996 solicited 
equivocal responses. Requests for interviews with some participants were 
refused without explanation. No comprehensive official account of the conduct 
of Operation Noroft is accessible. 
Despite the constraints and distortions attendant on any study of what remains a 
sensitive and controversial topic, it is intended here to focus on France's military 
as a growing revisionist lobby has it, everybody killed everybody, everybody is guilty, but because not 
everybody can be tried and imprisoned, everybody must be forgiven. 
2 Terre Magazine; Armees d'Aujourd'hui; Defense Nationale; Freres d 'Armes 
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role during the period identified in line with the following, broadly two-part 
structure. Firstly, following a background to French involvement in Rwanda, the 
theory of the early (what will later be categorised 'old-model' intervention) will 
be considered, in terms of the traditional justifications used: self-defence (i.e. 
protection of nationals); request of a legitimate government; fulfilment of treaty 
obligations; and counter-intervention. Subsequently, this intervention's practice 
will be considered, in its broadly threefold manifestation: arming; training; and 
direct participation. 
The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the effect of this intervention, and 
the mismatch between its purposes (declared and undeclared), and its result. 
Background to French involvement in Rwanda 
It is intended in this section to sketch the background to French military 
involvement in Rwanda, from that state's inception and consolidation under a 
stable authoritarian regime (the 'hard state'), to civil war and its rapid 
militarisation with French support, by means of which it became a militarised 
state (the 'weapons state'). That state's recourse to genocide, which led to its 
collapse and overthrow - and further French intervention - will be considered in 
Chapter 6. 
Origins of conflict in Rwanda 
Before the outbreak of the current Great Lakes crisis, its origins - in the colonial 
legacy of division and partition, and in the Belgian-sponsored creation in 
Rwanda of a sectarian, one-party regime which depended for its survival on the 
exclusion or elimination of its opponents - have been extensively (if not always 
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usefully) documented.3 It is not intended, therefore, to re-examine the sources of 
conflict in the region, but instead to consider the Rwandan civil war's longevity 
(over nearly four years) in light of overt external involvement until 1994. Suffice 
it to say here that characterisation of the crisis as ethnically-driven has been used, 
both deliberately and unwittingly, to downplay or conceal the colonial legacy 
suggested above, and the centrality of the role of external, i .e.  extra-African 
forces, in fuelling, sustaining and prolonging the conflice Accordingly, Western 
media coverage typically describe events there exclusively in terms of an ethnic 
or even 'tribal' conflict. Pieterse's recent article explains how: 'Ethnicity, although 
generally considered a cause of conflict, is not an explanation but rather that 
which is to be explained. The terminology of ethnicity is part of the conflict and 
cannot serve as a language of analysis. The core causes of conflict are 
authoritarian institutions and political cultures and the politics of hard 
sovereignty, while external influences play a significant role.'5 
Ethnicisation was singularly inappropriate, and particularly provocative, in 
Rwanda where, despite attempts by colonists and post-colonial sectarian regimes 
3 Among the more useful accounts are Catharine New bury, The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and 
Ethnicity in Rwanda (1860- 1960), New York: Columbia University Press, 1988; and Dixon Kamukama, 
The Rwanda conflict: its roots and regional implications, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1993. Notable 
among ethnocentric interpretations is Ferdinand Nahimana, Le Rwanda: emergence d'un Etat, Paris: 
L'Harmattan, 1993, interesting also as its author, a former rector of the National University of Rwanda, 
became a leading ideologue of 'Hutu power' and eo-founder of the pro-genocide Radio-Television Libre des 
Mille Collines. 
4 A countervailing analysis is possible. Although the societies of the Great Lakes were distinguished by 
separate castes in pre-colonial days, the current segregation into separate 'ethnicities' is a product of the 
colonial era - notably the Belgian census of 1 934 which 'froze' a citizen's  status by displaying his perceived 
ethnicity on his compulsory identity card, a process of 'ethnicisation' which was used effectively to divide 
and rule Rwanda's population. The country's 8 million inhabitants pre- 1994 are categorised typically as 
Hutu (84%), Tutsi ( 15%) and Twa (1 %). Rwandan independence in 1962 was achieved on the colonists' 
terms, via the Belgian-sponsored overthrow and exiling of those favoured (but, by 1959, anticolonial­
minded) Tutsis who previously had administered on the colonists' behalf. The accession to power of the 
hitherto downtrodden Hutu majority only reinforced sectarian divisions, to the extent that the practice of 
compulsory identity cards displaying a citizen's ethnic group continued, a practice which greatly facilitated 
the work of the genocide's militias which sought to eliminate Rwanda's remaining Tutsis as an inherently 
disloyal national minority, along with opposition Hutus and indeed those of any ethnicity who opposed 
them. 
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t o  prove otherwise, there is only one ethnicity: Rwandan. In a timely interview in 
November 1996, social geographer Dominique Franche told Le Monde that, in 
contradiction of much of that newspaper's own coverage: 'The Hutus and Tutsis 
do not form two different ethnic groups. An ethnic group is defined by a unity of 
l anguage, culture, religion or territory. The Tutsis, Hutus and Twas live together 
. . .  They speak the same language and share the same culture and religion. They 
used to specialise in certain areas of the economy, but not systematically . . .  The 
conflict can't be described as ethnic, since there's only one ethnic group in 
Rwanda, and that's Rwandan.'6 
However, Prunier points to a (foreign-authored) cultural mythology which, 
given the dominance of foreign influence in education and information, became 
reality: ' [T]he social and political actors moved by degrees from their real world 
into the mythological script which had been written for them . . .  In 1959 [sectarian 
p ogroms marking the start of the Belgian-supported 'social revolution'] the red 
seal of blood put a final label of historical unavoidability on this mythological 
construction, which from then on became a new real historical framework.'7 The 
Rwandan conflict was exacerbated by the international media's adoption of the 
false analysis which was in many ways at the root of the conflict: the original 
historical distortion became a script which the players acted oue 
In response, the current Rwandan government is seeking to eradicate 
categorisation by ethnic grouping, and eschews the terms Hutu and Tutsi in its 
discourse. Government spokesman Colonel Wilson Rutayisire argues that: 'The 
multiplicity of influences that led to genocide in Rwanda can only be understood 
5 J an Nederveen Pieterse, 'Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, R wanda and Somalia 
Compared', International Political Science Review 1 8 : 1 (January 1997), p7 1 
6 Interview by Jean-Pierre Langellier, Le Monde 12 November 1996 
7 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, London: Charles Hurst 1995 , p.xiii 
8 See Me! McNulty, 'Media Ethnicisation and the International Response to War and Genocide in Rwanda' 
in Tim Alien & Jean Sea ton eds., The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic 
Violence, London: Zed Books 1999 
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if we trail a long journey into history . . .  The economic frustrations arising out of 
long years of colonial and post-colonial exploitation created objective conditions 
upon which the psychological needs and motivations [of] genocide were 
nurtured by successive governing groups. . .  [I]t is the colonial plunder that 
reduced Banyarwanda [the people of Rwanda] to the status of sub-human beings 
susceptible to the ideologies of hate.'9 
This perspective argues that Rwanda's 'ethnic groups', commonly perceived -
most catastrophically by many within those groups - as mutually antagonistic 
throughout history, are instead 'three strands of the same rope', i .e. of one 
common Rwandan nationality (Banyarwanda) determined most obviously by a 
shared language, Kinyarwanda. By this reckoning, the constantly reiterated 
'ethnic' division of this nation into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa was not inevitable, but 
was a deliberate policy of colonialism.10 Amaza states that: 
[I]t was Belgian colonialism . . .  from 1919 to 1961 that laid the ground for the 
Rwandese problem as we know it today . . .  Indirect rule invariably amounts to 
"divide and rule" under colonialism, with the colonist using a section of the 
colonised people to do his dirty work such that the rest of the colonised 
people identify the section thus picked to do the colonist's work, rather than 
the colonist himself, as the enemy.11 
9 Major Wilson Rutayisire, Genocide in Rwanda: An overview of the causes, its systematic conception, 
planning and execution, unpublished paper, Kigali November 1995 
10 Most social anthropology of the Great Lakes region supports this analysis. What pre-colonial divisions 
there were in Rwanda were common to most feudal societies. The king (mwami) was drawn from one clan, 
and this clan distributed favours to a privileged caste, in this case comparatively wealthy cattle-herders. The 
majority in the richly fertile interlacustrian territories were farmers (cultivators), whose status was that of 
serfs. However, acquistion of cattle allowed a farmer to become a herder, and benefit from the richer, meat­
and-milk diet such an occupation allowed. Lowest in the social pecking-order were the 'pygmies' ,  landless 
potters who were treated with the contempt borne by landless people everywhere. The translation of this 
caste system into opposing ethnic groups - complete with racist anthropology which cast the taller herders 
as Ethiopians or a ' lost' semitic tribe genetically superior to their classically negroid eo-nationals - was an 
integral part of colonial expansion and self-justification. This interpretation argues further that division was 
imposed upon Rwanda -after Germany' s  loss in 19 19  of its colonies -by Belgians, themselves steeped in the 
sectarianism and division in their own country, and seeking to reproduce and by extension justify these 
divisions in their newly-acquired African territory as the natural order of things. 
11 Ondoga ori Amaza (former Director of Publications for the Ugandan army -NRA), Rwanda and Uganda: 
Post-War Prospects for Regional Peace and Security, unpublished paper presented in Harare, 1995, p6. 
Belgium had neither the will nor the means to settle its African mandate territory of Ruanda-Urundi with 
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There was no indigenous historiography in Rwanda to allow its people to 
counter the colonist's version of their history. Philip Gourevitch notes that: 
' [T]here is no reliable record of the precolonial state. Rwandans had no alphabet; 
their tradition was oral, therefore malleable; and because their society is fiercely 
hierarchical the stories they tell of their past tend to be dictated by those who 
hold power, either through the state or in opposition to it.'12 The effect of this 
manipulation of historiography, and the complicity of some historians, both 
Rwandan and European, in the perpetuation of sectarian mythology, is 
underlined by Mahmood Mamdani: 'That much of what passed as historical fact 
in academic circles has to be considered as tentative - if not outright fictional - is 
becoming clear as post-genocidal sobriety compels a growing number of 
historians to take seriously the political uses to which their writings have been 
put, and their readers to question the certainty with which many a claim has 
been advanced.'13 
Alan Zarembo offered a useful if rare alternative to prevailing interpretations of 
the Rwandan conflict: 'Colonial regimes taught Africans bad lessons in 
government. First, people came to believe that political power is the only source 
of wealth. The state dictates who prospers. Second, political entrepreneurs 
learned that manipulating ethnic identity is an effective way to stay in control .' 14 
Europeans, nor to send its sons into lengthy service in the colonies when the post-war mother country was 
so labour-deficient. Instead, through the already-established Peres Blancs religious order, it sought to 
educate a native elite - drawn from the taller, 1ess negroid' Tutsi - to manage on its behalf. Gerard Prunier 
points out the danger of this policy in the context the colonists had created: 'It was common for European 
colonists to administer their territories through local intermediaries, creating or solidifying local oligarchies 
as they did so. Only in Rwanda and Burundi, however, was this overlaid with such an explicitly racial 
ideology. '  Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, London: Charles Hurst 1995, p26ff 
12 Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families, London: 
Picador 1999, p48 
13 Mahmood Mamdani quoted in Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed 
with our families, London: Picador 1999, p48 
14 Alan Zarembo, Wall Street Journal November 1994, quoted in Joan Kakwenzire & Dixon Kamukama, 
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda, unpublished paper, Kampala 1996, p8 
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The contention here is that swift, externally-sponsored militarisation reinforced a 
chronically hard state, creating a weapons state in which radical, sectarian, 
militant extremism could flourish. 
'Revolution' and the First Republic 
Independence did not free Rwanda from its colonially-distorted history. In fact, 
its crippling sectarianism was reinforced by the very nature of the Belgian­
inspired - and supervised - 'social revolution' of 1959, which saw those Tutsi 
long-favoured as the colonists' administrators abandoned by their masters when 
they displayed evidence of anti-colonial ideas above their station. The idea that 
the majority - Hutu - had been oppressed not by Belgium but somehow 
independently by Tutsi genetically predisposed to dominate was embraced 
enthusiastically by the Belgian-sponsored PARMEHUTU (Parti pour 
['emancipation des Hutu), led by Gregoire Kayibanda, who would found the 
Rwandan First Republic and become its president. The sectarian pogrom that 
was the 1959-62 'social revolution' - which saw the killing or exiling of over half a 
million Tutsi - was assisted by Belgian military personnel, who armed, trained 
and commanded the new Rwandan army.15 More precisely, the consolidation of 
PARMEHUTU and its seizure of power at the Belgians' behest and to the 
detriment - indeed the physical exclusion - of their Tutsi fellow-citizens, was part 
of an ill-guided strategy in Brussels. The purpose of such a strategy was to 
forestall a radical, anti-European rebellion and maintain Belgian influence on the 
continent - in Ruanda-Urundi itself but more importantly in the vast Belgian 
Congo - by passing power to proxies and clients, as the French were to do in 
much of west and central Africa.16 
15 Crucial here was the role of Colonel Guy Logiest, whose shaping of events he describes in his own 
account, Mission au Rwanda: Un Blanc dans la bagarre Tutsi-Hutu, Brussels: Didier Hatier 1988. 
16 Prunier notes that: ' [T]his was a very strange "revolution" indeed. The break between the Belgian 
authorities and their long-coddled Tutsi elite had come about only because the colonial administrators felt 
betrayed by their erstwhile proteges. They now considered them as a mixture of backward traditionalists and 
revolutionary communists, an unlikely combination which was not dissimilar from the way the British then 
regarded the Mau Mau movement in neighbouring Kenya. What would later be touted as a "social 
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Violent expulsions of Tutsi recurred during the 1960s and early 70s, and the 
exclusion of those remaining Tutsi from employment, public life, and political, 
economic or military power created a quasi-apartheid system of discrimination. 
The worst lessons learned from the colonist were put into practice; a citizen's 
categorisation as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa continued, as in colonial days, to be 
displayed on his or her compulsory identity card. Kakwenzire and Kamukama, 
themselves of Rwandan exile stock in Uganda, describe how: ' [T]he Batutsi in 
Rwanda became underdogs. One had to obtain a Muhutu patron in government 
in order to gain access to state jobs or economic assets . . .  The client-patron 
relations that existed [during the colonial and pre-colonial periods] were 
reproduced, but this time in reverse.'17 
The net effect was that inter-ethnic tension became the definer of the country's 
problems, and sectarian prejudice and exclusion key features of the state because 
deemed essential to the state's survival. Although historically fallacious, the 
ethnic division became real for those who perpetrated or suffered violence 
because of ie8 In light of these factors, the contention here is that ethnic conflict 
revolution" resembled more an ethnic transfer of power. ( . . .  ) "The revolution is over," declared Colonel 
Logiest in October 1960. This was an appropriate declaration, for inasmuch as the "revolution" had been a 
Belgian-sponsored administratively-controlled phenomenon, its end could be administratively proclaimed 
just as its beginning had been administratively made unavoidable.' Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: 
History of a Genocide, London: Hurst 1995, pp50, 52 
17 Joan Kakwenzire & Dixon Kamukama, The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in 
Rwanda, unpublished paper, Kampala 1996, p8 
18 Alex de Waal, co-author (with Rakiya Omaar) of the most comprehensive account of the Rwandan 
genocide to date, points out that: 'Specialists on Rwanda protest in vain that Hutu and Tutsi are not separate 
ethnic groups. But sixty years of colonial and Tutsi rule, and thirty-five years of Hutu supremacy following 
the 1959 Revolution, which consigned half the Tutsi population to exile, have fundamentally changed the 
nature of the relationships between them. Political conflict, punctuated by intercommunal violence, has 
created distinct and mutually opposed Hutu and Tutsi identities, which, for all the hesitations of social 
scientists, are identifiably "ethnic".' He emphasises this point in reference to Tim Alien's  account of the 
creation of ethnicity on the Sudan-Uganda border: 'To argue that the tribes thus manufactured are artificial 
is to miss the point. As Alien points out, it is impossible to interpret recent events without recourse to tribal 
labels, as they are the labels used by the people themselves. Above all, people kill each other because of 
them. '  
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became a reality for Rwandans, both perpetrators and victims, but that ethnicity 
was not the root cause. As the Rwandan state hardened, the institutionalised 
sectarianism upon which it was built became its dominant characteristic, and 
continued to be the most effective means by which a dictatorship could keep the 
population divided. 
The Second Republic 
Fearful of betrayal, President Kayibanda had surrounded himself with 
supporters and family members from southern Rwanda, distributing patronage 
disproportionately to those he felt he could trust. As a result, erstwhile 
P ARMEHUTU supporters from the north and centre of the country grew 
isolated from the president and distant from the levers of political and economic 
power he controlled. Crucially, Kayibanda failed to retain control over the army, 
allowing his Chief-of-Staff Juvenal Habyarimana to build a power-base for 
family, friends and allies drawn from the latter's home region in Gisenyi, north­
western Rwanda. Claiming the president was unable to protect the country 
against attacks from without by inyenzi ('cockroaches') - small bands of exiles 
seeking his overthrow - or to guarantee peace and stability in the climate of 
sectarian revenge within, Habyarimana seized power in a military coup on 5 July 
1973.19 
Habyarimana recreated a one-party state, ensuring political, military and, by 
extension, economic, power was concentrated in his own hands and those of a 
19 The political tensions which led to the overthrow of Gregoire Kayibanda further weaken the argument that 
conflict in Rwanda is and always has been ethnically-driven. Kakwenzire and Kamukama point out that: 
'The political stance shifted from an "ethnic" to a regional basis of distribution [of patronage] and 
oppression. The result of this was the 1973 coup in which the northern and central Hutu conspired to topple 
the Kayibanda establishment. The coup . . .  helps to demystify the long-standing perception of the Rwanda 
crisis as a result of "age-old hatred of the Hutu for the Tutsi", since the 1973 coup exhibited a house divided 
against itself. ' Similarly, Amaza points out that Tutsi elites, those who had prospered as the colonist's 
proxies, were not the only victims of the P ARMEHUTU revolution: 'The annihilation policy of the 
Kayibanda regime against the Tutsi political elites and the opposition political parties . . .  meant that the 
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close inner circle largely composed of family members: the akazu ('the little 
house') . His Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND) 
p arty published its manifesto on 5 July 1975, the second anniversary of the coup. 
Amidst pledges to work for its three stated aims of 'Unity, Peace and 
Development', the document contains several revelatory passages which hint at 
the regime's true nature: 
The Movement recognises, as fundamental components of Rwandan 
society, the three ethnic groups Twa, Hutu and Tutsi. It wishes that ethnic 
differences will not be a cause of the disintegration of the Rwandan 
people, but a source of complementarity and enrichment in equal 
citizenship. 
National unity and harmonious social relations will be pursued 
without respite and elements causing social disintegration with be 
combatted systematically. 
Tranquility and peace will be the object of a constant preoccupation 
to protect citizens against those seeking to disturb social order.20 
It is apparent that the regime would seek to shift blame for civil conflict through 
the scapegoating of unspecified troublemakers, an enemy within who were to be 
held responsible for any of the state's shortcomings. The manifesto also explains 
the Movement's universalism, which would allow it to cast itself after 1992, in 
response to principal patron France's loosely-applied democratisation criteria 
announced in 1990 at La Baule, as the Mouvement National Revolutionnaire 
pour le Developpement et la Democratie (MRNDD):  'Every Rwandan is a full 
member of the MRND. Every Rwandan who participates actively in the 
dissemination of the ideas and exhortations (mats d' ordre) of the Movement, and 
gives example through the carrying out of its decisions, is considered an activist 
(militant).'21 Hence the party must be considered democratic, it would be argued, 
single-party dictatorship had to devour its own insiders - the Hutu. '  Joan Kakwenzire & Dixon Kamukama, 
The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in R wanda, unpublished paper, Kampala 1996, pS 
20 Mouvement revolutionnaire nationale pour le developpement (MRND), Manifeste et Statut, Kigali July 
1975 
2 1  ibid. 
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as i t  represented the patriotic (i.e. Hutu) majority, an argument supported by 
Fran�ois Mitterrand - patron and admirer of Habyarimana - in the early 1990s. 
The exiles problem did not go away. Habyarimana and the party he founded 
insisted that 'the glass was full': densely populated, high birth-rate Rwanda, with 
a population of 8 million in 64,200 square kilometres, was too overcrowed to 
allow the exiles to return. The issues of under-used and unexploited land 
(including large areas of undrained swamp), and primitive agricultural practices, 
went unaddressed, despite the availability of studies advocating workable 
changes.22 Over 15 years, the tranquility, indeed introspection of this 'little 
Switzerland of Africa' concealed a gradual hardening of its arteries as it failed 
repeatedly to address the basic injustice upon which it was built: the forcible 
exclusion of up to 600,000 citizens on the basis of sectarian discrimination.23 On 
July 27, 1987, the Central Committee of the MRND announced, despite growing 
international pressure, that it would not allow the immigration of large numbers 
of exiles. Habyarimana thereby set the scene for a confrontation with the 
emerging, militant exiles' movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the principal, 
defining aim of which was the 'right to return' of the Rwandan diaspora. This 
was unsurprising given that the regime's origins, survival and indeed its very 
reason for being were inextricably linked to the exclusion of its opponents, and 
of their natural support base: those Rwandans exiled by the regime, and those 
within the state excluded from full statehood, considered at best as second class 
citizens and at worst as an inherently disloyal Fifth Column. 
22 See for example Johan Pottier' s  article, published a year before the war' s outbreak, 'Three's  a crowd: 
knowledge, ignorance and power in the context of urban agriculture in Rwanda' ,  Africa 59:4 ( 1989), p461 
23 Other pressures on the Habyarimana regime included a series of bad harvests, a drop in the international 
price of coffee (the country's  principal export), and an inability to address crucial issues of chronic poverty, 
shortages and land misuse. On September 7, 1990, Pope John Paul II visited fervently Catholic Rwanda, and 
although the Pontiff made no call for greater democracy or observance of human rights by his hosts, 
Habyarimana felt the unaccustomed glare of international attention merited a general amnesty for prisoners, 
excepting those charged with subversion or endangering state security. Such an act of magnanimity did, 
however, free up space in the jails for a new influx of political detainees later the same year. 
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The Rwandan Patriotic Front 
In 1986, Rwandan refugees were in the vanguard of the successful campaign by 
U ganda's National Resistance Movement (NRM) to overthrow President Milton 
Obote and put an end to a quarter-century of dictatorships, typical of the African 
p ost-colonial experience, but which had caused the deaths of over half a million 
U gandans since 1962. The Rwandan exiles in Uganda were driven to support the 
rebellion in large numbers - eventually providing 3000 of the 14,000 troops of the 
National Resistance Army (NRA) - by Obote's mistaken efforts in 1982 to force 
potentially disloyal Rwandans back into Habyarimana' s hostile Rwanda, 
inadvertently creating the phenomenon he was trying to pre-empt: organised 
opposition by the Rwandans to his regime. A disproportionate number of the 
NRA's senior commanders were drawn from these Rwandans, notably Chief-of­
Staff Fred Rwigyema, and Intelligence Chief, Paul Kagame. Rwigyema's 
importance and his decisive role in the war to overthrow Milton Obote is 
acknowledged by NRM leader Yoweri Kaguta Museveni - now Ugandan 
president - in his autobiography.24 Indeed Museveni, of Ankole (southern 
U gandan) origin, is classed ethnically as Bahima and was dismissed by some of 
his sectarian opponents as nearly Rwandan himself. 
Militarily experienced and aware of growing resentment of the prominence -
perceived as dominance - of Rwandans in the new Uganda's army and 
administration, Rwigyema and Kagame represented a generation of exiles 
radicalised by combat and aware that, as Rwandans, they would always be 
stateless until their 'right to return' was granted or seized. Accordingly, the 
24 'By the beginning of 1985 . . .  I felt we now had enough guns to open that long-awaited second front. 
Therefore I gave orders that we should open a new front line in the Rwenzori Mountains of western 
Uganda, and I detailed Fred R wigyema, commander of the 1 1 th Battalion, to lead the forces to the west . . .  
R wigyema left with his group o n  3 0  March. I t  was a very long journey requiring much heroic perseverance 
. . .  We did not lose any people along the route, however, and that was in itself quite an achievement. ' 
Yoweri K. Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, London/Kampala: Macmillan 1997, p 1 64 
190 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was founded in Kampala in December 1987. 
Recruited initially from Rwandan exiles in Uganda, the RPF also attracted 
support from the significant Rwandan diaspora in Tanzania, Burundi, and in 
Europe and North America. Like people of no property elsewhere, the Rwandan 
exiles had sought advancement through education, and many, prosperous 
professionals, were prepared to bankroll the new movement. 
To what extent was the RPF a necessary and appropriate response to the 
Rwandan state? In an early assessment of the movement, Prunier suggests that 
the rebels sought to provoke the Habyarimana regime before it could make 
concessions, albeit reluctantly and at the insistence of its foreign backers.25 This 
would suggest that the regime's hardening, its emergence as a weapons state and 
latterly genocidal state, was the result of provocation. By this reckoning, reform 
was inevitable, was already underway, and the RPF offensive of 1990 was 
precipitated by the fear that the regime's imminent reforms would pre-empt the 
movement's attack, diminish its grievances and undermine its support base, in 
the region and internationally. The RPF's economic and diplomatic strength 
abroad, notably in Europe and North America, depended on the hard 
intransigence of the regime it opposed. 
However, even if this were the case, there was abundant opportunity after the 
outbreak of war for the state to 'soften', to concede at least in part the principal 
demand of its opponents. This, an interpretation shared by the post-genocide 
Rwandan administration, argues that the RPF's attack on Rwanda in 1990 was 
necessary and inevitable given the Habyarimana regime's failure to reform. This 
supports the contention that the state was already hard and could only be 
changed or made to compromise through the use of force. When it began finally 
to relent, under overwhelming international pressure, it was a case of too little, 
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too late. The hard state, through the process of externally-backed arming, had 
created a weapons state and culture which could brook no compromise.26 
Remarkably, the Rwandan state and the inherent conflict which led to war in 
1 990 functioned entirely outside of the Cold War framework which had 
determined the context and distorted the nature of wars elsewhere on the 
continent. Rwanda was of strategic importance to no-one during or after the 
Cold War except, for its own unique reasons, for France. But unlike the bulk of 
the states which constitute France's African sphere of influence, Rwanda is not a 
former French colony, and is only nominally francophone. France's response 
betrayed a misunderstanding of the historical dynamic of the Rwandan conflict: -
a single party government based on nepotism, clan loyalty, sectarianism and 
exclusion; and opposition to that regime composed primarily of highly 
motivated, educated and organised refugees, funded by a prosperous diaspora, 
led by militarily accomplished commanders, and enjoying at least tacit support 
from a neighbouring state. 
Having considered the origins of Rwanda as a state based on sectarianism, 
exclusion and dictatorship, the questions remain why, how and with whose 
assistance did the hard state become a weapons state, and to what effect. This 
chapter will proceed by considering France's military intervention in Rwanda 
25 Gerard Prunier, 'Elements pour une histoire du Front patriotique rwandais ' ,  Politique africaine no . 5 1 ,  
Paris: Karthala, octobre 1993, pp1 23- 132 
26 The late Ondoga ori Amaza, who as a senior Ugandan military man was an RPF supporter in the most 
l iteral sense, argued unequivocally that: ' [N]otwithstanding the massacres . . .  beginning April 1994, and 
notwithstanding the precarious security environment that was created during and after the war, not only was 
the war necessary, but it actually opened up possibilities for the democratic reordering of the Rwandese 
polity in a way few other approaches could have done . . .  [l]t is our conviction that had the extremists in 
Rwanda not blocked the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accords . . .  , by the time Habyarimana's  plane 
was shot down (by the very forces he had created to hold the Rwandese people in subjugation), the RPF­
RP A had created enough political space to bring about democratic transformations under conditions of 
peace. 'Ondoga ori Amaza, 'Rwanda and Uganda: Post-War Prospects for Regional Peace and Security',  
paper presented at the Pan African Movement seminar, Genocide in Rwanda: The Responsibility of Africa, 
Harare 28 January 1995 . Ondoga joined the NRA in 1982, served in the medical and political units, and was 
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from October 1990 to December 1993, Operation Noroft, in terms of its theory - i.e. 
its theoretical purpose, justification and legality as expressed in official discourse 
- and practice: its conduct and effect. 
French intervention in Rwanda: theory 
On 1 October 1990, the RPF launched its long-anticipated offensive against the 
Habyarimana regime, crossing into Rwanda from bases in Uganda. If the war 
had been left to run its course, the RPF would have triumphed quickly, given 
their numerical and material advantage. The Rwandan government army (Forces 
Armees Rwandaises - FAR) numbered 5,200 in 1990 against the RPF's estimated 
7,000, and were by all accounts poorly trained and short of munitions. The 
original, core RPF (termed 'the Ugandans'), on the other hand, were well-trained, 
well-armed (both with and without President Museveni's knowledge and 
approval), and highly motivated, with a hunger for land, nationality and 
reparations typical of dispossessed peoples. 
The provenance of these well-armed troops reinforced Rwandan government 
claims of a 'Ugandan invasion'. The regime reacted by detaining 8,000 Tutsis, 
selected by ethnic head-count according to the ethnicity displayed on their 
i dentity card. This was followed by the first massacre of Tutsis at Kibirira. The 
hard state thereby ethnicised the war immediately - ethnicity was militarised -
and its message to a frightened population was unambiguous: the conflict was 
not a result of the regime's failure to reform and include all Rwanda's ethnic 
groups; it was instead a foreign-backed invasion which would be supported by 
those the regime had excluded from power. These latter (all Tutsis and the 
regime's critics of any ethnic group), again constituted an inherently disloyal 
Fifth Column; hence loyalty to the State could most ably be demonstrated by 
later NRA director of publications until his death in 1 995. His only book is Museveni' s  Long March: from 
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p articipation in the elimination of the disloyal. The logic and dynamic of the 
subsequent genocide were already apparent. 
Faced with the application of the 'Ugandan model' of insurgency by his own 
exiled eo-nationals, Habyarimana swiftly contacted his principal foreign backers, 
President Mitterrand and his son Jean-Christophe (then head of the Cellule 
africaine attached to the French presidency), and claimed Rwanda had been 
attacked by an expansionist Museveni. This appeal struck the right chord in 
P aris, and it produced the desired effect, a military intervention - codenamed 
Operation Noroft - and rapid militarisation of the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR). 
French troops were deployed in Kigali, initially to evacuate French citizens, but 
w ere to remain for three years. The controversy surrounding French intervention 
in Rwanda arises principally from these military aspects, including arms 
supplies, training and the role of advisors, as well as direct action by French 
troops. 
France responded mechanically to a perceived intervention stimulus, as it would 
have done faced with secessionists in Chad or an army mutiny in the Central 
African Republic. The outbreak of civil war was characterised in much of the 
French media as an invasion of friendly, francophone Rwanda by hostile 
anglophone Uganda, with deliberate undertones of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
Little attention was paid to the Habyarimana regime's repeated denial of the 
'right to return' for Rwanda's refugees which was the RPF's principal demand. 
Operation Noroft was launched without specific operational guidelines or a time 
limit, and with quagmire potential, i.e. the involvement of ground troops, even 
in front line combat, in a guerrilla war in a mountainous tropical country, all of 
which directly contradicted the trend of the West's post-Cold War interventions. 
Guerrilla to Statesman, Kampala: Fountain 1998 
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As we have seen, analysis of military intervention typically begins with a 
discussion of the international legal constraints - the nonintervention norm - and 
the corresponding derogations from this norm, legitimising circumstances which 
could constitute a code of permissibility of intervention.27 The mechanical 
response to Habyarimana's request for help was buttressed with textbook 
j ustification. The articles of this unofficial and often subjectively-interpreted code 
most often invoked by France are: intervention in response to an explicit, wilful 
invitation by the legitimate government of a state; intervention to protect French 
nationals in situations of violence or instability; and intervention in situations in 
which an existing treaty permits such intervention. 
The first claim, of an invitation to intervene, is irrefutable. The immediate 
reaction in the centre of African policy-making in Paris - the Cellule africaine -
typifies 30 years of France's mechanical interventionary reaction to perceived 
intervention stimuli in Africa. We are fortunate to have an account from Gerard 
Prunier, who claims to have been present in Jean-Christophe Mitterrand's office 
on 2 October 1990: 
[T]he Rwandese head of state was sufficiently worried about the French 
attitude to call the Africa Unit . . . .  from New Y ark. .. In a brief conversation 
lasting no more than ten minutes, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand . . .  gave a bland 
and reassuring answer to President Habyarimana, adding with a wink: "We 
are going to send him a few boys, old man Habyarimana. We are going to 
bail him out. In any case, the whole thing will be over in two or three 
months." ( . . .  ) On Thursday 4 October, a company (150 men) of the 2eme 
Regiment Etranger Parachutiste [2REP] stationed in the Central African 
Republic flew down from Bangui to Kigali, immediately taking up positions 
around the airpore8 
The second claim, self-defence (i.e. protecting nationals), although technically 
justified in international law/9 is less easily sustained. Several accounts point out 
27 Christopher C. Joyner, 'International Law' ,  in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.), Intervention into the 1990s: US 
Foreign Policy in the Third World, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992 
28 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, London: Charles Hurst 1995, ppl00- 101  
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that Belgium also sent troops to evacuate its nationals in October 1990, but 
withdrew them after a month. However, French troops were to remain for three 
years; their numbers never dropped below 250, and at one point - following the 
RPF offensive in February 1993 which was halted with French assistance - French 
military personnel officially numbered 680, when there were only 400 French 
civilians to protect.30 Belgium, with four times as many citizens resident in 
Rwanda, felt no need to send troops on this occasion. Similarly, as will be 
discussed below, French troops were active on the front line, some 50 to 60km 
north of Kigali (notably in Byumba prefecture) where no French or other 
Western citizens lived. 
Given that the treaty justification is the principal claim to legality for France's 
interventions in Rwanda 1990 to 1993, it may be useful then to consider the 
sources of this document [attached; see Appendices] . As we have seen in Chapter 
4, the presidency of Valery Giscard d'Estaing saw the signing of cooperation 
agreements in terms of aid, trade and cultural exchanges which marked the 
formal expansion of France's African sphere from its own former colonies to 
include Belgium's ex-colonial territories -Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire - states 
perceived in France as francophone and hence as natural inclusions in the 
Franco-African 'family'. On safari in 1975 in the Akagera National Park in north­
eastern Rwanda at Habyarimana's invitation, Giscard agreed to formalise 
Franco-Rwandan military cooperation in a military technical assistance accord. 
29 Max Hilaire reiterates usefully that: 'Although the [UN] Charter does not specifically state that all forms 
of intervention are prohibited, given the broad language of Article 2(4), it is assumed that all forms of 
intervention except those in self-defense [i.e., in this case, protecting nationals abroad] are prohibited under 
the Charter. State practice in the post war era supports that view. The UN has also condemned all acts of 
intervention since 1 945 . '  Max Hilaire, International Law and the United States Military Intervention in the 
Western Hemisphere, The Hague/ London/Boston: Kluwer Law International 1 997, p .viii 
30 'L'envoi d'urgence de deux nouveaux contingents porte desormais a 600 le nombre de militaires franc,:ais 
au Ruanda [sic]. Cela peut sembler beaucoup pour proteger (version officielle) les 400 Franc,:ais qui vivent 
dans ce pays de 7 millions d'habitants, grand comme la Bretagne. Surtout lorsqu'on sait que le gouvernment 
beige, lui, n'a pas juge necessaire d'expedier de troupes pour proteger ses ressortissants, quatre fois plus 
nombreux, et que, jusqu'a present, aucun etranger n 'a  ete menace. '  Jacques Girardon, 'Le gendarme de 
Kigali' , L'Express (Paris) 25 February 1993 
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The Franco-Rwandan accord would be the twenty-second such document, and 
entailed an initially modest annual transfer of arms and military equipment from 
France to Rwanda worth about FF4m (£0.5m) per year. With regard to the 
deployment of French troops in the country, the accord states: 'The government 
of the French Republic places at the disposal of the government of the Rwandese 
republic the French military personnel whose services are required for the 
organisation and instruction of the Rwandese national police'. 
However, when it became apparent that Operation Noroft required the long-term 
support of Habyarimana' s weak and disorganized army, the accord was 
amended on 26 August 1992 to include the 'Rwandese armed forces' as eligible 
for French assistance. It is noteworthy that French justificatory discourse 
changed at this time; the intervention, by then approaching its second 
anniversary with official troop levels near 700, was no longer intended merely to 
protect French nationals, but, according to French ambassador Martres, 'to 
prevent destabilisation of Rwanda' .31 
Uniquely, both sections of the Franco-Rwandan accord were classified, and did 
not appear alongside similar accords published in the Journal officiel.32 The accord 
is only now in the public domain following its publication in the report of the 
Quiles Commission in December 1998.33 
31 The Quilt:s Commission report tells how: 'L' offensive du FPR en juin 1 992 declenche I' envoi d' une 
deuxieme compagnie "Noroit". Dans un telegramme du 10 juin 1992, l 'ambassadeur a Kigali estime que 
cette decision jointe a la livraison de munitions et de radars et a la nomination d'un conseiller sont autant de 
signes de la volonte de la France de ne pas laisser destabiliser le R wanda. '  
3 2  Unpublished i n  either the Journal officiel (Paris), or the Defence Ministry' s  Bulletin officiel des armees, a 
copy of the Franco-Rwandan military technical assistance accord of 1975, with its 1992 amendment, was 
passed to the author by a French journalist, who recovered his copy from the R wandan Defence Ministry in 
July 1994. 
33 Annexe 2.5, 'Accord particulier d 'assistance militaire du 18 juillet 1975 ' ,  Assemblee nationale, Enquete 
sur la tragedie rwandaise (1990- 1994), Tome II, Paris 1998, pp80-85 
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If we consider Joyner's second derogation from the nonintervention norm in this 
light: 
Under certain conditions, acts of intervention may be granted through treaty 
arrangements made by one state with another state. Some states have, in fact, 
concluded special bilateral treaties of "friendship and cooperation" specifying 
the possibility of intervention by the protector state in certain discretionary 
circumstances. Under these speciat bilaterally negotiated conditions, the 
acceptability of treaty rights clearly is viewed in international law as a 
legitimate exception to the norm of nonintervention. The precondition here, 
of course, is that the treaty must still be in force and duly respected by both 
governments at the time an intervention occurs.34 
To this precondition could be added, with reference to the Great Lakes region, 
that if there is to be intervention, the treaty must allow for direct military 
support on the ground for the state's armed forces. Post hoc amendments to any 
existing treaty do not make earlier interventions retrospectively legal. 
Before suggesting that French involvement far exceeded the terms even of 
France's own accord, it may be useful here to recall the theoretical model by 
means of which to explain France's open ended commitment - political and 
military - in Rwanda, and the implications for its subsequent claims (when the 
genocidal regime faced defeat in 1994) of humanitarian motives. Given the 
Franco-Rwandan patron-client relationship, France felt obliged to respond when 
the RPF launched its attack on the Habyarimana regime: 'When there is a high 
level of interaction between two states, the decision-makers in one must respond 
to the emergence of civil war in the other. '35 The outcome of this response, it is 
argued, will be the restoration of the original system, i.e. the former pattern of 
dyadic interaction, or a transformation of the relationship with the second actor's 
(here, France's) commitment shifting to the side of the bifurcated actor which 
challenged the original system. In this case, France's response was mechanical: a 
34 Christopher C. Joyner, 'International Law ' ,  in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.),  Intervention into the 1990s: US 
Foreign Policy in the Third World, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992, p236 
35 Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, London: Martin Robertson, 1975, p8 
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restoration of the original system even at the price of a direct intervention. This 
mechanical response should be seen in the context suggested above, of Franco­
African relations since 1960. The French commitment to one side of a bifurcated 
actor (i.e. the French-fostered or favoured ruling elite) was an integral part of the 
state's creation and/ or survival; this excludes the notion of the second actor's 
choice between intervention and nonintervention. Because of France's 
interpersonal 'networks' and treaty-ratified support for the internal status quo in 
the states of its African sphere, its permanent bases and its peerless power 
projection capacity on the continent, Franco-African relations are inherently 
interventionary. 
Practice of French involvement in Rwanda 
Arming 
Troops of Operation Noroit arrived in Rwanda on October 4, 1990. They brought 
with them 60-mm, 81-mm and 120-mm mortars and 105-mm light artillery 
guns.36 No official account of the total amount of arms supplied by France to 
Rwanda between 1990 and 1994 is available, but African Rights concludes that 
such supplies amounted to 'at least $6m worth in 1991-92, including mortars, 
light artillery, armoured cars and helicopters . . .  France also supplied spare parts 
and technical assistance to maintain the vehicles of the FAR'.37 
The authoritative account of the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda by Morris and Scharf cites a further expenditure of $6 
million, stating that: 'The Rwandan authorities distributed six million dollars 
36 Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Vol6, Issue l ,  January 1994, Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and 
Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War (New York: Human Rights Watch 1994) 
Section Ill, Arms Flows to the Government of R wanda 
37 African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, 2nd ed. London 1995, p67 
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worth of firearms provided by France to militia members and other supporters of 
President Habyarimana from 1992 to early 1994.'38 
Direct shipments were not the only means of rapid militarisation used by 
Rwanda and its supporters. South Africa (pre-Mandela), the only major arms 
manufacturer on the continent, was well placed to sell material to Habyarimana, 
and arms acquisition was greatly facilitated by French financial aid to support 
the Rwandan war effort, which grew from a peacetime FF4m to FF55m per 
annum in 1993, a nearly fourteen-fold increase, placing wartime Rwanda sixth of 
the 26 African states which received such aid from France.39 Human Rights 
Watch's 1993 annual report noted that: 
France has consistently supported President Habyarimana over the years and 
continued this policy during 1993 despite evidence of human rights abuses by 
his regime. Just after the beginning of the war in 1990, France sent a 
contingent of troops "to protect French citizens and other expatriates" in 
Rwanda. After the RPF violated the cease-fire in February, France sent an 
additional 300 soldiers some of whom actively supported Rwandan troops in 
the combat zones. Some of the French troops were withdrawn after the March 
cease-fire, but others remained in Rwanda, in violation of accords which 
called for the departure of all foreign troops. France supplied Rwanda with 
arms and with political and propaganda support within the European 
C . 40 ommumty. 
Weapons were also supplied by France through third parties (notably Egypt) . 
Goose and Smith, authors of Human Rights Watch's report on arms supplies to 
Rwanda, note that: 
A $6 million contract between Egypt and Rwanda in March 1992, with 
Rwanda's payment guaranteed by a French bank [the state-owned Credit 
Lyonnais], included 60-mm and 82-mm mortars, 16,000 mortar shells, 122-m 
D-30 howitzers, 3,000 artillery shells, rocket-propelled grenades, plastic 
38 Morris & Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1998 p52 
39 Statistics from Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Vol6, Issue 1 ,  January 1994, Arming Rwanda: The 
Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War (New York: Human Rights Watch 1994) 
Section Ill, Arms Flows to the Government of Rwanda 
40 Human Rights Watch World Report 1994 (events of 1993), New York: HRW December 1993, p38 
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explosives, antipersonnel land mines, and more than three million rounds of 
small arms ammunition.41 
Mobutu' s Zaire was key in this respect. At France's request, the late Marshal­
President's Presidential Guard had been in the frontline in repelling the first RPF 
offensive; and Zaire remained an indispensable supply route for weapons up to, 
including and subsequent to the Rwandan weapons state's recourse to genocide. 
(Indeed, the significance of Mobutu's Zaire as a source of regional instability, 
comparable to that of apartheid South Africa, explains the subsequent imperative 
for post-genocide Rwanda and other threatened states to cooperate in its 
destruction in 1997.42) 
A major UN-commissioned report on the international response to the Rwandan 
war concluded that: 'The influx of weapons from foreign sources to the 
Rwandese government as well as to the RPF contributed significantly to the civil 
war . . .  as well as to the massacres in 1994. '43 Goose and Smith concur that 
'Governments that supplied weapons and otherwise supported those forces 
[responsible for the genocide] bear some responsibility for needless civilian 
deaths.'44 
41 Stephen D. Goose (Washington Director of the Human Rights Watch Arms Project) and Frank Smyth 
(author of the Arms Project's report 'Arming Rwanda') ,  'Arming Genocide in Rwanda' ,  Foreign Affairs 
September/October 1994 
42 See Mel McNulty, 'The collapse of Zaire: implosion, revolution or external sabotage? ' ,  The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 37: 1 ,  March 1999 
43 Steering Committee of Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR), The International 
Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the R wanda Experience, JEEAR: Copenhagen March 
1996 
44 Goose and Smith in Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct 1994; they reinforce their point be desribing how: 'In March 
1993, following the release of a report detailing the massacre of several thousand unarmed Tutsi civilians 
between 1 990 and 1 993, Belgium withdrew its ambassador, Johan Swinnen, for two weeks to protest the 
abuses. In contrast, France apologized for them. Said French Ambassador Jean-Michel Marlaud, "There are 
violations by the Rwandan Army, more because of a lack of control by the government, rather than the will 
of the government." Hutu leaders got the message that they could get away with genocide facilitated by 
foreign arms. ' 
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Training 
For the duration of Operation Noroi't, French personnel were directly 
responsible, through arming and training, for the exponential growth of the FAR, 
which swelled from 5,200-strong in 1990 to 35,000 in 1993. Eventually, the deputy 
military attache at the French embassy, Lt.-Col. Chollet, was made special 
military advisor to the President and given overall command of operations. A 
Frenchman was thus the de facto chief-of-staff of the FAR.45 This extraordinary 
development of the FAR is comparable in modern history, in scale, expense and 
inefficiency, to the eventually fruitless American backing of the South 
Vietnamese Army.46 
Security assistance - training of the gendarmerie - was the only aspect of French 
military support that did not breach the terms of France's own military 
assistance agreement, although training of Rwandan military personnel and 
military intelligence operatives began in 1990, whereas the amendments to the 
1975 agreement, extending France's training remit to include the army, were not 
ratified until 1992, a largely symbolic post-hoc attempt to make legal a de facto -
illegal - military intervention. 
The Quiles Commission heard testimony from military personnel, supported by 
sometime advisor to the Defence Ministry Gerard Prunier, that depite 
accusations that French forces had colluded in the training of militias - and 
statements by FAR commander and leading genocidaire Colonel Theoneste 
Bagosora that he met regularly with a French military cooperant officer - this was 
not the case. 
45 In its conclusion, the report of the Quiles Commission asks: 'Comment la France a-t-elle pu en fevrier­
mars 1993 en arriver a ce point d'engagement qui conduit [un] certain militaire fran<;ais a considerer qu'a 
travers la mission d'assistance operationnelle qu' il mene i l  dirige et commande indirectement une armee, en 
! ' occurrence celle d'un Etat etranger?' 
46 See especially the most significant rupture in the official discourse surrounding US backing for the South 
Vietnamese hard state/weapons state, Robert S .  McNamara (US defence secretary under Kennedy and 
Johnson), In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, New York: Vintage 1996. 
202 
Comme l'a souligne Gerard Prunier . . .  , "il ne s'agissait pas de dire, comme on 
a pu le lire, que la France avait prepare le genocide et deliberement forme les 
miliciens pour leur permettre de tuer les Tutsis; en revanche, elle avait 
effectivement entra1ne des miliciens qui ont participe au genocide sans avoir 
pris conscience, betise ou naivete, de ce que representait son action." [ . . .  ] Le 
Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin [adjoint operations de ! 'attache de defense at the 
French embassy in Kigali, April 1992 to 14 April 1994] a confirme de fa<;on la 
plus categorique que jamais au cours des reunions d'etat-major auxquelles il 
avait assiste il n' avait ete fait allusion devant lui a un equipement de miliceS.47 
This defence - of naivety or simply ingenuousness - was possibly the weakest 
offered to defend French complicity in the training of genocidaires . In an article 
headlined 'Militiaman claims France trained Rwanda's killers' - on the day 
French troops officially re-entered Rwanda under the terms of the Operation 
Turquoise 'humanitarian' mandate [See Chapter 6], Guardian journalist Mark 
Huband reported an interview with Janvier Africa, by then in hiding, in which it 
was claimed that: 'French military advisers showed Hutu death squads how to 
throw knives and assemble guns supplied to the Rwandan government' .  Africa, 
a journalist and son of a Rwandan diplomat (well-connected to the Akazu), was 
arrested in September 1992 after he wrote an article which claimed that death 
squads were responsible for assassinations. He told the Federation Internationale 
des Ligues des Droits de l 'Homme (FIDH) investigators how: 
We had two French military who helped train the Interahamwe. A lot of 
other Interahamwe were sent for training in Egypt. The French military 
taught us how to catch people and tie them. It was at the Affichier Central 
base in the centre of Kigali. It's where people were tortured. That's where the 
French military office was. 
At the camp I saw the French show Interahamwe how to throw knives and 
how to assemble and disassemble guns. It was the French who showed us 
how to do that - a French major - during a total of four months training for 
weeks at a time between February 1991 and January 1992. 
The French also went with us Interahamwe to Mount Kigali, where they gave 
us training with guns. We didn't know how to use the arms which had been 
brought from France. 
In early 1992 we did our first killing. Around 70 of us went to Ruhengeri to 
kill Tutsis from the Bagogwe clan [sic] . We killed about 10,000 over one 
47 Assemblee nationale, Enquete sur la tragedie rwandaise (1990- 1994), Tome 1: Rapport, Paris 1998, p352 
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month, from our base at the Mukamira military camp at Ruhengeri. Two 
weeks later we went to Bugosera, where we killed about 5,000 people.48 
This account of the massacre of the Bagogwe is corroborated by Jean Carbonare's 
interview with Africa, broadcast on BBC Panorama in August 1995, by the 
International Commission of Enquiry (FIDH) 1993 report, and by Human Rights 
Watch. Amnesty's 1992 report states: 'Many extrajudicial executions reportedly 
followed the FPR's brief occupation of Ruhengeri town in January. Hundreds of 
Tutsi, mostly members of the Bagogwe clan, were killed by government soldiers 
or Hutu assisting them. Government appeals to the civilian population to 
prevent FPR attacks appeared to be interpreted by some Hutu as a call to attack 
any Tutsi suspected of supporting the FPR.'49 
It is also alleged that summary executions were conducted at military camps 
where French personnel of the Mission militaire de cooperation were based; 
Carbonare attested to having visited Bigogwe camp in north-western Rwanda, 
where: ' . . .  civilians were brought by the truckload. They were tortured and 
killed.'50 The International Commission of Investigation's report, published in 
March 1993, condemned 'genocidal practices in Rwanda' and 'the responsibility 
of the Rwandan authorities to the highest level in massacres'. It also corroborated 
the testimony that French instructors were based at Bigogwe. 
48 Mark Huband, 'Militiaman claims France trained Rwanda' s  killers' ,  The Guardian 22 June 1994 
49 Amnesty International , Annual Report 1992, London: Amnesty International 1993, p225 
5° Frenchman Jean Carbonare is a veteran human rights activist, one of the first to expose and denounce the 
use of torture by the French army during the Algerian war, and is eo-founder of the Federation 
lnternationale des Ligues des Droits de l 'Homme. Although now in his 70s, he has worked in Rwanda for 
CLADHO (Coalition des Ligues et Associations des Droits de l 'Homme) since 1994, and is an advisor to 
R wandan president Pasteur Bizimungu. In this latter role, his integrity has been attacked by several of his 
compatriots, and by Liberation's US-born Africa specialist Stephen Smith. Smith in turn has been criticised 
by Paris-based human rights organisations, notable Agir Ici/Survie, for his sometimes poorly-substantiated 
attacks on the current Rwandan government, and the comfort drawn from these attacks by the Former 
Government of Rwanda (FGOR) in exile and apologists for the 'double genocide' theory. 
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Participation 
French troops were deployed in Kigali initially to evacuate French citizens, but 
remained for three years. During this time they maintained a visible presence in 
the city, manning checkpoints and carrying out joint patrols with the F AR.51 They 
also played a less visible support role at the front - overseeing artillery 
bombardments and, on at least one occasion discussed below, conducting a 
bombardment: at Byumba, far from where there were any French citizens to 
protect, in October 1990. 
French officers also interrogated - or assisted in the interrogation of - RPF 
prisoners; at a time when French personnel were reported52 to be involved in 
'strong-arm' interrogations of RPF prisoners and suspects. Amnesty 
International's 1992 report on conditions of detention and use of torture in 
Rwanda states: 'Torture, which was widespread in the aftermath of the mass 
arrests of October 1990, continued to be reported. Detainees held by the Service 
central de renseignements (SCR) . . .  and at the gendarmerie detention centres and 
the armed forces' headquarters, both in Kigali, were reportedly beaten with 
electric wire, hoe handles and other implements, given electric shocks and made 
to drink urine and eat vomit. Prisoners in military custody were also reportedly 
tied in a deliberately painful and sometimes permanently damaging position, 
with the arms tied tightly together above the elbows, behind the back. Political 
prisoners reportedly continued to be held in unlit cells (known as cachots noirs . . .  ) 
in Ruhengeri prison and in small, poorly lit punishment cells in Kigali Central 
Prison.'53 
The author was shown evidence by Carbonare of French personnel in the company of R wandan militiamen; 
a photograph showing apparently French troops (i.e. military advisors) running alongside Interahamwe 
members was submitted by the Rwandan government to the Quiles Commission in 1998. 
5 1 Interviews with eyewitnesses I genocide survivors, Kigali October 1996 
52 By Survie, FIDH, and RFI journalist Christophe Boisbouvier (see Ch.6) 
53 Amnesty International Report 1992, London: Amnesty International Publications 1992, p224 
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French personnel, involved with the FAR at every level at this period, could not 
have been unaware of these practices. Prunier supports these reports, while 
maintaining that French troops were not directly involved in combat; his account 
of the operational brief of Noroit's personnel is as follows: 
They were not directly involved in combat duties, but they performed a 
variety of tasks which not only freed Rwandese troops for frontline duty but 
also bolstered their morale and increased the efficiency of the FAR as a 
fighting machine. They took care of the airport guard and logistics (large 
amounts of weapons and equipment were being flown in), looked after the 
government's helicopters and when necessary flew them, organised artillery 
positioning and ammunition supply, and ensured radio communications. In 
addition, they undertook rather more sinister duties such as supervising 
Rwandese military security operations (including the interrogation of 
detained suspects) and even manning roadblocks. For the men of "Noroit", 
the point of their presence in Rwanda was clear: short of direct infantry 
combat, they had to help the Forces Armees Rwandaises in every possible 
way in winning the war they were fighting against the invading RPF.54 
Despite Prunier' s assertion, Radio France Internationale (RFI) journalist Christophe 
Boisbouvier told a London conference in May 1995, 'Non seulement des officiers 
fran<;ais vont former des soldats, des officiers, des artilleurs rwandais, les FAR 
mais - et c' est main tenant pratiquement avere grace a un certain nombre de 
recoupements, notamment de mes confreres - ils vont participer aux combats a 
Ruhengeri, a Byumba, entre octobre 1990 et fevrier/mars 1993, a chaque 
offensive FPR.'55 
Several sources now concur that French personnel directed and even conducted 
artillery bombardments; Prunier himself tells in a footnote how: 
In June 1992, while on a research trip to the RPF-held area around Byumba, 
[I] was caught in a Rwandese government artillery bombardment. From 
inside the shelter, the RPF fighters could tune in on the FAR frequency and it 
was possible to follow quite clearly on the radio the orders given by the 
54 Prunier 1995/1998 pp 1 10- 1 1 1  
55 C. Boisbouvier in Bray, M. ,  Cook, A., & Neath, S . ,  eds. , Rwanda: Perspectives, London: University of 
Westminster Francophone Africa Research Centre 1 997 
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officer commanding the government battery. They were given in French, with 
an accent that could not conceivably have been that of a native African. 56 
This account is supported by Colonel Marcel Gatsinzi (formerly of the FAR, 
integrated into and now deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Armee Patriotique 
Rwandaise), and by Noroft personnel, who told how they had set up, loaded and 
aimed the artillery pieces, although 'c' etait quand-meme eux qui appuyaient sur 
le bouton! '57 
The report of the Quiles commission accepts the testimony of the military 
personnel who were prepared to offer it their depositions - without cross­
examination - that French troops did not participate in combat. However, despite 
their careful diplomatic language, it is clear the parliamentarians cannot avoid 
the conclusion that the FAR could not have conducted bombardments alone: 
La Mission a re<;u des informations selon lesquelles les militaires fran<;ais 
etaient tres fortement impliques sur le terrain, qu'ils se disaient que 1' ennemi, 
venu d'Ouganda, mena<;ait les ressortissants fran�ais et que, clans un tel 
contexte, etant donne la faible competence de l'armee rwandaise, il n'est pas 
absurde de penser que certains aient pu aider a regler les tirs de certains 
armes d'artillerie comme les mortiers . . .  [ . . .  ] [C]ertaines de leurs missions ont 
depasse . . .  le cadre habituel des operations d'aide et d'assistance a des forces 
armees etrangeres. 
[L]a mission ne peut totalement ecarter l'idee qu'un instructeur fran<;ais 
aurait pu, pour des raisons diverses, apporter ponctuellement un concours 
plus effectif lors de I' aide au maniement d'une piece de mortier ou clans une 
autre situation, malgre les consignes diffusees par 1' etat-major des armees, 
tant il parait difficile, en situation critique, de determiner la limite exacte au 
dela de laquelle !'instruction et la formation pourraient etre assimilees a un 
engagement reel. Cette ambigu'ite apparai't consubtantielle a la notion 
d'assistance operationnelle en temps de crise ou de guerre.58 
56 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, London: Hurst 1 995/1998, note 34, p 1 10 
57 Col. Marcel Gatsinzi, interview, Kigali November 1 996; Noroit personnel, interviewed by Stephen 
Bradshaw , BBC Panorama 'The Bloody Tricolour' ,  August 1995 
58 Assemblee nationale, Enquete sur la tragedie rwandaise (1990- 1994), Tome I: Rapport, Paris 1998, p163 
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Guerre secrete 
The role of military intelligence and special services is by its nature unclear, but 
Captain Paul Barril's account below, of French personnel attacking the RPF from 
helicopters, does not sound implausible. Covert operations were facilitated by 
some creative accounting with troop numbers. Throughout the period 1990-92, 
official reports numbered French 'support ground troops' (i.e. in addition to 
advisors, trainers and airborne support personnel) at the 1990 figure of 600, 
although a serving colonel subsequently boasted how, by playing on the dates 
and rotation figures of various units, it was possible to keep up to 1 ,100 men in 
Rwanda while admitting only 600 to the press.59 During the February 1993 RPF 
offensive, France officially had 680 troops in Rwanda including paratroopers. 
The role of Captain Paul Barril60, security advisor to Habyarimana (or more 
specifically, his wife Agathe, reputed power behind the throne, matriarch of the 
'clan de Madame' and focus of the Akazu, who, with her family and other 
associates was evacuated by French troops of Operation Amaryllis a few days 
after her husband's assassination), possibly from as early as 19906\ is made 
unclear both by its covert nature, and by Barril's penchant for hyperbole. 
However, his account of the use of French-piloted helicopter gunships to destroy 
RPF supply lines early in the campaign, redolent of Apocalypse Now, is supported 
by those on the receiving end.62 Barril gives an enthusiastic description of the role 
of  France's special military services: 
France's official special services blocked in '90 the attack by the RPF terrorists 
and Uganda, a DGSE [Direction generale de la Securite exterieure, French 
military intelligence] job. A remarkable job which was a source of great pride 
in this first phase of the war. There were heros on the French side who will 
59 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, London: Hurst 1995/1998, p164 
6° Former commander of the Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), forced to resign 
in 1983 after the false arrests and evidence-tampering in the 'Affaire des Irlandais de Vincennes' ,  
subsequently proprietor o f  his own private security firm SECRETS. 
6 1  Prunier 1995/1998, p 128 note 4 
62 Interviews:  Tito Rutaremara, Major Sam Kaka, Major-General Paul Kagame, Kigali October-December 
1 996. 
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never be known, extraordinary stories of guys who took crazy initiatives, 
who went out and blasted all around them with just a few helicopters and a 
few guns. There is material for a book on the heroism of the Secret Services in 
Rwanda, against Uganda and the RPF.. .  which explains their hatred for 
France.63 
Similarly, the military fanzine Raids Magazine suggested that: 'Francophonie has 
lost a battle, but not the war . . .  [I]n Rwanda France, without participating, was 
present at the seizure of power by the RPF, a rebellion which it had actively 
combatted from 1990 to 1993.'64 Tito Rutaramera, a leading RPF tactician, 
explained that the use by the FAR of French helicopters forced the RPF to 
abandon their conventional advance on Kigali from their northern stronghold 
around Byumba, and to adopt the tactics of the guerre mobile.65 This was most 
effectively demonstrated by the FPR's successful capture and subsequent retreat 
from Ruhengeri in Febuary 1993. Again it is apparent that French intervention 
prolonged and altered the nature of the war 
Result 
Creation of a counter-insurgent weapons state 
Initially, the Rwandan case was not unique. Most analysts would agree with 
Rene Wadlow that the recurring causes of intrastate conflict on the African 
continent may be summarised as one or a combination of a struggle for political 
power, a struggle over basic resources, or a struggle for political participation in 
a multi-ethnic state. However, when the catalyst of militarisation is added to this 
63Captain Paul Barril, former head of the GIGN (Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale), and 
currently director of the 'private security firm' SECRETS (Societe d' etudes, de conception et de realisation 
d '  equipements techniques et de securite), one of five constituent companies of Groupe Barril Securite, 
interviewed in Playboy (Paris), Dec. 1994 
64Raids Magazine (Paris) 101 ,  Oct. 1994, p32. Raids, a militaria fanzine similar to Soldier of Fortune, cannot 
be said to reflect an official French military point of view; but its celebration of the combat role of French 
forces in Rwanda, and criticism of the perceived loss of the Rwandan war, is not unrepresentative of 
military thinking. 
65 Interview with the author, Kigali, October 1996 
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p owder-keg, the situation becomes correspondingly explosive, and locked into a 
vicious circle. Rene Wadlow explains that: 'Militarisation is part of a cycle which 
leads to the impoverishment of the state, to aggravated debt concerns, to an ever 
narrower political base requiring ever more violence to stay in power.'66 
The Rwandan hard state's response to the problems of exclusion and 
reintegration it had itself created was unrelentingly military. Faced with a 
ceasefire and a negotiated settlement - under the terms of the externally­
brokered Arusha accords - the regime sought instead, through propaganda, 
ethnicisation and preparations for genocide, to restore the status quo ante. There 
was no room for the political approach to counter-insurgency, as this would 
imply a political solution. The now militarised Rwandan weapons state, and 
those it used to exert its power, had become victims of the zero-sum situation 
they had created; their only course, it was felt, was outright 'victory' through 
destruction of all opposition. 
France failed to apply the conditionality criteria which President Mitterrand 
himself had announced at the 1990 Franco-African summit at La Baule, which 
linked the continuation of bilateral aid, including military assistance, to progress 
by aid recipients towards democratisation. These criteria, however, failed to 
address the case of states where there was no consent over the natural electorate 
or the democratic unit, and where political power, as with that monopolised by 
Habyarimana since 1973, was dependent on the permanent disenfranchisement 
of refugees. That is, Habyarimana could count on the at least tacit support of the 
majority of Rwanda's population, because he had excluded, killed or exiled any 
who might oppose him. 
Second bifurcation 
66 Rem� Wadlow, 'African States: Security and Conflict Resolution' in Geneve-Afrique 19,  February 199 1 ,  
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I t  not  surprising that many voices within Rwanda did not share this analysis. 
Demands for 'democratisation' from Western backers had not been well received 
by many of Habyarimana' s supporters including, it is suggested, those making 
positive-sounding announcements of reforms. Even the tentative move to 
multipartyism in 1991 was perceived as a sell-out.67 The sectarian hard core, 
adopting the ethnic label 'Hutu Power', used their inflammatory press, the 
airwaves and public meetings to demonise the RPF and the internal opposition, 
and incite violence. Leon Mugesera, MRND vice-president in Habyarimana's 
home region of Gisenyi, told party militants in November 1992: 'The opposition 
parties have plotted with the enemy [ . . .  ] They have plotted to undermine our 
armed forces. [ . . .  ] The law is quite clear on this point: "Any person who is guilty 
of acts aiming at sapping the morale of the armed forces will be condemned to 
death." What are we waiting for? [ . . .  ] The fatal mistake we made in 1959 was to 
let them [the Tutsi] get out. [ . . .  ] They belong in Ethiopia and we are going to find 
them a shortcut to get there by throwing them into the Nyabarongo river. I must 
insist on this point. We have to act. Wipe them all out! '68 
The role of the Rwandan media - as propaganda organs which gave voice to and 
mirrored the hardening of the state and its capitulation to its extremes - was key 
in reinforcing sectarianism and promoting a sense of crisis and siege which in 
turn contributed to the sabotaging of the Arusha peace process, and damned 
compromise as surrender. This role has already been examined and documented 
in two excellent accounts.69 Suffice it to note here that a common theme invoked 
b y  all anti-RPF voices, locally and internationally, was that the movement was 
p .96  
6 7  See especially Dixon Kamukama & Joan Kakwenzire, The Development and Consolidation of  Extremist 
Forces in Rwanda' in Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke eds., The Path of a Genocide, Uppsala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet 1999 
68 Quoted in ibid. ; see also African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, London 1995 
69 Jean-Pierre Chretien ed. ,  Rwanda: Les medias du genocide, Paris: Karthala 1995 ; and Linda 
Kirschke/Article 19, Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda and State-Sponsored Violence in 
Rwanda 1990- 1994, London: Article 19, October 1996 
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anti-democratic, driven by a thirst for revenge and, by implication, more likely to 
perpetrate acts of genocide than the state. These arguments were given credence 
in Rwandan ears by their repetition in the foreign press, creating a vicious circle 
of black propaganda. The very ethnic labelling of the RPF as 'Tutsi' was at source 
a disingenuous attempt to drive a wedge between the movement and its natural 
allies, the internal Rwandan opposition. 
Extremism was organised into a political party - the Coalition pour la Defense de la 
Republique (CDR) - the inoffensive title of little relevance to its role as a pressure 
group against concession by the regime, and as a political platform for the 
organisation of paramilitary militias (milices). These were to be the footsoldiers of 
the genocide, organised country-wide and recruited primarily among 
unemployed, disaffected youth, and deliberately cultivating an image of 
machismo, violence and bigotry. Although operating as paramilitaries outside of 
official state control, the militias were coordinated and trained by senior military 
figures, drawn largely from the Presidential Guard (Garde presidentielle, GP), who 
had themselves been trained by the French military cooperants. 
The principal and most infamous of the militias is the Interahamwe. African 
Rights' account details the origins and consolidation of these Rwandan Tonton 
Macoutes: 'The "professional interahamwe" - those who received training and 
uniforms - are divided into various sections. These included the AbaZulu, Inyange 
and Inkerakubanguka. The training was carried out by members of the Presidential 
Guard based at Kanombe barracks in Kigali, who had in turn been trained by the 
French. In early 1994 their numbers were estimated at about 1 ,700' .70 
Overall, the militias were estimated to number 50,000, approximately the 
strength of the combined regular armed forces (FAR, Gendarmerie and GP) . 
70 African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, London: African Rights 2nd edn. 1995, p55 
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They were armed with some AK-47s and a large number of grenades, but the 
principal weapons used were basic agricultural implements: machetes, known as 
panga in Kiswahili. As the war seemed lost, the militias' discipline collapsed, and 
they broke up into looting gangs. But during the key stages of the genocide, they 
were coordinated by the state through its tightly-organised local government 
hierarchy. Survivors have emphasised the key role of prefets, bourgmestres and 
local councillors, who received the orders from Kigali, mobilised the local 
Gendarmerie and Interahamwe, ordered the peasants to join in the manhunts 
and called for FAR support if the victims put up too much resistance. 
It is important in passing to address another common misapprehension about 
the Rwandan conflict: that the genocide of April to June 1994 was in some way 
spontaneous. Its planning and, in early 1994, its imminence, were clearly 
signalled in advance, by both sides in the war, and by international observers. As 
early as August 1992 when, under international pressure, Habyarimana and his 
government agreed to a ceasefire with the RPF and consented to externally­
brokered negotiations, the dynamic of the subsequent genocide was already 
apparent. 
In February 1993, a lightning assault by the RPF likely to reach Kigali was halted 
only with the support of French troops. France subsequently reinforced its 
military deployment, and its military support for the regime continued 
unchecked. Prunier notes that: 
Paris found itself backing an ailing dictatorship in a tiny distant country 
producing only bananas and a declining coffee crop without even asking for 
political reform as a price for its support. This commitment was to have 
catastrophic consequences because, as the situation radicalised, the Rwandese 
leadership kept believing that no matter what it did, French support would 
always be forthcoming. And it had no valid reasons for believing otherwise.71 
7 1 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, London: Charles Hurst 1995, p l 07 
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A new ceasefire was agreed in March 1993, and new negotiations began at 
Arusha. UN Security Council resolution 812 envisaged the interposition of an 
international peacekeeping force (UNAMIR I). The RPF demanded the 
withdrawal of all foreign (i.e. French) troops, and official French troop numbers 
were reduced from that summer. The 'all military' strategy gave way slowly to a 
politico-military strategy which sought to encourage the Rwandan regime to 
'democratise', basing its legitimacy on its in-built ethnic majority and defeating 
or at least undermining the RPF's claims via the ballot box. This could be seen to 
harmonise with an international strategy of reconciling the regime and the RPF 
in a power-sharing administration under the Arusha accords; or could 
alternatively be viewed as a disingenuous attempt to shore up the Habyarimana 
dictatorship through conferring on it a spurious legitimacy based on a sectarian 
headcount. By this logic, Habyarimana, Hutu, supported by the [ethnic] majority 
in the country, also Hutu, and - democracy being the will of the greater number ­
the Rwandan regime might be made to appear democratic. 
On 4 August 1993, the signing of the Arusha accords seemed to herald the end of 
the Rwandan crisis. Most reassuring for Tutsis and opposition supporters was 
the agreement that a battalion of 200 RPF troops would be stationed in Kigali; the 
other terms of the accords were: a) a commitment to uphold human rights and 
rule of law; and b) an agreement on power sharing, which would bring the 
civilian opposition into government, with all government institutions -
presidency, cabinet, national assembly, judiciary, civil service and security forces 
- to be reformed. Many powers were removed from the presidency, and the post 
of prime minister awarded, for a transitional period, to moderate opposition 
leader Faustin Twagiramungu. This, by any criteria, was a good deal for the RPF, 
but also seemed to be the only way the regime could, on the Mobutu model, be 
seen to be democratising while ensuring its hold on the key levers of power. 
However, the hard weapons state was already too sclerotic to compromise; it 
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was not long before Habyarimana dismissed the treaty he had signed at Arusha 
as 'a useless scrap of paper.' 
Christopher Clapham has identified the inherent flaw in the Arusha process; it 
was based on a Western-imposed model of peace-making, an 'essentially 
mechanistic approach . . .  which readily overlooked the need for any successful 
settlement to rest on a basic political formula which enjoyed the active support of 
the key parties which were needed to implement it, and which could where 
necessary be imposed on recalcitrants who might be tempted to disrupt it.172 
Recalcitrants were to be found not only on the Rwandan side. Le Monde reported 
in early June 1994 that although the goverment of Prime Minister Michel Rocard, 
which was to lose power in 1993, supported negotiation and an agreed 
settlement between Habyarimana and the RPF - the tendency which supported 
the Arusha process - there were other actors who did not: 
[L]' "establishment" militaire n'a pas suivi: les militaires franc:;ais, qui etaient 
contre 1' embargo sur les armes decrete par la France il y a un an, le sont 
d' ailleurs encore aujourd'hui. "Il existe deux ecoles en France, explique-t-on 
clans un cabinet ministeriel, d'un cote, il y a ceux qui veulent toujours qu'on 
rearme les Forces armees rwandaises, de l'autre, il y a tous ceux qui pensent 
que rien ne peut etre regie sans le FPR."73 
The French military in Rwanda could operate largely free of political control, and 
'back-channel' messages were passed from the Military Cooperation Mission at 
the French embassy, and from French military personnel assigned to the FAR, to 
senior Rwandan military and government figures, assuring them that, despite 
public pronouncments about UN sanctions, or about demilitarisation and further 
military aid being conditional on implementation of the Arusha accords, French 
military support would always be forthcoming. This military opposition to 
negotiation, official government policy by 1993, was reinforced by elements 
72 Christopher Clapham, 'Rwanda: The Perils of Peace-making' ,  paper presented to the African Studies 
Association of the UK, University of Bristol, 9- 1 1  September 1996 
73 Marie-Pierre Subtil, 'La France s'efface au Rwanda' , Le Monde 7 June 1994 
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within the Elysee and the Quai. Georges Martres, French ambassador to Kigali 
from 1989 to 1993 (and hence signatory of the 1992 additional protocols to the 
1 975 Franco-Rwandan military cooperation accord) was considered, like many 
French diplomats wooed and won by their African clients, to be as much Kigali's 
ambassador to Paris; his telegrams to Paris offered unqualified support to 
Habyarimana and played down reports - including that of the International 
Commission of Enquiry - that the regime was committing gross violations of 
human rights. Martres was so appreciated by Habyarimana that he was 
honoured - Grand Officier de l'Ordre des Mille Collines - and a request that he 
be retained in post despite reaching retirement age was sent by the Rwandan 
president to Mitterrand. The request was unsuccessful, although Martres was 
replace by another inconditionnel du president Habyarimana, Ambassador Jean­
Michel Marlaud, who closed the French embassy on 12 April 1994 having 
ensured the evacuation of Mme Agathe Habyarimana and key members of the 
Akazu, but leaving the embassy's local staff to be killed by the militias. 
Presidential advisor Paul Dijoud, who met the RPF negotiators Jacques 
Bihozagara (the RPF representative in Brussels) and Claude Dusaidi (RPF 
representative at the UN), told both men how France and the FAR would 'casser 
les reins au FPR', and that 'France would never let the RPF take Kigali'.74 
Dijoud's submission to the Quiles Commission was more measured, telling how, 
in no small measure due to the personal relationship between Mitterrand and the 
Rwandan president (and their sons' business dealings), support for Habyarimana 
continued despite the soundng of alarm bells. ' [L]e president de la Republique 
fran�aise, son entourage immediat [viz. la Cellule africaine], le ministre des affaires 
etrangeres, ont toujours eu la conviction que "le president Habyarimana etait un 
moindre mal et, clans une certaine mesure, le debut d'un bien". '75 
74 Jacques Bihozagara, Ministere du Sport et de la Jeunesse, and Claude Dusaidi, advisor to the Vice­
President and Minister of Defence, interviews, Kigali November 1996 
75 Paul Dijoud, Rapport de la Mission Quiles 1998 
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There were no voices raised - with the possible exception of General Jean Varref6 
- in opposition to French military support for the Rwanda regime, during and 
subsequent to Operation Norolt; and this despite the International Commission's 
investigation and publicising of that regime's gross human rights violations, 
despite Habyarimana's dismissal of the Arusha process, despite the unconcealed 
training of militias and arming of the population, despite the alerting in early 
1994 of preparations for genocide. 
In sum, French-sponsored militarisation of Rwandan society contributed to the 
intransigence of its rulers. The failure to make continued support, especially 
military, conditional on human rights or anti-sectarian criteria, scuppered the 
Arusha peace process. The maintenance of French support for the regime despite 
Habyarimana's subsequent dismissal of the Arusha accord convinced the 
regime's extremists that French support would always be forthcoming. This 
belief in continued, unconditional French support was sustained by back-channel 
messages from Paris, particularly from military figures within the Mission 
militaire de cooperation who had both professional and personal interests in 
defending the regime and their proteges in the FAR. Such unaccountability 
points to a larger failure of democratic checks and balances characteristic of 
French African policy. Asked what he thought of the role of French soldiers in 
Rwanda, former Prime Minster Michel Rocard made clear to whom he 
apportioned blame for the 'dishonour' arising from France's involvement: 
Au-dela d'eventuelles bavures toujours possibles, il est evident qu'ils n'ont 
fait qu'appliquer les decisions du pouvoir civil [i.e. at the Elysee, as Matignon 
and presumably the Quai had been 'short-circuited' out or the decision­
making process]. Or, comme les politiques ne veulent pas assumer leurs 
responsabilites, on va retomber sur les soldats. Il ne faut pas jouer a cela. Il ne 
76 'Le gem!ral Jean V arret, ancien chef de la mission militaire de cooperation d'octobre 1990 a avril 1993 a 
indique devant la Mission [Quili':s] comment, lors de son arrivee au Rwanda, le colonel Rwagafilita lui avait 
explique la question tutsie: "Ils sont tres peu nombreux, nous allons les liquider."' [Rapport de la Mission 
Quiles, Le Monde 17 December 1998, pVIII] 
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faut pas deshonorer l'armee pour le  simple fait qu'elle a rempli les missions 
que lui etaient confiees par le pouvoir. Ce n'est pas l'armee fran�aise qui est 
77 en cause. 
On 6 April 1994 Habyarimana, attending a regional summit in Dar-es-Salaam, 
seemed prepared under enormous international pressure to concede power­
sharing with the RPF. Returning to Kigali on the night of April 6 in his personal 
jet (a gift from Fran�ois Mitterrand), Habyarimana was killed along with 
passengers including his Burundian counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira, and three 
French crew, when the plane was shot down as it came in to land. Although 
shrouded in conspiracy theories, most commentators now agree that 
Habyarimana was killed most probably by members of his own Presidential 
Guard, fearful of the betrayal which compromise represented for Hutu Power, 
and backed by its extremist exponents within the akazu including, some argue, 
Habyarimana's wife Agathe. Within an hour, Interahamwe had erected roadblocks 
in Kigali; within a day, most major opposition politicians had been killed -
including the prime minister designate Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and ten Belgian 
paratroops of UNAMIR charged with protecting her. The machinery of the long­
planned genocide moved smoothly into gear. 
There has as yet been no refutation of the damning reports in the post-genocide 
period 1994-96, quoted above, which pointed to external arming and other 
military support for the Habyarimana regime as a major contributory factor to 
the genocide. The outbreak of war in 1990 added a final catalyst to a pre-existing 
extremism, which was then harnessed by the state and used as a means of 
prosecuting the war. The consolidation of extremist forces, bolstered by the rapid 
militarisation of state and society, precluded a political or reformist reaction to 
insurgency. By the time Habyarimana signed the Arusha accords - which were to 
prove his death warrant - militarisation was too far advanced and the state was 
77 Rocard in Liberation 9 July 1998 
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too hard for reform to be  possible. Habyarimana became a victim of his own 
propaganda; once he was seen to compromise, to bow under irresistible foreign 
pressure, he was eliminated by his own deliberately-cultivated hard-line inner 
circle and troops. Rich and Stubbs have identified this phenomenon in the 
counter-insurgent state: ' [I]n many military-dominated regimes factional 
differences may emerge within the officer corps between hard-liners opposed to 
any concessions and reformers who urge that victory cannot be obtained by 
military means alone. '78 
Habyarimana was at best a reluctant reformer. He had believed, until shortly 
before his death, that he could have weapons without reform; and had been 
sustained in this belief by his French military advisors. Externally-sponsored 
militarisation of Rwanda was a key factor, some would argue the key factor in 
the intransigence of that state's rulers. The failure to make continued support, 
especially military, conditional on human rights or anti-sectarian criteria 
scuppered the Arusha peace process. The maintenance of French support for the 
regime despite Habyarimana's subsequent dismissal of the Arusha accord 
convinced the regime's extremists that such support would always be 
forthcoming. Christopher Clapham describes this radicalisation of extremist 
regimes through external backing: 
[A]n apparently inexhaustible supply of arms and aid from an all-powerful 
external patron encouraged rulers to suppose that their own hegemonic 
ambitions were ultimately unstoppable, and that they could therefore 
proceed with the establishment of a monopoly state which need take no 
account of internal opposition or the indigenous characteristics of the 
societies which they governed . . .  Ultimately, it was not the imported 
armaments which conferred power on the government, but the indigenous 
people who had to use them. When they failed, it failed.79 
78 Paul B. Rich, P. & Richard Stubbs eds., The Counter-Insurgent State, London: Macmillan 1997, p9 
79 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: 
CUP 1996, p l56 
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Habyarimana's principal legacy, however, was the creation of  the militias which 
thrived in the climate of state-sponsored terror, and prosecuted genocide with 
efficiency and zeal. Rapid militarisation - the creation of a weapons state - made 
a hard state even harder, to the extent that its leader was eclipsed - and 
assassinated - as a result of state-sponsored warlordism. The weapons state's 
tactics were assassination and genocide; but once these very tactics led to the 
removal of the foreign props upon which the weapons state depended, its defeat 
was swift. 
Conclusion 
France's first direct military intervention in Rwanda, Operation Noroft (1990-93), 
was justified as 'intervention by invitation', i.e. to honour a treaty obligation to 
an ally. However, the operation soon exceeded the terms even of France's own 
military assistance accord with the Habyarimana regime. French support for the 
FAR stopped two major RPF offensives, in October 1990 and February 1993; 
Operation Noroft intervened in Rwandan history and changed the power balance 
in favour of the government, arming and training that government's armed 
forces while the militarisation of Rwandan society proceeded apace. There was 
ample warning that the FAR was training militias and arming the population, 
while military and political actors - some known: Paul Barril, Paul Dijoud, 
Ambassador Georges Martres - assured that government that French support 
would never waver. 
Any attempt to understand the failure of the international response (notably UN) 
to the crisis since 1990 in the African Great Lakes region must firstly identify, and 
then separate, the factors which created the conflict from those which sustained 
it. Analysis of the former often overshadows the latter, to the extent that the 
prolongation of a war is explained away in the same terms as its origins. Such an 
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approach may result in a failure to focus sufficient attention on the unilateral 
support role or active participation of a powerful external actor (which may not 
have been apparent when the conflict began), and a subsequent failure to expose 
the paradox whereby that same actor is expected to participate in peacemaking 
between the principal warring parties. The Rwandan civil war of 1990-94 
demonstrates that external (i.e. extra-regional) support for one belligerent was a 
major contributory factor to the prolongation and exacerbation of the conflict, 
particularly when it became apparent that that belligerent believed the external 
support to be open-ended and unconditional. 
The Rwandan war demands analysis as an intrastate conflict greatly exacerbated 
by the direct and sustained participation of a powerful external actor, not only 
through its support for one belligerent, but also through its own role as a 
combatant. The inability of international organisations to respond effectively to 
the Rwandan crisis, even when faced with the UN charter's singular imperative 
demanding the prevention of genocide, can thereby be explained by a particular 
failure (or reluctance) to identify this external role, without which the conflict in 
Rwanda could have been briefer, less bloody and less destabilising for the entire 
region. 
In identifying France as a key player in sustaining the conflict, it is not intended 
to suggest that France lit the fuse in Rwanda, but that it built the powder-keg, 
provided the powder, and increased supplies without quibble and with seeming 
disregard for the obvious shortening of the fuse. Prunier, in his deposition to the 
Quiles commission as in the conclusion of his book, stops short of condemning 
French complicity in the genocide but reiterates that French policy was 
characterised by stupidity and (most surprisingly) nai"vety: 
These hapless foreigners, for their own mythical reasons, contributed to 
poisoning further an already disastrous situation. But they did not cause it. . .  
However, what the French did was terrible mostly because i t  fitted like the 
last piece in the jigsaw puzzle of the Rwandese political madness. Military 
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and political pressures had combined to bring the Habyarimana regime to 
repentance. Arusha was an admission of defeat for Mme Habyarimana and 
her family, but there was one last card to play: blow it all to smithereens. And 
since at least some of the French had also seen Arusha as a defeat, they would 
support the cleaning up.80 
Former Premier Michel Rocard, one of the few dissenting voices at the Quiles 
Commission, suggests, like Prunier, that French support was driven by 
Francophonie, albeit 'une vision folie et devastatrice de la francophonie' :  
C'est le theme de I' aggression exterieure: derriere le FPR, i l  y avait l'Ouganda 
anglophone et les Anglo-Saxons. Cette explication est totalement 
desequilibree. C' est un peu comme si 1' on accusait la 2e DB de Leclerc d' a voir 
agresse la France, parce que, en 1944, elle etait inseree dans un dispositif 
americain. Du point de vue de la moralite internationale, au Rwanda, on etait 
en presence d'un regime oppresseur combattu par ceux qu'il persecutait, les 
Tutsis, et d'un nombre significatif de Hutus qui desapprouvaient ses 
methodes. Pour la France, tout cela confine au deshonneur.81 
External military support for the regime, in the form of arms supplies and sales, 
training, and direct military intervention, was perceived as open-ended and 
unconditional. This perception reinforced extremists to the extent that there was 
no room for the state to move from a military to a political counter-insurgency 
strategy; any form of compromise (such as that represented by the 1993 Arusha 
accords) was deemed betrayal by the state's military and the unaccountable 
militias it had created. Accordingly, assassination of any potential agents of 
compromise, and the subsequent implementation of a long-planned genocide, 
were perceived by newly dominant warlords as appropriate and effective 
reponses to their enemies' political and military successes. Such a response was 
intended to eliminate all the state's opponents of any ethnicity who could 
constitute a support base for opposition, by applying an extreme counter­
insugency strategy; genocide, inverting the Maoist principle, was an attempt to 
remove the water from the fish. 
80 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, London: Charles Hurst 1995, p352 
8 1 Michel Rocard, deposition to the Quiles Commission, quoted in Liberation 9 July 1998 
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Rapid, externally-sponsored militarisation of an already authoritarian state (built 
on sectarianism, discrimination and enforced exiling or elimination of its 
opponents) acted as a catalyst for the hardening of the regime, and the state­
sponsored emergence of extremist militias and assassination squads. The militias 
which largely implemented the genocide, though initially fostered by the regime, 
soon overtook its leader, President Juvenal Habyarimana, and became the 
principal source of organised violence. Genocide did not occur as result of a 
weak or collapsed state, but because the state was highly centralised, tightly 
controlled, and perceived as so strong by its extremists that, radicalised by rapid 
and seemingly unconditional militarisation, they believed that any means of 
which they were capable would be justified by the end: the restoration of the 
hard state. The Rwandan hard state collapsed when those very means -
assassination and genocide - led to its abandonment by the external backers who 
had transformed it into a weapons state. 
In our consideration of France's subsequent reintervention in Rwanda in 1994, it 
will be argued that it resulted in a double discrediting: of France, the most 
prolific intervenor in post-colonial Africa and the external power most deeply 
implicated in the Great Lakes crisis; and of external military intervention itself as 
an appropriate response to inter-African conflict. 
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Chapter 6: French military intervention in Rwanda II: Operation Amaryllis, 
Operation Turquoise, 1994 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider France's 1994 military interventions in 
Rwanda (Operations Amaryllis and Turquoise) in light of: their theory, i.e. the 
shift of discourse and justification from old-style, mechanical intervention to 
new-style, 'humanitarian' intervention including the unprecedented seeking of a 
UN mandate to legitimise Turquoise; their practice, and the extent to which this 
complemented or contradicted the theory and justificatory discourse; and their 
effects and implications. 
The Quai d'Orsay's website (www.diplomatie.fr) offers the following on France's 
role in Rwanda in its introductory synopsis of 'la politique etrangere de la 
France' : 
L 'Afrique, continent sur lequel se deroule la plupart des crises, constitue une 
priorite. La France entretient des relations privilegiees avec de nombreux Etats 
africains ( . . .  ) La France ne menage pas ses efforts diplomatiques en vue de 
resoudre les conflits et les crises politiques qui affectent ces pays ( . . .  ) A l 'ete 
1994, elle s'est portee au secours des populations rwandaises menacees: elle a 
depeche des forces chargees de creer une zone humanitaire sure. L'operation 
Turquoise, autorisee par la resolution 929 du Conseil de securite, a ainsi 
permis de mettre des milliers de Rwandais a l 'abri des combats et declenche 
une mobilisation internationale.1 
The perspective granted by even the few years since the genocide allows some of 
the key factors in this evolution to emerge from the misreporting, propaganda, 
accusation and counter-accusation which so distorted coverage of the Rwandan 
conflict. Tom Young's introduction to his recent chapter on Mozambique may be 
applied with equal validity to an overview of events in Rwanda since 1990: 
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'Much has been written . . .  but much remains obscure. Worse, much has been 
deliberately obscured, not only by governments and political movements . . .  but 
also by academics, commentators and experts of various stripes . . .  This has meant 
that certain important questions have effectively been smothered either by 
ignoring them or by recycling hackneyed cliches in response to them.'2 Thus is 
coverage of and comment on events in Rwanda and its region most commonly 
couched in ethnic and quasi-racist terminology and frames of reference.3 
It is intended here to consider France's 1994 interventions not as factors external 
and unconnected to those events, but as key to the military and political 
evolution of the situation. The interventions were not, as often portrayed, belated 
and reluctant responses to humanitarian crises, but military support for one 
party to a conflict, decided with a clear geopolitical strategy in mind. 
Context for reintervention 
We have already considered the consolidation of political extremism in the 
Rwandan state between 1990 and 1994. By 1995, Belgian anthropologist Luc de 
Heusch could entitle his history of the country which witnessed one of the 
century's three recognised genocides 'A Republic Gone Mad' (Une Republique 
I Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, 'La politique etrangere de la France', http://www.diplomatie.fr, March 
1999 
2 Tom Young, 'Explaining the War in Mozambique' in Paul Rich & Richard Stubbs eds., The Counter­
Insurgent State, London: Macmillan 1997 
3 We should also allow for the possibility of a deliberate agenda on the part of those with a vested interest in 
Western involvement in central Africa, at government, NGO or media level. One theory is that the Western 
media's ethnicisation of the conflict justified Western intervention, and was perhaps so used deliberately. 
As a result, the following formula of cause and effect may be offered in response to prevalent 
interpretations of the media's role in African conflict, and the 'humanitarian intervention' agenda: in 
response to a crisis, the media portrays the conflict as ethnic (i .e. a crisis not of our making, caused not by 
political or economic circumstances but by ancestral hatreds beyond our ken) ; a media focus on human 
suffering rather than its political causes provokes demands for a presumed apolitical response - to freeze the 
situation if not solve it - which equals forcible 'humanitarian' intervention; but intervention by a powerful 
state into a weak state (and particularly by European states in Africa) cannot be disinterested or free of the 
suspicion of neocolonialism. See Mel McNulty, 'Media ethnicisation and the international response to war 
and genocide in Rwanda' in T. Alien & J. Seaton eds. ,  The Media of Conflict, London: Zed Books 1999 
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Devenue Folle); but are temporary national insanity or mass hysteria sufficient to 
explain the negative evolution of the Rwandan second republic? This was a 
sectarian, one-party, quasi-apartheid but largely stable regime, which in just 
three months killed a million of its own citizens. Prunier argues, in contradiction 
to the oxymoronic concept of 'genocidal anarchyA, that: 'The genocide happened 
not because the state was weak, but on the contrary because it was so totalitarian 
and strong that it had the capacity to make its subjects obey absolutely any order, 
including one of mass slaughter.15 
Despite evidence which signalled the hardening of the regime, the eclipsing of 
Habyarimana by the akazu and the practical and ideological preparations for 
genocide, the policy and strategy of France - the most powerful and influential 
actor in the equation - continued to be driven by its opposition to an RPF 
victory. When the regime's extremists - confident of continued French support 
allied with the indifference of the rest of the international community - still 
proved incapable of preventing their opponents' victory through war or 
genocide, France's strategy shifted: not to abandoment of those extremist allies, 
but to a new enthusiasm for implementation of the 1993 Arusha accords. 
However, a crucial factor in the unchecked hardening of the regime had been the 
failure of its principal sponsor, France, to make its continued support conditional 
on implementation of the power-sharing agreement; even when the late 
Rwandan president dismissed the accord as a 'scrap of paper', support did not 
waver. 
4 'Genocidal anarchy' and references to a central African 'heart of darkness' were common formulae in press 
coverage of events; see for example the Financial Times editorial on 29 July 1996, entitled 'Heart of 
Darkness ' ,  which warned: 'Once again the international community watches helplessly as an African state 
slides into genocidal anarchy . . .  Two years ago in Rwanda the world was caught unawares by the sheer 
speed of the slaughter. That is one excuse we cannot give today in neighbouring Burundi ' .  [FT 29 July 
1996] 
5 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, London: Hurst 1995 , p354 
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Instead, a new smokescreen strategy was employed, a strategy which has proved 
successful to the extent that, without exception known to this author, histories of 
the Mitterrand presidency feature Rwanda as no more than a footnote; one 
otherwise useful assessment of Mitterrand's foreign policy over his fourteen 
years in power concludes that, as far as Africa was concerned: 'Mitterrand was 
probably not the right man to revolutionize affairs :  he was content to fill a few 
gaps . . .  , supporting shaky regimes put in place by newly-fledged democracies 
(such as in Gabon) [sic] or intervening on humanitarian grounds, as in Rwanda. '6 
Despite the volume and eloquence of criticism of France's role, the notion that its 
intervention(s) in Rwanda was/were humanitarian is now, for many respected 
commentators, a matter of record. 
This process of reinvention, moulded to fit events as 1994's power-shift in central 
Africa became apparent, is now well-documented (thanks not least to the work 
of the Quiles Commission during 1998), and this chapter will proceed by 
assessing France's 1994 interventions in Rwanda in terms of their theory and 
practice, with a view to supporting the conclusion that these interventions were 
rearguard actions, and that the new-style 'humanitarian' intervention Turquoise 
fits the pattern of attempts to determine the outcome of Rwanda's four-year civil 
war through direct military support for one combatant, even while that 
combatant was in retreat. It will also be argued that contemporary international 
support for the concept of humanitarian intervention was used in a attempt to 
freeze the conflict at the point of its denouement, and to force the victors and 
victims into an impossible power-sharing compromise with those very forces 
which had sought their annihilation. 
6 Dominique David, 'Independence and Interdependence: Foreign Policy over Mitterrand's  Two Presidential 
Terms' in Mairi Maclean ed., The Mitterrand Years: Legacy and Evaluation, London: Macmillan 1998, 
p l23 
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Amaryllis and post-Amaryllis, genocide 
On 9 April 1994 - the third day of the genocide - over 500 troops of the ler, 3eme 
and Berne RPIMa (Regiment Parachutiste de l'Infanterie de Marine) - France's 
permanent garrison in Africa - were flown to Rwanda from bases in the Central 
African Republic, Gabon and Chad. The troops were in place in Kigali within 
twelve hours of having been put on alert, highlighting, for the French army's 
official journal Terre Magazine, 'l'interet du prepositionnement des troupes 
fran<;aises en Afrique pour une intervention rapide. '7 They evacuated 141 7 
people, of whom 445 were French, to Bujumbura (Burundi) and Bangui (CAR). 
Cooperation Minister Michel Roussin stated: 'Notre mission est une mission 
strictement humanitaire pour permettre aux ressortissants fran<;ais de quitter le 
Rwanda.'8 This textbook operation - codenamed Amaryllis - was a swift, effective 
military success, and the paratroopers left in under a week, on April 1 7th. 
However, Amaryllis cannot be considered in isolation, particularly as it followed 
less than four months after the official conclusion of the three-year Operation 
Noroft in which many of the same troops of the African-garrisonned RPIMa had 
participated.9 The Marines' official account, while seeking to cast France's role as 
that of honest broker between warring tribes10, concedes that this interpretation is 
not universal and betrays - through an interesting non sequitur and the imagery 
of a natural disaster - the regiment's attempts to skim over this, one of its less 
glorious episodes: 'Pour la France, accusee par la force des choses de soutenir le 
7 'Operation Amaryllis, les raisons du succes' ,  Terre Magazine 55 (June 1994), p l l  
' Quoted by Jean-Dominique Merchet in Liberation, 2 February 1998 
9 An official history of these regiments' interventions may be found in Comite National des Traditions des 
Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine dans les Interventions Exterieures de 
1961 a 1995, Paris :  Lavauzelle 1995 
10 See for instance its description of the Arusha process: 'L'OUA et la France obtiennent alors l 'ouverture a 
Arusha . . .  d 'un dialogue entre Hutus et Tutsis. Celui-ci se termine en aout 1993 par un accord . . .  Dans ce 
meme cadre, la France, soulignant sa neutralite et sa non-ingerence, annonce le retrait, fin 1993, des unites 
Noroit, ne laissant sur place qu'une Assistance Militaire et Technique (AMT) reduite. ' Comite National des 
Traditions des Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine dans les Interventions 
Exterieures de 1961 a 1995, Paris: Lavauzelle 1995, p 174 
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gouvernement hutu, il s' agit d' abord d' evacuer de Kigali les ressortissants 
etrangers menaces par le vent de folie qui souffle sur la capitale rwandaise. '11 
The justification is self-defence, i.e. evacuation of Western nationals facing the 
likelihood of massacre, and the bilan is presented ungarnished: 'Du 8 au 12  
[avril], pres de 1 .500 personnes, dont 450 Fran<;ais et  un contingent important de 
Beiges . . .  , vont ainsi etre sauvees d'un massacre probable et acheminees par voie 
aerienne soit sur Bangui . . .  , soit sur Bujumbura. '12 But none of the accessible 
official accounts specifies the nationality of the non-French nationals evacuated. 
Morris and Scharf point out that: ' [A] number of the Hutu hardliners, who were 
close associates of the late President Habyarimana and his wife, were reportedly 
evacuated to France with French government assistance.'13 Agir Ici/Survie are 
more forthright, quoting witnesses at the French embassy: 
Tandis que 1' on abandonnait aux massacreurs "des centaines de families 
accrochees au portail de 1' ambassade, auxquelles on refusait 1' entree", on 
recontrait a l'interieur "tous les dignitaires du regime et leur famille, ainsi que 
le directeur de la radio et ses subalternes connus pour leurs appels aux 
massacres."  A tout moment, ces dignitaires sortaient avec leurs escortes de 
militaires pour "circuler dans les quartiers en flammes et a leur tour tenaient 
des reunions a l'ambassade pour parler de revolution de la situation, dresser 
le bilan des victimes ou regretter que telle ou telle personne n'ait pas encore 
ete tuee ou tel quartier pas encore nettoye. 14 
Interestingly, Terre Magazine highlights the evacuation of the Mesaka orphanage, 
without elaborating on the number of 'nurses' and other personnel who 
accompanied the orphans.15 Agir Ici/Survie offer the following clarification: 
1 1  Comite National des Traditions des Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine 
dans les Interventions Exterieures de 196 1  a 1995, Paris: Lavauzelle 1 995, p 1 75 
1
2 Comite National des Traditions des Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les Troupes de Marine 
dans les Interventions Exterieures de 196 1  a 1995, Paris: Lavauzelle 1995, p 17 5 
13 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Volume 1 ,  New 
York: Transnational Publishers 1998, p59 
14 Survie/Agir Ici, ler Dossier noir de la politique africaine de la France, Paris :  L'Harmattan 1 994 
1 5 Terre Magazine's description i s  representative of official accounts: 
'Si leur mission s 'est soldee par un succes, les hommes du 3eme RPIMa n'en oublient pas pour autant les 
scenes dont ils ont ete temoins. Ils sont parvenus a sauver une centaine d'orphelins rwandais, pour la plupart 
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'L'evacuation des quelque soixante enfants de l'orphelinat Saint-Agathe a permis 
aussi celle de trente-quatre "accompagnateurs" rwandais - dont beaucoup 
n'avaient pas l'air de nounous . . .  Il s'agirait, selon certaines sources, de membres 
de I' ancien parti unique MRND.'16 
A background story supporting Liberation's coverage of the opening of the Quiles 
Commission in February 1998 condemned the limited mandate of the French 
troops - who were not empowered to stop the killings - emphasising that the 
Amaryllis mission was 'un sauvetage selectif par l'armee fran<;aise'; a French 
paratrooper quoted by Jean-Dominique Merchet told how: 'Il y avait des 
barrages tous les cinquante metres. Des types nous saluaient avec leur machette, 
des cadavres a leurs pieds . . .  Les militaires qui debarquaient au Rwanda etaient 
plutot etonnes par la situation, mais ils faisaient leur boulot: sauver les 
t . , ,!7 expa nes. 
While leading pro-genocide figures including President Habyarimana's wife 
Agathe and leading Hutu Power ideologue Ferdinand Nahimana were 
evacuated, those most at risk in the first days of the genocide - educated non­
MRNDD members of any 'ethnic group' who, it was assumed, were pro­
democracy and hence possibly pro-RPF - were left unaided. The Rwandan staff 
of the French embassy and the French cultural centre, and the local employees of 
European-owned businesses, were not helped in any way. One account of 
deliberate non-assistance to persons in danger is offered by Jean-Damascene 
des nourissons qui appartenaient a l 'orphelinat de Mesaka, a une dizaine de kilometres de Kigali .  Des 
enfants aux regards empreints de detresse et d'espoir, d'emouvants temoignages de sympathie exprimes par 
les ressortissants evacues: autant d'images fortes que les paras fran�ais garderont a jamais gravees dans leur 
memoire. 
I! faut saluer la reussite de ! 'operation Amaryllis, "conduite de maniere exemplaire", selon les propos du 
President de la Republique, et souligner ! 'extreme rapidite de cette intervention delicate et le merite de 
soldats courageux. '  Terre Magazine 55, June 1994, p l l  
16  Survie/Agir Ici, 1er Dossier noir de la politique africaine de la France, Paris:  L'Harmattan 1 994 
17 Jean-Dominique Merchet, 'Mission Amaryllis, un sauvetage selectif par l ' armee fran((aise' ,  Liberation 2 
February 1998, p l l  
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Ndayambaje, Professor of Education at the National University of Rwanda at the 
time: 
A une autre occasion, ils [les militaires de l' Armee gouvernementale] sont de 
nouveau venus pour nous fusilier. Les militaires fran<;;ais sont arrives sur les 
lieux et la question s' est compliquee. Les soldats gouvernementaux se 
disaient: "Ces professeurs seront certainement evacues par les militaires 
fran<;;ais qui probablement les cacheront quelque part." Les Fran<;;ais sont 
venus. Le professeur Muswayire et moi-meme nous sommes alles au-devant 
d' eux et leur avons declare qu' on avait dit qu'ils nous ernrneneraient avec eux. 
"Non, sales negres. Nous embarquons les expatries uniquement. Nous ne 
nous occupons pas de sales negres." 
Muswayire est temoin. Il peut affirmer la meme chose. Nous sommes restes la 
tout malheureux.18 
There are few press accounts, and no official acknowledgment, of the 
indifference and casual racism of these French troops who, it should be 
remembered, were part of France's permanent, 'acclimatised' garrison in Africa; 
although the racism of Canadian and Italian troops in Somalia has been 
recognised as instrumental in the abuses and failures of Operation Restore Hope 
in 1992. 
In interviews and public statements throughout the summer of 1994, President 
Mitterrand denied any French involvement in the Rwandan conflict, and instead 
arrogated to France full credit for the Arusha accords: 'La France a reussi une 
negotiation entre les deux clans.'19 He also noted that when the accords were in 
place, France left Rwanda, satisfied at a job well done, and only returned when 
begged ('supplies') to save vulnerable Europeans (including UN troops) and 
others - unspecified - who were at risk: 
Cette negotiation a abouti le 4 aout 1993 ( . . .  ) Et les Fran<;;ais sont partis 
[decembre 1993] .  Les Fran<;;ais sont partis plusieurs mois avant le 
18 Testimony of Brother Jean-Damascene Ndayambaje, former Professor of Education at the Universite 
Nationale du Rwanda in Ruhengeri , interview in Butare July 1996, recorded by Amon Kayumba, translated 
by Jean-Baptiste Karagire-Yaramba. Corroboration of Brother Ndayambaje's account in this interview of 
the persecution of academics under the Habyarimana regime may be found in Africa Watch, Academic 
Freedom and Human Rights Abuses in Africa, New York: Human Rights Watch Africa 199 1  
19 Franc;ois Mitterrand, interview, TF1 14 July 1994: Presidence de la Republique, service de presse 
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declenchement de ce genocide qui a sui vi 1' assassinat des Presidents du 
Rwanda et du Burundi. A ce-moment-la, on nous a supplies de revenir en 
nous disant: "sauvez les Casques Bleus, ramenez les Fran<;ais, les Beiges, les 
etrangers qui se trouvent au Rwanda", ce que nous avons fait. Nous avons 
envoye des avions, nous avons ramene clans d' autres pays, en particulier en 
Europe, des gens qui etaient menaces. Mais depuis les accords d' Arusha, no us 
ne sommes plus partie clans cette affaire. Done, le genocide a eu lieu apres. 
Nous etions deja absents.20 
In understandable contradiction, m an interview pubished in 1996, current 
Rwandan vice-president and defence minister Major-General Paul Kagame told 
how, in the months preceding the genocide: ' [I]l etait clair qu'il y avait une 
tentative de saboter le processus de paix. Mais nous [i.e. the RPF] n' etions pas 
stirs de qui etait derriere et quel etait le role specifique joue par chaque 
individu.'21 
But what was French strategy faced with recourse to genocide by the faction at 
the heart of the regime to which it had so publicly offered unconditional military 
and political support? Denial of Rwandan government involvement in the 
killings could not be sustained; the Quiles Commission noted that the genocide 
was no 'vent de folie', but that: 'Des massacres d'une telle ampleur ne pouvaient 
avoir lieu qu'avec une complicite, voire une participation des autorites politiques 
et administratives rwandaises. '22 The genocide, and concurrent collapse of the 
Rwandan army and regime, also raised urgent questions for French decision­
makers, faced with the victory of those RPF forces they had long opposed, about 
France's credibility with other allied African states should the Rwandan domino 
fall. 
20 ibid 
21 Interview in Fran�ois Misser, Vers un nouveau Rwanda?: Entretiens avec Paul Kagame, Brussels:  
Editions Luc Pire 1996, p 1 04 
22 Assemblee nationale, Mission d'information commune Rapport no. 127l, Enquete sur la tragedie 
rwandaise (1990- 1994), Paris 1998, Tome 1: Rapport p345 
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It is clear that French strategy was decided ad hoc, faced with the unprecedented 
situation of defeat for an army and regime it had supported. Attempts were 
made initially to consolidate the interim government, the installation of which 
(on the day following Habyarimana's assassination) was overseen by the French 
embassy. Quiles notes that, faced with the evidence of ongoing genocide by that 
same government, this was perhaps a commitment too far for even the most 
virulent opponents of the RPF: 
La France . . .  multiplie, au cours de la periode allant du 13 avril (depart 
d'Amaryllis) au 19 juin (presentation de !'operation Turquoise a l'ONU), les 
rencontres avec les differents acteurs et parmi eux les membres du 
Gouvernement interimaire re<;u le 27 avril a Paris par M. Bruno Delaye ( . . .  ) 
[C]ompte tenu du deroulement du genocide commandite par le 
Gouvernement interimaire, la France a commis une erreur en considerant 
qu' elle pouvait accorder autant de credit et autant de poids a tous les 
representants des acteurs du conflit.23 
However, despite nearly four years of supplies and training, the FAR was still 
incapable without direct French support of resisting the RPF advance. (Indeed, 
one recent assessment suggests that: 'The FAR and militias were soon so busy 
killing unarmed civilians that by June [1994] the RPF was able to overrun the 
country' .24) It was clear, as indicated by the minutes of a meeting between the 
head of French military cooperation General Huchon, and Rwandan army 
lieutenant-colonel Ephrem Rwabalinda on May 17 (after six weeks of genocidal 
killings), that some in Paris, notably the military, felt that a new strategy was 
required, one which would both reinforce the genocidal regime while concealing 
its true nature.25 However, French attempts to present the interim government as 
an acceptable partner, or as part of the potential solution, were made impossible 
by the ongoing genocide. Quiles notes: 'C' est en partie en raison de son attitude 
23 Assemblee nationale, Mission d'information commune Rapport no. 127 1, Enquete sur la tragedie 
rwandaise (1990- 1994), Paris 1998, Tome I: Rapport p343 
24 Helen M. Hintjens, 'Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda', Journal of Modern African Studies 37:2, 
June 1999, p269 
233 
par rapport au gouvernement interimaire qu'il lui fut difficile de faire accepter le 
caractere strictement humanitaire de }'operation Turquoise, puisque certains y 
voyaient une intention cachee de soutien au regime qui organisait le genocide.'26 
In seeking an explanation for the failure of strategy suggested here, we will 
consider the official version of events, and then assess that version in light of the 
unprecedented criticism France's 1994 interventions generated. 
Theory: Official discourse, legal justification 
This section will proceed by considering the official discourse of both political 
and military sources - unrevised at the time of writing - which maintains that 
Operation Turquoise presents, in every respect, 'un bilan tres positif'/7 Admiral 
Jacques Lanxade, chef d' etat-major (CEM) of the French army in 1994, lauds 
Turquoise as a model humanitarian operation which, through skilfully 
overcoming the logistical obstacles, meeting the imperatives of time and 
distance, and successfully fulfilling its stated aims, offers a model of action for 
the future: 
Decidee et lancee dans une situation de crise complexe et dramatique, placee 
sous le signe de l'urgence, cette operation difficile et lointaine presente 
aujourd'hui un bilan tres positif. L'analyse de cette intervention doit nous 
permettre de preciser et de renforcer, pour l'avenir, un concept d'operation 
adapte aux actions a but humanitaire.28 
25 See appendix, 'Rapport de mission adresse par Ephrem Rwabalinda a ses superieurs apres sa visite, en mai 
1994, aupn!s du chef de la mission franc;aise de cooperation militaire, le General Huchon', a report made 
public by Colette Braeckman at the Biarritz 'counter-summit', 8-9 November 1994 
26 Assemblee nationale, Mission d'information commune Rapport no. l27 1, Enquete sur la tragedie 
rwandaise (1990- 1994), Paris 1 998, Tome I: Rapport p344 
27 Amiral Jacques Lanxade, 'L'operation Turquoise', Defense nationale, February 1 995, pp7- 15 ;  see also 
SIRPA (Service d'Information et de Relations Publiques des Armees), Dossier de Presse, Bilan chiffre 
Operation Turquoise, 25 aout 1994: 'Bilan general: militaire, Deploiement: 2500 hommes, 700 vehicules, 
9000 tonnes de fret militaire acheminees par voie aerienne militaire Qeep, antenne chirurgicale . . .  ) ' 
28 Amiral Jacques Lanxade, 'L'operation Turquoise ' ,  Defense nationale, February 1995, pp7-15 
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Foremost among the claims of official discourse on this re-intervention29 in 
Rwanda in June 1994 is that it stopped the genocide: 'L'action de la force 
Turquoise a mis fin au genocide et a permis d'assurer la protection de la 
population dans la zone humanitaire sure ainsi que la transition avec la Minuar 
II [Mission des Nations Unies au Rwanda] dans de bonnes conditions.'30 
Secondly, it is claimed that re-intervention was necessary to allow humanitarian 
organisations to operate; indeed Lanxade tells how: ' [A]vant l'arrivee du 
contingent fran<_;:ais, aucune organisation internationale ou non gouvernementale 
n'avait pu s'implanter de fa<_;:on significative dans la zone tenue par le FPR.'31 We 
are led to believe by implication that the RPF was anti-humanitarian; France's 
humanitarian motive, in contrast, was paramount. (Indeed the word 
'humanitaire' is used in almost every paragraph of Lanxade's article) .  
Thirdly, we are told that France was strictly neutral: 'L'operation Turquoise est 
une intervention a but humanitaire, visant a mettre fin aux massacres partout ou 
cela etait possible, eventuellement en utilisant la force, mais en observant une 
stricte neutralite dans le conflit opposant les FAR aux FPR.'32 It is noteworthy 
that Lanxade at no point concedes that the FAR, which his own troops had 
trained, supported and indeed commanded, were involved in the systematic 
execution of the genocide; the Admiral's brief summary of the situation explains 
instead that in the FAR-controlled zone, 'les bandes formees de civils ou de 
militaires hutus incontroles continuent le massacre des populations tutsies sans 
autre raison que !'excitation du moment ou les incitations a la "defense 
populaire" prodiguees par certains chefs de milice. '33 
29 However, official accounts do not describe Turquoise as a 're-intervention' ; reference to the preceding 
interventions is judiciously avoided. 
30 Amiral Jacques Lanxade, 'L'operation Turquoise' , Defense nationale, February 1995, p l 2  
31 ibid 
32 ibid 
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At no point is the imminence of the RPF's victory, or of the FAR's collapse, cited 
as a motive for Turquoise. Instead, France's re-intervention is explained as a 
response to a triple imperative: a humanitarian impulse to stop the genocide, a 
display of logistical savoir-faire faced with UN inertia, and a popular response to 
traumatised public opinion: 'Devant 1' etendu de ces massacres, les lenteurs de la 
mise en place de la Minuar II et l'impact de ces actes de violence sur 1' opinion 
publique, la France decide d'intervenir au Rwanda.'34 
The official account of the French response to the genocide - supported by the 
Quiles Commission - maintains that the French government sought to reassert 
the primacy of the Arusha agreement and the imperative to install finally the 
power-sharing administration which Habyarimana - under pressure from the 
akazu though unpenalised by France, his principal supporter - had done so much 
to forestall; Quiles notes that: 'Une note [de la Direction des affaires africaines du 
quai d'Orsay] du 9 mai indique que "sur le plan politique, tout en se prevalant 
de "1' esprit d' Arusha", le FPR refuse les dispositions des accords relatifs au 
partage du pouvoir . . .  Pour que la solution a la crise s'avere durable, il faudra 
que 1' ensemble des forces politiques, y compris done le MRND du President 
Juvenal Habyarimana, y participent."'35 
However, the power-sharing agreement was by May 1994 rendered absurd by 
one party's complicity in genocide. France's insistence that the newly-victorious 
RPF share power with the former ruling MRNDD, members of which were 
actively implementing genocide against the former's presumed support-base, 
was comparable, by some accounts, to asking European Jews to share power 
with Nazis.36 
33 Amiral Jacques Lanxade, 'L'operation Turquoise' , Defense nationale, February 1995 , p8 
34 Amiral Jacques Lanxade, 'L'operation Turquoise' , Defense nationale, February 1995, p9 
35 Assemblee nationale, Mission d'information commune Rapport no. l 27 1 ,  Enquete sur la tragedie 
rwandaise (1990- 1994), Paris 1998, Tome I: Rapport, p297 
36 See especially Mehdi Ba, Rwanda, un genocide fran<;ais, Paris: L'esprit frappeur 1997 
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Creation of Turquoise 
As the death toll rose by thousands daily and the genocide slowly came to 
international attention, French policy (not uninfluenced by military opposition 
to negotiation) and its Rwandan ally had painted France into an awkward 
corner; Le Monde reported that: ' [L]a France, consideree comme "pro-hutue" en 
raison du soutien de l'Elysee au president rwandais assassine . . .  , est en facheuse 
posture.'37 Humanitarianism - perceived in many French minds as a modern 
form of the nineteenth century mission civilisatrice38 - had become by 1994 a major 
element of post-Cold War French and Western foreign policy discourse. The 
French state had in fact been trying to wrest control of its overseas crisis relief 
policy from NGOs - most notably Medecins sans frontieres (MSF) and Medecins du 
monde - which had often been critical of the government and hostile to the 
military. Unique among its European partners, France under President 
Mitterrand boasted a Minister for Humanitarian Action, a post originally 
occupied by MSF eo-founder Bernard Kouchner, who had inserted the concept of 
a 'right to interfere' (droit d'ingerence), interpreted in some NGO circles as a 'duty 
to interfere' (devoir d'ingerence), into French public discourse.39 Indeed in 1992, in 
the wake of the technologically-inferior French army's perceived humiliation 
during the Gulf War, Le Figaro political correspondent Sophie Huet could write 
that France's overseas military strategy was now driven by humanitarian 
concern, its politicians and soldiers acting as 'humanitarian fighters': 
Pour un pays qui, depuis un tiers de siecle, n' est implique dans aucune 
guerre [i.e. since Algeria, by this account] . . .  , I' action sur le terrain n'a plus 
pour objet de mener des batailles, mais de les prevenir ou d' en panser les 
37 Marie-Pierre Subtil, 'La France s 'efface au Rwanda ' ,  Le Monde 7 June 1994 
38 For an excellent history of France's assumption of humanitarianism as a motive for its foreign policy, see 
David Chuter, Humanity's Soldier: France and International Security, 19 19-200 1 ,  Providence RI & Oxford: 
Berghahn Books 1 996 
39 See Bernard Koucher, Le malheur des autres, Paris: Odile Jacob 199 1 ;  as noted in Chapter 1, Kouchner is 
currently UN administrator in Kosovo. 
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plaies. Les hommes politiques, quand ils sont engages clans cette action, 
deviennent des combattants humanitaires qui portent secours aux peuples en 
conflit et les aident a y  trouver une issue.40 
This appropriation of the humanitarian agenda had been identified by one 
French observer who wrote in 1993 that: 'More than ever, military participation 
is the continuation of diplomatic action. In this strategy, the "right to interfere" 
seems to be a means to enable France to appear as a great power, not only 
through her military capabilities, but also through her contribution to the 
"progress of humanity" .'41 
This theme has been the subject of an extensive literature since the end of the 
Cold War/2 but the concept that military intervention could be motivated by 
something other than national political, economic or strategic self-interest has 
long been debated by scholars of international relations and international law. 
We have discussed this in Chapter 1; suffice it to say here that the invocation of 
humanitarianism by France in Rwanda was a masterstroke, the authorship of 
which may be attributed at least in part to the climate of intense political 
competition within the centres of decision-making in Paris in mid-1994. Inter­
ministerial and inter-party rivalry was sharpened by the second period of 
cohabitation of the Mitterrand presidency, and the imminence of the 1995 
presidential elections. Prunier points out that: ' [G]iven the divided nature of 
French politics in that summer of 1994, the decision [to re-intervene] was bound 
to be taken in a climate of careful mutual watchfulness ( . . .  ) Rwanda and its 
chopped-up babies now looked as if they could give good political mileage in 
terms of public opinion ratings.'43 
40 Sophie Huet, Quand ils faisaient la guerre, Paris: Pion 1993, p lO  
41 Philippe Guillot, 'France, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention' ,  International Peacekeeping I: 1 ,  
Spring 1994, p34 
42 See especially Fernando R. Tes6n, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality 2nd 
edn., New York: Transnational l997, and the debate between Professors Robert L. Phillips and Duane L. 
Cady, Humanitarian Intervention: Just War vs. Pacifism, Lanham & London: Rowman & Littlefield 1996 
43 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, London: Charles Hurst 1995, pp28 1 ,  282 
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Playing to this constituency and a media-fuelled public clamour for action as the 
Rwandan genocide neared completion in mid-1994, President Mitterrand told a 
conference on development at UNESCO (in Paris) on June 18 that: 'France was 
ready, without waiting for the arrival of a United Nations force, to send along 
with any of its European or African partners who wished, a humanitarian 
protection force designed to assure the safety of those civilian populations which 
have escaped extermination. This is being prepared. It is now a matter of hours 
and days . . .  I repeat: every hour counts. '44 Accordingly, a joint communique was 
issued by the Elysee and Matignon the same day, June 18. The emphasis, as in all 
official accounts, is on purity of motive, legality, consultation and 
humanitarianism: 
La France souhaite que soit mise sur pied au Rwanda une operation 
internationale a but humanitaire destinee a sauver des vies humaines et a 
mettre fin aux massacres qui sont perpetres dans ce pays. ( . . .  ) Cette operation, 
dont le but est strictement humanitaire, sera menee sur la base d'un mandat 
qui sera demande aux Nations unies et en liaison avec toutes les organisations 
internationales et toutes les parties interessees.45 
To prepare the ground for the forthcoming reintervention, the Elysee also issued 
an unusually vehement rebuttal of the December 1993 Federation Internationale des 
Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH) report's criticisms of France's role since 
1990.46 The communique concluded: 
Que reproche-t-on a la France? De n'avoir pas laisse se perpetrer une action 
destabilisante contre un pays ami? D'avoir pese de tout son poids pour 
pousser les adversaires a negocier et a s'entendre? D'avoir alerte la 
communaute internationale pour qu' elle relaye ses propres efforts? Est-ce bien 
la la "politique detestable" que 1' on fustige? Et si cette politique etait 
44 ' [C] 'est desormais une affaire d'heures et de jours. [ . . .  ] Quoiqu'i l  en soit, nous le ferons. Je le repete: 
chaque heure compte . '  Original quote from Presidence de la Republique, Service de Presse, Paris 1 8  June 
1994 
45 Communique conjoint de l'Elysee et de Matignon, Presidence de la Republique, Service de Presse, Paris 
1 8  June 1994 
46 Federation Internationale de Ligues des Droits de l 'Homme et al . ,  Rapport de la Commission 
internationale d'enquete sur les violations des droits de l'homme au Rwanda depuis le 1er octobre 1990 (7-
2 1  janvier 1993), Paris: FIDH March 1993 
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detestable, quelle etait la politique de rechange, assurement sympathique et 
efficace, qu'il convenait de mener? Quel pays I' a preconisee? Qui s'est propose 
d'en assumer la responsabilite? L'emotion legitime que suscite le spectacle de 
l'horreur au Rwanda ne justifie pas que 1' on instruise des prod�s sommaires, 
au mepris de la simple verite.47 
By late June 1994, this statement was representative of the increasingly 
aggressive, 'never apologise, never explain' tone of official political and military 
accounts of France's interventions in Rwanda. President Mitterrand was 
adamant that France's motives were beyond question; visiting South Africa in 
July 1994, he used the opportunity of a joint press conference with President 
Mandela to refute all criticisms of France's role in Rwanda: 
Nous ne sommes pas partie prenante, nous Fran<;ais. Nous n' avons pas a 
choisir un camp, nous avons simplement a choisir la defense de ceux qui 
souffrent, qui ont souffert . . .  d'un veritable genocide. ( . . .  ) Nous avons ete 
quasiment les seuls . . .  a tenter de mettre un terme a ce genocide par une action 
qui est humanitaire et qui doit le rester. Cette action consiste a proteger les 
populations, quelles qu' elles soient, contre les effets de la guerre et surtout de 
la vengeance entre ethnies. Les forces fran<;aises ont deja sauvegarde des 
milliers de vies humaines, sauve beaucoup d' enfants, et souhaitent pouvoir 
continuer ( . . .  ) Mais il ne faut pas . . .  , comme j'en ai eu !'impression a la lecture 
de la presse de ce matin [5 July 1994], considerer que la France est clans la 
guerre. Elle ne le veut pas. Doit-elle pour autant abandonner la tache 
entreprise qu' elle est la seule ou presque seule a entreprendre? Cela nous a 
paru inadmissible.48 
No cracks would appear in the official discourse until some of the underlying 
personal and political tensions were exposed during the oral hearings of the 
Quiles Commission four years later.49 
Practice 
47 Communique de Presse de l 'Elysee, quoted in Marches Tropicaux 24 June 1994, 'Rwanda: La France 
prepare une intervention armee a but humanitaire' 
48 Presidence de la Republique, Service de Presse: Conference de presse conjointe de Fran<;ois Mitterrand et 
Nelson Mandela, Cape Town, 5 July 1994 
49 See the testimony to the Quiles Commission of former prime minister Michel Rocard, and former chef de 
la mission militaire de la cooperation General Jean V arret, in appendices. 
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Overall, despite the frequency with which the humanitarian motive of French re­
intervention in Rwanda was invoked, the traditional humanitarian actors in the 
NGO community were marginalised and excluded from the decision-making 
process. Significantly, some leading voices from this constituency had been 
raised in sceptical opposition to the proposed operation. Medecins du Monde 
president Bernard Granjon declared that: 'Une intervention militaire de la France 
serait folie furieuse . . .  [L]a France doit se racheter, condamner les responsables 
qu' elle a naguere soutenu.'50 And following a visit to Rwanda in early July 1994, 
Bernard Kouchner (although supportive of Turquoise as a perceived 
demonstration of the droit d'ingerence he had advocated for a decade) told how: 
'Dans le flot des refugies chasses par la guerre et par 1' avance du Front 
patriotique rwandais, ces miliciens sont la, profitant tout a la fois de la protection 
provisoire des soldats fran�ais et de I' aide humanitaire. Ils beneficient d'un sursis 
avant que ne se tienne, comme je le souhaite, un tribunal international sur les 
crimes contre l'humanite.'51 
Although unacknowledged at the time, the intervention's role in facilitating the 
escape of those responsible for the genocide is now a matter of record. In their 
authoritative study of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Virginia 
Morris and Michael Scharf note that: 
Ironically, while the Security Council. . .  proved unwilling or unable to stop the 
massacres of the Tutsis, it did take action to safeguard the Hutus who began to 
flee to southwest Rwanda in large numbers in the face of the advancing RPF 
forces. On 22 June 1994, the Security Council authorized France to send its 
troops to establish a "humanitarian protected zone" in southwest Rwanda by 
adopting Resolution 929. This French-led operation became known as 
"Operation Turquoise". The Hutu government, the Rwandan armed forces, 
and the militia reportedly took advantage of this operation in order to exert 
their control over the vast population that was quartered in the "safe zone". 
The Hutu government even moved its radio station into the zone where it 
50 Quoted in Marches Tropicaux 24 June 1994, 'Rwanda: La France prepare une intervention armee a but 
humanitaire' 
51 Bernard Kouchner, "Intervenir, oui, mais surtout changer de politique", interview with Pascal Krop, 
L'Evenement du Jeudi, 14-20 July 1994 
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continued without interference to incite the Hutu people to kill Tutsis in its 
broadcasts. 52 
Given the extent of France's support for the Habyarimana regime and now for 
the genocidal Sindikubwabo interim government, France of all countries seemed 
least qualified to organise any peacekeeping or 'humanitarian' intervention. The 
logic of this unprecedentedly briet UN-mandated, 'new-style' intervention 
would seem to have been dictated by the impossibility of an open-ended 
commitment, in a mountainous country and against a highly-motivated guerrilla 
army. The precedent of the Chadian 'saga' was familiar to French planners, and 
the Somali debacle apparent to all. Colette Braeckman pointed out that: 'Les 
observateurs ne peuvent s' empecher de songer a 1' enlisement des Americains en 
Somalie, et a l'ampleur qu'avait prise I' operation Manta au Tchad, passee de 100 
a 4000 hommes en aout 1983. '53 
Awareness of these facts in Paris led to an unprecedented interest in African 
affairs among decision-makers outside the Elysee. Indeed, Turquoise would be 
the first time that responsibility for France's response to an African crisis was 
removed from the exclusive control of the Presidency. The reasons personal and 
political for this are manifold, although the two most obvious seem the most 
likely: Mitterrand was so partisan he could not be left in charge, for fear that he 
would, as some suggested he wanted, send paras to take Kigali a la Kolwezi 
197854; and that the President was in any case terminally ill and unfit to make 
such decisions. Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, a would-be presidential 
candidate, announced to the National Assembly on June 19 the conditions which 
he felt should apply to any further French intervention in Rwanda: it should 
have a UN mandate, a strictly limited duration, French forces should not 
52 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Volume 1 ,  New 
York: Transnational Publishers 1998, p61 
53 Colette Braeckman, 'Le pari fran�ais: sauver et convaincre les Tutsis ' ,  Le Soir (Brussels) 24 June 1994 
242 
advance deep into Rwanda, the operation should be strictly humanitarian with 
no exclusively military component, and it should be multinational, with the 
involvement of allied troops so France would not be acting alone. 
We are fortunate to have an account of the preparations in Paris for the 
intervention from Gerard Prunier, who was called on to advise defence minister 
Fran�ois Leotard in June 1994. Prunier tells how the French troops' point of entry 
from Zaire into Rwanda was determined partly by the need, nearly three months 
after the genocide started, for there still to be massacres to end and populations 
to protect in keeping with their UN mandate: 
The first draft of the intervention plan . . .  was entirely based on the supposition 
that the French troops would enter the country through Gisenyi [in north­
western Rwanda] . . .  Since the official purpose of the mission was 
humanitarian, there was precious little to do at that level in Gisenyi and 
Ruhengeri prefectures. As a local Hutu trader was later to remark to a French 
journalist, "We never had many Tutsi here and we killed them all at the 
beginning without much of a fuss." The French forces would find absolutely 
no-one left alive to be paraded in front of TV cameras as a justification for the 
intervention. 55 
It was agreed subsequently that the French troops would enter Rwanda from the 
south-west (at Cyangugu); indeed they crossed the border from Bukavu in Zaire 
before their UN mandate had been approved, according to RPF commander Tito 
Rutaremera.56 But the reinsertion of the French military into a conflict which it 
had done much to fuel, and where it had close professional and personal 
relationships with one side, seemed like folly in many African eyes. The 
Organisation of African Unity opposed the intervention, on the basis that one of 
the conflict's principal combatants, the RPF, was understandably opposed to it. 
Colette Braeckman was one of the few journalists who recognised the cards being 
played, what she called a high-risk gamble ('un pari a haut risque'): ' [FJaire 
54 See Venuste Nshimiyimana, Prelude du Genocide Rwandais, Brussels: Quorum 1995, p56 (cited below, 
note 67) 
55 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, London: Charles Hurst 1995, p283 
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croire a 1' opinion franc;aise, internationale et au Front patriotique en la sincerite 
de son revirement, apres un soutien trop longtemps accorde aux commanditaires 
du genocide. Dans l'immediat, ce sont encore les doutes et les critiques qui 
1' emportent.'57 
Resolution 929 
Of Prime Minister Balladur's five conditions above, only two can be said to have 
been observed: a strictly limited duration (two months) and a UN mandate. It 
was unprecedented for France to seek UN sanction for a military intervention in 
Africa; but this happened on June 21, 1994, when the UN Security Council (by 10 
votes - including France and the Rwandan ancien regime - but with 5 abstentions) 
passed the French-drafted Resolution 929 [attached; see Appendices], the stated 
goals of which were to end the massacres, to protect populations in the areas still 
controlled by the Rwandan government army (FAR), and to hand over to 
UNAMIR II (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda) after two months. 
Placed within the scope of UN Charter Chapter VII, the mandate allowed the use 
of force to defend troops and protect refugees, but ruled out any interpositionary 
role. It was also intended to be a French-led multinational force, with the gradual 
incorporation of troops from a number of African states. 
Significantly, a Reuters report of June 24 mentions opposition to the operation in 
the Security Council - and the unprecedented five abstentions - only in terms of 
certain members' doubts that Turquoise's 10-week mandate would be enough: 
' [C]ertains observateurs ont avoue que cette operation serait vaine si elle 
n' excedait pas deux mois. C' est dans cette optique que cinq nations se sont 
absentues de voter au sein du Conseil de Securite des Nations Unies pour ratifier 
!'intervention franc;aise. Il s'agit de la Nouvelle-Zelande, de la Chine, du Bresil, 
56 Cdt Tito Rutaremera, interview Kigali October 1996 
57 Colette Braeckman, 'Le pari fram;ais: sauver et convaincre les Tutsis' ,  Le Soir (Brussels) 24 June 1994 
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du Nigeria et du Pakistan, qui ont argumente qu'ils doutaient de l'efficacite 
d'une telle operation.'58 
However, the report failed to contextualise the RPF's opposition and influence 
on the five abstainers, mentioning only that: 'Le representant du FPR a Bruxelles, 
Jacques Bihozagara a renouvele l'hostilite de son mouvement au deploiement 
fran�ais, affirmant que celui-ci "risquerait de compliquer la situation et 
d'embraser toute la region"'. Bihozagara's opposition was in fact more 
comprehensive that this report suggests; he was swift to label the French troops 
'aggressors'.59 Moreover, the RPF representative at the UN Claude Dusaidi 
(currently advisor to Rwandan vice-president Paul Kagame), was directly 
responsible for convincing China, Brazil, Nigeria and Pakistan to abstain in the 
vote; he also notes he had little problem convincing the New Zealand 
ambassador (less than 10 years after the Greenpeace affair) of a possible French 
hidden agenda.60 
Colette Braeckman was again one of the few to point out the incongruity of the 
'humanitarian' intervention force's vast material superiority to all local 
combatants and to the RPF in particular: ' [L]es 2500 militaires fran�ais deployes 
au Rwanda jouissent d'une forte superiorite materielle; ils sont dotes, 
notamment, de blindes legers Sagaie, et beneficient de la couverture aerienne 
d'une dizaine de Jaguar et de Mirage 1 . '61 The degree of support from France's 
African allies, meanwhile, was far from uniform; Senegal and Chad sent 243 and 
130 men respectively, Congo and Niger around 40, and Mauritania just four 
doctors and six nurses.62 A purely African intervention force might have been 
58 Reuters, 24 June 1 994 
59 Jacques Bihozagara, interview Kigali November 1 996 
6° Claude Dusaidi, interview Kigali November 1996 
61 Colette Braeckman, 'Le pari franc;ais: sauver et convaincre les Tutsis' , Le Soir (Brussels) 24 June 1994 
62 Freres d'Armes (September 1 994) offers a laudatory feature on 'les Africains de Turquoise' in apparent 
disproportion to their actual role. There has since been evidence, however, that France's African allies may 
now have become the new interventionary model of intervention by proxy. 
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acceptable, but this option was not discussed in France or at the UN. Rwandan 
vice-president and defence minister Paul Kagame, military commander of the 
RPF during the war, explained the movement's criticism of an operation which, 
it was commonly reported, fulfilled an international mandate and saved 
thousands of lives: 
Quand vous parlez des millions de personnes sauvees, vous devez savoir 
combien exactement et comparer ce nombre avec celui des gens qui ont ete 
tues au cours de processus. Si vous sauvez 5000 personnes sur un total d'un 
million, on peut se demander d'abord pourquoi on n'en a sauve que 5000 et 
non davantage. 
Deuxiemement, meme quand vous parlez du mandat, cela n'impressionne 
personne. On a sollicite un mandat pour faire la mauvaise tache alors que la 
communaute internationale, qui avait ete incapable d'arreter le genocide, etait 
prete a autoriser n'importe quoi en desespoir de cause. Cela ne justifie pas le 
fait que les Franc;ais soient venus ici d'une fac;on unilaterale. 
A la lumiere de leur implication dans le conflit, je pense qu'ils auraient du 
choisir plus sagement de rester en dehors de tout cela et peut-etre de soutenir 
d'autres forces. Il avait ete question que des forces africaines fussent deployees 
sur le terrain. Mais elles etaient depouvues d' equipment et de financements. 
C'est pourquoi la chose la plus facile a faire aurait ete de les equiper.63 
On the ground, the problem was not Somalia-style 'mission creep', but the 
peculiarities of French military experience and expectations in Africa, where 
intervention was always in support of one party, usually those in power, and 
against another, typically labelled 'rebels' .  However, by July 1994, the RPF which 
France had done so much to oppose had seized the levers of power in the capital, 
controlled most of the country, and had stopped the genocide. The 'rebels' were 
now France's former allies: the ex-FAR, the genocidal militias and the 'Hutu 
Power' faction of government (a coalition of forces concisely labelled the Former 
Government of Rwanda - FGOR) .64 
63 Paul Kagame, interview in Fran�ois Misser, Vers un nouveau Rwanda?: Entretiens avec Paul Kagame, 
Brussels: Editions Luc Pire 1996, pl04 
64 The useful term Former Government of R wanda (FGOR) to describe these forces was coined by William 
Cyrus Reed in Christopher Clapham ed. ,  African Guerrillas, London: James Currey 1998 
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There was also the remarkable situation whereby troops of a UN-mandated 
humanitarian force had, less than a year previously, been occasional but direct 
participants in the conflict. Many soldiers interpreted their Turquoise brief to 
imply a rearguard action in support of their beleaguered Rwandan allies, to 
allow them to retreat in good order and regroup; and there was a widespread 
belief among both Rwandan and French troops that Paris would never allow the 
'Anglo-Saxon' RPF to take control.65 
Many French troops half-expected to be sent into combat against the RPF, as 
indeed happened from July 3 when the French army and the now victorious RPF 
clashed; on one occasion the RPF captured a number of French troops, but 
released them without fuss the same day. Significantly, this confrontation seems 
to have convinced French military strategists that any attempt to bolster the 
crumbling FAR would be futile; and any further attempt to halt this RPF 
advance, made urgent by the ongoing genocide, would necessitate a major 
engagement on the ground. Reuters' account notes the juxtaposition of events: '4 
juillet [1994] :  au lendemain d'un accrochage entre soldats fran<;ais et rebelles et 
apres la prise de Butare et Kigali par le FPR, la France cree une zone humanitaire 
sure clans le sud-ouest du Rwanda . . .  '66 This interpretation is supported by 
Rwandan journalist Venuste Nshimiyimana, who suggested that France's 
limitation of its operations to this new, unmandated 'Safe Humanitarian Zone' 
(SHZ) was the result of negotiations with a now unstoppable RPF. 
Nshimiyimana notes: 
Certains pretendent que M. Mitterrand aurait souhaite que les paras fran<;ais 
depeches a Kigali le 9 avril 1994 pour evacuer les ressortissants fran<;ais 
puissent egalement aider les forces gouvernementales, ce qui est contraire a 
l'accord de cooperation militaire signe entre les deux pays en 1975.  Des 
65 See for example Raids Magazine no. l O l ,  October 1994, 'Avec les marsouins face au FPR' etc. A militaria 
fanzine not unlike Soldier of Fortune, Raids (published monthly by the Association 'Histoire et 
Collections ' ,  1 9, avenue de la Republique, 7501 1 Paris) is nonetheless useful as a barometer of military 
thinking on certain operations. 
66 Reuters, Paris, 2 1  August 1994: 'Chronologie de ! 'operation Turquoise' 
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sources dignes de foi affirment egalement que la France avait voulu empecher 
les combattants du FPR de prendre Kigali, ce qu'ils ne purent realiser, une 
dizaine de militaires fran<;ais venant d'etre captures par les rebelles. La 
liberation des otages fran<;ais fut conditionnee par I' abandon des ambitions de 
la France a defendre le regime en place. La France s' est done repliee dans la 
zone Turquoise et un diplomate a ete envoye aupres de M. Museveni . . .  
L'ambassadeur Marleau [sic: Marlaud] a en effet ete vu au quartier general du 
FPR a Mulindi au mois de juin.67 
The 'Safe Humanitarian Zone' 
The establishment of the SHZ now appears to have been a deliberate attempt to 
legitimise this, the most controversial aspect of the Operation, by linking it in the 
public mind with the UN-imposed 'no-fly zone' in northern Iraq, while at the 
same time bracketing the RPF with Saddam Hussein. France's Security Council 
representative Jean-Bernard Merimee concluded in his report on Turquoise to 
the Council that the sole purpose of the operation, and of the creation of the SHZ 
(simultaneous with the RPF's seizure of Kigali), was to facilitate (by force) 
humanitarian assistance; significantly, Merimee emphasises that a key priority 
was to make a convincing case for France's neutrality: 
L' operation "Turquoise a ete menee avec un succes certain, compte tenu des 
circonstances delicates de son declenchement. Il s' agissait de permettre, par 
l'emploi de la force, le retablissement d'une situation favorisant la reprise des 
activites humanitaires. Dans cette operation, engagee dans une phase de 
conflit entre le FPR et les anciennes forces gouvernementales rwandaises, 
1' observation de la plus stricte neutralite a ete determinante. La mise en 
pratique du concept de zone humanitaire sure a permis de mettre les 
populations a 1' abri des combats et a facilite le deploiement des organisations 
humanitaires. 
Dans cette ZHS, il a fallu d'abord convaincre du bien-fonde de l'impartialite 
de I' intervention militaire.68 
However, although advertised as protection for refugees fleeing the RPF 
advance, the Zone's principal effect was to provide a secure retreat for the FGOR 
including the perpetrators of the genocide, military, militia and civilian. 
67 Venuste Nshimiyimana, Prelude du Genocide Rwandais, Brussels: Quorum 1995, p56 
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Moreover (and contrary to Morris and Scharf's reference above to a Security 
Council-mandated 'humanitarian protection zone'), it was not part of the UN 
mandate under Resolution 929. Analysts concur that in modern UN 
peacekeeping practice, four types of protective zone may be created: preventive 
zones, intended to reduce the movement of refugees in times of distress, with a 
view to avoiding catastrophes associated with massive movements of 
population; UN protected zones, created in armed conflict situations, whereby 
territory is brought under UN protection with the intention of protecting the 
population from the effects of confict; security zones, in which all military 
activity is forbidden in all or part of a state, and from which, according to Mario 
Bettati,69 the state's armed forces should be evacuated and replaced by a 
corresponding deployment of international troops; and no-fly zones, intended to 
protect civilians and humanitarian operations from aerial bombardment. 
The protective zone is therefore a legal institution, allowed for and legitimised by 
international law, notably Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The question here 
concerns the legality of the zone established by the French army in south-western 
Rwanda in July and August 1994, which was of the third type, a security zone.70 
France's Security Council representative Jean-Bernard Merimee stated that 
France would put the SHZ in place even without UN authorisation. But of the 
powers mandated under Resolution 929, nowhere is there any mention of safe 
humanitarian zones. Indeed, the sentence which would normally refer to such 
zones is truncated, so that the Resolution's second point notes only that the 
68 J-B Merimee, Rapport final de I '  operation "Turquoise" autorisee par la resolution 929 (1994) du Conseil 
de securite, United Nations Security Council document S/1994/1 100, 27 September 1994, p6 
69 See Mario Bettati, Le droit d'ingerence, Paris: Odile Jacob 1996 
70 Security zones had already been established in the former Yugoslavia where, for example, Srebrenica was 
m ade a security zone by Resolution 819  of 17 April l993, and six Muslim security zones were created in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by Resolution 824 of 6 May 1993. 
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operation was intended to contribute to 'the security and protection of displaced 
persons, refugees and endangered civilians in Rwanda.'71 
There may therefore by a prima facie case that the UNSC had not given France the 
power to establish such a zone, not least because France went back to the Council 
to seek its authorisation. After three days, the Council agreed to 'note' the French 
proposal to create a SHZ, but there was no resolution to this effect.72 In fact this 
parallels the situation at the time of the imposition of no-fly zones by Western 
powers over northern and southern Iraq in March 1991 and August 1992, an 
initiative which was not authorised by the Security Council, although Western 
leader stated that their imposition was necessary to make earlier UNSC 
resolutions effective. The precedent thus created, which was exploited to the full 
by France in 1994, meant that powerful intervenors could re-interpret their UN 
mandates to suit their own purposes. Nigel White points out that: 
If such an approach to UN resolutions is accepted . . .  then it would be 
possible for states wishing to undertake humanitarian intervention of a 
greater or lesser extent in another state, to obtain implicit authorization from 
the Security Council by securing a resolution which, while finding a threat to 
the peace under Chapter VII, does not itself impose and authorise 
71 UN Security Council Resolution 929 ( 1994), 22 June 1994: 'The Security Council: ( . . .  ) 2. Welcomes also 
the offer by Member States to cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve the objectives of the 
United Nations in Rwanda through the establishement of a temporary operation under national command 
and control aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, 
refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, on the understanding that the costs of implementing the offer will 
be borne by the Member States concerned; 3.  Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, authorizes the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to conduct the operation 
referred to in paragraph 2 above using all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in 
paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) or resolution 925 ( 1994)' .  S!RES/929 (1994), 22 June 1994, The United Nations 
B lue Book Series Vol.X, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993- 1996, New York: UN Dept. of Public 
Information 1 996, p308 
72 It should be noted that although making no explicit provision for SHZs, Resolution 929 states in point 3 
that member states cooperating with the Secretary General can employ all necessary means to 'achieve the 
humanitarian objectives laid out in sections a and b of paragraph 4 of resolution 925 ( 1994). According to 
Antoine Mindua [ 'Sur la legalite de la zone Turquoise au Rwanda' ,  Revue Africaine du Droit International 
et Compare (RADIC) 6 ( 1994) pp643-652] this shows that Jean-Bernard Merimee was right that France did 
not need the Council ' s  express approval in order to establish SHZs. 
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enforcement action. States could then argue that military action is necessary 
to enforce that finding by the Security Council .73 
After the zone was established, the president of the UNSC Jamsheed K.A. 
Marker stated that the Council 'reaffirms the humanitarian nature of the secure 
area in the south-west of Rwanda and demands that all concerned fully respect 
this. '74 Antoine Mindua suggests that because the UNSC did not question it, the 
zone's establishment was legitimate (' . . .  la France etait en droit de la creer.'rs 
However, failure to criticise after the event does not automatically equal 
approval; and Mindua concludes that a hesitant, distrustful Security Council 
decided in the end not to make a decision on the SHZ. As with all operations of 
this nature, he suggests, the UN is caught in its inherent double bind: ' [L]'ONU 
qui a le pouvoir d' agir en vertu du chapitre VII n' a pas les moyens necessaires et 
les Etats qui ont les moyens n'ont pas le droit au regard du droit international 
d'entreprendre une ingerence humanitaire unilaterale encore qu'ils refusent de 
mettre leurs troupes sous commandement et controle onusiens.'76 
Moreover, for a SHZ to fulfil its definition, military personnel within it should be 
disarmed and all military activity stopped. Once the zone was established and 
presented to the UNSC as a fait accompli, and although Russia insisted that the 
militias and civilians within the zone should be disarmed, no attempt was made 
by the French forces to do so. Indeed, it was strongly suspected that some French 
military commanders in the field sought to use the SHZ to enable the FAR to 
regroup, rearm and launch a counter-offensive against the RPF, thereby violating 
a key principle of the non-intervention norm (UN General Assembly Resolution 
2625 (XXV), according to which a people is supposed to exercise its right to self-
73 Nigel D. White, 'Humanitarian Intervention' ,  International Law and Armed Conflict Commentary I : 1 ,  
June 1994, p 1 8  
74 Presidential Statement SC/PRST/1994/34, 14 July 1994, dispositif, point 3 ,  Doe. Nations Unies SC/5878 
du 14 juillet 1 994, quoted in Mindua p649 
75 6 RADIC 1994 pp643-652 
76 Mindua, 6 RADIC 1994 p65 1 
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determination in total sovereignty) . French commanders also stated that because 
of their mandate's limitations, they had no power to make any arrests within the 
French-controlled zone, even of individuals clearly identified as war criminals by 
journalists and NGOs. Neither, it was stated, could they prevent looting, or 
dismantle RTLM's FM transmitter broadcasting pro-genocide propaganda from 
within the zone, and encouraging the refugees, and the population of 
neighbouring Burundi, to pursue the elimination of all the ex-regime's 
opponents to its logical conclusion. 
In this light and in view of subsequent events, it was the Safe Humanitarian Zone 
which was to prove the most damaging element of Operation Turquoise for 
peace and reconciliation in Rwanda, and most threatening to the stability of the 
entire region. Colette Braeckman had suggested that Turquoise could only 
succeed if France managed to dissipate suspicions of its hidden agenda: 
' [R]enforcer les troupes gouvernementales, rehabiliter l'habile Mobutu, bloquer 
la victoire du FPR . . .  177 But most significantly, the operation in fact failed to fulfil 
either its hidden or its declared agenda. It did not achieve its 'true' (i.e. 
undeclared) aims as identified by Braeckman; by June 1994 it was too late, and 
France too compromised, to save the FAR and stop the RPF; and the 
rehabilitation of Mobutu was to prove short-lived. And Turquoise also failed 
even to fulfil its overt mission, under the terms of its UN mandate. It observed 
the limitation of time and was over in two months as scheduled; but the 
questions of whether it was 'strictly neutral', 'purely humanitarian', or actually 
'stopped the massacres', remain without satisfactory answer. 
Bisesero 
In a recent study, London-based human rights group African Rights documents 
the failure by French troops to fulfil their mandate under Resolution 929 at 
77 Colette Braeckman, 'Le pari fran�ais: sauver et convaincre les Tutsis ' ,  Le Soir (Brussels) 24 June 1994 
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Bisesero, Kibuye prefecture, in June 1994, where the threatened population had 
hidden from the genocidal militias. One of the refugees sheltering in caves and in 
the bush on the hills around Bisesero heard by radio of the arrival of French 
forces, and on June 26 French reconnaissance troops could be seen in the area. 
African Rights recorded the following testimony: 
Simeon: We all emerged from our hiding place. Eric, who could speak French, 
explained who we were. The French took photos of us. The militia were there 
with them, carrying their weapons. The soldiers then left and said that they 
would be returning. When the French had gone, the militia came back to kill. 
They killed a lot of us that day because many people had come out of their 
hiding places when they had seen the French soldiers.78 
African Rights notes that: 'In the days before the French soldiers' return [four 
days later], at least 1,000 refugees were murdered, half the number that had 
survived.' Another interviewee, Vincent Kayigema, told how: 
The day French soldiers arrived, we were called out. We saw cars with flags; 
all the Tutsis in hiding came out. The French assembled us on a hill. The 
militiamen, with their machetes, were on the other side. After we had been 
gathered together, the French left straightaway. The militia came. They killed 
more than half the Tutsis who were there. Fortunately, I escaped.79 
African Rights' 'J' accuse' is unambiguous: 'The decision of the French soldiers to 
leave 2000 terrified people - begging for their help - was inexcusable. Rwanda is 
a small country; the soldiers had vehicles, communication equipment and most 
important of all, they had arms. Having been informed of the gravity of the 
situation, it is difficult to understand why they did not leave some soldiers to 
protect the refugees while they sought reinforcements, or indeed to imagine why 
it took them three days to return.'80 
Subsequently, the survivors witnessed the French troops cooperating with those 
who had coordinated the attack on Bisesero - notably Alfred Musema - and they 
78 African Rights, Resisting Genocide: Bisesero April-June 1994, London: African Rights 1999, p61 
79 ibid p62 
80 ibid p62 
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testified to the French soldiers' hostility when the survivors expressed their 
preference to seek security in RPF-controlled territory; survivor Philimon 
Nshimiyimana told how: 'After three weeks, we expressed our wish to join 
Kivumu, the zone controlled by the RPF soldiers. This decision provoked the 
anger of the French soldiers, so much so that they stopped giving us food.'81 
Survivor Maurice stated that the French 'asked us who we liked more, the 
French or the Inkotanyi [RPF]. Of course we replied in their favour. When we 
said that we wanted to join the Inkotanyi, they would refuse biscuits for the 
whole day.'82 
But the Quiles Commission report, the only official acknowledgement of the 
incident and the only accessible quasi-official response to the accusations, 
concludes as follows: 
Il a ete reproche au Capitaine de fregate Marin Gillier . . .  d'etre arnve en 
reconnaissance dans la zone relevant de sa responsabilite (Bisesero), puis d'en 
etre reparti immediatement pour ne revenir sur place que trois jours plus tard, 
laissant ainsi le champ libre aux Hutus de la region pour poursuivre les 
massacres des derniers 50 000 Tutsis qui s'y trouvaient encore. ( . . .  ) De la 
confrontation des elements con tenus dans le rapport d' African Rights, du 
temoignage envoye par le Capitaine de fregate Marin Gillier a la Mission et du 
compte rendu de l'audition particuliere du reporter Michel Peyrard [of Paris 
Match], il apparait que rien ne vient serieusement a l'appui de ces accusations. 
Si trois jours se sont effectivement ecoules entre le moment ou le groupement 
du Capitaine de fregate Marin Gillier a procede le 27 juillet a une 
reconnaissance de la zone de Bisesero et le moment ou il est intervenu, le 30 
juillet, pour proteger et sauver les populations du lieu-dit Bisesero, ce delai 
n' apparait pas intentionnel.83 
On August 22, observing the letter of Resolution 929, Operation Turquoise was 
wound up, and the French handed over to a reluctant, ill-defined and soon 
81 ibid p63 
82 ibid p64 
83 Assemblee nationale, Mission d'information commune Rapport no. 127l, Enquete sur la tragedie 
rwandaise (1990- 1994), Paris 1998, Tome 1: Rapport, pp330-33 1 
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superfluous UNAMIR II, little-respected following the precipitate retreat of its 
predecessor (UNAMIR I) as the genocide began. 
Effects and implications 
But by late August 1994, with the RPF in control in the rest of Rwanda and the 
massacres stopped, nearly two million people fled or were driven out, under the 
command of the FAR and the militias, to the subsequently cholera-infested 
refugee camps at Coma and Bukavu. These camps were, as the FGOR (ex-FAR 
and militias) intended, to be used as bases for regrouping and training, to 
prosecute the war for a further two years. There is no admission of this in official 
French discourse; Admiral Lanxade maintains that Turquoise contributed in its 
own small way to a process of universal accountability: 'Certes, l'operation 
Turquoise n' a pu ramener la paix ni retablir des conditions normales de vie au 
Rwanda, mais dans le temps tres court de son mandat elle aura permis 1' arret 
d'un genocide, evite une catastrophe sanitaire et contribue, sinon a faire 
progresser les droits de l'homme en Afrique, du moins a en faire condamner les 
violations systematiques.'84 
Similarly, Jean-Bernard Merimee's final report on Turquoise for the Security 
Council reiterates official claims that the operation fulfilled its mandate, stopped 
the genocide and helped bring its perpetrators to justice: 
L' action de la force "Turquoise" a mis fin aux massacres perpetres au 
Rwanda et a pemis d'assurer la protection de la population dans la zone 
humanitaire sure, ainsi que la transition avec la MINUAR II dans de bonnes 
conditions ( . . .  ) [L]a presence du dispositif "Turquoise" en ZHS a facilite le 
recueil des temoignages sur les exactions commises a 1' encontre des 
populations. Ces temoignages ont ete transmis aux instances competentes des 
Nations Unies.85 
84 Amiral J acques Lanxade, 'L' operation Turquoise ' ,  Defense nationale, February 1995, p 1 3  
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However Morris and Scharf point out that France was one of the countries 
sheltering genocide suspects, and thereby contributing to the climate of impunity 
and resultant exacerbation of instability in post-genocide Rwanda86; while a 
Reuters report notes that: 'Meanwhile, the victims of Rwanda's genocide 
initiated criminal proceedings in Belgium and France in order to force the 
authorities in those countries to prosecute persons responsible for the Rwandan 
genocide who had taken refuge there.'87 
Christophe Boisbouvier, a French journalist who covered Rwanda in 1994 for 
Radio France Internationale (RFI) describes the role of France in Rwanda as: 'un 
sujet de polemique, comme en temoigne le nombre d' ecrits parus, surtout clans la 
presse anglo-saxonne' .  Does this imply that the press of English-speaking 
countries is party to the Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, or that the French-language 
press has been conspicuously negligent of the story? Already, the politico­
linguistic battlelines are drawn in this French journalist's account; there were, 
however, dissenting voices even within RFI, notably Philippe Leymarie, who 
wrote in November 1994 that: 'La conduite de ! 'operation "Noroit" . . .  avait 
demontre egalement a quel point cette France ne craignait pas de recourir, 
comme par le passe, au pretexte de la protection de ses ressortissants pour 
satisfaire des inten�ts d'ordre geopolitique ( . . .  ) Le basculement du nouveau 
regime rwandais clans la zone d'influence anglo-saxonne . . .  est cependant le signe 
le plus spectaculaire de la desagregation de l 'ancienne "chasse gardee" fran<;aise 
sur le continent noir, de plus en plus seduite par le parrain americain' .88 
85 J-B Merimee, Rapport final de ! 'operation "Turquoise" autorisee par la resolution 929 (1994) du Conseil 
de securite, United Nations Security Council document S/1994/1 100, 27 September 1994, p5 
86 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Volume 1, New 
York: Transnational Publishers 1998, p68 
87 Sue Pleming, 'Rwandans seek justice in Belgian courts' ,  Reuters World Service 27 Oct. 1994, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File 
88 Philippe Leymarie, 'L'adieu au "pre carre" africain', Le Monde diplomatique November 1994, p8 
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Boisbouvier distinguishes two periods in French involvement in Rwanda, before 
April 6 1994 and after. The first period was characterised by 'une strategie 
fran<;aise d'endiguement, d'abord militaire et ensuite politique. '  Paris, it is 
suggested, sought to oppose three perceived political phenomena: Ugandan 
expansionism, Anglo-Saxon perfidy and CIA penetration of the region via the 
Trojan horse of the RPF, 'car dans l'esprit de beaucoup de militaires fran<;ais, le 
FPR est entrame et arme par celle-ci': 'On est en fait en plein complexe de 
Fachoda: il fa ut endiguer 1' avancee des anglophones. C' est d' autant plus fort 
chez les Fran<;ais que le FPR est hostile au systeme de relations privilegiees entre 
les pays d' Afrique francophone et la France, qui a survecu a la decolonisation. Le 
FPR, lui, a une vision beaucoup plus "tous azimuts" des relations 
internationales. '89 
Boisbouvier concludes that France's debacle in Rwanda was the logical outcome 
of its African policy, and its failure to understand Rwanda: 
[L]a France n'a pas mene au Rwanda une politique differente que celle qu'elle 
mene ailleurs en Afrique. Elle a voulu soutenir un regime en place contre une 
rebellion venue de 1' etranger et c' est la sans doute son erreur fondamentale: 
elle n'a pas compris que le Rwanda etait different d'un certain nombre 
d'autres pays en Afrique . . . .  En fait, elle n'a pas su adapter sa politique a la 
situation rwandaise. Son manque de lucidite s' est revele notamment entre 
1991 et 1994 au moment ou elle n'a pas conditionne son aide a une vraie 
democratisation. On s'est contente d'une democratisation de fa<;ade sans 
vouloir considerer la militarisation du regime, la radicalisation de la societe 
civile et des medias.90 
89 Christophe Boisbouvier, 'Le role de la France au Rwanda depuis 1990' in M. Bray, A. Cook, & S. Neath 
eds. ,  Rwanda: Perspectives, London: University of Westminster Francophone Africa Research Centre 1997, 
p38 
9° Christophe Boisbouvier, 'Le role de la France au Rwanda depuis 1990' in M. Bray, A. Cook, & S.  Neath 
eds. ,  Rwanda: Perspectives, London: University of Westminster Francophone Africa Research Centre 1997, 
p38 
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Of the principal accusations of French complicity in the genocide, the following 
were addressed by the Quiles Commission:91 French diplomatic and military 
personnel in Rwanda were partisans of the 'Hutu Power' faction in the Rwandan 
government, and considered the RPF as an enemy; French military support for 
the FAR in its war against the RPF 'bordered on direct engagement' (est 'allee 
jusqu'au limites de !'engagement direct'); there was a secret dimension to Franco­
Rwandan military cooperation; French support for the Habyarimana regime was 
never questioned despite the numerous human rights abuses which preceded the 
genocide; France had foreseen the risks of genocide from as early as 1990 and 
was aware of the implication of the most senior figures of the Rwandan regime 
in its preparation; a high-level meeting took place in May 1994 between the FAR 
and the head of the Mission militaire de Cooperation at the Ministere de la 
Cooperation in Paris even while the same FAR was overseeing the genocide in 
Rwanda; France maintained diplomatic relations until July 1994 with the interim 
government which carried out the genocide; and the 'Safe Humanitarian Zone' 
created during Operation Turquoise facilitated the escape of the genocidaires .92 
These findings were significant, particularly in light of the official account of 
France's interventions in Rwanda which has never conceded that these were 
anything less than honourable and successful: 
La prise en compte du facteur humanitaire a ete !'element fondamental de 
1' operation Turquoise. La creation de la ZHS a evite un ex ode massif de plus 
de deux millions de personnes vers le Za'ire et le Burundi. Elle a permis de 
realiser les conditions de protection et de securite recherchees et de favoriser 
le developpement d'une action humanitaire en liaison avec les ONC et les 
agences. . .  S'inscrivant harmonieusement clans la manoeuvre politique, 
militaire et mediatique, l'action humanitaire entreprise a donne une forte 
credibilite a l'operation.93 
91 Assemblee nationale, Mission d'information commune Rapport no. l 27 1 ,  Engw3te sur la tragedie 
rwandaise (1990- 1994), Paris 1998, Tome I: Rapport 
92 This non-exhaustive list was suggested by Mehdi Ba (author Rwanda, un Genocide franc,:ais, Paris: 
L'Esprit frappeur 1997) in his commentary on the Quiles Commission's  report, 'Rwanda, encore un effort' ,  
Le Nouvel Afrique-Asie 1 1 3, February 1 999 
93 Amiral Jacques Lanxade, 'L'operation Turquoise ' ,  Defense nationale, February 1995, p 1 3  
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However the conclusion of the Quiles Commission's four-volume Enquete sur la 
tragedie rwandaisl4 in this regard - that France was at worst ill-informed and 
insufficiently prepared for the scale of the Rwandan 'tragedy' (even the choice of 
this term implying an unforseeable, unavoidable calamity) - falls short of that 
suggested by the body of evidence it presented. Critics of French African policy 
argue that the Quiles Commission's report should not be taken as the last word 
on France's role in Rwanda. Indeed, some commentators consider Quiles a 
'counter-offensive by the public authorities'95 against the relentless criticism of 
French policy in Rwanda in particular, in Africa in general, and increasingly of 
the unaccountability and lack of transparency of much of French external policy. 
While the Commission's caution, faced with the most catastrophic failure of 
French overseas policy since the Algerian war (which caused the death of an 
estimated one million Algerians) is understandable, it is important to emphasise 
that despite the unprecedented access to documents (otherwise subject to at least 
thirty years of secret defense) which the Commission enjoyed, it failed in a number 
of key respects: firstly, by its very status. The Commission was no more than a 
'Mission d'information'; requests for the establishment of a formal parliamentary 
inquiry were rejected. As such, the Commission could only request the 
cooperation of those it invited to testify; and there was not, and could not have 
been, cross-examination of those witnesses, some of whom (particularly military 
personnel directly involved in supporting the FAR) expressed surprise at the 
lack of any questioning of their at best partial and selective accounts.96 
Secondly, no effort was made to assess the impact of 'parallel diplomacy', i .e. the 
support offered by unaccountable actors - military, diplomats and intelligence 
94 Assemblee nationale Mission d 'information commune, Rapport no. 127 1 ,  Enquete sur la tragedie 
rwandaise (1990- 1994), Paris: Assemblee nationale 1998 
95 Mehdi Ba, 'Rwanda, encore un effort' , Le Nouvel Afrique-Asie 1 13 ,  February 1999 
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services - to the former Rwandan regime, often in contradiction of public 
pronouncements of support for the full text of the Arusha accords, the genuine 
implementation of which, it should be remembered, would have necessitated the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Rwanda. 
And thirdly, related to this, is the role of one of the key actors in French overt 
and covert support for the regime, former Captain of Gendarmerie Paul Barril.97 
Although retaining his military rank, he claims to have been in Rwanda in a 
private capacity, and hence could be seen in Kigali after December 1993, when 
French forces were supposed to have been withdrawn under the terms of the 
August 1993 Arusha Accords. Instrumental in the putting into effect of the long­
planned genocide was the accusation that the RPF had shot down the president's 
plane, a version of events promoted 'most vigorously by Mme Habyarimana and 
her controversial special adviser'.98 Barril appeared on French television news in 
June 1994, claiming the presidential jet had been shot down by the RPF and 
displaying a piece of equipment he claimed was the plane's 'black box' flight 
recorder. Prunier notes: 'It was a strange performance. The former captain 
seemed in a great state of excitement, and he insisted that the massacres being 
carried out in Rwanda at the time were 'only disinformation', an astonishing 
claim to make in late June 1994' .99 Barril's claims were easily refuted; the Garde 
Presidentielle (GP) and not the RPF controlled the hill from which the missiles 
were fired, and Agir Ici/Survie point out that a genuine 'black box' is in fact 
orange, and was optional on private aircraft. Prunier concludes: 
96 See Le Monde, Liberation 17, 18 December 1 998 
97 Gerard Prunier, himself a sometime advisor to the French defence ministry, reminds us that: 'In the early 
1 980s this career gendarme had been the head of the crack French anti-terrorist unit GIGN [Groupe 
d ' intervention de la gendarmerie nationale] which operated in close cooperation with the anti-terrorist unit 
in the President's  office led by his friend and mentor Major Christian Prouteau [disgraced and dismissed ­
one of the scapegoats along with Defence Minister Charles Hernu - during the Greenpeace affair). These 
connections helped to develop in him a disturbing tendency to place himself above the law. ' Gerard Prunier, 
The Rwanda Crisis, London: Charles Hurst 1995, p21 6  
98 ibid p21 6  
99 ibid p217 
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[T]he question remains: why should Paul Barril have deliberately uttered 
inaccurate statements on TV . . .  ? ( . . .  ) The former head of GIGN works in the 
shadowy business of "security" where many of his contacts are former 
regular military men turned soldiers of fortune. If we remember the 
testimonies about white men on Masaka hill being sighted on the evening 
of 6 April, and that firing anti-aircraft missiles is a relatively specialised 
trade, it is possible that Paul Barril could have known the men who had 
shot down the plane and on whose behalf they had acted. His unproven 
accusations against the RPF could have been made for the purpose of 
shifting attention away from other persons, known to him, capable of 
recruiting experienced white mercenaries for a hit contract on President 
H b . 100 a yanmana. 
Barril's testimony - sworn in before a public enquiry if such had been created ­
would have been key to unlocking the conspiracy which set the genocide in 
motion, and the degree of French complicity, official or unofficial, therein. 
However, the Commission waited until 9 December 1998 - six days before the 
publication of their report on the 15th - before summoning Barril, who at the 
time was in the US. This tardiness is at odds with the comprehensive 
documenation published as appendices to the report, which included eight 
damning documents detailing Barril's involvement in an arms shipment to the 
FAR during the genocide and after the UN embargo of May 17th. As special 
security advisor to Habyarimana (or, some have argued, to his wife, the driving 
force of the akazu), and as a mercenary and recruiter of mercenaries who, at the 
very least, knows more about the preparations for genocide and the assassination 
of Habyarimana than he has revealed, Barril' s testimony under cross­
examination would have been crucial.101 
lOO ibid p219 
101 Indeed, it may be argued that there can be no closing of the Franco-R wandan dossier until all this 
information is in the public domain, which may necessitate, as some in Kigali now argue, an expansion of 
the remit of the International Criminal Tribunal for R wanda to permit the arrest and indictment of key 
French players. But as France, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, was one of the progenitors 
of the Tribunal, and as France, alone with the US, opposed the universal jurisdiction of the proposed 
International Criminal Court, it may be concluded that the instigation of legal proceedings against French 
nationals is unlikely. 
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Conclusion 
Rwanda may prove to have far-reaching implications for the making of African 
policy in France. Michel Rocard, prime minister from May 1988 to May 1991, told 
the Quiles Commission that he had 'never heard of Rwanda' during his 
premiership. Interviewed by Jean-Dominique Merchet in Liberation (in an article 
bearing the unprecedented headline 'Rocard: "Le deshonneur" de la France au 
Rwanda') on the day the Commission concluded its hearings (9 July 1998), 
Rocard stated that he had been excluded from decision-making - 'totally short­
circuited' - by the Elysee, and had learned of France's first intervention in 
Rwanda - Operation Norolt - from the media: 
J' ai ete totalement court-circuit€. C' est par la presse que j' ai appris le 
lancement de I' operation "Noroi't". J'ai verifie aupres de mon ancien directeur 
de cabinet, Jean-Paul Huchon, de mes deux conseillers diplomatiques, 
Philippe Petit et Jean-Maurice Ripert et de mon chef de cabinet militaire, le 
general Menu. Ils ne gardent aucun souvenir d'avoir alors ete associe a des 
reunions sur !'intervention au Rwanda. En fait, c'etait la regie tacite. Les 
affaires politiques et militaires africaines se traitaient directement a l'Elysee. 
Elles m'echappaient totalement. C'etait le domaine du President avec deux ou 
trois hommes autour de lui, dont son fils Jean-Christophe. Cette tradition, 
remontant aux debuts de la Ve Republique . . .  etait deja bien etablie . 102 
Rocard, with Prunier, identifies 'francophonie' as the determining factor in 
French support for the Habyarimana regime and its immediate successor, the 
genocidal interim government of April 7 to July 4 1994. In his written deposition 
to the Parliamentary Commission, Rocard states that 'we were wrong in 
supporting for too long the unworthy, which became the monstruous, regime of 
President Habyarimana'; his explanation evokes the intervention stimulus which 
the Fashoda syndrome represented: 
Liberation: Selon vous, pourquoi l'avons-nous fait [soutenu le regime . . . .  de 
Habyarimana J? 
102 Quoted in Jean-Dominique Merchet, 'Rocard: "Le deshonneur" de la France au Rwanda' , Liberation 9 
July 1998 
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Rocard: A cause d'une vision folie et devastatrice de la francophonie. Le critere 
linguistique, c' est-a-dire le fait que 1' elite rwandaise parlait fran<;ais, a permis 
d'occulter les pratiques de ce regime.103 
The irony here is that, if this were the principal motivation for French backing of 
the regime up to and including its recourse to genocide, the francophone motive 
was specious. At best eight per cent of Rwandans could speak French; even the 
most basic textbooks emphasise that ' . . .  these territories [of 'francophone' Africa] 
were French-speaking only at the elite and administrative levels during much of 
the past century, because the colonial regimes kept education and political 
participation at a minimum.'104 
A rejection of these ethnocentric and Eurocentric interpretations demands a 
plausible alternative; this attempt to frame such an alternative has argued firstly 
that in order to establish a context for the crisis - the Rwandan civil war and its 
spillover into Zaire - it is necessary to consider it not as ethnic/tribal conflict or 
'anglophone plot', but as one product of the failure of French military 
intervention; and secondly, that France's interventions - Operations Noroft, 
Amaryllis, and Turquoise - do not present 'a very positive balance sheet,' as 
French official discourse still maintains. If intended as a humanitarian response 
to genocide, Turquoise, organised with apparent urgency, came three months too 
late, occurring only when the genocide was all but completed; on at least one 
occasion (at Bisesero), French troops failed to rescue or protect, within the Safe 
Humanitarian Zone, a community threatened by genocide and subsequently 
killed. Elite combat troops and heavy military equipment were deployed, more 
suited, by the French army's own admission, to a textbook 'restoration of client' 
intervention. And Mobutu's Zaire, rather than (anglophone) Tanzania or (RPF­
sympathetic) Burundi, was used as the French base. (Two French emissaries had 
103 ibid 
104 Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1 880- 1985, Cambridge: CUP 1988, p3 
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earlier cleared the ground by flying to Zaire to obtain the right to use the east 
Zairean airports at Coma, Bukavu and Kisangani for French planes) . 
Its legacy was instead a prolongation of the Rwandan civil war from 1990 to 
1993, a militarisation and radicalisation of a sectarian regime which allowed it 
room for the preparation and implementation of genocide, followed by an 
extension of the Rwandan war to eastern Zaire, and the subsequent escalation of 
that war. 
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Conclusion 
A double discrediting 
The parliamentary commission chaired by socialist deputy Paul Quiles, which 
examined France's military interventions in Rwanda, marked the first attempt by 
the French legislature to make the executive, its advisors and the army it 
commands accountable for military operations overseas. Earlier non­
accountability and lack of public and parliamentary scrutiny are now considered 
key factors in permitting 30 years of interventionary policy which culminated in 
France's support both overt and covert for Rwanda's extremist regime, even 
while that regime prepared and conducted genocide. 1  
It is obvious that despite some notable cracks in the official discourse, most 
revealingly in statements to the Quiles Commission by former premier Michel 
Rocard, the political and military shapers of French African policy have sought 
to draw a line under the Rwandan debacle. Given the international indifference 
to Rwanda's war, genocide and post-genocide trauma, pressure to keep Rwanda 
on France's agenda can only come now from within France, a point not lost on 
elements of that country's NGO sector (most notably Survie and its president, 
Fran<;ois-Xavier Verschave); three volumes to emerge from this constituency 
during 1998 offer some counterweight to the prevalence in historiography and 
public discourse of 'la nouvelle politique africaine de la France'/ (a doctrine 
which has been declared without any acknowledgement by policy-makers of 
' The alleged complicity by French military personnel in the training of genocidal militias also points to a 
failure to implement reforms of the military security apparatus promised a decade earlier in the wake of the 
Greenpeace affair; see Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services, Oxford: OUP 1995 , p466 
2 Fran<,:ois-Xavier Verschave, La Fran<;afrique: Le plus long scandale de la Republique, Paris: Stock 1998 
(follow-up to his swiftly-written Complicite de genocide? La politique de la France au Rwanda, Paris: La 
Decouverte 1994); Jean-Pierre Gouteux, Un genocide, raison d'etat, Paris: La Decouverte 1 998; Mehdi Ba, 
Rwanda: Un genocide fran<;ais, Paris: L'esprit frappeur 1997. Survie also publishes a monthly newsletter 
documenting the workings of la Fram;afrique: Billet d' Afrique et d'ailleurs. Also representative of the 
critical NGO constituency in France is Bulletin Liaison-Rwanda, published monthly by the Montpellier­
based Association Franco-rwandaise. 
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errors in 'l'ancienne politique africaine . . .  ') . However, current attempts by a new 
generation of French parliamentarians - of the long quiescent Defence and 
Foreign Affairs committees in the National Assembly elected in June 1997 - to 
make overseas military policy transparent and accountable may prove futile 
without a fundamental reform of the institutions of the French Fifth Republic. 
As a case study of external military intervention by a strong state in weak states, 
the African experience of French military intervention since 1960, and France's 
justification for these interventions, raise the question of whether external 
military intervention can ever be disinterested and genuinely humanitarian. 
Post-Cold War efforts to reclassify military intervention as 'forcible humanitarian 
intervention' or 'military humanism' have been categorically dismissed by 
commentators from weak states (notably Edward Sai:d and Sayeman Bula-Bula3) 
as oxymorons. As discussed in this study, the prolonged civil war and genocide 
in Rwanda were due in no small part to French involvement, as intervention 
exacerbated a crisis which necessitated further interventions, latterly 
characterised as humanitarian. Civil war in Rwanda was met with military 
intervention by France, intervention which through arming, training and directly 
supporting one party to the conflict copper-fastened that party's hold on power, 
legitimised its intransigence and sabotaged negotiated compromise. This was the 
foreseeable reductio ad absurdum of thirty years of mechanical interventionary 
response to crises of the African post-colonial state, crises perceived as naturally 
recurring and hence requiring only an automatic response. 
As a result of this and the failure or qualified success of other high-profile 
interventions (in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor), there has been an 
apparent shift in diplomatic and academic discourse since late 1996 away from 
3 See especially Sayeman Bula-Bula (Professor of Law at the Univesity of Kinshasa), 'L' idee d' ingerence a 
la lumiere du nouvel ordre mondial' ,  Revue Africaine du Droit International et Compare (RADIC) 6 ( 1994), 
pp14-44, and 'La Doctrine d' ingerence humanitaire revisitee' ,  RADIC 7 ( 1997), pp600-638 
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the 'right' or even 'duty to intervene' in African conflicts, to the validity of a 
nonintervention response. This shift, it may be argued, is attributable to: the 
failure of earlier, interventionary responses, the resultant absence of a credible, 
disinterested intervenor and, in France's African sphere of influence, of a new 
military assertiveness by emerging regional powers. 
Significantly for the Great Lakes region and subsequently much of central Africa, 
the use by France in 1990 and again in 1994 of bases in eastern Zaire for its 
Rwandan interventions had entailed the rehabilitation of Mobutu Sese Seko, for 
several years previously persona non grata in Paris. By November 1994 Mobutu 
could attend and eo-chair the Franco-African summit at Biarritz, from which the 
new, RPF-led Rwandan government was excluded. 
However, at the Biarritz summit's opening session, Fran�ois Mitterrand declared 
a switch of emphasis in military cooperation: 'Mains de milices ou de 
commandos parachutistes, mais des forces de gendarmerie ou de police, 
respectueuses des principes republicains, rendraient sans doute a la stabilite de 
vos Etats de meilleurs services.'4 In response, the newly-formed Observatoire 
permanent de la cooperation franfaise observed that: 'Despite the fundamental 
revision of France's politico-military objectives spelled out in the Defence White 
Paper of February 1994, despite new policy orientations favouring the training of 
police and gendarmerie, and despite the official declarations of the last Franco­
African summit, military cooperation remains the most visible sign of France's 
will to retain its world power status.'5 
4 Quoted in Observatoire permanent de la cooperation fran<;aise, Rapport 1 995 , Paris: Desclee de Brouwer 
1 995, p98 
5 Observatoire permanent de la cooperation fran<;aise, Rapport 1995, Paris :  Desclee de Brouwer 1995, p98 
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Indeed, Philippe Leymarie's 1994 article, 'L'adieu au "pre carre" africain',6 was 
contradicted the next year, following the election in May of President Jacques 
Chirac, by a report entitled: 'La France entend maintenir son "champ" africain'.7 
Following France's May 1996 intervention in the Central African Republic to 
support President Ange-Felix Patasse, Stephen Smith could ask in Liberation, 'La 
France peut-elle quitter l'Afrique?', and offer the tentative conclusion that it 
could not: 
Ex-puissance coloniale, la France voudrait se retirer du continent africain et le 
mouvement est deja bien amorce. Mais il y a toujours un fil a la patte pour la 
retenir.  A Bangui, c'etait la communaute fran<;aise sur place, la presence de 
1 .400 soldats fran<;ais "prepositionnes" et surtout, la mise en doute de la 
credibilite de la "premiere puissance africaine".  Bien que cette credibilite soit 
fortement ecornee . . .  , elle reste le ciment de la presence fran<;aise sur le 
continent. Bref, sans le sauvetage de la Centrafrique, Paris perdrait le vote 
automatique des 14 "pays amis" aux Nations unies et son droit de preemption, 
notamment sur le petrole et les telecoms, dans ses ancienne colonies.8 
But by August 1997, Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine stated that France sought 
to 'adapt [its] policy to today's African realities'.9 Africa and African attitudes to 
French military intervention were changing. Most notably in in the African Great 
Lakes region, a new military assertiveness emerged in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide which, in reaction to external ineffectiveness and self-interest, 
seized the initiative for preventive and punitive action and, by pre-empting a 
foreign response while applying the West's own Realpolitik tactics, has 
transformed the political and strategic map of eastern and central Africa. 
The longer-term significance of 1994 for French interventionary practice in 
Africa, in light of France's non-intervention in Za'ire in 1996, supports this 
study's argument that France's Rwandan interventions mark a turning point in 
6 Philippe Leymarie, L'adieu au "pre carre" africain', Le Monde diplomatique November 1 994, p8 
7 'La France entend maintenir son "champ" africain', Le Monde 5 July 1995 
8 Stephen Smith, 'La France peut-elle quitter l 'Afrique', Liberation 3 1  May 1996, p7 
9 Bouazza Ben Bouazza, 'France Explains Shift In African Policy', Panafrican News Agency (distributed via 
www.africanews.org), 6 August 1997 
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both the theory and the practice of French military intervention. All the 
contradictions of over 30 years of French intervention in Africa were brought 
together in 1994, a year which would come to represent a watershed in French 
military policy on the continent. Having considered the validity of French claims 
to have reworked the motives and practice of its intervention strategy in keeping 
with post-Cold War trends and demands for humanitarian intervention, one 
might ask why, if France's first 'militaro-humanitarian' intervention Operation 
Turquoise was such a success, did France hesitate and again demand a cloak of 
international support when faced, in eastern Zaire in late 1996, with an apparent 
recreation of the 1990 intervention stimulus: a perceived 'invasion' of a friendly, 
francophone state by an army of hostile neighbouring anglophones? 
Attacks by the FGOR (ex-Rwandan army and militias) on the rwandophone 
populations of eastern Zaire (the Banyamulenge) in late 1996, accompanied by 
Mobutu's revocation of those populations' Zairean citizenship, sparked the 
rebellion which was to lead to his overthrow; and for the first time in its African 
sphere, France's interventionary hands were tied. Following the RPF' s overthrow 
of a French-backed, pro-genocide regime in Rwanda, and with the cloak of Cold 
War legitimisation no longer available, France's pre carre could no longer be an 
exclusive sphere of influence into which it could intervene with impunity and 
automatic approval from the 'international community'. By the time France 
sought in vain to intervene in 1996 to save Mobutu once more, even the cloak of 
multilateral and 'humanitarian' intervention clashed with this new regional and 
international environment. 
There was little international enthusiasm for France's demands for intervention; 
after a visit to Zaire by the then Dutch cooperation minister Jan Pronk in 
December 1996, a Dutch official accused Paris of denying reality in its efforts to 
persuade the international community to let it halt the rebel advances: 'The 
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French want to discuss a situation that doesn't exist. They refuse to allow any 
talk of the Zairean conflict as internal. Paris only wants it discussed in terms of a 
foreign invasion. That way it can justify foreign intervention to prop up what it 
sees as a pro-French governrnent.'10 
Similarly, US ambassador to Kinshasa Daniel Simpson reacted sharply to French 
foreign minister Herve de Charette's criticism of the slowness of the international 
community (i.e. the US) to support its plan for intervention, telling the local 
press: 'France can no longer impose its will in Africa . . .  Such neocolonialism is no 
longer acceptable. The French attitude does not reflect the reality of the 
situation . . .  There is no longer any question of supporting dictators because they 
are pro-Western' .11 
So with Cold War justification consigned to history, and 'humanitarian 
intevention' severely compromised by France's failures in Rwanda and the 
former Zaire between 1994 and 1997, what future could there be for France as a 
unilateral intervenor outside Europe? 
Indeed, the overall record of interventions by Western powers our of area during 
the 1990s may suggest that, in the absence of a permanent, neutral battalion of 
UN-commanded troops mandated by the General Assembly (and commanded 
by a reformed Security Council), only regional solutions are appropriate. The 
model for peacekeeping may be that of regional powers (such as Tanzania in 
Uganda, Vietnam in Cambodia, Italy in Albania and even Nigeria in Sierra 
Leone), where at least the intervenor's interests - primarily regional security - are 
stated and clear. French intervention in Africa may take place clandestinely, or 
by proxy (mercenaries or African allies), or even under a cloak of UN-sanctioned 
10 Wm Cyrus Reed, 'Guerrillas in the Midst' in Christopher Clapham, ed. ,  African Guerrillas, Oxford: James 
Currey 1998, p 139 
' ' Quoted in Le Canard enchaine, 4 December 1 996 
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multilateralism; but the days of the mechanical intervention response - of La 
Legion saute sur Kolwezi or 'We'll send him a few boys, old man Habyarimana' -
are over. And crucially, this development has been driven by African, not 
French, imperatives. 
French African policy has been changed, although not on France's terms, by 
these events; as the AFDL approached Kinshasa in 1997, Jean-Fran<;ois Bayart 
offered the following summary: 
La France est malade de 1' Afrique. Nous avons ete complices, au Rwanda, de 
la preparation d'un genocide. Nous avons organise, voire finance, l'envoi au 
Zaire de criminels de guerre serbes comme mercenaires, pour defendre une 
des dictatures les plus consternantes de la guerre froide. Tout indique, en 
outre, que le desastre de notre politique dans les Grands Lacs et au Zaire, et 
les graves exactions qui 1' ont accompagnee a Kisangani, resteront sans 
sanction. ( . . .  ) Il est a craindre que la credibilite de la France ne soit pour 
longtemps ruinee par la debacle de sa politique en Afrique centrale.12 
In the wake of Rwanda-Zaire, French African policy-makers have now begun 
speaking of a policy of 'ni ingerence, ni indifference'13: what might be called 
engaged nonintervention. The professionalisation of the French army will be 
complete by 2002; its troop numbers in Africa have been reduced from 8350 in 
1997 to 5000 today14; its permanent bases in the Central African Republic at Bouar 
and Bangui, key strategic springboards for French interventions across the 
continent since 1960, were closed at the end of 199715; and by late 1999 it was 
decided that the number of military cooperation personnel would be reduced by 
a quarter. 16 
12 Jean-Franc;ois Bayart, interview in Le Monde, 29 April 1997 
13 See Lionel Jospin, 'Evolution generale de la politique de defense de la France' ,  Defense nationale, 
November 1 998, p l 6: 'Les principes complementaires de "non-ingerence" et "non-indifference" permettent 
tout a la fois le respect mutuel, le developpement de relations equilibrees de partenariat et la promotion des 
interets africains au sein des institutions internationales . . .  ' 
14 Jacques Isnard, 'La France remanie son dispositif militaire in Afrique' ,  Le Monde 2 1  July 1997 
15  Philippe Couve, 'La France fermera progressivement ses bases en Centrafrique' ,  Le Monde 2 August 
1 997 
16 Jacques Isnard, 'La France va reduire d'un quart le nombre de ses cooperants militaires en Afrique', Le 
Monde 2 November 1999 
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It has been argued here that the principal long-term effect of Operation 
Turquoise has been to discredit French intervention in Africa, while seriously 
damaging the very concept of humanitarian intervention. The net result is what 
might be called a double discrediting: of France's role in the Great Lakes region 
and now throughout central Africa; and of external military intervention, 
'humanitarian' or otherwise, as a contribution to conflict resolution there. The 
failure of French military intervention in Rwanda, and subsequent involuntary 
nonintervention in the former Zaire, also marks the initiation of a period of 
rollback of French influence in Africa and the reduction of overt military support 
for France's allies and interests there. However, the possible use of other African 
states as proxy intervenors where an overt French intervention would now be 
politically impossible (notably Chad in the current Conglese war) may suggest 
that the process of rollback may not be as swift or as inevitable as the evidence of 
the period 1994 to 1997 suggested. Nonetheless, there is an appetite, a public 
demand in France, a country where the droit d'ingirence has exercised public and 
academic debate to an extent unparalleled elsewhere, for a reinterpretation of the 
colonial 'civilising mission' to create a workable humanitarian framework for 
France's role in the developing world. Arthur Conte refers to the need for a 
Europeanisation of military intervention in Africa: 
[I]l est beau, noble et precieux que nous intervenions sur des theatres lointains 
pour sauver des vies humaines ou servir des causes internationales sous 
benediction de l'ONU, mais il n' est pas possible que la France seule prenne les 
plus lourds risques. De fait, elle est enorme, la liste de nos interventions outre­
mer depuis trente ans. N'est-ce pas une charge excessive? Ne faudrait-il pas 
deplacer la responsabilite au niveau europeen? On a de plus en plus le 
sentiment que non seulement il nous faudrait une tres importante force 
nationale d'intervention rapide, mais qu'il nous faudrait plus encore une force 
europeenne de meme genre. Il faut savoir penser dans l'avenir, si on ne veut 
pas s'exposer aux pires deconvenues.17 
17 Arthur Conte (Ancien Ministre, Ancien PDG de l 'ORTF, Historien, Auteur de "l'Epopee Coloniale de la 
France"), Preface, Comite National des Traditions de Troupes de Marine, De Bizerte a Sarajevo: Les 
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France has been Europe's most prolific intervenor; if it seeks a role in promoting 
regional security following the failure of its interventionary activity in Africa, it 
can only be through turning its experience to advantage and applying its 
unmatched power-projection and logistical skills on the continent to the creation 
and professionalisation of an African-led and staffed regional security apparatus. 
Quite apart from offering a new positive, creative role to the professional French 
soldier, it may also act as a catharsis and a healing of the wounds in the Franco­
African relationship, and began to restore France's image in a continent where it 
still has the power to do good. 
Stanley Hoffman asks: 'Can one expect France - especially under its present, 
activist president - to refrain from interfering in its former African colonies' 
affairs, should some of these become failed or troubled states; or even into an 
Algerian civil war, if it created vast flows of refugees and threatened French lives 
and property in Algeria on a large scale?'18 The answer here can only be a 
tentative 'yes'; France will refrain, albeit involuntarily, from the type of overt 
military intervention which observers might have expected hitherto, as a result 
of its discrediting - internationally, among important sections of domestic 
opinion-formers and, perhaps most importantly, among the intervened. 
Troupes de Marine dans les operations exterieures de 196 1  a 1 994, Paris: Lavauzelle 1995, p7 
18 Stanley Hoffman, World Disorders, Lanham /Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 1998, p 1 72 
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Carte des pays d' Afrique en assistance militaire avec la France 
• les 8 accords de dcfense conclus 
entre la France et I '  Afrique 
les 26 accords d'assistance militaire technique en Afrique 
;ameroun. 1 9 74 
:ote-d'lvoire, 1 9 6 1  
Comores. 1 973 
Jrtbouti. 1 977 ')abon. 1 960 
Republique centrafricaine. 
1 960 
Senegal. 1 960 
Toga. 1 963 
�1m Operations onusiennes ;U� a participation franyaise. 
Tchad 
Benin. 1 960 
Burkina-Faso. 1961  
Burundi. 1 969 
Cameroun. 1 960 
Comores. 1 978 
Congo, 1 961  
Cote-d'lvoire. 1961  
Ojibouti, 1 977 
Gabon, 1 960 
Guinee. 1 987 
Guinee equatoriale, 
1 98 7  
Madaaascar. 1 96 1  
Mali, 1977 
Maurice. 1 979 
Mauritan1e. 1 960 
Niger, 1 960 · 
Republique 
centralricaine. 1 960 
Rwanda, 1 975 
Seneaat. 1 960 
Seychelles. 1979 
Tchad. 1 960 
Toga. 1 96 1  
Zaire, 1 974- 1991  
Algerie. 1 967 
T unisie. 1 973 
Maroc. 1 973 
Senegal 
., ;: . ., 19Ei2. Des troupes frarw;.a,ses 
� �. l; 1968-1972. A la demande du p.-es.oenl Tomoa<baye. 
�,1 ;T-i partoopa!Kl<l a la lune conue la n!belloon Ou Tibesu 
� (. t.J t Centrafrique 
��� 1979. -�U.l � maintiennent rordre. ap11!s une tentatrve 1�1 /L de coup d'Etat centre le presodent Sengnor 1983-1 984. A 1a oemande du p<es<Jent Hable. la France <Jeclenclle rOI)<iratoon Mania. 4 .000 hommes 
�.\ 1 · 1 Apres la depoSJt>On de rempereuc Sokassa. i <J J La Fcance enva>e un detacnemenl mditaice De puis 1986, Ol)<iration Epervier. 900 hommes. 
Operations c1e soutien au gouvernement tchad•en 
centre les assauts hbyens au nord du pays. 
a Sangui a La aemancle 
du nouveau chef de rE tat. 
:rra Leone 1 .. Mal 1992. Operation SimOleau, 
:JOO hommes. envoi <tune 
lregate au large des c6tes 
s.ierra·leanaises pour secourir 
Mntuellemertt des 
ressortissants fr�is 
apres le coup <!'Eta! militaire. 
1 Togo 
� 0. SJ 19J!6. 150 flommes soot sur ptace. '�l opeta�O<'l de �en 11 /(j au pt<isidertt Eya<tema 1ocs 
<tune tertLltive cle coup <fELlt 
1991. Operation Verdier, 450 hommes oeployes au Benin a La suite de La tentawe 
de ;:>uiSCh con1re le Premier ministle 
togoLais de transitioo Joseph Kol<ou Kotf.got>. 
Gabon ��� 1964. Envco de paradlulistes }U-l.il apn!s renlevement du president M·aa. ______ __, 
Angola 
Mal a fuint990. Operation Aequin, 
2.000 hommes. ptOiection des ressortiSsants 
apres les emeutes de Port-Oen�l et de ub<evolle 
:-�i··, 1 992. Operation Addax. -----------------+--' """---' SO hommes dans le cadre 
de 1'\JNA VEM pour eocadrer 
les electJOns angQ(aises' 
> :c�.Juin 1m. 
Zaire 
,_.; .-' 19n·1 978. Guerre ou Shaba. organ.sation 
-� d'un ponl aerien entre Rabat et KdweZI, 
puis envo4 de paradlvttstes pour revacuation 
des ressortissants euangers. en coooeratl()(l avec La Setgique. 
�� �� Fin 1991/debut 1992. Opt!rallon franco-be!ge Baumier, 
":"N • 1 .000 hOmmes. Operatoon de protectKl<l et <tevacuatjon ;l;l; des ressortissants etrangers a la SUite deS emeutes de Kinshasa. 
;:. Oepuis 1992. 130 personnets m<id.caux sont envoyes dans le cadre 
de raperation Bioforce. 
Djibouti 
-- Mal a fuin 1991. 
i- t.l Operation Godoria a caracrere nvmanitaire � 
accuetl, coni/Oie. 
desarmement, taVtUtUement 
et soins de 40.000 fl!fugies .------ civils et miijta�es ethiOpiens. 
1992. Operation Oryx. 2.1 00  hommes 
sous commandement americain, 
dans la cadre de !'UNIT AF. 
1 993. 1 . 1 00  hOmmes dans operation ONUSOM 11. 
Corn ores �" �� 1989. Op<!rat1Qf1 Osite. 
---- " ·1 200 hommes depjoyes I I J a Mayone apres rassassinat 
du president Abdalla�. 
Q 
Rwanda _4,1_�" Oct_obre 1 990/decembre 1993. 
·� ·:J • Qperatl0f1 NorOtl de 300 }l_fl_j a 1 .000 hommes, aSSIStance mditaire 
et SVf"'ee:ILance aux lront•eres. 
Avril 1994. �60 hommes pour proc<ide< 
a revacuattOn de ressortissants 
tta�tS et etrangers. 
Chad 
- lnernMblll bl:aftllly 
-- � baJndllry * Hllilnlt caplal 
• � a�Pib�i 
- RaWid  
-- lbd  
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POU R  MEMOIRE .  
ACCORD DE COOPERATION militaire tech­
nique entre la Republique fran'r8ise et la Repu­
blique togolaise (ensemble un echange de 
lettres). 
Du 23 mars 1976 (A) . 
(A) Approuve par la loi no 78-693 du 6 j uillet 
1978 (JO du 7, p. 2695). 
Nota. - Ce texte sera insere dans le present 
ouvrage des la parution du decret de publication .  
2 .. [7 
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ACCOR D DE COOPERATION MILITAI R£ 
TECHNIQUE 
entre le Gou�rnement de la Republique f�ise 
et le GCKive mement de la ltepublique log<>taise 
(ettsemble un £change de lettres). 
Le Gouv�ment de b .R.bpuhlique .francai� d'u:H part. le 
Gouvememt!'llt de la lU:puhliqlle torolaise, d'autre part, 1ont co.ovemM � diS}>OOtions ci-aplis : 
Trnu: x·· 
DeJ penon�u rnlUtainl fra�. 
Article I••. 
A 1JJ �-chJ ��t de 1& Republlque to(ol.a.i.H, le 
Gou�"10ell't ode la �ublique � � -i· a� 
d.aru 1..- � de MS eo;reDS, · -we  UBi� - piiSOiibelll 
militaires fr�a.is pour l'orga.riliation et �- de& � � �Ja!.tes. 
Article m 
Le Gou�nt de la R6publ.ique �l.&.ise -d� 
unee et communique au Gou ... �mement de la  fru· 
'aise la li&te des pocstes i pourvoir, la description � emploi&, 
le.s qtalifications requbes - et J6s tieux d'a1futation des per· 
wnnel.s � mettre en place. 
u O<>u�l � la Republique fran� ftit cooliaftre ·au �t · ae ·la �Uque ·togo12iJe -!e:s �- -�'il 
est en me.� d'l!onorer. · · 
Article m. ·· 
� ,.e� � �t- �i.&'B& it�!' 1e" �t fren�� �- aitr�:!.llt1 "Gotft'�etit fi lt  togolalse poUT ta:�e daree tixee conform&nent A la r4]emen­
tation fra:ncalse sur les se;<>un A l'ext�eur ; cette dune peut 
E:tre aug:m.entee ou rMuite d'un commun aceord entre les 
Gouve�t&. Tout -eh�nt d'aff�tAtWll -en cours de � J&t � wprE:6 �t»n des alrlorite& �� de J. Repu1ilique �«-4es etorites co�ntes de la �. 
Le �t ft � �totGWie .et le Go� 
nement.- de b �IUS  �uveat l'wl et .rauU-e, -� co05UHa�. ps:endre l'icitiative de la releve cfun a&Si&W.nt mllitair� teclmique ea COW'S de sejour. 
ArUcle IV. 
Les � mllitams tnn� servent dill! !e& � trm!ieS �abes nee )e. grade de le hi&� ck ces forCe� a:nn� 4ant -t · ce1uJ dont Us sont  dans Jes � mm&!& fran�-; t1s rev@tent l'unifdr'Die- �- 011 
la ten� t5�le sulvant ie:! instructions de l'wtorltt titllitaire 
togolaJse. 
IU sont tenus de se coaformer aux rigl�ts et dired.lve� en ·vigueou:r dans les � &rmhs togolai£e£. 
ns ae ,.eu.e:Dt, • eucun <l&S, preDAlre ,art ·-e · l�u&:.uon 
' d'� • � tli de maintieo ou de � t M t'ordre ou � la lkg&llte.. 
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Article V. 
w parson..n.els militaires tr�ai.s con&ervent le statut qu.f 
est 1� leur dans ta �ntwtion lr�. . f A ce titre, ils 801lt afl� 1 une /Grmation dite Bureau d'ilde 
I 
" 
milltaire qui releve de l'AIIM>a.ssade de France et qui art pli<:H 
a()us l'autorite de l'oNi<:ler fran�ais le plus ancien ckns le grade 
le plus eleve mis � la dlsposlUon de b .RepubUque togol.-. 
Las apprecation.s portaes par les autor.ites togolal3es eur la 
mani&re de aervir des interesses .sont � au G<luvel"lli!!!Jlent lrlmQa.i.s ; en eas d'1ndi.9clpline ou de hut.e professlo�, llil n'encourem de la part du Gouvernement togola.U d'wt:re sanction que la temise motivee i la disJ>oelUon du G<>uverne.ment trancaJa, 
&.SISOriie s'il y a �u d'une demmde de sanction. tes dlapoeMi001 du present alinea ne font pa3 o.bstacle i la mise en jeu par loa autorites �ilies des pl'OCMures dlsciplinalres � par  .. 
a�t des mteresses. Le Gouvemement lran.!;IJ6 art temu eh fa.ire eonu!t.re aux autorites �laiaes la suite donn!e euxdlteJ 
proeM�. 
Toutes loes decisions du oommandeme.n.t. togolili les eoDOI!Ilnut sont porlbe.s a la e:ormalsaooe de l'Ambassade de FnDc:e ea Mpublique 1or0laite ; de �  toute5 disposi� les eollOCC'O.IQt prises � �  autorit& �aJses eont pan� i ia Nnn� 
du autor.ites . L'examen d&s probl«Des eoncemant Z. situation � per.sonz1e!l 
mllitaires !ran� au r-egard de leur atatut peut faJre 1'� 
de missions des autontee lAne�. Lee cond.itiOM dam leequellel 
a·aooom�t cas missions sont fbk5 par entente ell'tl'e lel 
deux Gouv�t&. 
Article VI. 
Dan.s l'eur<:ict de J.eur !ooetion, � � mititairel 
fr�ais mis 1 la disposition da Goovemoole.lt de la Rbpubllq�ae 
togoWse �ivent de ce Gouvernement l'alde et la protection 
qu'H &OCO� lUX p6l"!<)Dll� de !es propres forces �. 
ns jou.is.sent cklls drolt.s &t garantles dont WnMident lel e� intero.a1.ionaux poor lears .acUs, paroles et krlts N qoalit6 
daru 1·e�i� ou 1 J'ooecas.lon de l'eurclce de 1eo.rs fooetfoY. 
Article vn. 
Le Gouvernement de la &epublique �o� p1'0Did l aa � la �a.ratmt de! domma(e.s uus&s par l:as pmoDDeJI 
mHlairo.s franc.als d&cs i'e.xerclce � 1eun �m. F.n CM d'ae&ll judlclalre !ntentee i l'oooas.ioa de tell dommlceS, 11 G<x!�ement de 'la Repu.blique tolOW&e se � dllll l'insWloe aux � mi.1.itaiNB � mi.s en e>aa&e. 
Au cas oil le dommage resuiteralt d'une faaU pexaomel:le, '­
Gouvernement de la B.epublJque togol.aise pourr. en � 
r�paratlon au Gouvememerrt de la Rep� �-
En cas de domm.ages subls dam le service ou l l'oecaslon du �� par des cnJ.1itaJres � bonn!s le C8l5 de faate '*" 
aonn.elle, le Go�t de la Mpublique togoJdae .vereera 
des indemn.H!s 6qu)tablea. Les demande. d'iodemo.l� .erGOt traNWDI.u:s au Goovemement de fa � tog<ldse l 11 
dili�nce du Go�nt de ta Mpu.blfque �. 
A.rti.cle VIII. 
Lee juridktiona tog.oJ.Wes eont � pour coontftrt de.a � M«DDI\Jeee par te. penonnels m.H!&afrel � 
plaea aous le eommandemeot togolaia. 
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Ce�nd anl, en cas d'in!ractioo a ux  lois togolai� commi$e p.ar 
I� personnel.s rnillta.ires fnn�ais da.ns le service ou l l'oceasion 
du service, les auteurs desdites infractions soot renili immem• 
temeot l l'A.mba.ssade de France en Republique togoWse .quJ 
procede a leur rapatrieinent en France ou s.eront enga� l· 
leur en<:Ontre toules poursuites utiles. 
Le Gouvu.nement de la Republique fran�aise e.st tenu d 'in!or· 
mer le Gouvernement de la Republique togolai&e des suites 
iudiciaire.s donnees a l'afiaire. 
En oas d'ln!radion aux }oi.s togolaiSes passible d'une peine 
d 'empriso<>nnement ou d'une peine plus grave commise en dcllor:t 
d u  secvlce par Je.s ·pe.rsonnels militaires fra� et les membNJS 
de leur famille, � auteurs de!eres devant uoe juridictio:D 
toga!Ais.e et dont b detention est jugee necessaire, sont a.s,siznel l resl&nce dan.s un lieu fixe d'un commuo accord entre leJ 
•utorltes togolaises et ies autorites fr.an�aises en vue � � 
compuution devant le.s autorit� judiciaiTes togoWses compeo 
t.entel. 
� personnels militaires .fran�ais ou le.s membres de leur fa.mille cood� 1 des peines d'emprisonnement par fe.s Juri· d.ictJons t<>gola.lses soot rem.ls il l'Ambassade de Fr.anoe � 
fins � NPatrieJM.nt et purgeront leur peine dans les locaux 
penitentiaire.s fran�is. Le Gouvernement de 1a Republique lr� est tenu d'in!ormec le Gouvernement de la Mpublique 
togolaise des lieux et coodition.s d'execution des peine.s. 
Soot d bcid� .se1on la legislation frm�aise sur I' ;avis du puquet 
�tabli pres la juddiction togoWse qui � prononce la condamna· 
tion, · les commuutions, red�tions et remises grlc�. JIW· 
r.ttion.s condit!onneHes et autres modalites d'execution � pemes. 
LeJ �ns scmt notifi�es par le Gouverne-�nt fr� au 
parquet 6tabU pr� la juridiction to:ola.ise ay;ant prononce la 
con.damnation. Article IX. 
Le Gouvernement de la Republique !ra:n�ai.se prend a s;a � 
les droJtas acqais par les personoels militaires !ran� : sol9 
et aceessoir , primes diverses, frais de tunsport de Ft'ance 
l Lome et retour. Les ftais de dbplacemeot prevus par la reglementation frm· 
ta.ise et resultant de }'execution de mi9sions de se�e sont • 
la oharge du Gouvernement togolais. 
Article X. 
Le Gouverneme.nt de La Republique !ran� prend 1 &a 
char:e le \ogeme.nt des personnels nulilaires fra.n�ais ; le Gou· 
vernement de la Re�Hque togolais.e verse i titre de contrihutiou aux depen.se.s supportees par le Gouvernement de la Republique � une allocation pour chaque a.ssi6ta-nt miliUire teobnique 
dont le montant et les modalites de versement .soM determines 
d'un commun accord pa!" echange de lettres entre les deux Gou­
vernements. 
Le �uvemement de la Republique togolaise assure l �s 
personnels et 1 leurs familles Jes soins mediuux et ho.spit&lien 
au mble Utre et daDs les mmes conditlO'Il.S qu'aux membrel 
des force! arm&!:s togolalses. 
Article XI. 
Le3 personnels vise.s par le present Accord peuvent importu 
en 'franohise Ieurs effet.s personnels qui doivent correeponm 
1 leur ran.g .social ; ils peuvent importer ou aequerir IOUS le � de i'a&nission tempora.ire du mobi.!i� M Ulll \'6hleule 
prive A leur osaie per-sonnel. J'ls peuvent le reexpomr dans lea � eond�tlons 1 �ur depart definitil. 
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lla �uissent du droit de transferer librement .sur b France 
le montant des i<:onomies realisees sur les remun�rations et 
Lod�mnites aUerentes � � e u r  emploi et, lors de leur rapatriemenl 
dHini.tif, le pro<iuit de la vente eventuelle en :R�Jiubllque 
wgolai.se de leu rs ·verucules, biens mobiliers et effets pers·onnels 
apres a!'Quittement des droHs de douane y afftrents. 
Article xn. 
Les personnels de J'assistance militaire techni"que ·sont rede­
vables au Togo de la taxe progressive sur �' tra.itements et 
ulaires daru \es conditions prevues a l'art.ide 17- de 1' Accord 
�ntral M cooperation technique. 
TITRE ll 
De {4 �rmat i01t m France des C«<tre1 
des Jqrus armie-s jogotam. 
A.rtkle xm. 
Le Gocvernement de la Republique togola!se peut s'a&resser 
pour la .forn'iation des cadre! de ses forces � A Ja R�pu. 
blique franl:"t1se qu.i lui apporte a cet �gard son -eoncours dans 
la .aiesure de ses moyens. · Les ' DBtiODAtlX '-ti:>go1aiS SOO t admfs 'daDS Jes {1"�' ecoles 
et etabUSseiritnts Mllitaires !ran�is soit par eonrours" 'dans �, rnh'ies 'cotrdiUons que ' Je.s  natlonaux fran�s.· soil 't!ans la limlte 
d'uri ·contmge1rf . ·partietrlier ·comport.rit ·· amenagement de CCJ 
con dHions. · 
Des ' 'il<�tlOrirnx-«>go·Jafs ·designes ·par leur Gouv6nement, en accbrd � avec··'le -Gouvernemerrt· !rant'lis.� peUTeJ:It · eve admis 
com1ne ·:stagfihs tbn$ · les koles et etablli'3mds'ts 'frari�ls. 
Artil"le · XIV. 
Le Gouvoer�f-·tle la ReptW!ique ·..ofrani;fue ·PTef1d -i •• 
cbnge -� ·rnJS-:de tra�· et d'i.nstrtktiO!l c�es···'BeTes · et  sbt}ai� -� admls · :cfan5�- les · eeotes · ·et �fJib!!emetrt.s 
militaires trancais. 
Le -�r · de la Re.PilbllqUi f · togob.iR �end · i  sa 
C:hz"'ge" :re, �'d ' ·de salde rl les !rai! d'�  '(alime.n· 
t.ation, Joge�nt, securite ee-ciak) � � fu(itires. 
Le Gouvernement de la Republique fran�aise usure aux sta­
giaires togot.ais et l leur -famiHt en France les aoins mMieatu 
et �ullers . au m�me titre et dans Its mbnes condltioDJ 
qu'atu· membfes ·aes Force� armees fra.ntalses . .  
Artic1e· ·xv; · 
Le�· · to:ol.att en Fra1ice·· sont justidables lks dispo­aiti es +celle5 -pr�s ·au artide-s -'7, -8 · �t ·11 · pour 
les � -militak-es tedutiq� fr�ls -tn lenice ·au Toco. 
Tn-ar: m 
D« 14 foumittcre ck tn4�l et d'��t miliU:rire. 
Article xvz: · 
Le Gouvernement de la R�tzlilique togolaise peut s'adresser 
au Gouv.e.rnement de ta Republique fran�se pour l'entretlen 
et 11 folirillttire · 1· titre gratuit" · ou onmux � ·matEriel.s et 
d'e<i�ements'i:JilliW�es. . 
I..es for� a�s· togalaises peuvent faire awe\ pour le 
10uUen logtstiqtlif''*u concour'l ·des · tortl;S· �s -fran\alse.� 
qui""leur est lCCiltc!b dbs 'la llmlfe de 'lam possibrutk. 
. -
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TITU IV 
Dn fiJCiliUs de ttcruit et d'dcale. 
Artide Xvti. 
Le Gou�rnemeot togolais peut autoriser le transit terrestrt et l�rien Sur S<>n territoire au pe�Ohl1'el et h>etef'ief aes forces 
armees francaises. L'autoris.illob he peut  � tre accllrd�e flU� rur la l.texninde 'du 
Gou\'etn�nt fran�ls rotnpot'tailt entre auttes lndJdtl6ns, 
l'origine e"t la batut'e, 1a destffiatloli, ''i'iUnera1re dw le ),ayt 
de thruit �u 'personnel et du mat�tiet iniliWre ftah�." . 
Elle Jrest 'Valabl� 4ue }'lour nne seute llp�raUon ; ercept1on­nel1emeilt e-1le peut Hre d�J.Wr-ee 1' litre )ermime"rit et eouvfu pl�w.rs qpmUons fie transit -kbefonnee$ tfans le leftll>S. DaJD 
ce cas la �tn11nde du Gou�nt francw d&it � aecom· pagnee d'un plan de transit )ortant sur toutes � oJ*ntiona. 
Arti ele !tVt1l. · 
Le survol de l'espace aeriell togoltl& par des tiron-ets mill· 
taires fran�ais et les escales de ces appare11s sont �aumls • 
alltorisatlon r>t!aiable �as p�r cas ; · �utMOis ·]es tlaisons t�g'tl­
lieres ou periodiques font l'obj� a·autbtlsatio'Ds ahn'ue11eS el 
reb611velAMts. 
Ces autori.sations peuvent �trl! �uelr ·par 1e GonvHhe· 
ment togolals si celui-d est.ime que ces llaisl?ns aont de Mturt 
i porter· itteinte a la sou vera.i.ilet� ·de r.Etat {Q;olili.' 
Artlcle nx.; ·, 
Le Gouvernement togolais s'ene�e 1 .  apporter le eoneourt de 165 aervices pour laciiner . res op&-atiens ae tianill et a'achal 
5ur son terrholre au proflt des torces arm�S h-ancalses. · 
Artil!!e XX. 
Le$ d..i.spoeitioM pre\·ues IU,X .,rticleo Xvt.I. 'xvin et m �- . de.sus aont �ment &pplice.bles aux torces ami� togolalsel 
par le Gouvernement de la R�pub1.ique lran�a.i.Se. 
Artlt:ht xn. . 
Le present .Acc&rd remplace et a1>roge }«:s Ac-cord.s �e roopl­
ration miliWre oes � et 30 oclOOre loor:· 
n est condu pour une duree de deu· ·an, renoti-ve1aliie. par· · tacite mo!htuct.ion saut ·d�no�ath)n �ar 'Tune 4es 1-.a� 
con tracta.ntes. 
Le �n<ntdation devn. ttre notifih pu k veie i:Up�aUqu• 
au moins six mois 1 l'aVllnce. 
Le present Accord entrera en vigueur le premier jour du deut.l�rne molS S'Ul.�t l'edl1llge -'&6 blstrllmettt! :tion:statin\ l'at"C6trip�efl1ent ·ttes· ' pro�u� ;-teq\fu� 'l cet ·�fM 'c!an;' 
chacun des -deux Et.ats. . 
Cet &ha.rige iura i.ieu 1 Paris aUS'SilM · que talre ·� p(lti.iTa.. 
Fait A Lome, ie 23 mars,l976, en deux exemplaires originaux. 
Pour le GouYernement de la Republique fr&.Dcalse : 
.tv.N DE LIPitOWSICJ, 
Ministre de 14 Coopb-ati<m. 
Pour_ le Gouvernement de la �ue togolaise : 
A Yl B.Om:NOU lroN'La)£, 
• Ministre des Affaires itrgngeres. 
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Lom�, le 23 mara. 1976. 
A Son Excellence, Monsieur Avi Houenou Hunlede, 
Minirtn des Affaires �trangeru de la R4>Y­
bliqu.e togolaise. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
L'arUele 10, alinia t••, de l'A�rd �e cooper&tion milita.iu lechnJque pn:Woit le versement par le Gouvernement togt>Ials, I titre de contribution aux depeDfles &Upport� par le Gouvel'IM!­
ment !ran�w. d'une allocation pour ehaque assistant militm-. technJque dont le montant ett ies modalit�s de 'Versement sont 
determines d'un commu n  accord entre �s dewr Goovernementa. 
A la suite des echanges de vues qul ont eu lieu entre no1 
deux del��tions, les taux meruuels ruivants ont �U retenu• 
pour cette allocation qui comprend : 
- une in�mnlte de }()gement de : 
40 000 F C. F. A. pour un cellbataire ; 
45 000 F C. F. A. pour un menage sans enfant, 
au:rquels il convient d'ajouter 5 000 F C. F. A. par en! ant, le 
plaiond etant fixe a 60 000 F C. F. A. ; 
- une indemnite forfaltaire de 10 000 F c. F. A. pour tenir 
compte des servitudes &pkif.iques. 
L'allocation est due pour ehacun des assistants militaires tech. 
niques pc>ur h totaolitA du �jour au Togo, y compris la duree 
de conge reglementaire pour les cadres qui, exceptionnellement, 
1 font ®ux sejours consbcuti!s. 
Le Gouvernement de la Mpublique togolai9e mettra un agent 
qualifle a la disposition du Bureau d'aide militaire pour !'aider 
1 gerer les log.ements des assistants militaires techniques. 
Un titre de recette, etabli sur la base des effectifs constat!s 
111 t•• j anvier, comprenant le personnel en service oo en cong6 
reglementa.ire, sera emis par le Gouvernement de la Mpubllque 
fran�aise et eouvrira la penode du 1 .. janvier au 30 novembre. 
Le montant de ce titre de recette sera vers� par � Gouver· 
nement de la Republlque togolaise r.vant le 1" d�embre. 
Le ·tf.tre de recette da moi.s de dkembre sera un titre de 
regularisation pour tenir compte de la situation des ef!ectifa 
reels entre le 1•• j anvier et le 30 novembre. 
Le titre de recette du moi.s de d�cembre sera regM avant le 
31 mars de l'annee strlvante. 
Les dispositions prevues ci-dessus J)<>Urront Hre reexamineea l la dematlife de l'une ou l'autre des Parties. 
J'al l'bonneur de vous prier de bien voul()ir me CGnl:inner 
l'a�ord de votre Gouvernement sur les di.sP<>sitions qui precedent. 
Veuillez a:grier, Monsieur le M.inistre, les assurances de ma 
baute eonsid�ration. 
Jf.AN DE UPXOWSI:I1 
.Ministre de le Cooperation 
de la R!publique fran�ise. 
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Lom�. le 23 mars 197�. 
A Scn1 Ezallence, Monsieur Jean dt Ltpkou·skt, 
Mini.stu ck la Coop&at ian ck la Rtpubliqut fronf"(li.st. 
Monsieur le .Ministre, 
Vous avez ·bien voulu, en d ate d e ce jo ur, m'adresP-r la letlre 
dont la teneur suit : 
c L'article 10, aUnea 1'', d e ! 'Accord d e  coop�ration mi lit<� ire 
technique pw·oit le versement par le Gouvernement togol..tis, i 
titre de con tribution aux depenses supportees par le Gouver· 
nem ent fran�ais, d'une allocat ion pour ch aque assistant militaire 
technique doot le montant et les modalites de versement sont 
determines d'un commu n accord e n tre les deux Gouvernements. 
c A 1a sulte des �hanges de \'ues qui on t eu lieu entre nos 
deux delegations, les taux mensuels  suivants ont �':S relen us 
pour cette allocation qui compre nd : 
c - une iodemnit� d e logement : 
c 40 000 F C. F. A. pour un celibataire ; 
c 45 000 F C. F. A. po u r uo men age sans enfan: ,  
a uxqu els i l  ron\'ient d'ajouter 5 000 F C. F.  A. par enfant, le  
pltrfoo d etant fixe a 60 000 F C. F. A. ; 
c - une indemnite forfaitaire de 10 000 F C. F. A (lour tenir 
com pte d es servitudes specifiqu es. 
c L'allocati.on est due pour chacun des assistant; m.ilitaires 
techniques pour la totalite du sejou r a u  Togo, y rompris hi 
duree de coo.ge reg1ementaire pour l es cadres qui, ex:eptionneJ. 
lement, y foot deux sejours con.>ecutifs. 
c Le �ernement de la Republique togolaise mettra un 
agent quali!ie ia la disposition du Bureau d'aide rnilitaire pour 
l'a..ider 1 gerer ies logements des assistants militaires techniques. 
c Un titre de recette, etabli sur la base des effectw const•tes 
au 1•• janvier, comprenant le personnel en service ou en conge 
reglernenWre, sera emis par le Gou,·ernement de la Republique 
franca..ise et couvrira la periode s'�t.endant du 1 •• jaavier au 
30 n ovembre. 
c Le montant de ce titre de recett.e sera verse par le Gouver­
aement � -la Republique togo!iise avant le 1 .. decembre. 
c Le titre de i"ecette du mois de docembre sera Wl titre de 
r�gularis.ation pour tenir compte de la situation de; elfectils 
reels entre le 1 .. jam,ier et le 3:0 novembre. 
c Le titre de recette du mois d e  d ecembre sera rtgl6 avant le 
31 mars de l'annee suivante. 
c Les dispositions prevues ci-dessus pourront etre ��.umin�ea 
i la demande de l'une ou !'autre des Parties. 
c J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir me �onfirmer 
!'accord de votre Gouvernement sur les dispositions qai prec6-
dent. • 
J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que les dispositionJ cont.enues 
da.ns cett.e �ettre recueinent !'agrement du Gouverne.roent togolais. 
Je vous prie d'agreer, Monsieur le lfinistre, les aSJurances d� 
m a  haute consiMntion. 
A Y1 HOUENOU B"tJ!(LJ:I)J:, 
Ministre des affairu �eru 
de l4 Repu.blique ft)golaise. 
A. N. 125 - T. C. A. 931 .  - lmprimerie des Jouroaux of!'kieh, Paris. 
i on Ex c e l l en c e , 
Lome , l e  2 J m a r s 1 9 7 6  
Mon si eur l e  Mini s t r e , 
L ' ar t i c l e  1 0 ,  a l i n e a  l er ,  d e  1 1 A c c o rd d e  
c o op e ra t i o n  m i l i t a i r e  t e chn i qu e  prevo i t  l e  v e r s ement 
par le gouv e rn em e n t  t o go l a i s ,  a ti tre de c o n t ri bu t i on 
aux d e p en s e s  supp or t e e s  par l e  gouvern em en t fran � ai s ,  
d 1 une a l l o c a t i on p o u r  chaqu e a s s i s tan t m i l i t ai r e  t e ch­
nique d o n t  l e  m on t an t  e t  l e s  m o d a l i t e s  de v e r s e m en t 
s ont d e t ermi n e s  d ' un c ommun ac c o rd en t r e  l e s  d eux 
gouvernem en t s .  
A l a  s u i t e  d e s  e change s de vu e s  qui o n t  eu 
l i eu e n t r e  no s d eux d e l e ga t i on s , les t aux m e n su e l s  suivan t :  
ont e t e  r e t enu s p ou r  c e t t e  a l l o c a t i on qui c ompr end 
- une ind emni t e  d e  l o ge m e n t  d e  
40 0 0 0  F CFA , p o ur un c e l iba t a i r e , 
4 5 0 0 0  F CFA , p our un m e nage s an s  e n:fan t , 
auxque l s  i l  c onvi e n t  d 1 a j ou t er 5 000 F CFA p a r  en :fan t ,  
l e  p l a :fo nd e t a n t  :fi x e  a 60 000 F CFA . 
- une i nd emni t e  for:fai t a i r e  d e  I O  000 F CFA pour teni r 
c omp t e  d e s  s ervi t ud e s  s p e c i :fique s .  
. . .  I . . .  
l o n s i eur Ayi Houenou HUNLEDE 
l i n i s t r e  d e s  A:f:fair es E trange r e s 
, ,.... , _, o �  ....... ,. , h 1 ; , , ., n t '"' r?'"' l  � ;  c:: CJ. 
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L ' a l l o c a t i on e s t  du e pour c h a c un d e s  a s s i s t an t s  
m i l i t a i r e s  t e chni qu e s  p our l a  to t a l i t e  d u  s e j our au To go , 
y c ompri s l a  du r e e  d e  c onge r e gl emen t a i r e  p o ur l e s  cadre s 
qui e x c ep t i o nn e l l em e n t  y 1on t d eux s e j ou r s  c on s e cu t i 1 s . 
Le gou v ern em en t  d e  l a  R epub l i qu e  t o go l ai s e  m e t tra 
un agen t q u a l i 1 i e a l a  di spo s i t i on du Bur eau d 1 Ai d e  Mi l i ­
t a i r e  p o u r  l ' aid er a g e r e r  l e s l o gem en t s  d e s  a s s i s tan t s  
m i l i t a i r e s  t e chn i qu e s . 
Un t i t r e  d e  r e c e t t e , e t abl i  s u r  l a  b a s e  d e s  
eff e c t i f s  c on s t a t e s  au 1 er j anvi er , c omprenant l e  p er s o nn 
en s e rvi c e  ou en c onge r e gl e m en t a i r e , s era e m i s par l e  
gouv e rn em e n t  d e  l a  Republ i qu e  1ran� a i s e  e t  c o uvrira l a  
p e r i o d e  du 1 er j anvi er au J O  nov embr e . 
Le m o n t ant d e  c e  t i t r e  d e  r e c e t t e  s era v e r s e  
p a r  l e  gou v e rn em e n t  d e  l a  Repub l i qu e  t o go l ai s e  avan t l e  
1 er d e c embr e . 
Le t i tr e  d e  r e c e t t e  du m o i s d e  d e c embre s era 
un t i t r e  d e  r e gu l ari s a t i on pour t eni r c omp t e  de la s i tua­
t i on d e s  e 11 e c t i 1 s  r e e l s en t r e  le 1 er j anvi e r  e t  le JO n o ­
vembr e . 
Le t i t r e  d e  r e c e t t e  du mo i s  d e  d e c embre s era 
r e gl e  avan t l e  J 1 mar s de 1 1 ann e e  s u i van t e .  
Le s d i spo s i t i on s  p r e vu e s  ci -d e s su s  pourron t 
e tr e  r e e x am i n e e s  a l a  d emand e d e  l ' un e  ou 1 1 au t r e  d e s  
Par t i.e s .  
. . .  I . . .  
t 
• 
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J ' a i l ' honneur d e  vous pri er d e  bi en voul oir 
me c on1i rm e r 1 1 a c c o rd d e  vo tre gouv e rn e m e n t  sur l e s  
d i sp o s i t i on s  qui pr e c e d en t . 
Veui l l e z  agr e er , Mon si eur l e  M i n i s t r e , 
l e s  a s s u ran c e s  d e  m a  hau t e  c o n s i d era t i on . 
" C opi e c er t i 1i e e  c o n1orm e a 1 1 ori gina l " 
a L0me , l e  2 J m a r s  1 9 7 6  
J ean d e  LIPKOWSKI 
Mini s t r e  d e  l a  C o o p era t i on 
d e  l a  Repub l i qu e  1ran9ai s e  
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Lot n• 7�94 du 6 fulllet 1 978 autorinnt !'approbation de I• 
con�ntion fudlcialre enfr·e le �vemem�t de la R�bllque 
fr.n�ai� et le Gouvern.ment de la R'publiqve t09Qiaiu, 
1igM. i Loml le 23 mars 1 976 (1). l 
L'Assemblee nationale et le senat ont adopte, 
Le President de la .Repu blique promulgue la loi dont la 
teneur suit : 
Articl� u11iqtU. - Est auwrisee !'.approbation de la eonven· 
tion judiciaire entre le Gou�mement de a Republique fran· 
caise et le Goovernement de la Republique togolaise, signee i 
Lome le 23 mars 1976, dont le texte est annexe i la presente 
loi (2). 
La presen te loi sera executee comme loi de l'Etal . / 
Fait i Paris, le 6 juillet 1978 .. 
YALtRY ClSCARD D'E:sTA.lNC. 
Pu I� Prkldent de la Republlque : 
Le Prtmin minutre, 
L\ YMOHP IIARR.L 
Le minittre de1 affairu ltrangt:r�•. 
LOUIS Dl CIJIRJNCAUD. 
loi n• 71-094 TIAVAUX I'RfPARATOIRfS (1) 
u.,., , 
Prol-' rM loi n• 2S8 (lffl-19781 1 ....._, <M M. Jocq-. Gentof, ..,· nom rM lt ....-luicn deo affair• 
... � .....  n• 310 (lffl-1971) 1 • O;ICVUion tl adoption lt 20 .,;1 1 971. 
As .. ,..bU. norlonole 1 
Projel do lol, tdos>te pw le 5en.t (n• 129) 1 • 
•. · ·. 
· lt<>oort <M M. S.Vmel, _tu nom <M le conwnlaioft dos .Hair• Mr.no� 
(n• 2""1 1 · · Oiocuoaicn of odootlon lt 29 jv;n 1971. 
(2) D sera publie lllterleurement Ill Jo"� officiel 
LOI n• 7�95 dv 6 fuUiet 1971 autorlsant l'�robation de l'acconl de c�ration en mati,re cfinformltion �tr. le 
GouverMment de la Rl,wf; lique fran�alM et le GouvertMment 
de la R�ublique togofaiM, slgne A Lomi le 22 mars 1 976 {1). 
. -··--
t'Assemblee nationale et le �at ont adopte, 
: Le President de. la Republique promul&ue la lol dont la 
teneur suit : 
.Article uniqtU. � Est autori�e l'approbatiOn de i'aceord de 
cooperation en m.atiere d'information entre le Gouvernement 
de la Repllblique frantaise et le Gouvernement de la Repu· 
bUque togolaise, signe 1 Lo� le 23 man 1976, et dont le texte 
' ·  
est annexe i la presente loi (2). · 
La present.e loi sera ex�tee comme lol de i'Etat. · 
Fait 1 Paris, le 6 julHet l978. 
. , . . . � . . : .. VAL.fRY CISCARD D'ESTAING. Par le President de la RepubUque := 
w Premier ministre, 
JL\ YMOHP II..UtKC. 
� . . � . . .  
. .  �. Le ministre du ai/aire, itrangere1, ��..,'.P.Ht::.• . ,.,.."":?.(�.'r!:-: �� .l.OUIS PE CUlJUNCAUD •.. • ::�\ .. ' . 
w4 n• 78-69$ TIAVAUX PUPAIATOIRES (I) 
Unat l 
rrot.t de lol n• 2S6 (19n-197&l , loDC>Ort · dot  M. JOCQ\Iet Gent011, tu nom de le commluioft des .Hal .... 4tung""· n• 308 (l9n-1978J 1 
o;ocvuion M adooticn .. 20 avrU 1978. 
i • 
Lot n• 7�96 cfu 6 fui llet 1 971 autorisant l'approbation 
!'accord a cooperation mllitaire technique �tre le Gouv 
n.ment et. la Republlque fra�al� et le Gouvernement 
la Repu&U� t�olai�. enumble un ed\anee de lettr 
lignH I LOIM le 23 mars 1976 (1}. 
L' Assemblee nation ale et le senat ont .ado pie, 
Le President de la .Republique promulgue la Jol dont 
teneur suit : 
Article unique. - Est 1 utoris.ee J'approb.at ion de l'acco 
de cooperation militaire technique entre le Gouvernement ' 
la Republique frantaise et le Gouvernement de la Rcpubliqt 
togolaise, ensemble un kbange de lettres, signes 1 Lome 
23 mars 1976, et dont les textes soot annexes i la presen 
loi (2} .  
· La presente toi sera executee comme loi d e  l'Etat. 
Fait 1 Paris, le 6 j uillet 1978. 
VALDtY CISCARD D'ESTAL'iC. 
Par le Preddent de la RtpubUque : 
Le Premier ministr�. 
llA YMOND IIAJUlL 
Le mini.stre t:U1 affairel itTangert:! 
LOUll DE CUIRL'iGAVD. 
lol n • 78-496 TIAVAUX P1ttPAlATOIRES (1) 
Sb>el •  ;,.oiM cM. loi t1° 257 (lffl· 191IJ I 
'-ott de M. J-..a Go.oton. .., • ,_ <M le commls&lon d• .Ha<rw 
·.- ftr.,..._ •• 309 tl9n·I971J , 
Oiocuulon et adoption t. 20 awll 1971. 
Auemb�M _,_,. I 
Proiet <M lol, edopti - le �'' (n• 125) 1 
1.-otf • M. e.um.1, flU t10m rM lt co"'"'iuion de. •ffolr .. 41ron�• 
"'. 24)h . . ·• . .  - ... . . . Olt.:uuicn et .doPtlon .. 29 jvln 1971. 
f!J U. .eroDt pubiU. ulteneu�ment n Journal_ offKUl . . 
LOI n• 71-697 du 6 fulllet 1978 autoriscnt l'approhation de 
Yaccord de coo�ration dens le domaine maritime entre le 
Govvernement a I• Republique fra�ai� et le Gouvemernent de la Rlf"'blique togolaiu, en�mble un edtanee de lettru, 
ligr* I Lome le 23 mars 1976 (1) • 
L'Assemblee n.ationale et le senat ont adopte-, 
Le President de la Republique promulgue la lol dent la 
teneur suit : . 
Article tmique. - Est autorisee !'approbation de !'.accord 
de cooperation dans le domai.ne maritime entre le Gouverne­
ment de la Republique fran�aise et le GouverDement de la 
Republique togolaise, ensemble un ecbange de lettres, s�n� 
l Lome le 23 mars 1976, et dont les textes sont annexes 1 
la presente loi (2). . La pr�nte lol sera executee comme loi de l'Etat. 
Fait 1 Paris, le 8 juillet 1978. 
VALfRY CISCARD D'J:sTAINC • 
Par le Prbldent de la Republlque : 
u Premier ministr�. 
.llA YMOND IIAJUlL . 
. . . - ... r � Le mini.stre tU! af/airu etrangeru, ' .. �.,;:.·:.�.._� . .. • ... :·: . .. : .. :� ..:. .. .. . · . · LOUtS �E curamca�- ; 
loi ... � 
5enol 1 •• 
TIAVAUX PIEPARATOIRfS (1) 
Proiet <M lol n• 25.5 11977-1 971) 1 
lto>c>o<t <M M. Jocquoa Genton, ou ,._ de la commlaian dft off•;,.. ....... �... ... 307 (lffl-1971) 1 
[);ecuuioft M eclot>t;on I• 20 ,..,.;1 I 971. 
Au�mbl/,t notional• 1 
Proiet <M lol, adoote - le Unot (n• 1261 1 •. · AIHmbiH ,.,,,_,. 1 lt1>1>0<1 de M. "-ntt, .., """' rM la c.ommiaion cM. .Hai,.. 4tr�,.. (n• 2411 1 . Olaa�uion et odoofion la 29 fuln 1971. 
(2) D sera pubUi ulterleurement au Journal o/ficlel 
Projet rM lol, edoc>t4 r>« lt S.nal (n• 127) 1 
hooort 0. M. ltumel, au nom <M 14 commiuian dos aHolra ifrongf<• 
(n• ::IQ) I D;OCUN;- M edootioft le 29 j<lin 1971. 
12) n. aero.ot publles ulteneurement Ill Journ4l offidri. 
<.JU I 
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ACCORD de cooperation militaire technique 
entre le gouvernement de la Republique fran­
�aise et le gouvernement de la Republique du 
Tchad. 
Du 6 mars 1976 (A) (B).  
A nnexe et modele d'imprime : Une annexe.  
Textes abroges : 
Voir !'article 2 1 .  
Accord d'assistance militaire technique du 
19 mai 1 964 (BOC/SC, 1968 , p .  1 125) .  
L e  gouvernement d e  la Republique fran<;:aise , 
d'une part , 
Le gouvernement de la Republique du Tchad , 
d'autre part , 
Soot convenus des dispositions suivantes : 
TITRE P REMIER. 
DES PERSONNELS MILIT AIRES FRAN<;AIS. 
Art. ler. A la demande du gouvernement de la 
Republique du Tchad , le gouvernement de la 
Republique fran�aise apporte, dans la limite de 
ses possibilites, le concours en personnels mili­
taires fran<;:ais q ui lui sont necessaires pour ! 'orga­
nisation et !'instruction des forces armees du 
Tchad. Ces personne ls sont mis pour emploi a la 
disposition du haut commandement des forces 
armees tchadiennes. 
Art. 2. Le go�rnement de la Republique du 
Tchad determine 'chaque annee et communique 
au gouvernement de la Republique fran�aise la 
liste des postes a pourvoir' la  description des emplois, les qualifications requises et les lieux 
d'affectation prevus pour les personnels a mettre 
en p l ace sous rese rve des d isposi t ions  d e  
!'article 3 ci-apres. 
Le gouvernement de la Republique fran�aise 
fait connaitre dans un delai maximum de quatre 
mois au gouvernement de la  Republique du 
Tchad les postes qu'il est e n  mesure d'honorer.  
Art. 3. Les personnels fran�ais sont designes 
par le gouvernement fran�ais apres agrement du 
gouvernement de la Republique du Tchad, pour 
une duree fixee conformement a la  reglementa-
(A) BOC. 1978. p. 2343 (extraits) . 
(B) Publie par decret n" 78-568 du 2 1 avril 1978 
(JO du 30, p. 1 9 1 9) cet accord est entre en 
vigueur le 1 e r  mars 1 978. 
tion fran<;aise sur les sejours a l 'exte rieur ; cette 
duree p e u t  etre prolongee ou redu ite d ' u n  
commun accord entre les deux go uvernements. 
Tout changemeni d'affectation ou de lieu de 
residence en cours de se jour est arrete apres 
consultation e ntre les autorites competentes de la 
Republique fran�aise et de la Republique d u  
Tchad. 
Art. 4. Les p�rsonnels militaires fran�ais ser­
vent dans les forces armees tchadiennes avec leur 
grade. lis revetent l 'uniforme tchadien ou la 
tenue civile suivant les instructions de l 'autorite 
militaire tchadienne . 
lis sont tenus de se conformer aux reglements 
en vigueur dans les forces armees tchadiennes 
sous reserve des dispositions du premier alinea de 
! 'article 5 ci-dessous. 
Ils ne peuvent en aucun cas participer directe­
ment a !'execution d'operations de guerre, ni de 
maintien ou de retablissement de l'ordre ou de la  
legalite. 
Art. 5. Les pe rsonnels mil i taire s  fran�ais 
conservent les statuts qui sontles leurs dans la  
reglementation fran<;aise. 
A ce titre , i ls  sont affectes a une formation dite 
<< Bureau de cooperation militaire » qui releve de 
l 'ambassade de France et qui est placee sous 
l 'autorite de l 'officier fran�ais le plus ancien dans 
le grade le plus eleve mis a la disposition de la 
Republique du Tchad .  
L e s  appreciations portees par les autorites 
tchadiennes sur la  maniere de servir des inte­
resses soot adressees au gouvernement fran�ais ; 
en cas d'indiscipline ou de faute professionnell e ,  
i ls  n ' e ncoure n t ,  de la part d u  gouvernemen t  
tchadien,  d'autres sanctions que l a  remise moti­
vee a la disposition du gouvernement fran�ais,  
assortie s' i l  y a lieu d'une demande de sanction . 
Les dispositions du present alinea ne font pas 
obstacle a la mise en jeu par Jes autorites fran­
�aises des procedures disciplinaires prevues par le 
statut des interesses. Le gouvernement fran�ais 
est tenu de faire con naitre aux autorites tcha­
diennes la suite donnee auxdites procedures. 
Toutes les decisions du commandement tcha­
dien les concernant son t  portees a la connaissance 
de l 'ambassade de France aupres de la Republi­
que du Tchad, de meme toutes dispositions les 
concernant prises par les autorites fran�aises sont 
portees a la conna issance de l'autorite tcha­
dienne.  
L'examen des problemes concernant la situa­
tion des perso nnels militaires fran�ais au regard 
de leur statut peut faire l'objet de missions des 
autorites fran�aises.  Les conditions dans les­
quelles s'accomplissent ces missions sont fixees 
par entente e ntre les deux gouvernements. 
Art. 6. Dans l 'exercice de leurs fonctions les 
personnels militaires fran�ais mis a la disposition 
du gouvernement de la Republique du Tchad 
re�oiven t  de ce gouvernement l'aide et la protec­
tion q u'il accorde aux personnels de ses propres 
forces armees. 
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Art. 7. Le gouvernement de la Republique du 
Tchad prend a sa charge la reparation des dom­
mages causes par les personnels militaires fran­
<;ais dans l 'cxercice ou a !'occasion de l'exercice 
de leurs fonctions. En cas d'action j udiciaire 
intentee a ! 'occasion de tels dommages le gouver­
nement de la Republique du Tchad se substitue 
dans ! ' instance aux personnels militaires fran<;ais 
mis en cause . 
Au cas ou le dommage resulterait d'une faute 
personnelle le gouvernement de la Republique du 
Tchad pourra en demander reparation au gouver­
nement de la Republique fran<;aise . 
Art. 8. Les personnels mil i taires fran<;ais mis a 
la disposition de la Republique du Tchad demeu­
rent sous juridiction fran<;aise pour les infractions 
commises dans le service ou a ! 'occasion du 
service et sont places sous juridiction tchadienne 
pour les infractions commises en dehors du 
service . 
Pour les infractions commises dans le service 
ou a !'occasion du service , les auteurs desdites 
infractions sont remis immediatement a l 'ambas­
sade de France en vue de leur rapatriement pour 
prese ntation devant les juridictions fran<;aises 
competentes ,  l e  gouve rnement fran<;ais etant 
tenu d'informer le  gouvernement de la Republi­
que du Tchad des suites judiciaires donnees a 
l 'affaire. 
Pour les infractions commises e n  dehors du 
service , la Republique du Tchad accepte, si les 
autorites fran<;aises en font  la demande : 
- que les auteurs soient , si les circonstances 
! 'exigent ,  astreints a residence, sous surveillance, 
en un l ieu fixe en terri toire tchadien,  d 'un 
commun accord entre les autorites tchadiennes et 
les autorites fran<;aises e n  vue de leur comparu­
tion devant la juridiction tchadienne competente ; 
- que les peines soient infligees par les juridic­
lions tchadiennes soient purgees dans les etablis­
sements penitentiaires fran<;ais.  
Sont decidees, selon la legislation fran<;aise sur 
!'avis du parquet etabli pres la j uridiction tcha­
dienne qui  a prononce la condamnation, les 
commutations, reductions et remises g racieuses, 
liberations conditionnelles et autres modalites 
d'execution des peines. Les decisions sont noti­
fiees par l e  gouvernement fran.;:ais au parquet 
etabli pres la j uridiction tchadienne ayant pro­
nonce la condamnatio n .  
Les dispositions relatives a u x  infractions corn­
mises en dehors du service , sont applicables aux 
membres de la famille du m ilitaire fran<;ais n!si­
dant avec lui au Tchad. 
Le rapatriement d'un membre de sa famille 
entraine celui du cooperant mil itaire technique 
fran<;ais. 
Art. 10 .  Le gouvernement de la Republique du 
Tchad fournit gratuitement aux cooperants mili­
taires techniques fran<;ais les logements meubles 
et equipes qui leur sont r1eccssaires pour e ux­
memes et pour leurs families.  Ces logements 
doive nt correspondre a leur grade . 
Les personnels de la coopera tion mil i taire 
technique fran<;aise et leurs families,  d'une part , 
les mil itaires tchadiens e t  leurs families,  d'autre 
part, jouissent  des orgar'lismes communs (mess, 
cercles, clubs, etc. ) ,  sous reserve du respect de la 
reglementation propre a ces orga nismes .  
L e  gouvernement de la Republique d u  Tchad 
dispense, dans la mesure de ses moyens,  les soins 
medicaux et hospitaliers dont peuvent avoir be­
soin les personnels de la cooperation militaire 
technique et leurs families. 
Art. 1 1 . Les personnels vises par le present 
accord peuvent  importer en franchise de tous 
droits et taxes de douanes leurs effets et objets 
personnels , a !'exclusion des vehicules a usage 
prive , sous reserve que ces effets et ob jets soient 
en cours d'usage et que leur importation ait lieu 
dans un delai de six mois apres leur arrivee au 
Tchad.  lis peuvent les reexporter dans les memes 
conditions de franchise a leur depart definitif. 
lis jouissent du droit de transferer l ibrement 
sur la France le montant des economies realisees 
sur les remunerations et indemnites afferentes a 
leur emploi et ,  fors de leur rapatriement definitif, 
le produit de la vente eventuelle en Republique 
du Tchad de leurs vehicules, biens mobiliers et  
effets personnels apres acquittement des droits de 
douane y afferents. 
Art. 12. Le regime fiscal du personnel militaire 
de cooperation technique est celui defini par 
!'article 17 de la convention relative au concours 
en personnel apporte par la Republique fran<;aise 
au fonctionnement des services publics de la 
Republique du Tchad , et par le protocole relatif 
au regime fiscal applicable au personnel de la 
cooperation fran<;aise au Tchad, a !'exclusion de 
son article 2,  qui est remplace par les dispositions 
de l 'alinea suivant : 
Le montant brut imposable comprend, a !'ex­
clusion de tout supplement, majoration ou alloca­
tion de caractere fam ilial  et deduction faite des 
retenues ou versements obligatoires a la charge 
de l ' interesse pour constitution de retraite ou 
securite sociale , la remuneration versee a ! ' inte­
resse au titre de la periode de presence au Tchad. 
TITRE 11 .  
DE LA FORMATION EN FRANCE 
DES PERSONNELS 
DES FORCES ARMEES TCHADIENNES. 
Art. 9. Le gouvernement . de la Republique fran<;aise prend a sa charge les droits acquis par 
les personnels mi litaires fran<;ais - solde et 
accessoires, primes diverses - frais de transport 
de France a N'Djamena et retour. 
Art. 13. Le gouvernement de la Republique 
fran<;aise assure, dans la mesure de ses moyens et 
sur la demande du gouvernement de la Rep ubli­
que du Tchad, la formation et le perfectionne­
ment des personnels des forces armees tcha­
diennes. 
j l l  
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Les n ationaux tchadiens sont admis dans les 
ecoles et etablisse me nts militaires franc;:ais, soit 
par concours dans les memes conditions q ue les 
nationaux franc;:ais,  soit dans la limite d'un contin­
gent special fixe an nuellement e t  comportant 
amenagement de ces conditions.  
E n  outre , certains besoins exceptionnels peu­
vent faire l 'objet de conventions particulieres qui 
seront etudiees cas par cas. 
Art. 14. Le gouvernement de la Republique 
franc;:aise prend a sa charge les frais de transport 
et d 'instruction des nationaux tchadiens admis 
dans les ecoles et etablissements militaires fran­
c;:ais . 
Le gouvernement de la Republique du Tchad 
prend a sa charge les depenses de solde et les frais 
d'entretien de ses stagiaires. 
Les dispositions de ! 'article 10, alinca 3, du 
present accord sont applicables aux stagiaires 
tchadiens et a leurs families en France. 
Art. IS. Les stagiaires tchadiens en France sont 
j usticiables d e  dispositions analogues a celles 
pn!vues aux articles 7 e t  8 pour les cooperants 
m i l i t aires techniques  fran c;:ais en service au 
Tchad. 
TITRE III . 
DE LA FOURNITURE DE MATERIEL 
ET D'EQUIPEMENT MILIT AIRE. 
Art. 16. Le gouvernement de la Republique du 
Tchad peut s'adresser au gouvernement de la 
Republ ique fra n c;:aise  pour la fournit ure e t  
l 'entretien ,  a titre gratuit o u  onereux , de mate­
riels et d'equipement militaires .  
Le gouvernement de la  Republique du Tchad 
peut demander le concours de la Republique 
franc;:aise au sou� logistique des forces armees 
tchadiennes, qui  est  fourni dans des conditions 
fixees par u n e  convention particuliere. 
TITRE IV. 
DES F ACILITES DE TRANSIT ET D'ESCALE 
ACCORDEES PAR LA REPUBLIQUE DU 
TCHAD A LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;AISE. 
Art. 17. Le gouvernement de la Republique du 
Tchad autorise le transit clan s  son espace aerie n  
avec o u  sans escale d u  personnel e t  du materiel 
des forces armees franc;:aises transportes par aero­
nefs civils ou m i litaires .  
L'autorisation est  accordee sur la demande du 
gouvernement franc;:ais comportant entre autres 
indications le point de depart , la  destination , la 
mission, la nature du chargement et eventuel le­
ment l'escale demande e .  
Art. 18. L e  survol d e  l' espace aerien tchadien 
par des aeronefs militaires franc;:ais et les escales 
de ces appareils sont soumis a autorisation prea­
lable ; les liaisons regulieres font l'objet d'autori­
sations permanentes valables pour une duree de 
six mois . 
Art. 19 .  Le gouvernement de la Republique du 
Tchad apporte . dans la mesure de ses moyens.  le 
concours de ses services pour faciliter les opera­
tions d'escale et de· ravitaillement sur son terri­
toire des aeronefs des forces armees franc;:aises.  
Le cas echean t ,  i l  autorise la venue d 'une 
equipe de depan nage . 
TITRE V .  
DISPOSITIONS DIVERSES. 
Art. 20. En matiere de cooperation mil itaire 
technique (personnels,  formation,  fournitures de 
materiels et equipements, facilites de transit et 
d 'escale . . .  ) , l 'ambassade de France aupres de la 
Republique du Tchad est l ' i nterlocuteur du gou­
vernement de la Republique du Tchad. 
Art. 21.  Le present accord rem p lace et abroge . 
clans les relations entre Ies deux parties contrac­
tantes, ! 'accord de defense signe le 15 aout 1960 ( 1 )  ainsi que ses annexes et !'accord d 'assistance 
militaire technique signe le 19 mai 1964. Toutes 
dispositions contraires au present accord sont 
a nnulees. 11 est conclu pour une duree de deux ans 
renouvelable par tacite reconductio n ,  sauf denon­
ciation par l'une des parties contractantes. La 
denonciation doit etre notifiee par voie diploma­
tique au moins six mois a l'avance . 
Le present  accord entrera en vigueur le p re­
mier jour du deuxieme mois suivant l 'echange des 
instruments d 'approbation, lequel aura lieu aus­
sit6t que faire se pourra . 
Chacun e  des parties contractantes peut de­
mander a tout moment la modification d'une ou 
plusieurs dispositions du present accord et l 'ou­
verture de negociations a cet effet.  
Fait a N'Dj amena, le 6 mars 1 976, en double 
exemplaire original en langue franc;:aise . 
Pour le gouvernement 
de la Republique franc;:aise : 
Le Premier ministre, 
Jacques CHIRAC. 
Pour le gouvernement 
de la Republique du Tchad : 
Le president du conseil superieur militaire, 
chef de I' Et at, 
General Felix MALLOUM NGAKOUTOU 
BEY-NDI. 
( I )  Public par decret n" 60- 1230 du 23 no­
vembre 1960 ( n . i .  BO : JO du 24 . p. 1 0459) .  
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A N N E X E  ( 1 ) . 
A L'ACCORD DE COOPERATION MILITAIRE 
TECHNIQUE RELATIVE AU FONCTION­
NEMENT DE L' HOPITAL MILITAIRE DE 
N'DJAMENA. 
Le gouvernement de la Republique fran�aise 
d'une part , 
Le gouvernement de la Republique du Tchad 
d'autre part, 
Considerant les l iens d'amitie et de cooperation 
q ui existent e ntre les deux Etats ; 
Considerant les accords de cooperation entre les 
deux Etats e n  date du 6 mars 1976, 
Soot convenus de ce qui suit : 
Art. ler. Le gouvernement de la Republique 
du Tchad apporte les locaux necessaires au sup­
port de cette format ion , assure son fonctionne­
ment et son entretien , fournit dans la mesure du 
possible le personnel medical et paramedical 
necessaire , et assure son approvisionnement en 
medicaments et equipements sanitaires . 
Art. 2. Le gouvernement de la Republique 
fran�aise participe au fonctionnement de cette 
formatio n .  11 contribue a son approvisionnement 
en medicaments et  equipements sanitaires, met a 
la disposition de la Republique du Tchad les 
personnels dont le nombre et  la qualification soot 
definis chaque annee par le gouvernement de la 
Republique du Tchad .  
Art. 3 .  L e  personnel militaire fran�ais affecte a 
cet h6pital sert au titre de la cooperation militaire 
techn ique fran�aise et est soumis aux dispositions 
prevues par ! 'accord de cooperation mil itaire 
techn ique du 6 mars 1976. Le person nel sanitaire 
civil fran�ais affecte a cette formatio n  sert au titre 
de ! 'accord de cooperation technique du 6 mars 1976. 
Art. 4. L'h6pital militaire assure des services 
de consultation , d'examen paraclinique et d'hos­
pitalisatio n .  Les malades y sont admis par pres­
criptions exclusives des organismes medicaux pu­
blics civils et militaires de consultation et d'hospi­
talisation du premier degre , apres accord du 
directeur du service de sante des forces armees 
tchadiennes. 
(1) Cette annexe est e ntree e n  vigueur le 27 j anvier 1978. 
Art. 5 .  La defin ition des beneficiaires des 
prestations de cette formation fera l'objet d 'une 
instruction du ministre de la defense nationale et 
des anciens com battants de la Republique du 
Tchad . 
Art. 6. Afin de permettre ! 'attenuation des 
charges afferentes a ses activites, cet etablisse­
ment militaire tchadien f;:St habilite a percevoir 
aupres des malades ou de leurs employeurs les 
frais medicaux et d'hospitalisation engages a leur 
profit .  
Art. 7. Le gouvernement de la  Republique du 
Tchad communiquera au gouvernement de la 
Republique fran�aise ! 'ense mble des dispositions 
reglementaires concernant le fonctionnement de 
cette formatio n .  
Art. 8 .  L a  presente annexe est etablie dans le 
cadre de l'annee civile pour une duree de trois ans 
renouvelable par t acite reconduction.  
Art. 9.  Chacune des parties contractantes noti­
fiera a ! 'autre l 'accomplissement des procedures 
requises pour sa mise e:t vigueur qui prenda effet a la date de la notificatio n .  
N'Djamena, le 1 9  j uin 1 976. 
Pour le gouvernement 
de la Republique fran�aise : 
L 'ambassadeur de France 
aupres de la Republique du Tchad, 
Louis DALLIER. 
Pour l e  gouvernement 
de la  Republique du Tchad : 
Le ministre des affaires etrangeres 
de la cooperation, 
Kamougue WADAL AB DELKADER. 
5 i � 
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CONVENTION entre le gouvernement de la Re­
publique fran�;aise et le gouvernement de la 
Republique du Tchad fixant les regles et condi­
tions du concours de la Republique fran�;aise au 
soutien logistique des forces armees de la Repu­
blique du Tchad. 
Du 6 mars 1976 (A) (B).  
Le gouvernement de la Republique franc;aise, 
d'une part , 
Le gouve rnement de la Republique du Tchad, 
d'autre part , 
Dans le cadre des dispositions generales prevues 
par !' accord de cooperation militaire tech­
nique , 
Soot convenus de ce qui suit : 
Article premier. 
Objet de la convention. 
A la demande du gouvernement de la Republi­
que du Tchad le concours de la Republique 
franc;aise au soutien logistique des forces armees 
de la Republique du Tchad est fourni dans les 
conditions ci-apn!s : 
Article 2 .  
Principe du soutien. 
La Republique du Tchad est responsable du 
soutien logistique de ses unites et en assume 
normalement la charge financiere. 
La Republique franc;aise apporte son concours, a titre onereux ou exceptionnellement a titre 
gratuit, a ce soutien par des cessions de materiels 
et equipements. 
Article 3. 
Modalites du soutien. 
Les cessions ne concernent en principe que les 
materiels et fournitures necessaires aux forces 
armees de la Republique du Tchad. 
Ne soot pas inclus dans les cessions ci-dessus les 
materiels dont la fourniture fait l'objet d 'accords 
particuliers. 
(A) Mentionnee au BOC, 1982, p. 3789 ; pu­
bliee par decret 0° 78-568 du 21 avril 1 978 [10 
(N.C.)  du 30, p. 1919) .  
(B) Cette convention est  entree en vigueur le 
1er mars 1978. 
Article 4. 
Prevision des besoins. 
Les previsions globales des commandes a effec­
tuer en France par I'a.rmee nationale pour une 
gestion donnee soot presentees en temps op­
portun sous la forme d'une demande generale 
d'approvisionnement etablie par categorie de 
materiels et suivant la nomenclature habituelle. 
Toutefois, Ies demandes de munitions doivent 
etre formulees un an avant la date prevue pour la 
livraison.  
Les demandes ou commandes exceptionnelles, 
nees de besoins inopines ou s'ecartant des normes 
de I'entretien courant peuvent etre presentees en 
dehors de la demande generale d'approvisionne­
ment annuelle mais soot,  autant que possible,  
regroupees trimestriellement et honorees dans Ies 
meilleurs delais. 
Les besoins exprimes sous forme de demande 
generale d'approvisionnement ou de demandes 
exceptionnelles font l'objet de la part des auto­
rites franc;aises d'une etude concernant les possi­
bilites de fournitures ( delais et  prix) dont les 
resultats soot communiques aux autorites tcha­
diennes. Au vu de ces renseignements, les auto­
rites tchadiennes adressent eventuellement une 
commande ferme pour Ies cessions retenues. 
Toutes ces demandes soot adressees a I 'ambas­
sade de France aupres de la  Republique du 
Tchad. 
Article 5 .  
ModaJites de reception et de livraison. 
Avant la prise en charge , aupres des etablisse­
ments Iivranciers , le constat de conformite avec la 
commande est fait ,  a !'initiative du gouvernement 
de la Republique du Tchad et  par Ies personnels 
designes par lui.  
L'enlevement des materiels, matieres ou objets 
cedes, I'emballage eventuel, I'acheminement jus­
qu'au point de livraison fixe par le gouvernement 
de la Republique du Tchad soot assures par un 
transitaire agree par !edit gouvernement et habi­
lite par le ministere de la cooperation aupres des 
etablissements franc;ais livranciers. 
Les services militaires franc;ais n'interviennent 
ni dans !'execution de ces operations, ni dans leur 
reglement financier. 
Les materiels commandes soot Iivres soit globa­
Iement, soit selon la periodicite demandee . 
Article 6.  
Reglement financier des cessions. 
Toutes les cessions soot e ffectuees a titre 
onereux. Les frais de transport soot entierement a la charge de la Republique du Tchad. 
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Cessions faites au titre de la D . G . A .  annuelle : 
U ne premiere facture provisoire est adressee 
par la delegation mi nisterie lle pour l 'armement 
au gouvernement de la Republique du Tchad 
sous couvert du ministere de la  coope ration. Les 
delais de livraison des m ateriels sont precises 
dans u ne annexe . 
Au vu de cette facture, le gouvernement de la 
Republique du Tchad verse une provision egale a 30 p. 100 des sommes facturees. 
Deux cas sont alors a distinguer : 
a) Les materiels sont livres a partir des approvi­
sionnements de l'armee franr;aise. 
Dans ce cas ,  le transitaire est aussit6t avise q ue 
les materiels sont tenus a sa disposition.  
b) Les materiels sont a fabriquer. 
Dans ce cas, la commande est passee immedia­
tement a la direction interessee et le transitaire 
est avise en temps utile de la disponibilite des 
materiels. 
Apres arret definitif du montant de la cession 
et achevement de la livraison, le solde fait l'objet 
d'une seconde facture transmise au gouverne­
ment de la Republique du Tchad par Ies m emes 
voies que pn!cedemment. Cette facture est reglee 
dans les memes conditions que la premiere. 
Cessions exceptionnelles : 
Les cessions correspondant a des demandes 
exceptionnelles sont soumises aux memes regles 
que ci-dessus. Les prix de cession font l 'objet 
d'une evaluation qui est proposee a ! 'accord du 
gouvernement de la Republique du Tchad p reala­
blement a toute commande ferme au service 
livrancier. Toutefois les commandes exception-
nelles tres u rgentes pn!vues a ! 'article 4 ci-dessus 
peuvent faire l 'objet d'une Iivraison immediate. 
Article 1 .  
Duree d e  la convention. 
La pr�sente convention remplace et abroge la 
convention de soutien Iogistique du 6 fevrier 1965 ; e lle est eta blie daris le cadre de I 'annee 
civ!Ie pour une �u ree d 'un an et renouvelable par 
tacite re�onductio n ,  sauf denonciation par I' une 
des parties contractantes. La denonciation doit 
etre notifiee par voie diplomatique au moins six 
mois a I'avance. 
La . pr�sente convention entrera en vigueur le pre�Ier JOur du de uxiem e  mois suivant I 'echange 
des Instruments d'approbation,  lequel aura lie u 
aussit6t que faire se pourra. 
Chacu�e des parties contractantes peut de­
mander a tout moment la modification d'une ou 
plusieurs dispositions de la presente convention 
et I 'ouverture de negociations a cet effet. 
Fait a N'Djamena, le 6 mars 1976, en double 
exemplaire original en langue franc;aise . 
Pour le gouvernement 
de la Republique franc;aise : 
Le Premier ministre, 
Jacques CHIRAC. 
Pour le gouvernement 
de la Republique du Tchad : 
Le president du conseil superieur militaire, 
chef de /' Etat, 
General Felix MALLOUM 
NGAKOUTOU BEY-NDI . 
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ACC ORD PARTICULIER D ' ASSISTANC E MILITAIRE 
Le Gouverne ment d e  l a  Republ i q�e FranG aise et 
Le Gouvernement de l a  Repub l i que Rwandaise 
s ont c onvenu s de s di spo s it i ons suivant e s  i · ? 
a) Le Gouve rment d e  l a  Republ i que FranG aise �et a l a  d i s p o s i t i  
dan s  la me sure de s e s  moyens, du G ouve rnement d e  - l a  Repub l i que 
Rwandai s e  l e s  pers onne l s  m i l i t a ir e s  franG ai s dont le c onc ours lui e s  
n e c e s s aire p our l ' instruct i on e t  l ' ent raine ment des Forc e s  Arm e e s  
Rwand ai s e s . 
b )  Le Gouvernemen t  d e  l a  R epubl ique Rwandai s e  prend . �  s a  
charge l a  reparat i on d e s  d ommage s  cau s e s  p ar l e s  p e r s onne l s  m i l i t air 
franGai s dans l ' exerc i ce et a l ' o c c a s i on d e  l ' exerc i c e  d e  l e urs 
fonct ions . En c a s  d ' ac t i on j ud i c iaire int ent ee a l ' o c c a s i on d e  t e l s  
dommage s ,  l e  Gouvernement d e  l a  R epubl i que Rwand aise s e  sub s t itue 
d ans l ' ins t ance aux p e r s onne l s  milit a ir e s  f ran<;: ais mis en c aus e .  
Au c a s  ou l e  dommage resulterait d ' un e  faut e pers onne l l e , l e  
Gouvernement de l a  R epub l i que Rwand ai s e  p ourra e n  de mande r  rep arat i c  
au Gouvernement d e  l a  Republ i que Fran<;: ai s e .  
En cas d e  dommage sub i  dan s  l e  s e rv i c e  ou a l ' o c c as i on du s ervice , c 
m i l i t ai r e s  s ont c ouvert s par l eur s t atut . 
c )  Le Gouvernement Fran G a i s  ac c ep t e  d e  loger s e s  r e s s ort i s s �1t 
militair e s  s e  t rouvant au RWANDA . D ans la mesure ou la Repub i ique 
FranG a i s e  voudrait cons truire d e s  l ogemen t s  sur le t e rrit o ir e  de l a  
Repub l i que Rwandais e , l e  Gouvern ement Rwandais lui fac i l i t e r a  
l ' ac qu i s it ion d e s  t e rrains ne c e s s ai r e s  et tout e s  l e s  formal it e s  
l e gal e s  y r e l at ive s .  
d )  Pendant l a  dure e  de l a  p e r i od e  de s ervice , l e  Gouvern ement 
de la Repub l i que Rwanda i s e  as sure auc p e r s onne ls  et a l eurs fami l l e s J 
gratu i t e  de s me d i c ament s ,  app are lls d 'orthop edie et de prothe s e , 
prothe s e s  dent ai re s exc ep t e e s .  
L e s  s�n s  med i c aux , chirurg i c aux , obst e t r i c aux et hospi t a l i e rs sont 
donn e s  gratu itement d ans le c adre de l a  l e gi slat i on rwandaise e t  
s ont d i sp en s e s  a u  RwAliDA . Le trans fert d ' un malade dans l e s  hopitauJ 
e t r angers e s t  s�pp ort e p a r  l a  part i e  fr anG aise • 
. . . I . . . 
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e )  Le Gouve rnemen t de l a  Republ i que Rwandai s e  exonere de t ou s  
les droits  de douane ou autre s taxes , a l ' importation ou a l ' ex­
p ortation a in s i  que de toute autre e spece  de charges f i s c ale s , les 
meuble s , vehicule s et effets personnels introduits sur son 
t erritoire dans le re spect de l a  l e g i s l ation douani ert:: de  1 a  
Republique Rwandaise par l e s  personne l s  mil i t aires design e s  au · 
ainsi que p ar l e s  membre s de leurs fami l l e s  e t  
us age exc lus if.  C e s  personnel s  sent exempt .. e s  au 
3i 6 
present art icle 
de s t ines a leur 
RWANDA , de tous 
men t Franct ais . 
, 
l e s  imp8ts sur leur trait ement verse p�r l e Gouverne-
f) Ces p e r s onne l s  j ou i s s e nt du droit de trans ferer l ibrement 
sur l a  FRANCE le montant de s e c onomie s real i s e e s  sur . le s  remune­
rat ions et indemnit e s  afferent e s  a leur emp l o i  e t  l ors de l eur 
rapat riement di f init if , l e  produit de 
de l eur vehicul e , b iens mob i l i e r s  et 
ment de s droi t s  de douane afferent s .  
l a  vent e eventue l l e  au RwANDA 
e f f e t s  p er s onne l s  anres acquitte-
· '  
Art icle 2.  
Le s p e r s onn e l s  mi l it a i re s fran� ai s mis a la disp o s i t i on du 
Gouvernement de la Republique Rwandais e  s ent des ignes  par l e  
Gouvernement de l a  Repub l i que Fran9 aise apres ac c ord d u  Gouvernement 
de l a  Republique Rtvandaise . 
Le s intere sses  sont affe c t e s  a une format i on denommee "l'HSSION 
D ' ASSIS11ANCE HILI'rAIRE " . 
La dure e de s ervic e  e st de deux ans renouvel able s  ave c  
pos sibilite pour chaque Gouvernement d e  proc eder apres  c onsultat ion 
ave c  l ' autre p ar t i e  au retrait de l ' aGrement d ans l ' int eret du 
s e rvi c e . Tout changernent d ' affe c t at ion en cnurs de s e j our est  arret e 
�' ap re s c onsultat ion de s aut orit e s c ompet ent e s  de l a  Republique 
Fran� ai s e  et d e s  aut o r it e s  c o mp e t ent e s  de l a Renublique Rwandaise . 
Arti c l e  3 .  
Le s p e r s onne l s  fran9 a i s  d e  l a  I'!is s i on d ' As s i stance M i l i t aire 
s ont p l ac es s o us l ' aut orit e d ' un Offic i e r  Fran� ais de s i gne a cct e f fe t  
par l e  Gouvernement F r an� ai s apre s avi s  favorab l e s  du Gouvernement 
Rwandai s .  Le Chef de la Mis s ion d ' Assistance Militaire j oue en outre 
le r8le d ' int e rmediaire ent re l e s  autorit e s  militaire s rwandaises  
et l e s  aut orite s  fran� ai s e s  c onc ernee s  par l a  cooperat i on militaire . 
Outre s e s  responsab i l i t e s  a l ' egard d e s  ners onne l s  
mil itaires fran9 ai s ,  l e  C h e f  d e  l a  M i s s i on d ' Ass i s t anc e Mi l i t a ire 
rel eve de l ' Ambassadeur de F&\NCE ,  e t  s ous s on aut ori t e ,  il  est le 
repres entant du Chef de la 11i s s ion I1i l i t a ir e  de Cooperat i on aupres 
du Min is tre de la De fen s e  Nat ional e . Le Chef 4 e  l a  M i s s i on 
d ' As s i s t anc e  I1i l i  taire a l e s t atut d i.plo m.s.t iqt+e e t  s ert s ous 
l ' uri i f o rme franQ a i s . . . .  I . . .  
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En cas d ' ab s en c e  ou d ' ind i s p on ib i l it e ,  i l  e s t  remp lac e dans 
s on r o l e  de Che f de l a  i1i s s i on d ' As s i s t anc e M i l i t aire , p ar 
l ' O f f i c i e r  l e  PLUS ANCIEN dans le grade le PLUS e l e v e  p r e s ent 
au Rw'ANDA . 
Art i c l e  4 .  
a)  Le s p e rs onn e l s  militaircs f r an9 a i s  m i s  a l a  d i s p o s i t i on du 
Gouvernement de l a  R epubl i qu e  Rwanda is e demeurent s ous ju�idict ion 
' 
f ranc; ai s e . C e s  personn e l s  s ervent s ous l ' un i fo rme rwandais ave c l e  
grade d on t  i l s  s ont t i tulaires ou l e  c as e ch e ant , s on e qu ivalent au 
s e in d e s  Forc e s  Arme e s  Rwand ai s e s .  Leur qual it e d ' A s s i s tants 
T e c hn i qu e s  M i l i t aire s e st mi s e  en eviden c e  par un b a�ge s�e c i f i que 
" COOPERATION rULITAIRE " port e sur la manche g auche de 1 '  uniforme a 
l a  hauteur de 1 '  epau l e .  I l s  ne p �uvent en aucun c as �tre as soc i t� S  a 
l a  preparat i on ou a l ' e xe c�t��td ' op erat ion de gue rre , de maint i cn 
ou de r e t ab l i s s ement d e  l ' o rdre ou de l a  l e gal i t e .  
b )  Les p e rsonne l s  mil i t a ire s f r an<; ais e n  s e rvi c e  dan s  . .  l e s  
F or c e s  Arne e s  Rwand a i s e s  s ont emp l oye s p ar l e  C ommandement Rwand a i s  
s e l on l e s  r e g l e s  t r adit ionne l l e s  · d e  l eur Arme e ou Servic e .  
T out e s  l e s  de c i s i ons l e s  c on c e rn ant s ont port e e s  a l a  c onn aissance 
J �  I 
de l ' Amb ass ade de FRANCE · en Repub l i que Rwand ai s e ; de meme t out e s  d i s ­
p o s i t ions l e s  c oncern an t  pris e s  p ar l e s  aut o r i t & s  fran<; ai s e s  s ont 
p o rt e e s  a la c onn ai s s an c e  d e s  aut o r i t e s  rwand a i s e s .  
c )  I l s  s ont s oumi s aux r e g l e s  d e  l a  d i s c ip l ine generale en 
v igueur dan s  l e s  Forc e s  Arme e s  Rwandais e s  s ous r e s e rve d e s  d i s ­
p o s it i ons inheren t e s  au s t atut qu i e s t  l e  l our d an s  l a  reglemGn tat ion 
f ranc; a is e .  
Art ic l e  5 .  
L e s  p e ine s d i s c i p l inaires eventue l l ement cnc ourues par l e s  
p e r s onne l s  mi l it a ir e s  franq a i s  s ont prononc e e s  p ar l e  C h e f  de l a  
T1i s s i on d I As s i s t an c e  Ih l i  t a ire , s o i  t d e  s on propre che f ' s o i  t a l a  
de mande de s aut o ri t e s  rwand ai s e s  • 
Art i c l e  6 .  
a) Le s infract i o n s  c omm i s e s  p ar l e s pers onne l s  mil itaires 
fran.c; a i s  s ont d e  l a  c o mp e t enc e des aut ori t e s  judic iaires rwandais e s , 
a l ' exc o p t i on de c e l l e s  de c e s  inf rac t ion s qui ont e t e  c ommi ses en 
s e rvi c e  ou a l ' o c c as i o n  du s e rvi c e . Dans c e s  dern iers c as ,  les 
aut eurs de s di t e s  infra c t i on s  s ont r e m i s  a 1 '  Amb a s s adc de FRJ�NCE aux 
f ins d e  rap at r i emcnt . 
. . .  I . . .  
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b )  Les p e r s o nne l s  mil i t a i r e s fran c;: a i s  d e f e r e s  devant l e s  
juridi c t i ons rwandais e s  e t  d ont l a  d & t ent i on e s t  j ug e e  n 6 c e s s aire 
s ont ass ign e s  a r �; s idenc e par l e s  s o  ins e t  s ous l a  r e spons ab ili t e  
d e  1 '  Amb as s ade d e  FRANCE qu i l e s  fait c omp araitre a l a  d e 1nande d e s 
aut ori t e s  j ud i c i a i r e s  c omp e t ente s .  
c )  Le s pers onne l s  mi l it a i res franc;: a i s , c ondamn e s  p ar l e s  
juridict i ons rwand a i s e s  s ont remis a l a  d i spo s i t ion d e  l ' Arnbas s ade . .. . 
de FRANCE pour e t r e  r ap at r i e s ; i l s  ne p euvent en auc ur1 c as faire 
1 '  o b j et d ' une mesur e  de d e t ent ion au RI{ANDA . L e s  p e ine s eventue l l e ­
ment pronconc e e s  s e r ont sub i e s  d an s  un c t ab l i s s ement p enit entiaire 
franc;: ais . 
d )  Les dis p o s i t i on s  d e s  deux d e rn i e r s  p aragraphes s ont 
app lic ab l e s  aux membre s de la farni l l e  du p e r s onne l mil i t aire qui 
r e s ident ave c lui au mJANDA • 
. � Art i c le z .  . .  
Le C h e f  de M i s s i on d ' As s i s tanc e  J.iilit aire peut aut oricer nes · pen;onne l� 
a pr endre les perm i s s ions en c ours de s e ,j our s ous re s e rve d e  
l ' a c c o rd d e s  aut o r i t e s  rwand ai s e s  d ' empl o i .  
;Art i c l e  8 .  
L e  Gouvernement de l a  Repub l i que Fran c;: a i s e  as sure dans l a  
l imit e d e  s e s  moyens l a  forma t i on e t  l e  p e rf e c t i onnement d e  c adr e s  
de s For c e s  Arme e s  Rw�nda is e s  dan s  s e s  e c o l e s  mil i tair e s e t  pr end a 
s a  charge l e s  fra i s  r e su l t an t  du t r ansport du l ,JANJA en FRANCE e t  
r e t our e t  l ' ins truc t i on d e s e l eve s s t agiaire s ,  y c ompr is l e  l o v,emen t , 
l e s  divers frais d ' entre t i en ( b ours e , s o ins de s an t e ,  • • •  ) . 
Les s t ag iaire s rwand ais en FEANC E s ont jmJ t i c i ab l e s  d e s  dis­
p o s i t i o�s analogu e s  a c e l l e s  p r evue s a l ' art i c l e  6 e t  aux p ar agr aphe s 
" b " , " e " , e t  " f" de l ' art ic l e  1 p our l e s  A s s i st ant s I"l i l i t aire s 
Te chn i que s en s e rv i c e  au RvlANDA . 
A:t i c l e  !j .  
Le Gouvernement d e  l a  Repub l i que Rwand ai s e  peut faire app el en 
t an t  que de b e s o in et dans d e s  c o nd it i ons d e f in i e s  d ' un c ommun 
ac c o rd au Gouvernement de l �  Repub l i que Franc;: a i s e  p o ur l ' e n t re t ien 
et l a  f o urniture a t i t r e  gratuit ou onereux de m at e r i e l s  et 
d ' e quipemen t s  m i l i taire s .  
Dans d e s  c ond i t i ons et ab l i e s  d ' un c ommun a c c ord e t  dans l a  l imite de 
ses p o s s ib i l i t e s ,  la Repub l i que Franc;: a i s e  :') ourra c ont r i.bue r  au s ou­
t i en l o gi s t i �ue d e s  F o rc e s  Arme e s  de la Repub l ique Rwanda i s e . 
Le s ruat er i c l s  fourni s 1l t it r e  fr,Tatu i � p "r l a.  FRi>..NCE ne p ourront p as 
et're r e  exp ort e s .  
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Art i c l e  1 0 .  
En vue d ' as sur e r  l a  me i l l � ur e  appl i c at i on d e s  p r o s e n t e s  
d i sp o s it i ons , l e s  p art i e s  c ont r ac t ant e s  ou l eurs repr e s ent ant s  
pro c e d eront a d e s  e c hange s d e  VU G S  r e gul i 0rs . 
L ' examen de s �rob l eme s c oncernant l a  situat i on d e s  p er s onne l s  
m i l i ta ire s fran9 a i s  a u  r egard d e  l e ur s t atut p eut f a i r e  l ' ob j e t  d e  
� i s s ions d e s  aut or i t e s  fran9 a i s e s . L e s  c ond it i on s  d an� I e s que l l e s  
s ' accomp l i s s ent c e s  mi s s i on s  s ent f ixe e s  p ar en t en t e  ontre l e s  d eux 
G o uvernement s .  
En out re p our p e rm e t t r e  l a  c o ordina t i on ct ans l ' execut ion de s 
p ro j e t s  en c ours , une c omm i s s ion t e c hn ique peut e t ie mi s e  sur p i e d  
s o  it a PARIS , s o  i t  a KI GALI a l a  d e mande d e  1 '  une o u  de 1 '  aut re 
p ar t i e  c ont r ac t ant e . C e t t e  c omm i s s ion t e c hn i qu e  se c omp o s e  d e s  
t e chnic iens fran9 a i s  d e s i gn e s  p ar l e s  aut o r it e s  fran 9 ai s e s  
c omp etent e s  e t  de s t o chn i c i e n s  rwanda i s  d e s i gn e s  nar l e  M in i s tre 
Rwand ais de l a  De fens e Nat i ona l e .  · '  
L e s  pro c e s -verb aux de c e s  c ommi s s ions sont c haque f o i s  p art e s  
a l a  c onna i s s an c e  de s part i e s  c ontrac t ant e s .  
Arti c l e  1 1 . 
3 i ' 
Le pre s ent a c c ord a c c ord entre en vigueur l e  • • • • • . . • • . . • . • . . . . .  
I l  e s t  conclu p our une p e r i ode ind e t e rm ine e .  
C h acune d e s  p art i e s p e u t  l e  d enonc e r  ou prop o s er s a  r Pv i s i on 
a t o u t  moment en prev2nant l ' aut re p art i e  d e  s on int ent ion t r o i s  
m o i s  a l ' avance . 
Le pre se nt ac c o rd ab roge e t  r e mp l a c e l ' ac c o rd part i c ul i e r  
d ' A s s i s t anc e I"l i l i t a ire d u  18 Jui l l e t  1 97 5 .  
Pour l e  G ouve rn ei?tcnt d e  l a  
Repub l i qu e  F r an 9 a i s e  
P our l e  G ouvernem2nt de l a  
R ep ub l i qu e  Rwand a i s c  
r 
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AVENANT A L 1ACCORD PARTICULIER D ' ASSISTANCE MILITAIRE 
ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE ET LE 
GO'UVE!lNEMEm DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE SIGNE A KIGALI 
LE 1 8  JUILLET 1 975 
Le Gouvernement de la R6publique Rwanda.ise , d 1une part 
et 
Le Gouvernement de la Rt!ipublique Fran9aise , d 1 iutre part, 
I 
Des�r�. de re�orcer davantage les relations .d ' amiti6 
et de coopt!iration · qui existent entre lee deux pays , plus particuli�rement 
dans le domaine de la coopt!iration militaire J  
CONVIENNENT d ' amender comma suit l ' aooord partioulier d 1 aesis­
tanoe mill taire eignt!i a Kigali ' le 1 8  juillet 1 975 1 
Article premier 
I I A l 'article 1 er; alint!ia A de 1 1aocord particulier d 1assistance, 
11 expression "Les Forces Armees Rwandaises" remplace "La Gendarmerie 
Nationals". 
A 1 1 article 6, l ' expression ''Des Forces Armees Rwanda.ises" 
remplace ''De la Gendarmerie Rwandaise". 
Article 2 
Lee autres termes et conditions dudit accord restent inchangt!is. 
Article :5 
Le present avenant entre en vigueur a sa. signature. Il demeurera 
en vigueur aussi longtemps que l ' acoord partioulier d ' a.ssistance militaire 
du 1 8  juillet demeurera. en vigueur. · 
Fait a Kigali, le. 2 ( f\ (1IJ A � '\  2.. 
En deux exemplaires originaur en · fran9ais. 
POUR LE GOIJVERNEMENT DE 
LA REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE 
� 
NGULINZIRA Bonifaoe 
POUR LE GOlJV'EllNDiENT DE LA REPUBL:7AISE 
�s � 
Mlnistre des A!!aires Etrang�res 
et de la Coop6ration 
Ambaesadeur 
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0 .  : • : 1�.;ilj.n::·.'l..ion in '..i-:·octo <lo:� trr;·upo�� l:tr:'.l '�-.)�1 roc;uli�o ()"..1 non. 
D... ::1osoim u:t'' '<Jl'rliB a 
-.· "mlitiapo pour L."l lli.o 1 ()5rn (2 .000 coupe an noino) .  
-conr;lctar loo n.mitiaco pour loo ll1'00S iD:lividnalleo nu beGOin on pa.ooant 1D.U.rGct 
nont !'0.1' loo !\Wl VOioinn r>rd.o (lU fu.rrl.l"Xla.e 
o .  ;·[•� �.;icj,r.o.tion .:1m: on.1uetoo vio..-u-rt l:.:. :fD..li'o le. lw:ti.l;ro c�-:r ln nm-t t:'�JUicluo G.u 
I:;:eciuont do J.n ;:O:Duhliquo J!uo...""¥hioa ot colui du Du:rumi. 
:--. • Il fc ... �rt ;�-;·�-�:::; .. �i..."":r;.:�.c= fa-.-o:-r� ta1tco lt;:� �ut:oo ��vn.:·:t ln lUc;i-tir.d:tQ do 1� c.,�:..�c: c:.::..Ul r.2:i."A'1 1:1 ��':rr.•.nlc� d.c f'c')On i::. rotou::r-nar 1 1 opinion intonntionalo cm :S:'aveur du  
ot pouvoi.r ropronc'lro 1n coop6ro.tion bilntCralo . Entrotompo la mo.ioon mili tc1.ro <la 
C fJ!"''':"'!�:-:-.�:7. :�0�1 �!t:'·�·f-' ',�0 10�.; .""C '��iO!l:': C-,_� �::.:!C O':.�� � !"10n0� :'\ ;"".i"".:�O f· ·.1.:-o\,1�� .  
,, • · .. 
� :! ··-, .-·-�- ·:�. � -- ··:· � - � r;:�'0 :.�:�:�rj.; :··::::;;.-� .)·�-� � :::� .�;: � ·.� :·:-: .. '::z�' .. l f1 I2WJ1 G'J o .. � t'.f . : (�·)''/!=�� : :: .-c� ·�·:: 
L'�· .: �-� �;�t �: �-_.� o:.: .. :�---. ;.:.,; ::·:,;:.') .. ; ,3cu:r��; (cl.J:- .. oo:-1.-�or-J..i.o) :_;�::.r ttl'lJ '"'c,il;;.'Co �CJ�'Do:·e:.·l .. J � U t<� t'..Cb6i�:.il'l5 
o�_ c.' f<I..�l7-:L. . j)i:: oo;:-;. !Kl"'uito pootoo L 7 fri'-XJ,wmoo ch."'\Ctm ont ot6 o�OI:Xlnt onvoyen 
ro�x: i'r>.cili tor loo con:runioo..tiom ont:i:'O loo UnitOo dG 1n villa e.o n:a.�r I • . -:J. :�  :-:rc-:-�; . . .:'11 "'. .17r-:�'.1� /:.:".1 C. 1 :;�-:x,� .. � t·1r· -:::-r:; Z -�·sto:�"!.o . Il "L'1:.';J:' l:t.o rJ 1 . ......:\ . .:..��".r ... ;or .. t::; � ; c:n c� c •.:. ·<�  !��2 · :  � '  ··.··J·. · · .  (T:""� �·:)C.: c��· · �.::  . . .. :: :�::t.!:-.; :: t�_ ·::.� t�x�·�i.::-:.::.,)3 r:tJL.r;,":_):·r� :J·� )  f'�:i:..'c c: ... .. �o�r�o o�.:c :.zrit< .. : � �� �.-: ::.a�,;·�. "··?:!,� l� ..t.z :::;..·2:1 . . ·· -t-.: �'OtOn) c o:···.oo: .. ;or��.r.�lo n·4.1:: op(�v.. .. Gio:nn 2� co::-x.� . ::"u:io:;1 ,:o bO"�"'Cilel:' 
le:-.; ·:...::o:r.; C:"';u:-;.t"t-101::.; ot d 1 C-c�l.I' ... � lo:; o�i0110 qui ci...�ul.ont o.'tl% c.1ou-;o--:ra do cot 
��CJrt. 
::;n�1r.lO�:rtit-:k� 1 1  D.C1."";.�Q.�_1.i....""'' r: ld nzlj O�.tt""tl '!·r:.U. C.i:Jt)O�O do [;:'r'.ln'1 ! '.O:{Ql1,.'J . r.:arli!:' 
tl.c t�)U c.;_11J/�8 J..1�r.i::;:-:�Jt:.-J . 
c .  Pl�ccr le CO!lto:rto do eo·� to ,'JUCJ."'1.'0 t ... --.::-&3 lo to11!'::J • l.a. [:,"UUrro oara lonc.,"UU . 
d .  Lore dca .  ont:roti01m oui "Vr!.n'to au co-...zro cla!x;Loolo j 'o.i i.miat;6 aur lea oo-tiom � ot a DOytm torae, a:ttmxh�s do la F.rn:.'llO, lo GOntSral Ii'OOm:rl m•a. cl.niror:'amt :tait · con::::!'o::x.l:ro q·uo loo f1il.it..""!iror.1 F:!:'t:-��·lt]:.'.i� ont loo r.-� .... ino et loo piodo lioo pour fuiro 
· �" .. :; i!ri.;..u·""J':.':raon �-'.14'Jlcon.:�"L1D .:;:.1 l�otr•1 :::':�-.;::yz::- � c�wc de l ' ooi1non do:; r..::�din.c q_uo oattl. L: ; · r: D-.m7Jlo r•llo·i;ol:• . :;i :cion n • oat .::·:··.i:t :po-..tt> :rotOLU-�101' 1' iz:nGo du � a l 'oxtOri.o' lo� ro.opOln..;bloo Dilito.iroo ot polit:U1uos du Rtr.:indn ooronf; tonua roaponoo.bleo dOG 
:.Y\.r:-:NJro::-: cor:ni� :-,u ; :-.;rl .. l'x.1r . •  
I 
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n est revenu sur e a  point plusieurs fois . Le gouvernement Fra.n98-is , a:..t-n oomlu 
1" 1 ·-· C:C·"·< ···I''' .,.. . - (, 1 : .. �-C "  .,. e r , .,.,.. .':. C� "' ' 'O'l+ •"i'� .... le-� r.:-,1"' '"' il"' 1 1 ·:')'()' 'U,-,j� j nt"""':l." +·; o  ..,, , n I. • •• · ·- ·  , . . . . •• • ... . •• , ,  • .  · · � -- - �\. - ,l,,.,. · - �  :. . •  • ... · -  � J  � J ·· · � .... 1._ - � · :  . .J· · - ' .. ·�:- · ,.. -.� .�.  .L .. .  �. ,.. 
�: o:·u.� · : ; � 1  �;-:; ;: •.:.i : : . ;  Ge cl0f,;rd<nd� r;��Z 4 L �  C 0:'1i):l,.t c":.no ;::,":di� c o:n::;titu.:3 t!lle urccnce • 
.i.l c onclitionno d ' autros opern.tion."J u1 tiiricuro . D<!c QttC lo contn.ct telephoniqua 
protcjc oera etabli , une appreciation des problemes relates a.u point 3 ai-d.esm 
nnrn n.ffin'io ot oomrotiMie on tenant C0171Jlto do ln pooi tion du �ou'V' �rnornont 
l ' ! · ; ,n•_:: •  i: 1 l ltD' l•)  en1 1 du Hu:.tnill.L .  
5 •  C omlusiono c 
a.. Ces conta.ots m'ont permis . de  sond.er oombien la c�ti<m.militail:'e �. 
est genee de noua expliquecr se. reteln.le en ma.tH:re d' intervention direct par aom: 
de solidarite a 1 1 opinitn polit�ue Europeonne et Americaine . 
b .  Lea assa.ia de relance de media.tiaation fait a Paris par 'la. oelJ.ule du CoJ. 
lJTAliO:BALI que j 'ai enrichie J?etr les articles ci-e.nnexes sont a stimul.er et 
rr:n:[o:rc or . A e o  ouj ot , il lll"GO d. 1y d.apochor un Q.ttac M do prcoso it la l1..:"1.utour de 
b. :::ihtD.tion. Soi�nor dn.vantn(."' 1 ' i�� du pv;yn a 1 1 oxtcrieur c onotitue una des 
IJriori too a lill Pl'.!J pordre de vue .  
c .  Le::; 2 aiJ:;.:aroiln t<.Jla:r-honiqv.e o que j ' n.pporte doVTa.ient nous aider a sort:U- de 
1 1 ico18mont via a vis de 1 1 etrunuoer .  
d .  Le c omit6 c onnultn.ti:O' de crioe devrait cpauler da\lu.ntage l 'autorite po1itico­
mi1H.:-.ire pox deG r.r�:;-os:!. ti0BScomertees allo.nt mcme au deli du court torme • 
!1'· • 
e ;  Lea amis contaetes noua oonaeillent de :f'a.ire un effort poor Jnettre a lc�OCVl41 
dea equipes S.l.tX: effeoti:f'a redui ta pour sa'hoter les a.rri�ee d.e l 'Eni et 'brieer 
D..ilmi r�on elan . 
f' .  IJ. est a reill<U'qu.er tant du c ote .Be1ge que du cote de la .Fra.n:;e , l 'hesitation 
d1 envoyer to·lls les atB8iaires au Rwanda .tnSme oeux pour qui les oours � 
f'in au. debut d.e juille't 94. 
6• Une visite de hc1.ut niveau politiquo pour:rait trlioux. cadrer lea orientations et 
les actions attendues . 
RWABALDIDA Ephre.m 
Lt C ol m! 
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Security Council resolution, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, 
authorizing Member States to conduct a multinational operation for 
humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to 
strength . ... 
S/RES/929 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ,  22 June 1 994 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situ­
ation in Rwanda, in particular its resolutions 9 1 2  ( 1 994) 
of 21 April 1 994, 9 1 8  ( 1 994) of 17 May 1 994 and 925 
( 1 994) of 8 June 1 994, which set out the mandate and 
force level of the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwand.1, 
Determined to contribute to the resumption of the 
process of political settlement under the Arusha Peace 
Agreement, 11 and encouraging the Secretary-General 
and his Special Representative for Rwanda to continue 
and redouble their efforts at the national, regional and 
international levels to promote these objectives, 
Stressing the importance of the cooperation of all 
parties for the fulfilment of the objectives of the United 
Nations in Rwanda, 
Having considered the letter from the Secretary­
General dated 1 9  June 1 994, 2/ 
Taking into account the time needed to gather the 
necessary resources for the effective deployment of the 
Mission, as expanded in resolutions 9 1 8  ( 1 994) and 925 
( 1 994) ,  
Noting the offer by Member States to  cooperate with 
the Secretary-General towards the fulfilment of the ob­
jectives of the United Nations in Rwanda, 3/ and stressing 
the strictly humanitarian character of this operation, 
which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral 
fashion and shall not constitute an interposition force 
between the parties, 
Welcoming the cooperation between the United Na­
tions, the Organization of African Unity and neighbour­
ing States to bring peace to Rwanda, 
Deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic 
and widespread killings of the civilian population in 
Rwanda, 
Recognizing that the current situation in Rwanda 
constitutes a unique case which demands an urgent re­
sponse by the international community, 
Determining that the magnitude of the humanita­
rian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and 
security in the region, 
1 .  Welcomes the letter dated 1 9  June 1 994 from 
the Secretary-General, 2/ and agrees that a multinational 
operation may be set up for humanitarian purposes in 
� -.�.;. 
Rwanda unril the United Nations Assistance Mission[�� 
Rwanda is brought up to the necessary strength; ��F "'i\i··· · 2. Welcomes also the offer by Member States 3iw. 
cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to ach!_e;t·� 
the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda throU8Jl': 
the establishment of a temporary operation under Ji1�':­
tional command and control aimed at contributing, iti'il{: 
impartial way, to the security and protection of displaticf •, 
persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, on'd;e· ·  
understanding that the costs o f  implementing the'o£lct 
will be borne by the Member States concerned; . :t..1.!'�: 
3 .  Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter· ' 
United Nations, authorizes the Member States COI:>��ra"f. 
ing with the Secretary-General to conduct the nn.�r�IN"M 
referred to in paragraph 2 above using all ne,ceSllai'l'�; 
means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set . 
paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 925 ( 1  
4 .  Decides that the mission of  Member 
operating with the Secretary-General will be 
period of two months following the adoption _.,�.-..,..� 
present resolution, unless the S 
mines at an earlier date that the expanded United 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda is able to carry 
mandate; 
5. Commends the offers already made by 
States of troops for the expanded Mission; 
6. Calls upon all Member States to 
gently to the Secretary-General's request for r� .. O\lt��··· 
including logistical support, in order to enable_' 
panded Mission to fulfil its mandate effectively 
as possible, and requests the Secretary-General . .  
and coordinate the supply of the essential 
required by troops committed to the expanded . 7. Welcomes, in this respect, the offers 
made by Member States of equipment for troop . .  
tors to the Mission, and calls on other Member 
11 Peace Agreement between _the Government of the 
Republic and the Rwandese Patnonc Fr�nt, s1gned at1 Republic of Tanzama, on 4 August 1 99.,; see Offtaa 
Securtty Council, Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for . 
vember and December 1 993 , document S/26915.  
2/ Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-ninth 
plement for April, May and June 1 9 94, document S/1 
3/ Official Records of the Security Council, 
plement for Apnl. May and June 1 994, document 
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